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1
Introduction
In May 2013 a young man called Michael Adebolajo, London-born and of  Christian 
Yoruba background, hacked a soldier to death with a cleaver, in broad daylight, 
outside the military barracks in Woolwich, southeast London. He did this in the 
name of Islam, to which religion he had converted some years before. When he was 
charged in court a week later, he brandished a Koran and shouted Allahu  akbar! to 
underscore the point, and likewise his accomplice, another young man of similar 
background. The incident was shocking enough in itself, to people of all religions 
and ethnicities, though it was not unthinkable, as it would have been a few years 
earlier. It led to a range of what are, by now, fairly predictable public  responses, 
ranging from the criminal and disgraceful, such as retaliatory attacks on mosques, 
to the evasive and implausible, such as the insistence of Muslim  leaders and some 
others that the attack “had nothing to do with Islam.”
No doubt the backstories to this incident—the preconditions that we need 
to know to make it rightly intelligible in all its detail—ramify so widely in time 
and space as to pass beyond the bounds of any final understanding of what hap-
pened. In the main, they are stories of movement and change, and stories that 
serve to connect people and religion. If we start from the Yoruba background of 
the perpetrator, there has been for decades a large-scale migration of Yoruba to 
London. It goes back to the 1950s—a time bright with the prospect of Nigerian 
 independence—when the migrants’ main motive was to gain qualifications to 
enhance their life chances when they returned home. A good majority of them 
were already Christians when they came, and their migration was grounded in a 
process of social transformation that already went back for more than a century. A 










































the other half becoming Muslim. “Conversion” was never a narrowly religious 
process, for it went with the adoption of a whole complex of values: education as a 
key to personal and communal advancement, progress and prosperity, modernity.
Over the years the Yoruba have grown to become the largest single African-
heritage group in London. They have brought with them the whole spectrum of 
their rich associational life, including a great variety of churches, among which 
Pentecostalism now bulks large. At the same time, they have become socially dif-
ferentiated in British terms, ranging from a substantial professional stratum to a 
mass of middle- and lower-income folk, mostly concentrated in a broad swath of 
south London stretching from Brixton to Thamesmead. Some of their children 
(to the anxiety of their parents) were drawn into the multicultural lifeworld of 
inner-city youth, with its linkages to delinquency, drugs, and gang violence. A 
measure of disaffection from mainstream society and its institutions was fueled by 
the experience of racism, especially at the hands of the police.
Among the various forms that disaffection may take, radical Islam has emerged 
as an option attracting young men from diverse cultural origins. Though Adebolajo 
came from a solid family background and was popular at school, he went through 
a period of teenage alienation in which he was involved in petty crime (dealing 
in marijuana, stealing mobile phones, etc.) before becoming a Muslim at the age 
of sixteen, to the dismay of his Christian family. The bitter irony of his having 
adopted a violently jihadist form of Islam is that Yoruba Islam is not at all like 
this. In Yorubaland, Islam and Christianity, although rivals, coexist peaceably 
within a framework of shared community values, in marked contrast to the situ-
ation in Northern Nigeria, where a jihadist tradition has contributed to a pat-
tern of endemic religious violence whose most recent manifestation is the militant 
Islamist organization known as Boko Haram. Paradoxically, if Adebolajo’s own 
background had been Muslim rather than Christian, he would probably have been 
less susceptible to jihadism, since he would have lacked the incentive to that self-
proving extremism that is so commonly a mark of the convert. Yet in the end, his 
Yoruba or Nigerian background is less relevant to what he became—he might as 
easily have been Jamaican or Ghanaian—than certain conditions provided by the 
worlds of multicultural London and of global Islam.
The Islamist group that played the prime role in radicalizing Adebolajo was a 
later-banned organization called Al-Muhajiroun. Its name (The Emigrants) alludes 
to an epochal event in early Islamic history, the Prophet’s withdrawal (hijra) with a 
group of companions from Mecca to Medina in 622. The contemporary sources of 
Muslim anger (colonialism, the Israeli occupation of the West Bank, the invasion 
of Afghanistan, etc.) were thus configured in terms of a long-span vision of Islam’s 
history that also yields precedents for action. The most consequential hijra in West 
African history was surely that of Shaykh Usman dan Fodio in 1804, which led to 
the launching of the jihad that established the Sokoto Caliphate and that has deeply 
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shaped the politicoreligious order of Northern Nigeria ever since. Though religious 
traditions (which include much more than what is in their scriptures) are capacious 
and multivocal, they still give a strong cultural steer to the actions and aspirations 
of their adherents. This occurs not automatically but through a complex, two-way 
exchange between the messages of the tradition and the pressures of the contexts 
in which believers turn to it for guidance. So debates among Muslims about the 
import of their faith are, from an anthropological perspective, directly constitutive 
of it. At the same time, where grievances arising in a specific context are articulated 
through the lens of a world religion, connections are necessarily made across large 
gulfs of time and space. The full explication of what happened on 22 May 2013 thus 
points toward an analysis that is both comparative and historical.
• • •
The story just told has touched on many of the general themes of this book: re-
ligious conversion, new movements in Islam and Christianity, relations between 
world religions, the conditions of religious violence or amity, the transnational 
flows of contemporary religion, the interplay between tradition and the demands 
of an ever-changing present. The people at the center of the story are the Yoruba of 
southwestern Nigeria, who are also the starting point for the various comparative 
forays, both internal and external, that are undertaken in the course of it. They are 
the second largest language group (over 35 million) in Nigeria and are concentrat-
ed in its most developed region, Lagos and its hinterland, reaching some two hun-
dred miles into the interior. Before their incorporation into the colonial state, they 
formed a cluster of a few dozens of mostly small kingdoms or city-states, among 
which a few larger ones achieved periods of wider regional domination, notably 
Oyo (up to ca. 1830) and its principal successor state, Ibadan. The name Yoruba 
came into currency as a self-designation only in the late nineteenth century, but 
there is no reason to doubt a good measure of cultural continuity between today’s 
Yoruba and the culture of classical Ife (fl. 11th–16th centuries), known for its mag-
nificent bronzes. Ife (which Yoruba have also seen as the site of their cosmogony) 
is powerfully evoked in the myths of the orisa (deities), who are the centerpiece of 
their traditional religion.
For over four hundred years the Yoruba have straddled two geocultural spheres, 
one reaching north over the Sahara to the world of Islam, the other linking them 
via the Atlantic to the Euro-American world. Besides their trade networks, these 
two external spheres were the source of contrasting cultural influences, notably 
those emanating from the world religions (Islam probably going back at least to 
the seventeenth century, Christianity to the mid-nineteenth). Since it was only in 
the late 1930s that these religions, taken together, came to command the allegiance 
of a majority of Yoruba, there is the unusual theoretical bonus that we can com-










































Islam and Christianity but have also exported their own orisa religion to the New 
World. Besides the voluntary modern diaspora that has created Yoruba commu-
nities in London and elsewhere in Euro-America, there was an earlier involun-
tary diaspora, reaching its peak in the second quarter of the nineteenth century, 
which took tens of thousands of them as slaves to the New World, and with them 
orisa religion. Ironically, the internal disruption that fueled those wars of enslave-
ment also contributed to the spread of Islam and Christianity among the Yoruba 
at home. The intertwined character of the three religions in Yorubaland and the 
dense imbrication of religion in all other aspects of its history are what this book 
sets out to explore.
• • •
The research on which this book is based goes back now over half a century, to 
when I first went to Nigeria, in 1964. The five chapters of Part I are revised ver-
sions of papers published between 1987 and 2009, while those of Part II all largely 
depend on research done since 2008, were written as a set, and appear here for 
the first time. Part II deals largely with Islam and the contemporary situation, but 
so much of the ground for it was laid in the earlier papers that it made for greater 
completeness and coherence in the collection as a whole for them to be  included. 
All the chapters are strongly comparative in their approach. Their  thematic 
 sequence bears the traces of an interlinked double history, between how the reli-
gious scene in Yorubaland and Nigeria at large has evolved since the 1960s, and 
how its study has developed. Of course these two strands do not move in lockstep: 
apart from the inevitable time lag between social reality and its representation, 
or between history as lived and history as written, the study of Nigerian religion 
has been shaped by currents in African studies at large, as well as by intellectual 
trends grounded outside Africa altogether. It is almost normal that a research 
 project of any duration—from its conception through research and writing to final 
 publication—will be framed in one social and intellectual context and find itself 
concluded in another; and will so bear the traces of its own history.
Fifty years ago Nigeria was coming to the end of the first flush of its postcolo-
nial existence, and my first book, Aladura (1968), being a study of independent 
churches that emerged in the midcolonial period, fitted in with the nationalist 
zeitgeist. Such churches were often placed within a larger literature on supposedly 
similar movements in other colonial settings—cargo cults, millennial and “revital-
ization” movements, and so forth—that saw them as “religions of the oppressed” or 
applied a Marxist schema that viewed them as the immature precursors of a politi-
cal nationalism that would supersede them.1 Closer analysis, however, led me to 
see the Aladura rather differently: “nationalist” in being a self-directed African ini-
tiative, but one addressed to practical and existential problems that arose from the 
encounter between two religions and cultures under specific colonial conditions.
4    Introduction










































What followed on from Aladura was strongly shaped by the review essay of it 
written by Robin Horton, which branched out from appreciation through critique 
to develop a general and influential theory of African conversion.2 Horton’s theory 
treated both colonialism and the world religions as merely catalysts of a process 
of cognitive adjustment grounded in indigenous terms. Its clarity and generaliz-
ability allowed the theory to be greatly taken up, applied, confirmed, rebutted, or 
qualified over the next twenty years. But religious change tends to be a very multi-
dimensional process, and there were important aspects that his theory neglected 
or underplayed. To draw these out, comparison was an essential instrument. I had 
previously made use of internal Yoruba comparison to throw light on the spatial 
patterns of conversion within Yorubaland, and now I used an external comparison 
to test his theory.3 This took two polities, the Ijebu-Yoruba and the better-known 
case of Buganda in East Africa, which both experienced mass conversion move-
ments in the 1890s. What that comparison showed was that beneath considerable 
surface differences were linkages of conditions and outcomes similar to those that 
Horton had proposed. But a more searching comparison, one that would not just 
confirm the theory as far as it went but drive the analysis of religious change for-
ward on a broader front, would need to be one where the conditions specified by 
the theory went with divergent outcomes. Such appeared to be the case when the 
Yoruba were compared with the Akan of southern Ghana.
That paper appears below as chapter 1: “History, Culture and the Comparative 
Method: A West African Puzzle.” The puzzle was defined as such within the terms 
of Horton’s theory. Since the relevant conditions, of increase in social scale, were 
equally present in both societies, why was the patterning of conversion over time 
so different, with the Yoruba being precocious and the Akan tardy? My answer 
was that this needed to be explained by a factor that lies quite outside the terms 
of the theory, namely the role of religion in a society’s political integration. Now, 
there was produced in the 1960s and 1970s a substantial literature on the condi-
tions of political centralization in precolonial West African kingdoms. This had its 
theoretical roots in a genre of regional comparative studies that had grown up in 
British social anthropology since the 1940s and had led to a revival of interest in 
the “comparative method” as a distinctive feature of anthropology. But there was 
inadequate recognition that comparison had been practiced in a number of very 
different modes and that hardly anyone (except Radcliffe-Brown) was still attached 
to the classic comparative method that nineteenth-century social theorists had 
advocated. The ahistorical character of most anthropological comparison became 
a problem when the work on West African kingdoms required a measure of con-
vergence between anthropology and history. For there was still a strong penchant 
to discount cultural factors (including religion) and to look for social-structural 
or technoecological factors to explain variations between kingdoms. Since the for-










































only circular explanations. But culture is the way that the past of a society reaches 
into its present, to continuously inform the choices and actions through which 
social forms are realized. Akan/Asante and Yoruba each derived from their pasts a 
view of what mattered to them, to which what we may call “religion” was integral; 
and this underlay their differential responses to the challenge presented by the 
world religions. What this perspective allows us to address is something neglected 
in Horton’s very “cool” view of religious change—as a process of cognitive adjust-
ment to change in the conditions of social life—namely as a “hot” process often 
attended by passion, conflict, and violence.
This argument, without doubt, was speculative, because our factual knowledge 
of West African religions as historical entities is so patchy and limited. So with 
the aim of developing it through a substantial comparative study of religion in the 
forest kingdoms of precolonial West Africa (Oyo, Asante, Dahomey, and Benin), 
I thought I had better begin by getting a better picture of Yoruba religion itself. 
So I embarked on an exhaustive reading of what is by far the richest documen-
tary source, the archive of the Church Missionary Society (CMS), an evangelical 
Anglican body that started its Yoruba operations in the 1840s. Over several years 
this led to a displacement of my original objective, as I came to write a detailed 
account of the encounter between evangelical Christianity and the Yoruba when 
their indigenous orisa religion was still absolutely predominant.4
As historians tend to appreciate better than anthropologists, theoretical objec-
tives have to be adjusted to what the source material makes possible. Yet a theoreti-
cal thrust can still make itself felt, even though it may entail brushing against the 
grain of the evidence. I wanted to tell as much as possible a Yoruba story, a story 
with a Yoruba starting point and the story of an African initiative in religion (as 
Aladura had been), even though the evidence was almost entirely derived from 
missionary reports. So it was a great help that so much of this material—as well as 
the greatest literary achievement of the mission, Samuel Johnson’s History of the 
Yorubas—had been written by the African agents of the CMS. Even so, in the writ-
ing of Religious Encounter and the Making of the Yoruba the greatest challenge was 
not to give an adequate account of the encounter itself but to avoid anachronism in 
reconstructing what orisa religion had been at the first point of encounter and to 
be especially careful in doing what is very hard to avoid, namely filling the gaps in 
the evidence from what “traditional” religion had subsequently come to be. What 
we too readily forget is that “tradition” itself is subject to change. Chapters 2 and 3 
deal with the two sides of the encounter.
Chapter 2 follows on directly from chapter 1 in that it involves a comparison 
between the pioneer local historians of the same two societies: Samuel Johnson of 
the Yoruba and C. C. Reindorf of Akan/Asante. As a comparison it is uneven, since 
it is much more a study of the making of Johnson as a historian, beside whom 
Reindorf stands mainly as a foil. So the play of resemblance and contrast, which is 
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the essence of comparison, is used more for expository than explanatory purposes. 
Its aim is to bring out the singularity of Johnson’s achievement, in transmuting his 
social experience so as to produce the extraordinary work that came to play such 
a large role in forming modern Yoruba identity.
Chapter 3 is complementary to chapter 2, since it is a sample analysis of the 
other side of the equation, namely what Johnson, as a Christian missionary, pitched 
himself against. Yet it would have been impossible to write without the evidence 
about nineteenth-century life, especially the worship of the deities (orisa), that 
Johnson and his colleagues provided in their journals. Its subject, Ogun, the god 
of iron, was arguably the most extensively worshipped of the quite small number 
of truly pan-Yoruban deities. The argument is built around two axes of compari-
son. The first contrasts different regions of Yorubaland, showing that the worship 
of particular orisa varied from one region to another; and the second compares 
Ogun and other orisa, showing that many of their functions and attributes were 
not stable but variable between one orisa and another. The paradox here is that, 
though Johnson and his fellow Yoruba clergy subscribed strongly to the idea of 
an essential Yoruba unity—evident in the standard form of the language that they 
actively promoted and the legend of common descent from Ife as “the cradle of the 
race,” which they accepted as historical truth—their concrete observations, taken 
in the aggregate, tend to undermine it. We are left with a picture of “Yoruba tradi-
tional religion” as a dynamic entity, with fluid and malleable deities, less a single 
religion than a spectrum of local cult complexes.
With chapters 4 and 5 we come forward in time, both in the real time of the 
events and in the time of writing. They stand loosely together, for they both focus 
on Pentecostalism, but their approaches differ according to the logic of the com-
parison that they employ. Both were commissioned for conferences dealing with 
wider-than-African themes, so the consideration of Yoruba matters is subsumed 
within a wider theoretical or thematic framework. As in chapter 1, the argument of 
chapter 4 is driven by a theory-led contrast, this time Harvey Whitehouse’s distinc-
tion between two modes of religiosity, which he terms “imagistic” and “ doctrinal.”5 
These depend on two contrasting forms of memory by which religions may per-
petuate themselves but that are variably present in particular cases. Since this 
model is abstracted from the contrast between the indigenous religions of Papua 
New Guinea and mission Christianity, its relevance to the situation of West Africa 
is obvious. And since as a model it is abstract, it allows us in principle to make 
comparisons between religions in many other situations, such as between differ-
ent indigenous cults or religions, or different forms of world religion. Chapter 4 
applies it across the long span of Yoruba religious forms, from those of the orisa 
to Aladura and contemporary Pentecostalism, finding that the success of the latter 
can be seen in terms of how Pentecostalists are able to combine elements of both 










































Chapter 5, by contrast, takes off from an empirical comparison—between the 
post-Soviet and the postcolonial African worlds—and so follows a more open and 
exploratory path.6 It opens with the unlikely story of an Ijebu-Yoruba founding 
the largest Pentecostal church in the Ukraine—which prompts us to ask: What it is 
about Pentecostalism and the present global conjuncture that makes such an out-
come possible? The argument proceeds by a series of ad hoc but strategic compari-
sons: between the articulations of religion and polity in the two regions; between 
different former colonial regimes in Africa in terms of their propensity to adopt 
socialist solutions to their problems after independence; and among the three 
African regimes (Benin, Mozambique, and Ethiopia) that claimed to be Marxist-
Leninist. It culminates in an analysis of how Pentecostalism gained massively after 
the fall of these regimes at the end of the 1980s and why it has such appeal in the 
neoliberal world order.
• • •
Part II, like Part I, opens with a chapter of much wider scope, which sets out the 
theoretical basis for the empirical studies that follow. Whereas the chapters of Part I 
mostly compare contexts (societies, regions, states, etc.) to clarify the conditions 
under which religions—chiefly forms of Christianity—gain support or take on a 
particular character, in Part II the main logic of comparison is reversed:  Christianity 
and Islam are compared within a single setting, first Yorubaland and then Nigeria 
as a whole. And while in the papers of Part I comparison is mainly an analytical 
instrument of the observer, in Part II it also comes into the picture as part of what is 
observed, namely as a key aspect of the interaction between the two religions.
Islam got all too short shrift in the earlier papers. While this might be consid-
ered venial in an author whose main interest has been on Yoruba Christianity, it 
also reflects a serious weakness in the literature on modern Yoruba religion as a 
whole. There has never been a serious in-depth anthropological study of Yoruba 
Islam and virtually the only historical study appeared over thirty years ago.7 
References to Yoruba Muslims in writing on modern politics are quite frequent 
but brief, and the specific character of Yoruba Islam gets little detailed attention. 
For that, one has to turn to scholars grounded in religious or Islamic studies. As 
academic disciplines these tend to be very distinct, with the former mainly the 
province of non-Muslims, the latter of Muslims—a division unfortunately now 
solidified in the organization of Nigerian universities.8 Much of the research pro-
duced in the latter has a strong literary or philological bent, though it also contains 
very useful material on Islamic movements, aspects of Muslim religious life, and 
the intellectual concerns of the ulama. There is much of value in Ph.D. theses, 
particularly from the Arabic and Islamic Studies Department at Ibadan, but these 
nearly all remain unpublished. In 2008 and 2009, I undertook six months’ field-
work, mainly collecting local documentary materials and conducting interviews 
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with Yoruba Muslims. I found myself on a steep learning curve. In the comparative 
chapters that follow, I have tried to give particular attention to Islam in order to do 
something to even up the coverage that the two religions have received in the past.
Chapter 6 picks up from where the argument of chapter 1 ended, with its plea, 
against the dominant tendency in social anthropology, for a mode of comparison 
that takes seriously the fact that societies have histories, meaning that they are 
shaped by the reach of the past into the present that we call culture. Now, the 
world religions may be seen as an ideal terrain for exploring this, with their richly 
documented histories and their realization in so many culturally diverse settings. 
Yet anthropology was slow to study them and slower to attempt any theorization 
of them as objects of study. Eventually this got under way not at a generic level 
but rather as a series of religion-specific initiatives, hardly connected with one 
another: an anthropology of Islam started to emerge in the 1970s,9 then Buddhism 
and Hinduism,10 and last of all Christianity. Chapter 6 argues that these need to be 
brought together in a common comparative framework, not just because of their 
close coexistence in today’s world but because they present common analytical 
problems. The main one is how to treat the characteristic features of religion X 
without defining it in terms of a single set of enduring attributes (an “essence”) that 
is held to underlie all its manifestations. I argue that we can avoid this through a 
notion of tradition, which reciprocally interacts with the contexts through which 
it passes over time and by which it is simultaneously reproduced and transformed.
The extended comparison of Christianity and Islam as they have developed in 
the one Yoruba context, which follows in chapters 7–9, shows this in operation. 
These three chapters, all covering roughly the same time span, explore from differ-
ent angles the complex patterns of convergence and divergence that have played 
out between Muslims and Christians over the long twentieth century. The Yoruba 
context was not, of course, historically static, but a large component of it, a nexus 
of values built round the notion of community, did serve to connect the Yoruba 
to a sense of their own past—and not least to certain aspects of their “traditional” 
orisa religion, which overall they were in the process of abandoning.
Chapter 7 thus begins by analyzing the process of conversion to the world reli-
gions. It goes on to examine how the new potential for religious conflict that they 
brought was checked by strongly held community values, and how each commu-
nity of faith still drew on its inherited cultural template to realize itself institution-
ally in the Yoruba setting. Yet Yoruba religious amity is to be seen not as a time-
less cultural absolute but as always needing to be worked at; and at times it has 
come under strain. This showed above all in the sphere of modern politics, which 
initially was dominated by Christians, because of their higher level of education. 
The significant measure of Muslim disaffection that had emerged by the 1980s 
has since receded, as the Yoruba default system was restored, and the Muslim/










































Chapter 8 turns to a countertendency that arises from the cultural trajecto-
ries inherent in each religion’s history. Staring from a baseline around 1870, when 
Islam was widely seen as much better adapted to Yoruba culture than Christianity 
was, I draw a systematic contrast between the Christian project of inculturation 
or Africanization, and the Muslim “Reformist” project, which tended toward 
the adoption of a more universalizing form of Islam. The outcome has been that 
Muslims are now more likely than Christians to set themselves off from previously 
shared Yoruba attributes by adopting marks of religious distinctiveness. The acme 
of this, Sharia law, adumbrates the possibility of further cultural divergence, but 
it remains unappealing to the great mass of Yoruba Muslims and an unrealizable 
objective in the foreseeable future.
At the same time, this divergent tendency is checked by a counterforce that 
fosters convergence, which paradoxically has its roots in the very fact of the com-
petition between the two religions. Since the Yoruba religious field is like a mar-
ketplace with potential converts as consumers, local criteria of religious value will 
tend to prevail, giving the rival faiths a strong incentive to borrow effective ele-
ments from each other. Chapter 9 traces this process over time, noting shifts in 
the direction and content of the borrowing that has taken place. Since the rise of 
neo-Pentecostalism since the 1980s, influence has flowed mainly from Christianity 
to Islam, evoking a range of Muslim responses, of which the most notable has been 
Nasfat, the largest new movement in Yoruba Islam. Yet again there is a check: 
the market model, while illuminating, is itself limited by constraints arising from 
within the distinctive traditions of each faith.
In chapters 10 and 11, the geographical focus is expanded, first to Nigeria at 
large and then beyond Africa. Chapter 10 examines critically the claim that 
Pentecostalism has its mirror image in “fundamentalist” Islam, or Salafism. For 
comparative purposes the argument moves from Yorubaland, where Pentecostalism 
is strong, Salafism weak, and interfaith relations peaceable, to Northern Nigeria, 
where Salafism is strong and interfaith conflict has been acute and often violent. 
I argue that, despite some formal resemblances, their ethos and historical trajec-
tories have little in common and have very different implications for the Nigerian 
public sphere. The argument is clinched by a comparative reading of two recent 
histories by Yoruba authors—a Pentecostal view of Nigerian Christianity and a 
Salafist one of Nigerian Islam—which brings out how radically divergent are the 
conceptions of state, nation, and culture promoted by the two traditions.
An irony of Yoruba religion today is that whereas the orisa cults in Nigeria 
itself (Circle 1, the historical baseline) are deep in decline, eclipsed by the two 
Abrahamic faiths that demonize them (Circle 2), orisa religion in the New World 
(Circle 3) is flourishing and spreading. Yet the two sets of phenomena, of interest 
to different bodies of scholars (and believers), have been studied largely in isola-
tion from each other—which chapter 11, in a very preliminary way, attempts to 
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rectify. I conclude with reflections on the cross-pressures of re-Africanization and 
universalization evident in Circle 3, as phenomena of religious globalization.
• • •
The essays are linked not just by their Yoruba point of reference but by their com-
mitment to comparison as a tool of analysis. It is odd that comparativism has had 
such a faltering, on-and-off presence in the history of anthropology, granted that 
the “comparative method” was virtually its founding charter.11 But it came to be 
widely seen as an embarrassment, whether because of its link with a discredited 
unilinear evolutionism, or because its generalizations failed the test of evidence, 
or because it seemed wedded to a scientific program too exclusively positivist. 
The well-worn antinomies of nomothetic (generalizing) vs. idiographic (particu-
larizing) or of causalistic vs. hermeneutic analysis have given rise too readily to 
an overlimited view of the possibilities of comparison. If the blind trial of a newly 
developed drug in medical research may be taken as a kind of gold standard in 
the use of comparison to test causal relations, the social sciences can still go some 
way to emulate this within the limits of what is practicable for their subject mat-
ter, as with the statistical analysis of large data sets used in the study of social 
mobility. These are theory-led inquiries, which are made easier if the data can be 
“constructed” in a controlled way, as when informants are questioned. But even 
when these strict conditions cannot be met, the same logic underlies more infor-
mal and open-ended comparisons. Historians (and to a large extent anthropolo-
gists) have to work with the evidence as they find it, and their comparisons mostly 
arise from given circumstances, such as a historic path not taken, the contrast with 
a neighbor, the divergent actions of two groups within a nation or region, and so 
forth. Such comparisons are often ad hoc, made within the flow of a narrative and 
various in their aims: to bring to light new factors, to clarify or rule out causal 
hunches, to give a sharper definition to probable connections. And moving right 
away from positivistic or cause-seeking conceptions of the comparative method, 
what could be more essentially comparative than translation between languages, 
the very germ of hermeneutics?12
Comparison is in fact so basic to human beings’ engagement with the world in 
which they live that it is as integral to mundane, practical reasoning as in its more 
formalized and systematic applications. It is at least implicitly present whenever 
there are choices to be faced. It belongs as much to pensée sauvage as to scientific 
inquiry, as much to the moral as to the cognitive options that human beings face. 
For wherever it is applied, comparison implies difference, and so opens up a range 
of possibilities for seeing the world and for living life differently. Few subjects take 
us more directly to comparison in social practice than those treated in this book, 
such as conversion from one faith to another and the interaction between religions. 










































and a deeper and more systematic pursuit of the same activity, albeit from a more 
detached subject position, than those engaged in the practical comparison of reli-
gions can usually manage. It thus has the potential to flow across from the study 
of the social processes of religion in history to a real-life engagement with them.
In the five or so years that this book has been in the writing, violent Islamism 
has shot up the register of public attention, in Nigeria as in the rest of the world, 
and this is reflected in the content of its later chapters. It seems fair to say that 
much more discussion, at least in the West, has been given to how to control it 
than to understand what gives rise to it. As to the latter, there are diametrically 
opposed opinions, with It’s nothing to do with Islam and That’s the way that Islam is 
at the extremes. Comparison can release us from these hopeless polarities, because 
it opens up a wider range of possibilities and enables us to choose between them. 
And here there is a way for Nigeria not just to address its own agony over Boko 
Haram but to serve a wider purpose, since it furnishes two sharply contrasting 
cases—Yorubaland and the North—that suggest two broad conditions for the 
absence or presence of religious violence, which have their analogues in many 
other situations. The first is sociological: the crosscutting of communal and reli-
gious ties (universal in Yorubaland, much rarer in the North), which greatly raises 
the cost of religious violence and so reduces its incidence. The second is cultural: 
the virtual absence from Yorubaland of a jihadist tradition, such as had such has a 
strong presence within Northern Islam.13
In general, we are much more inhibited about probing the cultural than the 
social conditions of Islamist violence, whether because we feel it is politically inex-
pedient,14 or because we wish to avoid essentializing Islam, or because we don’t 
want to be accused of Islamophobia. That perhaps explains the very circumspect 
tone in which Michael Cook argues that the exceptional degree of Islam’s engage-
ment in modern politics, compared with other religions, has clear roots in its 
heritage, going right back to the teaching and example of its Prophet.15 Violence 
as such, except implicitly under the headings of jihad and warfare, does not figure 
saliently in his analysis, though it is the inescapable concomitant of any attempt 
to turn a confessional community into a state, as the Prophet and his successors 
set out to do; and the Prophet was not squeamish in endorsing violence when he 
thought it justified.16 Cook’s compelling case for the capacity of Islam for politi-
cal mobilization rests primarily on his mastery of the foundational texts of Islam 
and of works by later Muslim scholars, in relation to the course of Islamic his-
tory as informed by them; but it is strengthened by a systematic comparison with 
Hinduism in India and Catholicism in Latin America, where he finds this capacity 
lacking. His conclusion is carefully balanced: “no [religion’s] heritage is a reliable 
predictor of the behaviour of those who inherit it, but just as surely heritages are 
not interchangeable.”17 The implication is that while a religion’s tradition can be 
powerfully constrained by any fresh context in which it is realized, it still makes 
12    Introduction










































some responses to fresh contexts more or less likely than others; and that produces 
what we regard as the typical features of that religion in practice. But here a limita-
tion arising from the broad scope of Cook’s book shows itself. Because he has to 
compare the religions in the different regions of the world where they have been 
dominant, there can be little contextual overlap (except to a degree in South Asia) 
between the three cases. This means that the power of comparison cannot be fully 
brought to bear on the crucible where religions are at their most concrete, the 
social contexts where traditions prove themselves. The sparrow hawk coursing the 
hedgerows is closer to its quarry than the eagle scanning the ideological terrain 
from on high. So I offer a historical anthropology of a context where Islam and 
Christianity both coexist and interact with each other: the exemplary Yoruba, who 






History, Culture, and the 
 Comparative Method 
A West African Puzzle
At the most general level, comparison is not a special method or in any way unique 
to anthropology.1 Comparison is implicit in any method of deriving understanding 
through explanation—that is, by determining the sufficient and necessary conditions 
for the existence or occurrence of any phenomenon or action. To say why a thing is so 
is to indicate particular obtaining conditions, and it follows that where these condi-
tions obtain otherwise, so also must the object of explanation. If it does not, the ade-
quacy of the alleged explanatory conditions, or the description of the explanandum, or 
both, are called into question. Comparison’s key role, then, is as a test on explanations, 
in the manner classically set out in John Stuart Mill’s System of Logic, the Method of 
Difference providing a more powerful test than the Method of Agreement.2 This is as 
true in principle for explanations of occurrences in daily life as it is for those sought in 
science, as true for explanation of sociocultural as of natural phenomena. The more 
elaborate or systematic explanations that we call theories may be little invoked in fields 
like history or textual criticism, but the logic of explanation is still present in such 
seemingly idiographic exercises as the construction of a plausible chain of events in 
history or the determination of a most likely reading in a classical text.
But the West African puzzle of my chapter title does arise from a theory: namely 
the systematic explanation that Robin Horton has given for the widespread occur-
rence, timing, and distribution of conversion to the world religions in Africa over 
the past two centuries.3 Briefly, it explains this as an adaptive response to changes 
in the scale of people’s social experience. As traditional African religions make 
cogent sense of living in localized, small-scale communities, so when people move 
into a wider field of social relations—as through labor migration or more exten-
sive trade networks—they are drawn to more general, transcendental forms of 










































religion. This theory made much sense of the Yoruba data (see further chapter 7) 
but failed completely to explain why the trajectory of religious change of the seem-
ingly comparable Akan should be so different. Since the Akan yield nothing to the 
Yoruba in terms of the kind of factors that Horton’s theory specifies as relevant to 
conversion—they even had earlier direct relations with Europe, a richer export-
oriented colonial economy, the earlier development of modern education, and so 
on—why should their religious development have been markedly so much slower 
and more uneven?
In 1960, according to the Population Census of Ghana, just over 60 percent of all 
the Akan were reported as being adherents of world religions, the great majority of 
them Christians. By contrast, already by 1952 well over 80 percent of Yoruba were 
Christians or Muslims, though the proportions varied considerably by region.4 
By 1960 the difference between the two peoples had grown to over 30 percent. 
Only after the mid-1960s did this gap start to close, with the further growth of 
Christianity among the Akan. Other divergent features of their religious histories 
appear to correlate with the difference. In fact, what first pointed me in this direc-
tion was puzzlement as to why the strains of high colonialism had produced a 
Christian-prophet movement known as Aladura among the Yoruba, whereas the 
main Akan response had been to turn to pagan antiwitchcraft shrines.5
So we have to look elsewhere than to the factors specified in Horton’s micro-
cosm-to-macrocosm theory in order to explain the Akan/Yoruba difference. The 
explanation I shall eventually propose—that it is to do with the contrasting rela-
tionship between religion and political authority in the two societies—will involve 
us in a critical reappraisal of the strong comparative literature produced by social 
anthropologists, mostly in the 1960s and 1970s, about the conditions of state for-
mation in West Africa. But to get our intellectual bearings here, it is helpful to go 
further back and consider the tradition of comparative study from which it arose, 
and in which the comparative method occupied a central position. This was seen 
as a means toward developing a natural science of society, in opposition to history 
as the study of unique sequences of events. But it has been far from being a uni-
fied enterprise; and I shall argue that it has involved several distinct modes, which 
differ in how they handle history. This will bring us back to the Akan/Yoruba con-
trast, where I shall argue that they need to be compared in their histories, not (as 
with most anthropological comparison) as static social systems.
MODES OF THE C OMPAR ATIVE METHOD
The comparative method, sometimes argued to be the method of social 
 anthropology6 or treated as if it were one, single thing,7 exists in at least five dis-
tinct modes:
 1.  a single, universal, ideal history or natural history of society;










































 2.  a branching, concrete history, on the model of comparative philology;
 3.  where history is denied or ignored, as comparison is used to derive socio-
logical universals or general laws;
 4.  where a degree of common history is presumed, as in regional comparative 
studies;
 5.  where it is histories, not societies, that are compared.
These modes tend to be products of particular historical moments, but at 
the same time they have a perennial appeal, since they represent distinct logical 
options for the analysis of social phenomena.
Mode I: An Ideal, Universal History
Mode I began as a projected natural history of society or histoire raisonnée; and 
it involved the search for a single, logically appropriate (and hence also norma-
tive) sequence of stages. The comparative method was to provide the confirming 
evidence. This mode existed fully fledged by the 1760s and 1770s in the four-stages 
theory of Smith, Turgot, and Millar.8 The presents of backward societies were the 
equivalent of the pasts of advanced societies, so that comparative evidence from 
contemporary non-European societies could be used to fill in or corroborate evi-
dence for stages of Europe’s past. “It is in [the American Indians’] present condi-
tion we are to behold, as in a mirror, the features of our own progenitors.”9 The 
nineteenth century produced much fresh data, more complicated stage models, 
and several special applications (e.g., to marriage types, forms of religion), as well 
as the authoritative paradigm of comparative anatomy and physiology, worked 
through most thoroughly in Herbert Spencer’s theory of social evolution; but the 
basic components were the same.
Though social evolution had ceased to be the absolutely paramount form of 
social thought by 1914, this mode of the comparative method continued to be prac-
ticed in anthropology for some time. Indeed one could hardly find better instances 
of it than in such late works as those by L. T. Hobhouse, G. C. Wheeler, and Morris 
Ginsberg, or by A. M. Hocart.10 Neoevolutionism apart, some of its devices con-
tinue to find valid heuristic employment within projects of a quite different over-
all character. For example, the device of using an undeveloped community as a 
model to reconstruct the baseline form from which a culturally related but devel-
oped community has grown has been used by M. G. Smith (contemporary Abuja 
= pre-Fulani Zaria) and Robin Horton (contemporary Niger Delta fishing villages 
= New Calabar before the Atlantic trade).11
Mode II: A Branching, Concrete History
Mode II emerged in the early nineteenth century, its paradigm being comparative 
philology. The achievement of William Jones and Franz Bopp was to explain the 
affinities between Greek, Sanskrit, and other languages in terms of their descent 










































from a putative common ancestor, Indo-European, and to work out rules governing 
the phonological shifts that lay between them. The essential point of comparison 
here was to reconstruct a particular ur-form, the actual histories of the languages 
being paths of divergence from it. Compared with Mode I, Mode II dealt with sev-
eral actual histories rather than with one ideal or normative history, and its focus 
was the point of origin or departure rather than the path of development from it. 
Moreover, whereas Mode I depended on a unity grounded in nature (“the psychic 
unity of mankind”), Mode II pointed to a limited and cultural unity, that of the 
Indo-European (or Ural-Altaic, or Semitic, . . .) stock. A linguistic version of Mode 
I was found in a theory like Alexander von Humboldt’s, which held that all lan-
guages, by virtue of their common human nature, pass through the same sequence 
of developmental stages. Even in modern anthropology there are instances of 
Mode II, such as Luc de Heusch’s study of Bantu mythologies.12 Besides Claude 
Lévi-Strauss, the major influence on de Heusch was the work of Georges Dumézil 
on the transformations of mythical archetypes in Indo-European cultures.13 Both 
Dumézil and de Heusch, characteristically, are more concerned to demonstrate 
the existence of an ur-form that serves to bring out the resemblances between 
diverse myths than to map the historical path of that model’s transformations.
C OMPARISON:  FOR OR AGAINST HISTORY?
All use of the comparative method in the nineteenth century, and especially in its 
dominant Mode I, was informed by two profound inclinations. The first was to 
reduce a vast and perplexing variety by postulating an underlying unity of some 
kind: in the terms of Mill’s Logic the Method of Agreement got vastly more atten-
tion than the Method of Difference. Consequently, the manifest variations or dif-
ferences are less often explained than set aside or treated as superficial: compara-
tive analysis thus pointed away from history.
Second, there was the impulse to make sense of things in terms of how they 
had come to be, in terms of origins, sources, or paths. That led Auguste Comte 
to regard the comparative method (Mode I) as a méthode historique, which for 
him also had the appeal of providing scientific grounds for divining the path into 
the future. But this is a historical approach only in a very particular sense: in the 
sense of dealing with time and change but not in the sense of dealing with the 
unique totalities or conjunctures, the action and the contingencies, out of which 
concrete instances of social change are formed. Spencer went further and expressly 
set the project for a science of society in opposition to any notion of a human-
istic history, in terms of a series of antinomies: process vs. events, structure vs. 
 individuals, necessity vs. contingency, and so forth.14
It was the legal historian Frederick Maitland who saw that such ahistoricism 
was self-defeating and succinctly stated comparative anthropology’s dilemma: 










































“by and by anthropology will have the choice of being history or being nothing.”15 
Rarely has a clear statement been so often misunderstood by being read out of 
context.16 Maitland was not telling a functionalist anthropology that it should 
study social change. His essay “The Body Politic” was directed at the whole organi-
cist metaphor in which the comparative method (Mode I) sought laws of develop-
ment, taking Spencer as the great exemplar. His point was that processes of change 
must be seen in terms of contingencies and specific conditions, not as the working 
out of immanent laws of organic development. The great irony was that, whereas 
Maitland wanted the time perspective without organicism, what British anthro-
pology eventually produced after the structural-functionalist revolution was a 
form of organicism without the time perspective.
The fundamental methodological issues here were posed most sharply in 
 Germany, where a strong attraction to evolutionary and organicist models of 
 society coexisted with the greatest contemporary school of historical scholarship 
and an antipathy to Anglo-French universalism and utilitarianism in such fields 
as law and economics. The famous Methodenstreit concerned the antithesis of 
history and science, of Geist and Natur as objects of study, and of the placement 
of any so-called social sciences in this academic scheme. Sociology was precisely 
what Max Weber called his attempt to transcend the distinction, to meet scientific 
standards in the definition and analysis of historical problems without denying 
the meaningful character of their subject matter.17 But for all Weber’s vast influ-
ence on the history of sociology, anthropology was shaped instead by the rather 
different response to this dilemma proposed by Franz Boas, the main conduit 
by which German historical idealism was transmitted to American anthropol-
ogy. Boas polarized the historical method, concerned with the development 
of unique cultural wholes, and the comparative method.18 The latter sought to 
establish synchronic links between discrete variables expressed in the terms of a 
general theory.
This distinction between history and comparison was already implicit in what 
has come to be called Galton’s Problem.19 At the first presentation of Edward 
Tylor’s famous essay in Mode I comparative method on the evolution of systems 
of marriage and descent, Francis Galton drew attention to a major difficulty with 
its research design.20 How could one tell whether the adhesions or correlations 
between variables were independent cases of the postulated causal relationships 
between traits, thus serving to confirm the theory, or were the result of societ-
ies’ borrowing traits at some particular stage in their history? The problem indi-
cates the tension that must exist between the search for a theory specifying causal 
relations that hold irrespective of time and place, and the evident fact that social 
variables may be rather loosely fitting and combine in unique configurations (cul-
tures) under contingent circumstances (history). In that sense, as Boas saw, both 
culture and history presented refractory materials for the comparative method.










































Mode III: History Ignored
Mode III applies when the comparative method is detached entirely from consid-
erations of time and change. This was decisively achieved only after the structural- 
functionalist revolution, but some of the groundwork had already been laid. Even 
when, as with Mode I, the ultimate object of the comparative method was to construct 
a natural history of society, the temporal sequence was essentially something added to 
the correlations from outside. The sequence itself usually followed from some natu-
rally ordered feature such as population size or density, degree of social differentiation, 
or level of technology. The comparative method was to determine the corresponding 
sequence of religious beliefs, kinship systems, ethical values, and so on; and obviously 
it could continue to be used apart from any social-evolutionary project.
Moreover, there is an ambiguity in the very notion of explaining a thing by 
reference to its source or origins. This may be interpreted phylogenetically, in 
which case an institutional history (as with a language’s descent from an ur-form) 
is required; or ontogenetically, in which case the genesis in an individual of an 
instance of the thing is required. These two interpretations can be combined, as 
in Freud’s theory of religion, where a historical myth about its supposed origins is 
taken up in an account of the origin of individual neuroses that reach out to reli-
gious solutions. We find the same thing in James Frazer. For besides the evolution-
ary progression from magic to science, he also seeks explanation by looking for a 
link between some need or habit of thought inherent in human individuals and 
some type of magicoreligious action. The intellectual tedium of The Golden Bough 
is largely due to the fact that the vast range of comparative materials is used to 
provide repeated illustration of such linkages between source and effect according 
to Mill’s Method of Agreement.
We are here only a very short step from Mode III, which was described by 
Alfred Radcliffe-Brown as a means “to pass from the particular to the general . . . 
to arrive at the universal, at characteristics which can be found in different forms 
in many societies.”21 This is the Method of Agreement exclusively and à l'outrance. 
In the next generation this universalist ambition was sustained above all by Meyer 
Fortes. In Oedipus and Job in West African Religion Fortes acknowledged the lead 
of Frazer in the great project “to bring home to us the unity behind the diver-
sity of human customs,” and where he refers to the beliefs of other West African 
peoples it is only to point out the similarities, not to use the differences to get a 
better explanatory purchase on the specifics of the Tallensi situation.22 Again, in 
“Pietas in Ancestor Worship” he gives far more attention to parallel cases that fit 
his theory of ancestor worship as a ritualization of lineage authority,23 and even to 
extensions of it to such spheres as the “pietas” displayed by Russian cosmonauts 
and Cambridge college fellows, than to problematic countercases such as the Tiv 
that might sharpen up the explanation.24










































The conditions for finding generalizations applying to “all human societies, 
past, present and future”25 were better met when Lévi-Strauss displaced the subject 
matter of anthropology upward, from social relations to cultural forms such as 
myths, and explanation was sought in terms of laws of the mind, not of society. 
Rodney Needham’s book Exemplars, written very consciously as comparativist, 
shows the clear outcome of Mode III. Though Needham considers a historical 
sequence of writers, neither their pastness, nor the temporal relations between 
them, nor their historically specific circumstances are of essential concern to him; 
for through comparison he is looking for “fundamental inclinations of the psyche” 
or “natural proclivities of thought and imagination.”26 Such things point to “cere-
bral vectors” as where explanation must ultimately lie; and at that point the natural 
science of society teeters on the edge of physiology.
Mode IV: Regional Comparative Studies
The trajectory of Mode III, from Radcliffe-Brown to Needham, was not, however, 
the most typical development of the comparative method in social anthropology 
from the 1950s onward. This was Mode IV, where more limited comparisons are 
essayed, usually dealing with particular social institutions and within a particu-
lar ethnographic area. For Africanist anthropology, it arrived in the classic vol-
umes African Political Systems (ed. Fortes and Evans-Pritchard, 1940) and African 
Systems of Kinship and Marriage (ed. Radcliffe-Brown and Forde, 1950), albeit 
prefaced with Mode III manifestos from Radcliffe-Brown. This mode of the com-
parative method did not simply make use of ethnographies but, more than any 
of the preceding ones, really arose out of ethnography and remained close to it. 
Consequently much more use is made of Mill’s Method of Difference, in two prin-
cipal ways: explanation and exploration.
Two essays by S. F. Nadel—who had a better idea of what he was about theo-
retically than any of his contemporaries27—indicate the difference in emphasis. 
Explanation is predominant in the tightly organized argument of “Witchcraft in 
Four African Societies”28 (1952): two pairs of closely related societies, a single defi-
nite question about each (presence or absence of witchcraft beliefs? female or male 
witches?), and a clear guiding hypothesis (that witchcraft beliefs answer to frustra-
tions and anxieties arising from the pattern of social relations). His essay on Nuba 
religion, on the other hand, is more exploratory, seeking to clarify a rather diffuse 
difference between the religions of two further Nuba peoples, one of which has a 
more anxious, ritually obsessive outlook, and the other, a more serene and sub-
missive attitude toward the gods.29 No definite explanatory hypotheses are evident 
here, beyond an assumption that one should look for “more significant, because 
more far-reaching, causal relations connecting religion with acts of an altogether 
different order, that is with conditions which are functionally autonomous and 
hence represent ‘independent’ variables.”30 So Nadel proceeds to look at a number 










































of variables, most of which are germane to his interest in social psychology: the 
regulation of adolescence, the jural status of wives, sexual morality, attitudes to 
homosexuality, and so forth. Thus ethnography reaches, through the comparative 
method, to further and better ethnography.
In the early 1950s, a time when the surge of new ethnography studies encour-
aged several reviews of the comparative method,31 Isaac Schapera strongly urged 
its methodological advantages, in contrast with sweeping cross-cultural studies 
such as those based on the Human Relations Area Files. At the very least, where 
social-structural relations were being investigated, comparison within an ethno-
graphic region enabled culture to be held much more securely constant. Its further 
potential was that it allowed variations genuinely to be analyzed as variants or 
transformations of locally given basic forms. This remained a productive seam, 
as was shown in such fine studies as those of Adam Kuper on Southern Bantu 
marriage systems,32 or Richard Fardon on social organization in the Benue Valley 
region of Nigeria and Cameroon.33 One original aim of Mode IV was to avoid 
being bothered by culture through setting up situations where it could be set aside 
as a constant, yet the regional focus eventually pointed the way back to historical 
questions, and hence reintroduced the problem of culture. Mode IV could also 
converge with Mode II, as with the work of de Heusch.
REGIONAL C OMPARISON WITHIN BRITISH 
 SO CIAL ANTHROPOLO GY
Before turning to issues that bear directly on my initial puzzle, it is necessary to 
examine two closely related features of British social anthropology as practiced 
in the 1940s and 1950s: holistic presentism and sociological reductionism. These 
infused most exercises in Mode IV comparative method without being strictly 
entailed by it, and together they utterly inhibited an adequate analysis of the role 
of culture in social transformation. Holistic presentism followed from the practi-
cal rejection of historical explanation by the founders of structural functional-
ism. Where the histories of preliterate societies were judged to be unknowable, 
conjectural history, using Mode I’s comparative method, was worthless, and so 
apparent history or oral tradition made better sense when interpreted as a charter 
for present social arrangements. Thus, all social phenomena had to be explained 
in terms of other social phenomena with which they cohered in whole systems or 
else in terms of the external conditions of such systems. With this doctrine, social 
anthropology acquired a wonderful self-sufficiency as a discipline, since ethno-
graphic fieldwork, if sufficiently thorough, could provide all the material needed 
for explanation.
What holistic presentism did not provide was guidance as to what explains 
things. In principle, it might be environment, race, technology, cultural values, . . . 










































But after Radcliffe-Brown, it was social structure: social anthropology for a while 
became more sociological than sociology. Now, while this still left open many 
questions about the relations between such social institutions as politics, law, kin-
ship, the economic division of labor, and the like, it did propose a definite answer, 
or rather two somewhat inconsistent answers, to the interpretation of culture. The 
core message was: culture does not matter much in social analysis.
On the one hand, culture is a kind of clutter, which has a certain obscuring 
tendency and so needs to be cleared away if valid comparisons are to be made. 
Because there might be “the same kind of political structures .  .  . in societies of 
totally different culture,” comparison should be “on an abstract plane where social 
processes are stripped of their cultural idiom and reduced to functional terms.”34 
Over thirty years later I. M. Lewis, in Ecstatic Religion, was to propose just the 
same thing. He urged “the crucial importance of distinguishing between the 
unique cultural forms of particular institutions and their actual social significance 
in any society.” Only if anthropologists did this would they be able to “develop 
useful typologies which cut across cultural forms and which facilitate meaningful 
comparison.” Thus would anthropology be able to storm “the last bastion of the 
unique,” religion.35
Alternatively, instead of varying randomly, culture was argued to covary 
exactly, as a dependent variable, with the forms of social structure. If the Tallensi 
have a cult of their ancestors, it is not (as Frazer would have argued) because of 
a fear of the dead, “but because their social structure demands it.”36 And it was 
precisely with those forms of religion—ancestor worship and witchcraft/sorcery 
beliefs—that seem in fact to reflect social structure most closely that the compara-
tive analysis of religion was attempted to best effect.37 As R. E. Bradbury put it in 
a fine study of the Edo cult of the dead, where “relations with the objects of wor-
ship derive very directly from the typical experiences of individuals in their rela-
tions with certain categories of deceased persons . . . severe limits are set upon the 
imaginative capacities of the religious thinker.”38
Bradbury clearly recognized that this need not be true of all forms of religion, 
but any great exploration of cultural autonomy was long impeded by a strong 
methodological resistance from social anthropologists. John Middleton and E. H. 
Winter, for example, counterposed two ways to explain the content of witchcraft 
beliefs: cultural analysis and sociology. Only by sociological analysis, they argued, 
can we develop explanations that subsume the facts from more than one society; 
and cultural explanations are in any case untestable.39 But why should cultural 
explanations be less testable in principle than sociological ones? The contention 
that phenomenon A in society X is due to its being Muslim (a cultural fact) can 
indeed be supported by showing that it is also present in other Muslim societies Y 
and Z (the Method of Agreement), especially if it is absent from otherwise compa-
rable but non-Muslim societies P, Q, and R (the Method of Difference). But there 










































has to be a theoretical interest in finding explanations of this kind; and mostly, 
in the comparative analysis of the 1950s and 1960s, this interest was excluded by 
satisfaction at the power of social-structural determinism to explain at least some 
of the empirical variation of African religions.
But what eventually became clear is that substantial amounts of variation were 
left unexplained by sociological facts, and that these often pointed to culture. 
Two examples suffice to make the point. Max Gluckman’s extended comparison 
of domestic systems among two centralized Bantu societies, Zulu and Lozi, is a 
good example of synchronic, social-structural Mode IV comparative method.40 He 
explained the presence or absence of the house-property complex and related phe-
nomena in terms of the presence or absence of strong agnatic lineages. Compelled 
thus to extend the range of comparison, he found his explanation supported by 
the same correlations among a cluster of peoples in northeastern Africa. Things 
started to get untidy when a group of patrilineal peoples in West Africa (Tallensi, 
Fon, Igbo) provided a negative case—no house-property complex—but this he 
was able to handle in a theoretically plausible but also ad hoc way, by adducing an 
extra negative condition—their having brother-to-brother succession. But what is 
then the import of a case like the Yoruba, another patrilineal West African peo-
ple, who manage to combine some major features of the house-property complex 
typical of the Zulu with other features more characteristic of the Lozi, who lack 
it? Clearly it does not simply invalidate Gluckman’s detailed explanation of the 
Zulu/Lozi differences, but it does negate any idea of a necessary link between the 
two variables. There is just greater free play between social-structural variables 
than Radcliffe-Brown’s program supposed, so that where variables do cohere, it is 
within a complex of other conditions that is the product of a particular local his-
tory. Any necessity of things is the rolling product of determinations accumulating 
over time—a subject matter that social anthropology, for a time, forswore to touch.
Mary Douglas’s classic paper “Lele Economy Compared with the Bushong” 
brings us more expressly to a similar conclusion.41 She asked why the Bushong of 
the Congo were so much more productive than their neighbors, the Lele, despite 
identical levels of technology and a similar natural environment. Her convincing 
answer was that it was due to different patterns of labor use, which in turn depended 
on contrasting evaluations of what activities were appropriate to particular age/
sex categories. In other words, the key factor was specific cultural patterns, which 
existed in the present simply as a precipitate of the past and were themselves only 
to be explained historically. By the same stroke, we are forced to take culture/ideas/
religion seriously and to open social explanation to history. Holistic presentism 
excludes historical explanations but not explanation by reference to culture, the 
form in which the past exists in the present. There were good grounds for this 
suspicion of historical explanations. But only its companion dogma, sociological 
reductionism, really closed the door, by refusing to acknowledge the effectiveness 










































of any constituent of present reality besides the social relations themselves or, for 
those of an even harder turn of mind, their ecological and physical conditions 
of existence.
HISTORY REVIVED IN ANTHROPOLO GY?
For all that these were idées maitresses of British social anthropology at its acme, 
they never won universal assent. Opposition to them was most sharply expressed 
by E. E. Evans-Pritchard. Yet this opposition was both shifting and equivocal, and 
did not lead to a resolution of the problems of an ahistorical anthropology. This 
was because Evans-Pritchard was unable to transcend Radcliffe-Brown’s terms of 
debate, which themselves had been set in the Montesquieu/Spencer/Durkheim 
tradition of science vs. history. He merely opted for the other alternative. Despite 
his own remarkable analysis of structural transformation (The Sanusi of Cyrenaica, 
1949), Evans-Pritchard’s case for anthropology as history had less to do with the 
treatment of time or change than with insistence on the uniqueness of what the 
anthropologist studies: individual cultures. History acknowledged this unique-
ness, which a natural science of society would deny.42 The kind of explanation he 
wanted had nothing to do with causes: it was “exact description which bears its 
own interpretation.”43 He was consequently unenthusiastic about the comparative 
method, that handmaid of science. Some comparative religion he was prepared to 
countenance, but insofar as it goes beyond hermeneutics, he allowed it only the 
very weak causal aspirations of relational study.44
For the anthropologists who most seriously reengaged with history did not 
take their cue from the later writings of Evans-Pritchard. The new concern arose 
among those who had done fieldwork in some of the larger-scale African societies, 
typically societies that had acquired some depth of literary tradition and whose 
ethnic traditions had the most direct relevance to the newly emergent states: 
peoples like the Yoruba, Akan, Tswana, Somali, Akan, Ganda, and Hausa-Fulani. 
Methodological essays45 led on to monographs46 and to collaborative volumes.47 
Though the forms of the anthropological engagement with history varied consid-
erably, its typical position was in fact diametrically opposed to Evans-Pritchard’s. 
Rather than adopt the supposed traits of history (idiographic, hermeneutic, etc.) 
in order to be adequate to its subject matter, anthropology should preserve its own 
disciplinary identity, which was as some sort of science, and bring it to bear on 
questions of change. Anthropologists might interact closely with historians, but 
they would do distinctive things with historical data.
A full account of the contrasting styles of history and anthropology is not 
needed here. Suffice it to note briefly three characteristic ways in which anthro-
pologists tackled historical questions. First, potted histories or ethnographies were 
used to test general theories of social processes, or else theoretical models were 










































used to shed light on historical questions, as with Lloyd’s conflict model applied 
to Yoruba kingdoms.48 Second, anthropologists opposed the supposed historian’s 
interest in unique sequences of events to their own search for structural regulari-
ties or sociological time.49 Here the most telling voice was M. G. Smith’s, since few 
anthropologists of West Africa had collected more extensive oral-historical data 
or pursued such a consistent theoretical project. From Zazzau (1960) to Daura 
(1978) his (parahistorical, as he called it) objective had been to establish relations 
of logical necessity holding through time.50 He did not shrink from the implication 
that the elements to be so temporally ordered required abstraction from the total 
historical process and that causal analysis, qua determination of the conditions 
of concrete historical reality, were not what he was about. Finally, of course, there 
was again the comparative method. Thus Mode IV, though still marked by some 
ahistorical tendencies that ran back a long way, was brought directly to bear on 
historical questions. How it fared in relation to substantive issues in the history of 
West African societies, I now turn to consider.
ANTHROPOLO GY AND STATE FORMATION IN 
WEST   AFRICA
From the 1950s to the 1980s the dominant theme that brought anthropologists and 
historians together was state formation. In the age of African nationalism, it was 
of pressing interest to West Africans themselves, and the local schools of academic 
historiography made states and elites their central topic.51 Social anthropology was 
able to respond effectively because it had, in its own tradition, already addressed 
some cognate issues. Fortes and Evans-Pritchard in African Political Systems pro-
vided the conceptual groundwork for later collections on precolonial states.52 
Behind the presentist ethnography of structural functionalism there still lurked 
the evolutionary schemes, based on Mode I comparative method, of Lewis Henry 
Morgan and Henry Maine. The dichotomy between segmentary lineage systems 
and states that was used as a static typology in African Political Systems was turned 
again into a description of process in the studies of political centralization. This 
was thus conceived as a process in which the decline of lineages was the essential 
condition of the state’s advance.
Discussion about the factors making for political centralization in precolonial 
West Africa faces a considerable initial difficulty. How do we distinguish a state of 
greater from one of lesser centralization? The most appropriate sort of evidence 
would seem to be historically concrete actions indicative of the center’s political 
capacity: a king able to tax his subjects heavily, to raise armies and use them to ends 
determined by himself, to effect his will in distant provinces and to maintain public 
works, to place his own nominees in influential positions and to remove them at 
will. By such criteria Asante and Dahomey are reasonably considered centralized 










































kingdoms. Elsewhere, adequate historical evidence of actions being lacking, infer-
ences are often made from institutions, typically observed in the twentieth century 
but presumed traditional, which are considered appropriate indicators or proxies 
of relative centralization. The typology contained within African Political Systems 
gives clear guidance as to what those institutions might be. The baseline for devel-
opment would be a segmentary state, in which titled offices belong to lineages 
and the king is selected by nonroyal titleholders from the segments of a royal lin-
eage.53 Of the four forest kingdoms that were at the center of discussion—Asante, 
Benin, Dahomey, and Oyo (Yoruba)—the Yoruba approximate most closely to this 
model, and, in true Mode I fashion, their present condition was taken as analogous 
to the condition from which the others are presumed to have developed.54
There are several difficulties with this procedure. The first is logical. The argu-
ment becomes circular when the same thing—for example, the decline of descent 
groups—is both used to define centralization and treated as a factor of change 
itself.55 In a diachronic analysis, of course, the same institution may at one moment 
be treated as a cause or condition, at another as an effect. But here the  comparisons 
are essentially static, between one generalized societal description and another, as 
in the manner of Gluckman’s Zulu/Lozi comparison, albeit with the aim of  isolating 
historically significant variables; so circularity is hard to avoid. Hence the peren-
nial appeal of technological determinism, which offers a way to break the circle. 
Thus the argument, first put forward by Peter Morton-Williams to explain Asante/
Oyo differences, and elaborated by Jack Goody for West Africa more widely, 
that military technology (specifically the horse vs. the gun) was the main factor 
determining the allegedly greater centralization of the forest  kingdoms.56 Behind 
 military technology lay geography (savannah vs. forest), since rulers near the coast 
would get the guns, which they could store and use to take power from lineage 
chiefs into their own hands. But empirically, as Robin Law showed,57 Goody’s hier-
archy of causes—geography, technology, sociology—just doesn’t work. To give 
just one example, the introduction of guns into nineteenth-century Yorubaland, 
one of the later areas to receive them, served to accentuate political fragmentation 
and conflict, both between states and within them, rather than to create a greater 
 centralization of power.
But centralization cannot be plausibly defined in this question-begging way, 
with a theory of the process built into the definition. The case of Asante shows 
this most clearly. P. C. Lloyd expressed a once common view when he grouped 
the Asante with most of the Yoruba in one category (open representative govern-
ment), while Benin and Dahomey were placed in another (government by political 
association). In the first of these, chiefs are selected as lineage representatives, an 
arrangement that expresses the coherence and importance of the lineages in soci-
ety at large. The latter category, indicated by nonlineage titles, close succession in 
the royal house, and so forth, is more centralized. The same linking of Asante and 










































Yoruba occurs in Fortes’s essay “Strangers,” where he argues that in both societies, 
because lineages are the building blocks of the community, strangers can become 
members of the community only through assimilation to it.58 Mostly by the 1970s, 
however, the Asante and the Yoruba were being placed in contrasting categories, 
the Asante alongside Dahomey and Benin as relatively centralized states (gun-
using, with nonlineage titled offices), in contrast to less centralized states (cavalry-
using, with lineage titles), such as Oyo, Gonja, or Mossi.59 The shift in the clas-
sification of Asante resulted from Ivor Wilks’s demonstration of the bureaucratic 
aspects of the Asante state in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,60 which 
had eluded the attention of an anthropology too rooted in the colonial period.
Wilks’s work forced a reconsideration not just of Asante but of the whole com-
parative framework derived from African Political Systems. What had seemed to 
justify its model of centralization was that, linked to the declining significance of 
lineages, there should be a number of other socially significant features,  including 
such commonsense criteria of centralization as royal executive capacity. All 
this now collapsed in the light of Wilks’s account of Asante. Certainly the late 
 eighteenth-century Kwadwoan revolution in government involved the establish-
ment of new bureaucratic offices, which were detached from the matrilineages 
to which titles of general community leadership belonged.61 But the matrilin-
eages remained of great consequence in social life, access to land, and other local 
 functions, and so continued to be represented in the colonial ethnographies after 
the structures of the expansionist Asante state had fallen away.62 The advance of 
the state did not entail the withering away of the lineage.
Does the model fare better with the other kingdoms? Dahomey, like Asante, 
combined a powerful royal system of control with the continued existence of cor-
porate, landholding (patri)lineages, which M. J. Herskovits called “the pivot of 
Dahomean social organization.”63 At first, the Yoruba would not have seemed to 
present much of a problem, since the ethnographic consensus represented their 
town structures as federations of lineages64 that failed in diverse ways to become 
centralized; but this consensus came to be severely questioned.65 Great difficulties 
arise from the regional variety of Yorubaland, but in general it can be said that the 
importance of lineage as the basis of social organization was much exaggerated. 
Yoruba title systems do not reflect lineage structure alone; in many instances resi-
dential groupings, such as quarters, are as important a principle of cooperation as 
descent; the ancestral cult known as egungun shows a much less decisive recogni-
tion of the importance of corporate descent than do the ancestor cults in Dahomey 
or Asante. It is curious that corporate lineage, this supposed token of the baseline 
of political development, should have been more strongly emphasized in accounts 
of the northwestern Yoruba, none of whose communities in its present form pre-
dates the wholesale upheavals of the last century, than in the centuries-old com-
munities of the southeastern forests, such as Ondo and Ilesha. Indeed Lloyd ends 










































by admitting of Ibadan—the new military master of Yorubaland in the nineteenth 
century, which chronically failed to create a stable political center—that its strongly 
corporate lineages were “a product of the development of the political structure in 
response to new opportunities in the sphere of trade and war.”66 It is true that at 
Ilesha the importance of nonlineage titles and nonlineal social units (such as the 
quarters) grew as an aspect of the town’s successful expansion; but they did not 
bring (and cannot be used as an indicator of) any marked centralization.
The last case to be considered is Benin. Its contrast with the Yoruba now looks 
less sharp, though the evidence of its relative centralization is not to be denied: the 
periodically impressive executive outreach of its kings, the extraordinary role of 
the palace associations in the integration of the kingdom, the stem dynasty. But is 
there a plausible trajectory of development? Bradbury argued, from the evidence 
of the ritual opposition between the Oba (from a dynasty of Ife—i.e., Yoruba—
descent) and the kingmaker Uzama chiefs (representing the elders of Benin), for 
a convergence of Yoruba and Edo (Benin) political cultures. Divergences from 
the Yoruba pattern were put down to ur-Edo cultural elements (e.g., primogeni-
ture, lineages shallow, nonlandholding). But should we equate what seems distinc-
tively Edo to a twentieth-century ethnographer with a putative ur-Edo baseline? 
Some things count against this: some less centralized peoples of the Edo-speaking 
periphery in fact have landholding patrilineages more like the Yoruba than Benin;67 
and the Uzama titles at Benin, those supposed tokens of ur-Edo culture, are wide-
spread as very ancient titles among the forest Yoruba.68 In sum, it strongly looks 
as if at least some of those institutions distinctive of Benin were the product of its 
political development rather than drawn from an ur-Edo baseline. If, moreover, 
the reduction in the significance of lineages in the heartland of the Benin king-
dom was part of this process, it seems that Benin’s development squares with the 
lineages-to-state model suggested by African Political Systems better than Asante 
or Dahomey do.
So what can we conclude from this debate about the conditions of political 
centralization in precolonial West Africa? First, the notion of centralization is 
thoroughly confused. In fact, at least three distinct criteria seem to be involved. 
(1) All forms of political development appear to have entailed some concentration, 
an essentially spatial process by which the population and disposable resources of 
a region come to be concentrated at a power center. Such concentration appears 
to be a necessary but not a sufficient condition of (2) the sort of power transfer 
between institutions within the emergent center that the lineages-to-state concept 
of centralization is mostly about. Then there is (3) a growth in the capacity of a 
state executive to extract and direct to its own ends the labor and resources of its 
subjects. Criteria (2) and (3) need not coincide. Take, for example, the nineteenth-
century jihadist state of Masina, on the middle Niger.69 This was a cavalry-based 
state with a mass dynasty, and so belongs to Goody’s group of the less centralized, 










































by criterion (2). But its Fulani Muslim ruling estate maintained their cavalry 
by extremely heavy taxation of the Bambara subject population; the land was 
expected to produce at least double the subsistence of its cultivators, a very high 
level of exploitation by West African standards. Masina was highly centralized, by 
criterion (3). Process (3) is surely the one that, from a general viewpoint, has the 
greatest historical significance. It refers to an increase in societal capacity, achieved 
through rulers’ finding ways of controlling their subjects more, making more con-
tinuous calls on their labor and resources, and thus being able to take political 
and military initiatives not open to the rulers of less geared-up societies. The large 
armies they raised, the vast size of their palace establishments, the accumulation 
of resources at their annual Customs (as these ritual occasions are styled), the road 
networks they maintained—all indicate that states like Dahomey and Asante took 
a definite developmental step. The question then is: How did they manage to do it?
It is evident that neither anthropologists nor historians have produced very sat-
isfactory answers. The leading anthropological idea, that the advance of the state is 
linked to the decline of the lineage, has proved to have very little in it; process (2) 
is only contingently connected to process (3). Technological determinism, mili-
tary or otherwise, is hardly more helpful; and even the presence of trade routes 
(for there is plenty of trade without rulers in West Africa)70 does not sufficiently 
explain why states come into being or, in a handful of cases, succeeded in gearing 
themselves up to higher levels of societal performance. Can we do no more than 
agree with Law when he writes, after a careful review of the comparative litera-
ture, that “ultimately, perhaps, explanations are to be sought in specific historical 
circumstances [for the failure of Oyo to become more centralized]”?71 Law raises 
questions here about the specific factors of change and about the value of the com-
parative method in general.
RELIGION,  IDEOLO GY,  AND THE STATE
One large area of thought and activity has by and large been neglected by both 
historians and anthropologists in their attempts to explain the differences between 
these societies: religion. For the social anthropologists this neglect is hardly sur-
prising in the light of the sociological reductionism that has been the main key 
to their interpretation of religion. Even Goody’s essay “Polity and Ritual: The 
Opposition of Horse and Earth,”72 which is almost the only treatment of religion 
in relation to the debate about political centralization, seems to assume that, while 
religion may have some real effect on the behavior of individuals, it has no signifi-
cant role in the creation of social forms.73 Historians too have tended in practice 
to deny significant historical effects to religion. The two major studies of the for-
est kingdoms, Wilks on Asante and Law on Oyo, have little to say about it. It is 
only with Islam that a role for religion as a force of social change seems readily 










































conceded, as with Marion Johnson’s argument that “Islam, military force and taxa-
tion are connected in a complex way” in Masina’s development.74
Available evidence suggests that it was not utterly different for the pagan reli-
gions, that they too served as models for as well as models of social relations.75 
For all that they have been little investigated, it is clear that religious innovation 
and controversy were integral aspects of the growth of state power in eighteenth-
century West Africa. In Asante, one king met effective resistance from his chiefs 
when he contemplated adopting Islam;76 and in Dahomey, the great king Agaja 
(1708–32) introduced the Ifa cult of divination from the Yoruba77. The central occa-
sion for the exercise of the state’s mastery over the resources and activities of its 
subjects was the great annual religious celebration known as the Customs, prepa-
ration for which structured the activities of the entire population of the kingdom 
for a large portion of the year.78 In Asante a further key role in this regulation of 
subjects’ activities was the Adaduanan, or forty-two-day calendrical cycle, which 
T. C. McCaskie calls a veritable Grundnorm of Asante life, a rooting of social activ-
ity in a cosmic pattern.79
Here at last we can start to return to the initial puzzle: Akan resistance to adop-
tion of the world religions, compared with Yoruba openness to them. For what 
that comparison of twentieth-century patterns of action showed is that even after 
the British had dismantled the structures of Asante state control, the Asante long 
retained a lively sense that the integrity of their society depended on the sanc-
tions of the traditional religion. A most significant instance of this was the petition 
of Christian clergy, both missionary and local Akan, to the Asantehene (king of 
Asante) in 1944, arguing that Akan Christians were loyal subjects of their chiefs, 
even though their religious scruples prevented them from treating Thursdays, 
sacred to the Earth goddess, as rest days within the Adaduanan cycle.80 It is utterly 
inconceivable that Yoruba Christians should have had to make such a protestation 
as late as the 1940s. The same Akan attitude was evident in other ways too: for 
example, in the much greater and longer-enduring sense that chiefship and church 
membership were flatly incompatible, or the much commoner practice of requir-
ing Christian converts to withdraw from the town to live in a quarter outside it, 
usually known as Salem.81
So my argument about religious change in twentieth-century West Africa 
leads back to an argument about political change, and the role of religion in it, 
in eighteenth-century West African kingdoms. Common to both is an insistence 
on an aspect of religious change that finds little cognizance in Horton’s theory 
of African conversion from which I began. That is essentially cognitive or cool: 
change is explained as occurring insofar as people’s new experience renders their 
old explanatory frameworks inadequate. The present argument, however, is that 
religious change is a much more affective or hot process, because religion (in addi-
tion to having explanatory functions, as Horton says) also serves to define the 










































membership of social groups and to underpin authority in them—and especially 
so in highly geared-up societies such as Asante. It is important, when we recognize 
that religion serves as an ideology, to stress that it must be more than that. There 
is a danger here of another form of sociological determinism, the quasi-Marxist 
functionalism that embodies a teleology: the ruling class needs an ideology to jus-
tify its position, and so religion must somehow be on hand to provide one. Such 
strategies often paper over crucial gaps in the explanation. So Wilks tells that in 
late eighteenth-century Asante, “government had to be extended in range . . . in 
scope . . . and in proficiency” (my italics).82 He tells us how it was but not how it 
could be so. The need does not suffice to produce the effect; the crucial cultural 
conditions had to be met. If it had to be ideology to work the trick because purely 
material conditions fall short—and we must never forget that in West Africa the 
most segmentary peoples and the most centralized states share the same techno-
logical, ecological, and physical conditions of existence—there had to be some 
independent strength in the religious ideas drawn upon. Religion had this power 
because it was already the shared idiom in which both chiefs and people con-
fronted the pains and anxieties of the human situation. Asantehenes really feared 
witchcraft; kings of Dahomey, two of whom died of smallpox, respected its cult for 
all that they disliked it.83 If this was the bottom line of their reality, on what else 
could rulers better seek to build structures of higher obligation and control—and 
themselves remain constrained by its premises?
REINTRODUCING HISTORY
It is now clear that some of the failure of the comparative method to explain West 
African centralization is to be attributed to the neglect of culture or ideology as a 
causal agency. But the problem goes deeper. The comparative method, as employed 
by social anthropologists on these questions, is really a combination of two modes: 
it is Mode I in its view of the process of centralization and Mode IV in its views as to 
causes. Now, both these modes proceed by abstracting their data from history, even 
when their aim is an idealized, general history or the determination of real histori-
cal causes. For what they compare are either societies described in a detemporalized 
ethnographic present or a cross-section from a society in history, a frozen moment 
taken as some kind of whole; and they aim to establish relationships between vari-
ables that hold apart from historical time. But it is inconsistent with a realistic con-
cept of what society is, and human experience within it, thus to base comparison 
on a procedure that eliminates change, incompleteness, and potentiality, memories, 
and intentions—in a word, historicity. It is small gain to rectify the omission of cul-
ture from explanations by introducing it as yet another factor in a presentist scheme 
of comparison. For it is then reified rather than viewed as the hinge between the 
past of which it is the precipitate and the future that it aims to prefigure.










































Mode V: Histories Compared
What we need is a Mode V of the comparative method, where it is histories, or 
societies in change, rather than just societies that are compared, following the 
path blazed by the great historical sociologists or comparative historians such as 
Frederick Maitland, Max Weber, and Marc Bloch. Other modes of the compara-
tive method (except Mode II) pose questions about general sociological categories, 
aggregates of things taken from their several historical contexts. Underlying this is 
the antithesis of science and history, and the assumption that if the data are to be 
treated scientifically, their historicity must be purged from them. Mode V differs in 
several related ways. Its aim is to explain historical particulars through applying to 
them general statements, which are theories or models, rather than to move from 
particulars to empirical generalizations or laws. This is to hold to the general logic 
of scientific explanation as to the use of comparison but to refuse to distort the data 
by dehistoricizing them, that is by taking them out of their placement in a time 
sequence. For their place in a time sequence is an essential feature of social facts, 
constituted as these all are by individual actions. Natural science, whose example 
has done so much to inspire the comparative method, need have no concern with 
historicity, since it deals with entities that have fixed properties and hence highly 
determinate relationships with one another. Social anthropology’s attempts to 
develop such generalizations about the variables of its own subject matter have 
been extremely disappointing. Virtually all its generalizations turn out to be no 
more than tendencies, or true only by definition, or holding only under particular 
historical or cultural conditions, or able to state only the very minimal conditions 
under which social facts exist. Between its variables there is much more free play: 
we are forced to conclude that the linkage of variables in particular cases often 
results less from their inherent properties than from how they have come to be com-
bined, through human action in a succession of contexts. By comparing histories 
or societies in change, Mode V offers a path to the explanation of social phenom-
ena without misrepresenting the general way in which they are brought about.
A FINAL C ONTR AST BET WEEN YORUBA AND AKAN
A final recourse to the Yoruba/Akan comparison illustrates the role of culture as 
the pivot of social change. I have argued that the relative reluctance of the Akan, 
especially Asante, to embrace the world religions had much to do with their 
sense that the integrity of their society depended on sanctions bound up with 
the old religion. Asante society was not religiously static; but the world religions 
could not be subjected to local chiefly control as other imported cults were. The 
Asante knew their political community as founded by human agreement, though 
also given spiritual sanction by the Golden Stool. McCaskie brilliantly conveys 










































the Asante sense of the fragility of their achievement, speaking of their “abiding 
fear that without unremitting application and effort, the fragile defensible space 
called culture would simply be overwhelmed or reclaimed by an irruptive and 
anarchic nature.”84
The Yoruba perception of themselves and their situation was rather different. 
Again it is instructive to look back from their response to the world religions. 
Though conversion brought both conflict and persecution, the fact remains that 
the Yoruba were much more open to religious change. It was, of course, a less 
highly geared-up society, which could allow more religious toleration—already 
within Yoruba paganism there was both cultic diversity and religious choice—
and whose rulers were perhaps less able to stop religious novelty. Whereas, after 
Asantehene Osei Kwame’s flirtation with Islam in the late eighteenth century, the 
Asante authorities quarantined Islam and effectively prevented its further spread, 
in the Oyo empire at the same time Islam made such strides that Muslims became 
a key component in its overthrow; and Islam grew steadily in Oyo’s successor 
states in the nineteenth century. A highly distinctive feature of Yoruba traditional 
religion was its oracular cult called Ifa, whose priest-diviners (babalawo) had 
great prestige as religious professionals. Through consultation with Ifa an indi-
vidual might be directed to the worship of a particular deity. But most remark-
ably, babalawo could, and on occasion did, advise clients to become Muslims or 
Christians.85 Why could Ifa, a key element in the traditional religion, thus sponsor 
major religious change?
The many Yoruba kingdoms never enjoyed political unity or a common eth-
nic name till the twentieth century; but they recognized their affinity through 
the claim of all their kings to descent from Oduduwa, a god who had reigned at 
Ile-Ife. Ife had been the first great kingdom of the West African forest (fl. 1100–
1450),86 and even after it had declined to a town of modest political importance, 
the Yoruba always looked to it not only as a supreme cultic center but as the very 
site of the creation of the human race.87 Ife’s sacred prestige in later centuries was 
especially conveyed in the cult of Ifa. This was not just because Ife is especially 
prestigious as a center for the training of babalawo but because of the way that Ife 
is represented in Ifa.
Ifa comprises a vast number of poems (ese), organized under the 256 figures 
(odu) that the babalawo may cast with his apparatus.88 The babalawo then recites 
the ese appropriate to the figure cast, one of which will give the key to the  client’s 
problem. Each ese takes the form of a mythical precedent, in which  such-and-such 
a diviner or diviners (named by praise names that often encapsulate the  problem) 
is consulted by some archetypal figure, who does or does not do what Ifa advises, 
usually to make a specified sacrifice; and the outcome is told, usually in the form 
of an extended myth, parable, or fable; finally the precedent is applied to the 
case in hand. Ifa is, therefore, a vast corpus of coded messages about the past. 










































More important than the fragments of specific historical information it may con-
tain is its overall vision of the meaning of the past.
The forty-two-day calendrical cycle or Adaduanan of the Akan bears a certain 
comparison with Ifa—as central elements of their respective cultures and so, as 
we have seen, factors in the reception of the world religions. Both are to do with 
the ordering of social life through the assertion that things do, and should, repeat 
themselves. The Adaduanan, with its lucky and unlucky days, is much more to do 
with the mastery of time as such, structuring human activity in short cycles, well 
expressive of the perpetual anxiety of that hard-won and humanly constructed 
political order. Ifa, by contrast, is less concerned with time than with the past, 
specifically with the Glory that was Ife. For the mythical precedents that prefigure 
all possible later contingencies are stated or presumed to have taken place in Ife, 
“un état autrefois florissant, et dont la capitale fut une ville sainte . . . une patrie 
mystique,” as a babalawo working in Dahomey in the 1930s put it.89 Ifa presents 
to its adherents the highly refracted image of a past great civilization, and it is 
here that for the Yoruba the essential order lies, an ideal order. It is moreover a 
divinely given, not a humanly constructed order; for Ife (unlike Kumasi, Abomey, 
or Benin) was also the site of a cosmogony. While the Adaduanan actually creates 
definite patterns of activity, Ifa does not stipulate but rather sanctions, in the name 
of this past, those actions that the client is deeply disposed to take. The flexibility 
and openness to change of Yoruba society is thus conditioned by the belief that the 
ultimate order is eternally guaranteed by how things began. What our comparison 
most importantly teaches is that culture is less a reflection of society than a reflex-
ion on history.
38
The last chapter ended with the assertion that culture is less a reflection of society 
than a reflexion on history.1 The contrast between the two Latin forms reflectio 
and reflexio allows the expression of a distinction often concealed in English, 
between the thing made and the process of making it, as in the term “work.” Yet 
that ambiguity may have its uses, in pointing us to the intimately reciprocal char-
acter of the making of culture and history. In so far as Yoruba ethnogenesis was 
a cultural work,2 it was mainly achieved through the efforts of those who worked 
on Yoruba language, religion, and history. It is not surprising that these were the 
critical areas for such work or that so much pioneer work in all these fields was 
done by the native agents of the missionary societies, since establishing a stan-
dard written form of the language was crucial to Bible translation; understanding 
the character of “heathenism” was vital to combatting it; and writing local history 
was a means to incorporate Christianity into it. Here “history” shows a similar 
ambiguous duality of meaning, as given events or res gestae (things done) in the 
past and as narratives about them. Narrating or re-presenting that past is thus a 
central part of the self-realization of both culture and society.
The two historians I consider now come from the two West African societies 
whose cultures and histories were compared in the last chapter. They are the Rev. 
Samuel Johnson and the Rev. Carl Christian Reindorf, authors, respectively, of 
the History of the Yorubas (hereafter HY) and the History of the Gold Coast and 
Asante (hereafter HGCA). Both books were completed in the 1890s, and stand 
as two great monuments, towering over lesser literary efforts like the steeples of 
the Anglican and the Presbyterian churches in a small Ulster town. They invite 
comparison with each other, but they are much less alike than seems at first 
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glance—and hardly anyone is equally familiar with the interior of both edifices. 
While my knowledge of Johnson and his background is perhaps as thorough as 
anyone’s, what I know of Reindorf ’s work rests on little more than a good day’s 
reading of HGCA. So this comparison is asymmetrical, with Reindorf mainly 
used as a foil to Johnson.
Now there are two ways in which we may want to evaluate or assess the 
work of past historians. The first comes readily to those who work on the same 
region and period as the historian in question: it focuses on the relationship 
between the historian and his sources, and examines where he got his informa-
tion, how reliable it was, and what he did with it. The second is more external, 
and is less directly concerned with the quest for historical knowledge (at least 
according to a correspondence theory of truth). Indeed, it is likely to come with 
a reserve toward historical positivism, as with most literary approaches to his-
torical texts. A supreme example of this is the work of the critic Hayden White, 
who gives precedence to form over content, to a history’s emplotment or narra-
tive structure over its treatment of source material, and to its related “ideologi-
cal implications.”3 Though he comes to it from a different direction, the social 
anthropologist is likely to find this external approach more congenial, since, 
being inclined to skepticism about the objective truth value of any proposed 
version of the past, he characteristically seeks to make it intelligible in terms of 
its users’ interests and its social function. The justification of this approach is 
that a historian’s intention, formed from his experiences and his prior notions 
of what an account of the past might look like and be useful for, must always be 
prior to his use of the evidence, even though it will surely be modified by his 
working on it.
Here I take this second line and aim to shed light on the kind of work that 
Johnson produced by looking at how it was shaped by the concerns and assump-
tions he brought from his professional life as an African Protestant pastor. “Pastor 
of Oyo” is how he styles himself on the title page, just as Reindorf appears on his 
as “Native Pastor of the Basel Mission.” The focus is on the peculiar interests of 
the native agent of a missionary society, a man to some extent alienated by his 
Christianity from the mass of his compatriots but identifying with them even as 
he wished to convert them; and on a mind shaped by the narrative resources of the 
Bible and of European historical writing as well as by the traditions and uses of the 
past current among his own people.
THE  HISTORIES C OMPARED
With its 650 pages of historical narrative (that is, excluding its preliminary essay 
on the Yoruba language and some appendixes), HY weighs in at nearly 290,000 
words, over twice as long as HGCA. In one sense HY has to be regarded as a more 










































original book than HGCA. The precedents for what Johnson set out to do were 
much more limited: apart from some short essays by various authors on Yoruba 
history, put together from oral materials, that appear in missionary journals, local 
newspapers, or as modest pamphlets,4 he virtually created his own genre. His 
source material was almost entirely oral, whether it was consolidated traditions 
of the remoter past (some derived from professionals like the Oyo court bards or 
arokin), informants’ memories and commonly circulating accounts of the more 
recent past, or Johnson’s own memories and records for the last thirty or so years. 
He did not have available such published historical accounts by Europeans, going 
back to the seventeenth century, as provided Reindorf with both information and 
historiographical models for his own work.
The very existence of these published sources—arising from the long European 
presence on the Gold Coast—meant that Reindorf ’s HGCA both could and had to 
incorporate much more of the long-term interaction of Africans and Europeans 
than HY. The latter by contrast is a more purely native history, albeit one seen 
from that period when the European presence, which had been growing for over 
forty years, was eventuating in colonial annexation. At the same time, HY is much 
more immediate to the writer’s present. Whereas HGCA comes to an end in 1856 
with the consolidation of British rule on the Gold Coast after the cession of the 
Danish forts, a generation before Reindorf ’s writing, Johnson takes us right up to 
1897, the year in which he laid down his pen; and in fact over a third of the entire 
massive book deals with the last great war among the Yoruba kingdoms (1878–93), 
in whose closing stages Johnson played an important political role as a mediator. 
While what he says about Yoruba history from its mythical origins up to the fall of 
Old Oyo in the 1830s is uniquely indispensable as source material,5 the chief glory 
of his history lies in it how it treats the politics of Ibadan, where Johnson lived for 
most of his life, from midcentury onward. HY is at its greatest as contemporary 
history, and it is from this feature that we learn most about its general orientation, 
even in regard to earlier periods.
The point of greatest commonality between HY and HGCA arises from the 
authors’ value commitments, as native pastors. I use this term pointedly, with its 
implicit reference to the two sides of their public identity, as Christian profession-
als and as patriots, members of their own African communities. The relevance 
of this dual allegiance is signalized in the notably parallel ways in which the two 
authors bring their narratives to a conclusion. Both abandon historian’s prose for 
emotionally more charged forms of speech. Johnson expresses his fervent hopes 
in prayer (HY, 642):6
But that peace should reign universally, with prosperity and advancement, and that 
the disjointed units should all be once more welded into one from the Niger to the 
coast as in the happy days of ABIODUN, .  .  . that clannish spirit disappear, and 
above all that Christianity should be the principal religion in the land—paganism 










































and Mohammedanism having had their full trial—should be the wish and prayer of 
every true son of Yoruba.
Reindorf, by contrast, breaks into a kind of free verse, invoking Britannia. After 
celebrating her victory over external enemies, he identifies the two “inner and 
dangerous” foes that still exist—ignorance and funeral custom—and concludes 
(HGCA, 341):
To exist, and then to rule, rule at ease,
Is never the spirit of Britannia.
By thee no nation ever was paralysed.
’Tis mission’s duty the gospel to preach,
The government’s, classical education.
One word, and the funeral custom will die,
And all will sing, “Rule, Britannia, Rule.”
Superstition will then flee far way,
And Christianity will rule supreme! 
Common to both is the expression of hope that Christianity will triumph and 
transform the nation. In fact the Christian Bildung of the two men is even closer than 
may appear, since though Johnson was Anglican, the missionaries who had the great-
est impact on him were two of the many Württemberg Pietists (often Basel-trained) 
whom the Church Missionary Society employed in the nineteenth century. One was 
David Hinderer, who founded the Ibadan mission and led it between 1851 and 1869, 
to whom Johnson, “as a former pupil,” dedicated HY. The other was Gottlob Friedrich 
Bühler, between 1858 and 1864 the principal of the CMS Training Institution at 
Abeokuta, which Johnson attended from 1862 to 1865. When they are compared with 
their English colleagues, the Germans stand out for two things: the strongly paternal-
ist but spiritually intimate relationship that they cultivated with their African pupils 
and staff; and their commitment to a seriously liberal education for Africans. Bühler 
came into conflict with his senior colleague, the Englishman Henry Townsend, over 
the latter’s disapproval of overly academic education for men intended as native 
agents.7 Bühler’s curriculum gave pride of place to religious subjects—Old and New 
Testaments, Scripture history, biblical geography, catechism, and the like—but also 
found room for general history and geography, natural history, and philosophy, along 
with some Greek and Latin.8 Reindorf ’s view of the complementarity of “the gospel” 
and “classical education,” even if he looked to the government to provide the latter, 
expresses very much the same cultural philosophy as Buhler’s curriculum. 
Of the differences, some are less significant than others: Reindorf ’s dominant 
note of the British bringing enlightenment can be readily paralleled from else-
where in Johnson9—and in any case Reindorf was writing from within an estab-
lished colonial order; Johnson, from the edge of one. A much more significant dif-
ference has to do with each man’s relationship to his presumed ethnic and national 










































constituencies. Just as Reindorf is proud of being a Ga and of his descent from 
the “national officiating high priests in Akra and Christiansborg,”10 so is Johnson 
of his being an Oyo or Yoruba proper and descended from Abiodun (d. 1789), 
the last Alafin of Oyo before its decline. Reindorf also seems sensitive enough 
about his mulatto descent to insist that, at one point, it was those of mixed blood 
who “became the protectors and deliverers of their country from its enemies” 
(HGCA, 97)—an aspect of identity that did not affect Johnson. On the other hand, 
Johnson, like many of his colleagues, was a repatriate from Sierra Leone, with the 
burden of slavery and social deracination in his parents’ recent past.
But the link between these received ethnic or communal identities and the 
wider emergent nations that both men envisaged was more complicated and prob-
lematic in Reindorf ’s case. The Ga people of Akra (Accra) were not numerous or 
central enough to be the core of a plausible modern nation; there was also “the 
principal and important portion of the Gold Coast, Fante, the land of history, the 
land of poetry and enlightenment and semi-civilization” (HGCA, v), whose early 
history Reindorf felt he had to leave on one side; and then again there was by far 
the most impressive indigenous state in the area, the still-independent Asante, 
which figures somewhat awkwardly in his account both as an ally of Akra and 
as an oppressor of the Fante. It was plainer for Johnson. The process by which a 
name applied by the Hausa to the Oyo (“Yoruba”) got expanded to cover a mass of 
peoples with closely cognate dialects and cultures, dominant in the British colony 
of Lagos and its large hinterland, was begun by the CMS itself in the 1840s in Sierra 
Leone. And who could be more fitted than an Oyo pastor, resident for most of his 
life in Ibadan, the principal successor state to Old Oyo, to write the charter history 
of this emergent Yoruba nation? Things were as yet uncomplicated by the incorpo-
ration of Lagos and the Yoruba into an entity called Nigeria.
This relationship of the historians’ primary ethnic roots (Ga and Oyo, respec-
tively) to what they each saw as the potential nation (Gold Coast and Yoruba, respec-
tively) profoundly shaped the emplotment of both Histories. Because Reindorf took 
as his collective subject a regional entity, defined originally by European activities 
and of much linguistic diversity, he plotted his as a universal history of enlighten-
ment and progress working itself out in the Gold Coast. There are traces of other 
plots, such as the Rev. J. Zimmermann’s scheme of Hamitic migration from the 
ancient seats of religion and civilization, followed by a “deathlike sleep of more than 
a thousand years,” and finally the renewed call for Africa to rejoin “the history of 
the world” (HGCA, 1). And Middle Eastern, especially Jewish, origins had other, 
more specific uses: they could be used to back up such claims as that “no African 
nation or tribe [is] ever known to have so advanced in their religious views as the 
Akras” (HGCA, 6). But in the main, after an opening that gives us the Bevölkerung 
of the Gold Coast and early visitors from outside, HGCA presents a continuous his-
tory, with some ups and downs, but still with the overall impression of an upward 










































movement. This effect is chiefly achieved by there being three (out of the 29) chap-
ters that are thematic rather than segments of the chronological sequence that 
structures the work as a whole. The first (chapter 8) is a remarkable comparison of 
Tshi (Akan) and Akra (Ga) political forms, in terms partly of an antithesis between 
despotic and patriarchal government,11 partly of a developmental sequence from 
prophet to priest to king (which surely derives from the Scripture history of mission 
training); and it urges on “the educated community [the need] to reorganize the 
whole structure of government on Christian principles, before we shall be acknowl-
edged as a nation” (HGCA, 117). The second (chapter 19), interpolated in the main 
narrative sequence at the 1820s, covers the whole history of education and the mis-
sions from 1720 to 1890. The third (chapter 22), interpolated at the 1830s, deals with 
agriculture and runs the whole historical span from the time of Adam, through 
early farming on the Gold Coast, the new crops introduced by Europeans, problems 
of agricultural production, and finally “What the Government Should Do to Get 
the Colony Prosperous.” It looks as if Reindorf found it impossible to work up most 
of his material in his preferred mode, as a story of progressive development, so he 
left it in a relatively unplotted chronicle form; but he provided the three chapters 
that, by each treating an aspect of long-term cultural change, could serve as herme-
neutic keys to the whole, an invitation to the reader to discern steady progress even 
through the vicissitudes of wars and political history.
If the emplotment of Johnson’s HY is more finely integrated, this fundamentally 
depends on his having a more amenable collective subject, the Oyo-to-Yoruba 
nation. Johnson was as committed to progress and Christian enlightenment as 
Reindorf, but he was able to combine it with the contrasting theme of restoration. 
This theme, entirely absent from the exordium of Reindorf ’s History, is given great 
prominence in Johnson’s: British rule will bring not only modern advancement 
but also the welding together of the “disjointed units . . . as in the happy days of 
ABIODUN.” This combination of recursion with progression is deeply set into the 
narrative structure of HY. The thirty-five chapters of HY are divided into two parts: 
part I, which presents an ethnographic introduction (140 pages, with another 55 
mostly on the language), and part II, which is the history itself. Such an extensive 
ethnography gives a very strong definition to the Yoruba collective subject of the 
narrative to come. Part II is divided into four periods: of these the first (a mere 12 
pages) and the second (a further 32 pages) may be taken together as covering the 
history of Old Oyo up to its culmination with the peaceful and prosperous reign 
of Alafin Abiodun; the third period (95 pages) covers the decline, disintegration, 
and eventual collapse of Oyo (ca. 1789–1836) through the joint agency of weak and 
incompetent rulers, disloyal subjects within, and ruthless enemies without, nota-
bly the Fulani jihadists; and the fourth (374 pages) presents the turbulent history of 
the mid- to late nineteenth century as a restoration, which Johnson saw as begin-
ning with the growth of Ibadan (which stopped the Fulani tide) and hoped to see 










































continued under British rule. So although HY is very unevenly weighted toward 
the fourth period, its narrative is clearly plotted in three stages, as the growth, 
decline, and recovery of a single nation.
Johnson’s ideological coup was the persuasive alignment of Yoruba and Christian 
destinies, by means of a great romance of national redemption.12 Since the notion 
of a redemptive history is a profoundly Christian one, we may say that HY offers 
a content of Yoruba experience organized within a Christian form. It is worth not-
ing that, in contrast to Reindorf ’s devoting one of his thematic chapters to them, 
Johnson makes relatively few and passing references to the establishment and activi-
ties of the missions themselves. His Christianity makes itself felt in the more diffuse 
and profound way of how HY is emplotted. Michel Doortmont has made a case 
for Johnson’s classicism, even suggesting that we should view HY as a Greek his-
tory, consciously modeled on the work of Xenophon in particular, who was in the 
Bühler curriculum.13 This is not very persuasive. The few explicit references to the 
Greeks strike me as being essentially decorative in nature, classical grace notes like 
such baptismal names as Claudius, Pythagoras, and Zenobia, which were popular 
at the time with the Christian elite.14 The similarities that Doortmont sees between 
Johnson’s HY and Xenophon’s Hellenica are either commonplace or likely to be for-
tuitous (e.g., both men wrote about their people’s internecine wars, were participant 
observers of them, accepted the reality of divine intervention in human affairs, were 
interested in the portrayal of character, etc.). But however much of the Hellenica 
Johnson may have read with Bühler—and actually there is no direct evidence that he 
read any—it would have been of minimal importance compared to the Scripture his-
tory and Bible study that was the staple of his education. We know that Bühler had 
his pupils learning New Testament stories by heart; and at the end of a course on the 
Old Testament he wrote of his uplift at “their attention, their interest and their aston-
ishment about the wonderful ways and dealings of God with Israel and the nations 
who came into contact with them and the whole plan of God for the redemption of 
the world.”15 The Bible in the King James Version, in which Johnson was saturated, 
and which he must have read virtually every day of his adult life, was incomparably 
the most important external literary influence on his historical thought.
THE EVANGELIST BEC OMES A HISTORIAN
To appreciate the experiential ground of Johnson’s historical work, we need to turn to 
the invaluable record of his and his fellows’ daily thoughts and activities, and through 
them of so much of the life of the community at large, that is provided in the journal 
extracts that CMS agents were required to send back to the mission’s headquarters 
in London. Johnson’s first journal is dated 1870, when he was a young schoolmaster, 
24 years old. In hesitant, immature prose he records his weekly sorties in Ibadan, 
after taking Sunday school, to preach under an ọdan tree. His superior, Daniel Olubi, 










































reported of him that “often he came home with almost the words of the disciple, ‘And 
the Seventy returned with joy saying, Lord, even the devils are subject to us through 
thy name.’ ”16 On the evidence of his own journals, Johnson was highly combative in 
these encounters, showing little tenderness toward the pieties of his pagan auditors. 
At the same time, he early shows an interest in their history and an awareness of the 
importance of history to them: in his first journal he tells us of the settlers in Ibadan 
from the destroyed town of Ikoyi—though he gets the date of its destruction much 
too early—with the ex-king they had honored in their locality.17
We cannot but read Johnson’s early journals for signs of the great History to 
come. At the outset they are far from unique, since the journals of several other 
African agents contain references to history, both in the past and in the current 
life of Yoruba towns, and to manifestations of local culture. Of course, because 
Johnson did write his history, we can sometimes identify in his journals passages 
that were later drawn on directly in HY, among the most remarkable of them one 
that tells of a man’s near-death experience in which he had a revelation of the 
gods.18 In fact we get the first real foretaste of Johnson’s destiny as a historian not in 
his occasional references to past events but in the detail and zest of his narratives 
of political conflict in contemporary Ibadan, where we can compare him directly 
with his colleagues Olubi, Allen, and Okuseinde. Already in 1874 he gives us the 
most detailed blow-by-blow account, some of it eyewitness, of the downfall and 
murder of Efunsetan (the Iyalode or senior female chief), and by 1877 his handling 
of the civil disturbances round the downfalls of two other chiefs, Aiyejenku and 
Iyapo, is even more fluent, expansive, and assured.19
From the late 1870s too, Johnson’s journals start to offer more historical ampli-
fication of his experiences, as if he was now continuously aware of the traces of the 
past in his routines of the present:20
In July 1879 while out and about in Ibadan, he meets a middle-aged man, who 
greets him cordially. The man says he is an Agberi, and to Johnson’s account of him-
self, replies: “I hold my communion directly with the invisible beings and I am too 
enlightened to be taught by you. . . . I am a diviner and can show you Sango, Oya, the 
maker [Obatala] and your own guardian angel [Ori]. . . .” Johnson emphasizes the 
uniqueness of Jesus, and how we cannot know the future, but only how to live and 
the future state after this life. He preaches a whole account of “Jesus and Him cruci-
fied.” The man prostrates and says he’ll come to hear more.
While there are dozens of reports of evangelistic encounters in the CMS jour-
nals that are rounded off something like this, Johnson goes on to tell us something 
about the Agberi:21
“a tribe living to the east of Oyo, and .  .  . regarded as great doctors and charm-
ers. Before the destruction of Oyo, they were the King’s doctors and instruments of 
evil. . . .” He would use them if he wanted to kill a powerful chief, and for their skills 
they were held “in slavish veneration.”










































About this time Johnson starts to travel more widely, especially to the east of 
Yorubaland, which was never under Oyo rule, and he acquires a sharper sense of 
regional variety and local history. He does not lack confidence in his judgments, 
made against a cultural standard provided by the Oyo: Yoruba civility required 
that people lived in towns (ìlú) and had a king (ọba). So in 1880 he describes the 
Ikale, a Yoruba subgroup who lived toward the creeks in the far southeast, as:22
a set of people still inferior to the Ondos [a kingdom of the southeast] in intellect and 
mode of life. They are a half naked, greasy bodied, dirty and covetous people, occu-
pying a vast portion of land, but living in thickets without any regular town. Each 
village consists of a family or families and the headman is their chief. . . . No sign of 
royalty to distinguish them, they are all in their primitive state.
By 1882 he had started occasional diplomatic service with the governor of Lagos 
to end the war. As he passes through Modakeke on his way northeast to the war 
camp of Kiriji, where the armies of Ibadan and the Ekitiparapo faced each other, he 
gives a potted history of the origins of the Ife-Modakeke quarrel, though again his 
dating is loose (“about the commencement of the 18th century [surely he meant the 
19th] when the Yoruba kingdom was destroyed”).23 I suspect that the great project 
of the history may have crystallized in his mind about now—he must have been 
stimulated by what he learned of the antecedents of the bitter interstate rivalries 
expressed at Kiriji. In November 1882, news of an insurrection against the reigning 
Alafin Adeyemi at Oyo led him to comment that “in this country as in [a] civilised 
country the person of the king . . . [is] sacred,” so if a king is rejected, it is a message 
from the people that he must kill himself; and he mentions the precedent of the 
death of Abiodun’s successor Aole, the Alafin at Old Oyo under whom the decline 
began.24 A week later he has an argument with some Muslims in Ibadan about the 
religious authority of the Koran. When one of the Muslims says Mohammed proved 
he was a prophet by giving an account of five generations before his birth, Johnson 
ripostes: “I can now tell you the names and histories of the kings of Yoruba since it 
was kingdom, generations before King Abiodun, am I therefore a prophet?”25 It is 
from this point that we can be pretty sure that Johnson was working on the History.
YORUBA EXPERIENCES,  BIBLICAL INTERPRETATION
Johnson’s maturation as a historian took place against the background of near-
continuous evangelistic and pastoral practice (except for the periods in 1882–84 
and 1886–87 when he was on diplomatic business). So how was doing history rel-
evant to that? History among the Yoruba may be seen as grounded in two contrast-
ing forms (which, however, also touched and sometimes merged with each other): 
tradition and memory. By “tradition” I mean those socially consolidated versions 
of the past, and particularly accounts of the origins of institutions, that served to 










































define communities and underwrite authority in them. By “memory” I mean those 
traces of past experience present in the consciousness of every human being that 
provided the essential but problematic basis for the sense of personal identity, as 
well as the constraining or enabling basis for future action. Tradition is social and 
hierarchical; memory is individual and open-access. In mid- to late nineteenth-
century Yorubaland the break point between the two was largely associated with 
the collapse of Old Oyo and its knock-on effects. Hence references to the two key 
figures of this transition—Abiodun, the Alafin of Oyo at its apogee, and Afonja, 
the ruler of Ilorin whose alliance with the Fulani led to Oyo’s final destruction in 
the 1830s—were commonplace in popular historical discourse and thence taken 
up by Johnson.26 In 1876, he mentions a female baptismal candidate over seventy 
years old, allegedly born about 1800 in the reign of Abiodun, “whom Mungo Park 
knew.”27 As late as 1883 there died a parishioner of Olubi’s, an old lady so full of 
years that she had seen eleven kings of Yoruba crowned.28 Tradition and personal 
memory thus took on another contrast: the former was idealized as past order 
whereas the latter was full of the experiences of warfare, dislocation, enslavement, 
loss of kin, and so forth. David Hinderer commented, in a report of a journey 
through the region of the old Egba towns, destroyed in the wars of the 1820s, that 
a book of touching interest might be written from the tales that his Yoruba com-
panions told of them.29 The recent past, the past of memory, was characterized by 
Yoruba as an “Age of Confusion,” a time under the sway of Esu, the trickster deity.
The aim of any mission is to insert itself into the ongoing history of the evan-
gelized people and so to transform it. With successful missions a complex mutual 
adaptation nearly always occurs, in which Christianity is seen as fulfilling or con-
forming with key elements of local culture even as it challenges or rejects others. 
To appropriate and rework local versions of the past so as to legitimate the new 
religion is a critical aspect of this process. It is also a highly assertive act, for it 
insists both that the Christians belong to local society and that their leaders have 
authority. The clash of rival authority claims was very evident in Johnson’s encoun-
ters with the Agberi diviner and the argumentative Muslim that I have already 
noted. But the very real epistemological issues were never more clearly expressed 
than in an exchange with a Sango devotee, who responded to Johnson’s preaching 
by demanding to know “How could you know God’s mind?” Johnson continues 
his account:30
I replied it was revealed in Christ His blessed son 1800 years ago. He interrupted me 
by saying, “What a liar! Were you then born? How do you want to believe on Him 
whom you have not seen?” I replied, “Let me answer your question by another. Was 
Abiodun really a king of Yoruba?” “Why, decidedly,” he replied, “Who knows not 
that?” “But were you then born?” I asked again. “No,” he replied. I then said, “How 
then do you want me to believe him to have lived and reigned whom you have not 
seen?” He replied, “Eyewitnesses over whom he reigned are living testimonies who 










































testified the same to us.” “Even so,” I rejoined, “Eye and ear witnesses have handed it 
down in writing of all that Jesus did and taught on earth.” He dropped the conversa-
tion and asked for rum.
Here speaks someone who placed the verification of Yoruba and of Christian 
history within a single cognitive framework, with the figure of Abiodun providing 
a critical point of common reference between him and his interlocutor.
In the battle against heathenism, Johnson was quite prepared to use his acquired 
knowledge of history (qua tradition) against those who owned it. In particular, he 
argued that the histories of orisa (deities) showed that they were merely deified 
men, unscrupulously elevated to the status of gods by their priests—a strategy 
especially useful in the case of the Christians’ worst bugbear, Sango, the thunder 
god, who was reputedly an early Alafin of Oyo. The great occasion when this argu-
ment was deployed was when the mission house was itself struck by lightning in 
1883—Johnson himself narrowly missed being killed—and a large crowd of Sango 
worshippers surrounded the house to demand the usual heavy fines and to carry 
out the appropriate rituals of appeasement. The Christians refused to comply, and 
an angry confrontation ensued, but the Sango people were repulsed. In the next 
few days, as many visitors flocked to the mission house, Johnson challenged the 
cult by explaining the nature of electricity and divulging Sango’s history: “The his-
tory of Sango are [sic] only known to the Priests and this the common people 
were also made to know, and the cruel deceits of the Priests exposed by us to 
their shame.”31
In contrast to this polemical euhemerism, the Christians also sought to associ-
ate themselves with the best of Yoruba tradition. In 1898 the elderly Daniel Olubi 
gave a remarkable sermon at the ordination of Johnson’s long-term friend and col-
league, F. L. Akiele, taking as his text II Timothy 2:1, “Then therefore, my child, be 
strong in the grace of Christ Jesus”:32
Olubi gave the Ẹso, the elite of military chiefs at Old Oyo, sometimes called the 
Alafin’s bodyguard, as the exemplar of the virtues commended to the ordinand. 
Renowned for their courage, loyalty, endurance and obedience to their royal master, 
the Ẹsọ had ever to be braced and ready, always prepared to suffer for the cause, 
and their dying words to their king must be “I am coming to meet you.” . . . “Your 
devotion, your obedience, your love must be unquestioning, you cannot prostrate 
yourself to the world, you cannot suffer yourself to be turned aside from the path 
of duty, you cannot allow yourself to grow slack, even in your death you will still be 
your master’s servant.”
This sermon had an electrifying effect on the congregation, whose members 
perfectly understood the symbolic meaning of the Ẹsọ. Johnson’s History (com-
pleted the previous year) shows us why: it quotes sayings still current that cel-
ebrated the honor and staunchness of the Ẹsọ and emphasizes the pride people 










































still felt in being descended from one (HY, 73–74). Olubi’s sermon and Johnson’s 
History may well be taken together as documents that mark a certain moment in 
the inculturation of Christianity by the Yoruba. The Christians in Ibadan had long 
been regarded as “a quiet people, averse to fame and worldly honour,”33 and their 
young men had sometimes been accused of being cowards for their reluctance to 
enroll as warriors, so this conspicuous endorsement of a military elite indicates 
a major rhetorical shift. It is significant that the model was a historical one, set 
back in Old Oyo, while the context of its use was an Ibadan newly under the Pax 
Britannica. Olubi’s sermon expresses a new confidence in the Christian body, as 
it felt itself able to move from the margins of society closer to its center and able 
at last to appropriate something of the values of a past that it once deemed deeply 
inimical to it.
In contrast to this appropriation of tradition in order to place Christianity 
within Yoruba history was the appeal to memory, or the personal experience of 
recent events, in order to give a providential Christian shaping to that history. 
What Johnson does in HY has its roots in the mundane theodicies through which 
people sought meaning in the sufferings and successes of their lives. Though only 
Christianity had the theology for a transcendence of suffering through acceptance 
(“Thy grace is sufficient”), Yoruba pagans and Christians also shared much com-
mon ground: success was read as a sign of divine favor and suffering as a punish-
ment to bring man back again to a proper relationship with God. In 1884 Johnson 
read a paper at the annual prayer joint meeting of the three Ibadan churches, 
“enumerating some of the special merits vouchsafed to us as a church during the 
past year.”34 The main items were the delivery of the houses of several leading 
Christians from pillage by the agents of the war chiefs, and the happy outcome of 
the lightning strike on the mission house, which had ended in the confusion of the 
Sango people.35 The converse of this divine favor for God’s people was the retribu-
tive justice that Johnson saw in the downfall of Iyapo, one of the ringleaders of the 
movement against Aiyejenku (HY, 410).
The politics of Ibadan were such as virtually to preclude a consistent moral 
response to them by Christian leaders. In his journal entries for 1874 describing 
the murder of Efunsetan by her own slaves at the instigation of the head chief, 
Latosisa the Arẹ-Ọna-Kakamfo (leading general of the Oyo army), Johnson leaves 
the reader in no doubt as to Latosisa’s full involvement.36 When charged, Latosisa 
denied it with oaths, “was acquitted to prevent civil war”—and then, with match-
less hypocrisy, presided over the assembly that condemned the slaves to death 
for murder. In an act of necessary diplomacy, the Christian agents (including 
Johnson) then paid a formal visit to the Arẹ-O na-Kakamfo to congratulate him for 
being acquitted and also “to express our feelings of sympathy for the present state 
of the town.” Johnson records that he “really was shaken” at the instant and ruth-
less execution of the slaves; and he concludes his narrative by exclaiming, “ ‘Whoso 










































sheddeth man’s blood, by man shall his blood be shed’ Oh! the consequences of 
sin.” Yet a year or two later he describes Latosisa as “this good chief ” and as a “good 
chief ” of “kindly” actions on account of support he had given to members of the 
Christian body.37 There was realpolitik on both sides to this friendship: Ibadan 
needed to keep the goodwill of the British in Lagos, and the African agents of the 
mission counted as oyinbo (Europeans). In the History, with benefit of distance 
and hindsight, Johnson is able to make a more measured judgment of Latosisa. 
The moral condemnation of many of his actions is still strongly present, but it is 
offset, not by facile plaudits for his favors to the Christians but by an understand-
ing of his actions in Yoruba historical terms. Johnson opens his mature account of 
Latosisa’s move in 1877 to pull down old Chief Aiyejenku by observing (HY, 407):
The Arẹ [Latosisa] now began to evince more and more the characteristics of a 
Kakanfo. Experience has shown us that a Kakanfo always caused trouble at home 
and abroad. Their paths were always marked with blood. We have only to recall the 
history of Afonja of Ilorin, Edun of Gbogun and Ojo Amepo who were rivals, of 
Kurumi of Ijaye among others; and now Latosisa of Ibadan was on the same track.
So while Johnson judges Latosisa as a Christian, he explains his actions as a 
Yoruba.
Latosisa encapsulated the whole problem of Ibadan—and by implication of 
Yoruba culture generally—for the Christians. On the one hand Ibadan was domi-
nated by values and practices deeply antithetical to those of the Christian missions: 
idolatry, slavery and slave raiding, polygamy, a militaristic ethos fostered by con-
stant warfare, notions of personal worth and achievement diametrically opposed 
to those of the bourgeois individualism promoted by the missions. Yet at the same 
time, Johnson felt, there was an objective and overarching sense in which Ibadan 
was on the same side as Christianity in God’s providential plan for his country. He 
makes his perspective plain at the close of the chapter dealing with the foundation 
of Ibadan, where he does not mince words in describing the violence and cruelty 
of its politics. But he concludes (HY, 245–46):
The moral and social atmosphere of such a place as has been described could easily 
be imagined. Yet they were destined by God to play a most important part in the his-
tory of the Yorubas, to break the Fulani yoke and to save the rest of the country from 
foreign domination; in short to be a protector as well as scourge in the land. . . . A 
nation born under such strenuous circumstances cannot but leave the impress of its 
hardihood and warlike spirit on succeeding generations, and so we find it in Ibadan 
to this day. It being the Divine prerogative to use whomsoever He will to effect His 
Divine purpose, God uses a certain nation or individual as the scourge of another 
nation and when His purposes are fulfilled He casts the scourge away.
Johnson did not initiate this rationalization of Ibadan as a God’s scourge of the 
Yoruba, for it was a regular part of the moral discourse of the CMS missionaries in 










































Ibadan. An African catechist, James Barber, had written in 1856 that the Ibadans 
“are proud of the conquering power which the Lord has lent them for a time [but] 
. . . they do not know themselves to be nothing but a whip in the hand of God to 
chastise their fellow sinners.”38 Over twenty years later, Daniel Olubi, travelling 
through Ondo, quotes a view that the Ibadans were “made as rods by God to cor-
rect these nations, and when he pleases to finish with them, there will be an end.”39
The passage quoted above is Johnson’s most central and solemn statement as 
to the purpose of his History: an attempt to discern the purposes of God operat-
ing through the turbulent history of his times and his people, and (as a corollary) 
to give a secure place to Christianity in that history. He achieves this by plotting 
his History as a romance, the story of a people’s redemption through its suffer-
ing, a story whose outcome would bring both a restoration of the nation and its 
renewal through the enlightenment of the Gospel. Ibadan and the Christian mis-
sion, though mutually opposed in so many ways, by God’s providence combined 
to offer salvation to the Yoruba nation. The comparison of Johnson with Reindorf 
from which I began seems to point more clearly to the differences than to the simi-
larity between them. Their contrasting circumstances, which indicated historical 
problems unique to each of them, meant that this had to be so. But they were 
both native pastors of their respective churches; and if there is any indication from 
Johnson as to how we should read Reindorf, it is that we should not overlook how 
the life of the mission agent engendered the historian40—or, as the Yoruba might 
put it: Alufa baba ọpitan, “The pastor is the begetter of the historian.”
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3
Ogun in Precolonial Yorubaland
A Comparative Analysis
Clerical intellectuals like Samuel Johnson prided themselves on being the con-
structors of a more nearly unified concept of Yoruba society and culture,1 includ-
ing something that they called “Yoruba heathenism.”2 Yet they were well aware of 
the variety that stood in the way of this task, since their very activity as evangelists 
introduced them to religious practices in dozens of communities across a large 
swath of Yorubaland, and their detailed reports necessarily document it. In this 
chapter my aim is to use this evidence in a deconstructionist spirit, suggesting 
that the sheer extent of regional diversity in Yoruba religious practice calls into 
question whether we should be speaking of Yoruba religion as a single entity at 
all. We have to deconstruct Yoruba religion if we are to see it as an entity with a 
history rather than (as most of the literature presents it) as a pantheon of deities 
with unchanging, even eternal attributes, as first manifest in the archetypal setting 
of primordial Ile-Ife.
Ogun, the Yoruba god of iron and war, makes an excellent subject for this 
purpose, since his cult is spread all over Yorubaland, placing him clearly 
in  the  quite small number of truly pan-Yoruba orisa. In this task, compari-
son will play a key role, in two dimensions: between the manifestation of 
Ogun in  different areas/locations and between the functional attributes of 
Ogun and other orisa. What will emerge is a view of Yoruba traditional reli-
gion as less a single pantheon of deities with fixed attributes in relation to one 
another, spread evenly across the whole country, than a spectrum of varying 
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EVIDENCE FROM THE CMS JOURNALS
The great bulk of the evidence will be drawn from the journals and reports of mis-
sionary agents—in the great majority, Yoruba ones—of the Church Missionary 
Society, active since 1845 and the richest contemporary source for almost any 
aspect of Yoruba life These men were hardly disinterested observers of what they 
considered to be “idolatry,” and only rarely can their observations be called ethno-
graphic, in the sense of attempting to portray “heathen” religious practices in some 
detail as being significant in their own right. There is, for example, little detailed 
description of the rituals of orisa worship or record of myths or prayers. What we 
have is hundreds of mostly brief references to the orisa and their devotees as they 
came to the attention of CMS agents proceeding about their pastoral and evange-
listic duties. These fall into several main categories: observations of orisa worship 
by individuals encountered in streets or houses; references to public festivals, sac-
rifices, or oracular consultations; conversations and arguments with devotees or 
priests about their orisa or about orisa worship in general; itemizations of which 
idols have been given up by new converts; and, very occasionally, general charac-
terizations of particular orisa or of the cults of a particular community. In contrast 
to much of the large existing literature on orisa, which is strong on general char-
acterizations of the orisa drawn from oral sources such as myths, Ifa divination 
literature and other kinds of religious poetry, and on analyses of their rituals, par-
ticularly the great annual festivals, as observed in the present, the CMS data focus 
our attention on the more prosaic, day-to-day character of orisa worship. Where 
modern studies of traditional religion commonly present it as detached from the 
main preoccupations of daily life, the CMS journal writers, even if their accounts 
do not often penetrate very deeply, cannot but forcefully convey the omnipresence 
of the orisa in the lives of ordinary Yoruba in the nineteenth century. Their evi-
dence, taken as a whole, tells us a great deal about both the settings wherein and 
the occasions when Yoruba people entered into relations with the orisa.
So this body of source material has weaknesses of which we must be aware, as 
well as strengths that we should try to exploit. The most significant strength is the 
sheer number of references to orisa cults—in my reading of the entire archive, I 
have noted 778 of them and have doubtless missed some—made under broadly 
similar assumptions over a large swath of Yorubaland. This makes possible system-
atic comparison between different towns and regions in terms of their cult profiles 
and between the manifestations of particular orisa in different places. Through 
comparison, and particularly through the use of appropriate contrast cases (e.g., 
Sango vs. Ogun, Ogun in eastern vs. in western Yorubaland), we can make much 
more out of what are often rather passing observations. And just as a determined 
historicism is the best antidote to the tendency to essentialize Yoruba religion 










































across time, so is regional comparison to the too easy assumption of pan-Yoruba 
uniformity. It is not that pronounced continuities do not exist in Yoruba religion 
across both time and space but that they need to be seen as existing in the face of 
historical vicissitudes and variable local circumstances.
Table 3.1 presents references to the main orisa in the journals and letters of 
CMS agents organized according to five distinct regions, each of which has its own 
cultural character. Because of the uncertainties attaching to the figures, they are 
better used comparatively with one another—because the effects of the uncertain-
ties will then tend to cancel one another out—rather than treated individually as 
indicators of an objective state of affairs. Moreover, because they are biased by 
where the CMS was active, as well as by the number of mission agents and the 
length of time they served—nearly a third of the references relate to Abeokuta, 
and just over half to the southwestern corner of Yorubaland, while Ijebu and large 
parts of the farther north and east are missing—cross-regional comparisons need 






T O T A L 
(n)
n % n % n % n % n %
Ogun  11   4   6   4  10   7   5   6  21  14  53
Sango  41  16  23  16  41  27  29  38  12   8 146
Oya   3   1   1   1   9   6   7   9   1   1  21
Orisa Oko  14   6   1   1  12   8   5   6   0  —  32
Obatala  30  12   4   3  11   7   2   3   8   5  55
Other white orisa  13   5   8   6   4   3   3   3   1   1  29
Ifa  40  16  31  22  25  17  15  19  29  19 140
Esu/Elegbara  19   8  14  10   9   6   2   3  27  17  71
Osun  15   6   6   4   8   5   0  —  13   8  42
Yemoja  12   5   6   4   1   1   1   1   0  —  20
Other water orisa   5   2   5   3   2   1   1   1   4   3  17
Osanyin   3   1   8   6   1   1   0  —   1   1  13
Sopona   9   4   3   2   2   1   0  —   6   4  20
Buruku   6   2   1   1   2   1   0  —   0  —   9
Ori   6   2   4   3   3   2   3   4   0  —  16
Ibeji   5   2   3   2   2   1   0  —   0  —  10
Other  21   8  20  14   8   5   4   5  31  20  84
 T O T A L 253 100 144 102 150 99 77 98 154 101 778
NOTE: Percentage totals may exceed or fall short of 100 percent on account of rounding. Abeokuta includes all Egba 
and Egbado towns and villages, but more than 90 percent of references relate to Abeokuta itself. Coastal Southwest 
means Lagos, Badagry and vicinity, Awori towns (Ota, Igbesa, Ado Odo). Ibadan is just Ibadan and its farm villages. 
Other Oyo means (in order of importance) Ijaye, Iseyin, New Oyo, Oke Ogun settlements, Ogbomosho, and observa-
tions made on journeys through the Oyo towns to the east of Ibadan. East means (in order of importance) Ondo, 
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to be made on the basis of the proportion of references that each orisa receives in 
a particular region. Thus we can compare the 4 percent of references to orisa that 
Ogun receives in Abeokuta with Obatala’s 12 percent in the same town or the 14 
percent that Ogun reaches in the East. The table needs to be read down (compari-
son within a region) before it is read across (comparison between regions).
Of course, these kinds of data present certain problems in their use. Most impor-
tant, the aggregate references to orisa in the CMS agents’ reports can be at best only 
an approximate measure of their actual significance in the lives of communities, 
since strictly speaking they record not the real frequency of cult observance among 
the Yoruba but rather what struck missionary observers most frequently as worthy 
of report. Religious prejudice, as such, seems less of a problem than less obvious 
forms of bias, such as a tendency to give more space to what caught the eye or to 
neglect those aspects of religion that were private or implicit in other activities. 
Doubts about arguments that proceed largely from silences or thinnesses in the 
sources are well recognized in principle in historical methodology but are less easy 
to quell in practice. I simply say that I am very aware of them, and I will address 
them as they become pertinent at particular points in the argument.
T WO QUESTIONS AB OUT O GUN
So what do the figures tell of Ogun? To begin with, they clearly confirm what is 
often remarked on in the literature, that the cult of Ogun is especially strong in 
eastern Yorubaland. From the Eastern Lagoon up through Ondo to Ilesha and the 
edges of Ekiti, Ogun accounts for 14 percent of orisa reported, third after Ifa (19%) 
and Esu (17%). Ogun’s important cult center at Ire3 is unfortunately unreported—
most of Ekiti was not visited by evangelists until the twentieth century—and so 
is the famous Olojo festival of Ogun at Ife.4 But Ogun’s importance at Ondo and 
Ilesha is strongly attested. At Ondo, unlike Abeokuta or Ibadan, the annual festi-
val of Ogun is referred to as a major event in the public life of the town.5 Though 
references to Ilesha are relatively sparse compared with the rich documentation 
available for Ondo from 1875 onward, the CMS agent there wrote in June 1889 of 
“the annual festivity of Ifa . . . which with Ogun, wh[ose] festivity is always kept 
about six [months] after this, make the two great idols worshipped in common by 
the whole town from the king to the poorest man.”6 Ifa and Ogun still structure the 
Ijesha year in this fashion, and the dominance of precolonial religion by these two 
orisa is strongly confirmed by the responses to a question put to household heads 
in a sample survey that I conducted in Ilesha in 1974: Ifa and Ogun each made up 
26 percent of all orisa named as those worshipped traditionally in the household, 
followed by Osun at 8 percent and Orisa Onifon (the local equivalent of Obatala) 
at 7 percent.7 It so happens that the agents who provide us with information about 
the cults of these eastern Yoruba towns were themselves mostly Egba, and they 










































clearly understood that the cult profiles of this area were significantly different 
from what they knew at home in Abeokuta. So the first question is: Why is Ogun 
more prominent in the religious systems of eastern Yorubaland?
The second question concerns the nature of Ogun’s presence in western 
Yorubaland. My initial reaction on collating the evidence of the CMS reports was 
one of surprise that in the whole southwestern area Ogun accounted for only 4 
percent of references and was outstripped by Sango in the ratio 4:1, even though 
Sango was a deity associated with the Oyo enemies of the Egba.8 In Abeokuta itself, 
Ogun also came behind such orisa as Ifa, Obatala, Esu, Osun, Orisa Oko, and 
Yemoja. In Ibadan and the Oyo areas, Ogun came up somewhat more often but at 
7 percent still did not reach more than half the level reported for the east. This was 
the more surprising since Ogun appears to occur far more often as the main ele-
ment in personal names than any other orisa (with the possible exception of Ifa). 
Notable examples include Ogunbona and Ogundipe, the two balogun (war chiefs) 
who successively between the 1840s and the 1880s were the chief patrons and pro-
tectors of the CMS at Abeokuta; Ogunmola, the Basọrun of Ibadan; Ogunkoroju, 
the Balogun of Ijaye who gave quiet support to the mission there; and Ogunbiyi, 
the first Lagosian chief to become a Christian. The explanation I shall propose 
will be partly a matter of religious realities, that Ogun was part of a more complex 
cultic division of labor in the Center and the West, and partly one of religious 
appearances, that Ogun was of a particularly immanent character, which reduced 
his saliency to the missionary gaze.
O GUN AND IRON
Ogun is most commonly glossed by the CMS journal writers as the god of iron 
and war, and the relations between these aspects have provided a primary focus 
for discussing Ogun’s place in the cultural and political development of forest-belt 
West Africa. Ogun appears as god of iron in a more direct and unmediated sense 
than as god of war, since he is not merely of iron, in the sense of being the force 
or principle behind iron technology, but virtually iron itself, worshipped as a per-
sonal force. The epithet god of iron sounds analogous to such expressions as god of 
brass or god of palm nut, applied to Osun and Ifa, respectively, which missionaries 
sometimes used to make their point that the orisa were merely idols: inanimate 
material objects or artifacts taken to represent imaginary beings. Ogun is some-
times described in this way as god of stone,9 which refers to the blacksmith’s anvil 
stone, taken as one of his symbols. But with iron, it seems less fitting to say that 
Ogun was represented by iron than that Ogun was iron. Perhaps this would explain 
why Ogun, despite the very personalized way in which he appears in myth, is never 
portrayed in carved human form, as such a representation could only be inferior to 
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James Barber when, in his report of a deep discussion with a diviner or babalawo, 
he first wrote “Ogun (the god of iron, which is of hunting and war),” and then 
crossed out the first “of,” so that it reads simply “Ogun (the god iron).”11
This is consistent with the common practice of Ogun’s cult as CMS evangelists 
observed it. At Erinla, near Ondo, a man worships Ogun in the form of some 
iron implements with a piece of skin from an elephant’s tail,12 and at Leki, on the 
Eastern Lagoon, a pastor encounters six men in an enclosure next to a house wor-
shipping Ogun as “twelve guns arranged horizontally in a row, an animal having 
been sacrificed to worship them.”13 But what particularly underscores how much 
Ogun is identified with iron is that clear instances of Ogun worship are often 
described without Ogun being named as such—something that happens with no 
other deity. A Lagos pastor sees a dead fowl hanging over the anvil and bits of kola 
lying around in a blacksmith’s shop. Asked why he doesn’t eat them instead, the 
blacksmith replies that he must be “paying religious homage to his tools as such 
acts make him to be always lucky.”14 The German missionary J. A. Maser gives a 
more detailed account of a rather similar ritual at Abeokuta:
Abroad in the town, he encounters a family group gathered in a blacksmith’s shop for 
an oracular consultation. Seven “country hammers,” the blacksmith’s tools, are set up 
erect, and he addresses each in turn, breaking kola as he does so. As the pieces fall, 
the answers are lucky or not. The sacrificial fowl is held up in front of the hammers. 
As Maser retires, not wanting to disturb the ceremony, the blacksmith calls him back 
to partake of the kola, which he declines.
Maser does not say that the ritual here is addressed to Ogun, but this is con-
firmed when he calls back ten days later to find the blacksmith in the “house of 
Ogun” close by, “making odun [festival]” with his fellow worshippers.15 Elsewhere, 
in the absence of the clinching presence of the blacksmith, iron objects of worship 
can be only presumptively attributed to Ogun, though I think the presumption 
must usually be very strong, as with the calabash with a plate, an old rusty sword, 
a mug, and half of a pair of scissors that made up the idol of a man at Palma,16 or 
the “new god of iron” that Chief Olikosi of Ota set up in the center of his house.17 
A case that is less certain is a reference to people rescuing their “gods of iron” from 
their houses during a fire at Abeokuta, for the plural may have indicated other 
deities, such as Orisa Oko or Osanyin, whose cult objects were also made of iron.18
The links between Ogun and iron appear more directly in connection with 
blacksmiths, who are engaged in the mysterious transformations of ore and metal, 
than with other occupational groups, such as hunters, warriors, and farmers, who 
merely use iron tools. Here there is a very marked and curious bias in the CMS 
references. Although Ogun was more widely worshipped (both by individuals and 
as the major deity of the community) in the east, nearly all the references to black-
smiths, whether or not they also refer to Ogun, occur in documents relating to 










































central or western Yorubaland. This does not seem likely to have occurred ran-
domly, and yet obviously there were many blacksmiths in the east, so it is a real 
puzzle that they are virtually missing from the detailed and continuous reportage 
that we have over more than thirty years from Ondo, for example.19
The most likely immediate reason has to do with the public saliency of black-
smiths, which would affect the frequency of missionary allusion to them. In central 
and western Yoruba, blacksmiths’ shops are often mentioned in reports of public 
preaching about the town, for they were places where people liked to congregate, like 
markets, thus providing the evangelist with a ready-made audience. The processes 
of ironworking were also a rich source of useful metaphors. In one case the evan-
gelist affects to accuse the blacksmith of cruelty for putting the iron in the fire and 
inflicting blows on it—“iron being worshipped by the people as the god of iron,” he 
adds—and goes on to ask them: “To whom then . . . should we give thanks—He who 
makes the iron for our use or the iron which is made?”20 In another case, a catechist 
chances on workers separating the dross from the pure iron and likens it to sin. “As 
this iron was useless before you smelted it, so is our body,” he tells them. “We are to 
be purified before we are made fit for the kingdom of heaven and there is no furnace 
that would make us pure, but the blood of Christ which cleanseth from all sins.”21
These two cases come from Ota and Ibadan, and apparently blacksmiths’ shops 
were not the same kind of public place as this in Ondo. Weavers’ sheds—again a venue 
suitable for the evangelist to make contacts22—present something of a parallel case, 
being present in Ibadan and Abeokuta, but absent in Ondo. Here there is an obvious 
reason: the East lacked the tradition of men’s weaving that existed among the Oyo and 
Egba.23 Though this does not help us directly, it still suggests that regional comparison 
may clarify things. For as well as the contrasts between eastern and central/western 
Yorubaland in the prominence of the Ogun cult and in the frequency of reference to 
blacksmiths in missionary reportage, there is a third: the scale of ironworking activity 
itself. As map 1 shows, whereas the great civic festivals of Ogun are to be found in the 
East, especially in its forest regions, the centers of iron mining and smelting—the real 
seat of iron technology—are located in an arc running from the Awori country west 
of Lagos up into Egbado, to a large area of north-central Yorubaland between Ibadan, 
Iseyin, and Ogbomosho, possibly to Ilorin.24
That blacksmiths’ shops in the Center/West appear more prominently as public 
venues may be related to the practice here of a wider and more elaborate range 
of ironworking techniques, which included smelting. Though Eugenia Herbert 
in her comparative study of African ironworking has underscored the contrast 
between smelting and smithing, the correlations we have found for Yorubaland 
rather undermine her linkage of smithing with the public and smelting with the 
secret and isolated.25 It was in the Yoruba East, which lacked a strong tradition of 
smelting, that blacksmiths appear to have worked inside their compounds, just 
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because it was not locally produced and was imported from the smelting areas of 
the West and North,26 that Ogun was held in the greatest honor.27 For iron must 
have been particularly crucial in enabling agriculture and human settlement to 
take place in the formidable environment of the southeastern forests. Ẹni pe Ilaje 
l’oko, ko ni irin ajo Ogun ye (Whoever calls Ilaje a farm will not have Ogun to clear 
his journey’s path) goes an Ijesha proverb, referring to a small village that was 
once the kingdom’s capital before the foundation of Ilesha.28 What this proverb 
declares, like the festivals of Ogun in towns such as Ilesha and Ondo, is how much 
the overall viability of the community depends on the use of iron. The festivals 
do this most emphatically through the parades of the male citizenry through the 
town, marshaled by their ẹgbẹ or quarter-based bands of militia under their ẹlẹgbẹ 
chiefs, which are such a prominent feature of their title systems.29 This tendency 
Oyo Empire boundary
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Map 1. Yorubaland: Iron and Ogun.










































to associate Ogun with the generality of the townsfolk rather than just with those 
whose work brings them into close contact with iron is perhaps the keynote of the 
cult of Ogun in eastern Yorubaland.
O GUN AS SNAKE:  A LOST CULT?
Nothing that has been said so far—whether about the individual devotions of black-
smiths and others who worked with iron or about the communal importance of Ogun 
in eastern Yorubaland—challenges the notion, widespread in the literature, that (as 
R. C. Abraham’s Dictionary of Modern Yoruba puts it) “Ogun is worshipped only by 
men, not by women.” This may seem to make symbolic sense for a deity of iron and 
war, yet it is not true. Pierre Verger has given a detailed account of women’s participa-
tion as “femmes dediées à l’Orisa et qui chantent pour lui” in a festival of Ogun Igbo 
in the Nago villages of Ilodo and Isede, and Margaret Drewal has described women 
possessed by Ogun not far away at Igbogila in Egbado.30 For a more prosaic instance 
of female devotion to Ogun, there was the female butcher noted by E. M. Lijadu far 
away at Ondo in 1892.31 As she went into her stall in the market, she gathered up her 
iron implements, split kola and threw the pieces several times over them, and offered 
some incantations. To Lijadu’s question, she said she was “consulting Aje the goddess 
of money through Ogun the god of iron [and that] Aje promises to send me many 
customers with much money to carry home after the market.” This Ogun-Aje linkage 
is attested from elsewhere;32 and as a woman’s ritual directed at personal wealth, it may 
perhaps be seen as practically analogous to the cult of Ori, which was popular among 
wealthy women in central and southwestern Yorubaland but apparently absent from 
the East.33 As described here by Lijadu, such elements of the ritual as breaking kola 
over iron tools seem identical to those practiced by male workers with iron.
But the main way in which Ogun appears in the CMS journals as an object of 
women’s worship is quite different: not as iron but as a snake. It was not exclusively 
a women’s cult, though women were most active in it (as indeed in most forms of 
orisa worship). The most dramatic account of the cult of Ogun as snake comes 
from Ijaye in 1855:34
It was the annual Ifa festival of the Arẹ Kurunmi, despotic ruler of the town, and large 
crowds had gathered before the gate of his compound. Most of them were said to be 
“worshippers of the orisa called Ogun or snake,” for Kurunmi’s late mother had been 
one of its principal devotees, and this was in remembrance of her. Lots of snakes of 
different sizes from different parts of the town were brought to “play” with Kurunmi, 
but he wouldn’t allow them inside his house since (says the African catechist Charles 
Phillips) he was afraid of them. So they were displayed on a platform set up in front 
of it. The worshippers took them up and carried them in their arms: mild unless irri-
tated, some were up to six feet long and as thick as a man’s thigh. The people looked 
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Kurunmi’s own premier orisa was Sango, and a rather similar (though reversed) 
family linkage of Sango and Ogun came up during a pastoral visit at Ota in 1855: 
a female devotee of Sango has a child dedicated to Ogun, whose snake is kept in a 
calabash, where it is fed with rats.35
The cult was most publicly manifest when its members went about the town 
with their Ogun snakes, offering blessings in the god’s name and receiving gifts 
(in essence, sacrifices) of cowries in return.36 An African pastor in Abeokuta in 
1852 met two women, “one of whom had a large snake curled round her neck, 
while the other as a crier went before singing and extolling Ogun the god of black-
smith [sic].”37 Many years later another pastor, on the road to the Ibadan camp 
at Ikirun, met a “snake charmer” who had once even attended church at Ibadan 
with a Christian friend, and reproached him for “directing [people] to worship 
Ogun through the snake to earn his livelihood.”38 Back in Ibadan, a catechist told 
a woman sitting by the roadside with her snake and getting a few cowries from 
passersby that Ogun was not the true God to worship.39 A traveling Methodist 
missionary was visited by a female “snake charmer” at Oyo in the early 1890s.40 
Our last glimpse of the cult is again in lbadan, when a European woman mission-
ary encounters “sitting by the roadside an old woman, an Ogun worshipper with a 
huge snake coiled round the body, and she asking alms of the people.”41
This form of the cult of Ogun has gone almost unremarked in the secondary 
literature, save for the briefest passing reference in P. Amaury Talbot’s Peoples of 
Southern Nigeria (1926) to “snake charmers, . . . who adore [Ogun] in the guise of a 
smallish snake called Mana-mana.”42 This does not sound as if it derives from any 
very close acquaintance with the cult, since mọna-mọna means “python,” which 
better fits the descriptions of the sometimes large snakes that occur in eyewit-
ness reports from the nineteenth century. Evidently erased from the memory 
of Abraham’s educated informants in Ibadan in the early 1950s (along with the 
memory that women also worshipped Ogun), it seems likely that it died out rather 
rapidly in the early twentieth century. The old woman whom Mrs. Fry met with 
her snake near Kudeti church in 1911 must have been one of a dwindling band. It 
looks likely that it died out sooner among the Egba than among the Oyo Yoruba: 
the sole Abeokuta reference is from the 1850s, whereas those for the Oyo areas 
continue into the 1880s and later. This seems supported by the confused reference 
to the cult in Rev. Tom Harding’s summary account of Egba religion in 1888: he 
emphasizes the importance of Ogun in a listing of orisa that goes on to mention 
Orisa Oko and Yemoja, and right at the end notes that worship is also given “to a 
snake called Manumanu.”43 Harding’s failure to link “Manumanu” explicitly with 
Ogun, if it is not due to misunderstanding or ignorance, suggests that this form of 
Ogun’s cult was by then rare if not extinct at Abeokuta.
It is not easy, in the absence of evidence of other kinds from outside the CMS 
papers, to explain why Ogun’s cult should take this form. But one final negative 










































clue gives us a little help. There is only one reference to Ogun as snake from out-
side the central and western areas, but it is an exception that seems to prove the 
rule that this cult was exotic to the east:44
At Ondo in 1878 a man and a woman were seen to have brought from Ile-Ife several 
snakes which they publicly exhibited “as the god Ogun, blessing the people in its 
name . . . [and getting] large amounts of cowries in return.” But next day one of the 
quarter chiefs took against them when they started their display in his street, and 
threatened to cut the snakes to pieces. This triggered a popular clamor against them, 
and the Lisa [Ondo’s most powerful chief of the day] advised them to get out of town.
Since the site of Ile-Ife was all but deserted at this time, it seems quite likely 
that these two religious entrepreneurs were not themselves Ifes but Oyos from the 
adjacent settlement of Modakeke, where the cult must have been as prevalent as 
it was in Ibadan or Ijaye. However that may be, the Ondos clearly took it greatly 
amiss that strangers should come and present one of their most important deities 
in such an outlandish form.
So we need to seek an explanation in terms that apply specifically to the situ-
ation in central and western Yorubaland. Dahomey may seem a possible source, 
since it had two notable snake deities. There was the vodun Dangbe, represented 
by a large python at its major cult center at Whydah, and also worshipped along 
the lagoon eastward as far as Badagry;45 and there was also the rainbow serpent 
Dan, otherwise known as Aido-Hwedo or (by the Yoruba) Osumare, whose ori-
gins were traced to the Mahi country north of Abomey.46 But neither of these 
seems to have any affinity with Ogun (or with Gu, his Dahomean form). In any 
case, an explanation of a cult in terms of external origins is less helpful than one 
that deals with its intrinsic meaning.
Unfortunately, the lack of external evidence to supplement the thin accounts 
in the CMS journals prevents anything more than the most hesitant specula-
tion. Snake symbolism in general can carry a number of different connotations, 
but one of the most widespread is of earth-rooted or chthonic power, and this 
would fit with the technologies of iron production, mining, and smelting, long 
practiced in central and western Yorubaland. Ogun as snake evidently had its 
heartland in the Oyo towns where Ogun, while not attaining the degree of civic 
recognition that it got in the iron-hungry East, was nevertheless an ancient cult, 
probably more so than Sango.47 It was at Oyo in the 1950s that Peter Morton-
Williams came across the orisa Alajogun, a refraction of Ogun known as the deity 
of fighting.48Alajogun, unlike Ogun himself, was represented in human form, and 
in one instance was accompanied by his wife Oke Ijemori, she standing with a 
snake around her neck (for she was said to play with them). Their children were 
hills (oke), and one wonders if iron-bearing hills were particularly intended. For 











































Ogun in Precolonial Yorubaland    63
O GUN AND ORISA OKO
The prominence of any one of Ogun’s potential meanings or functions in a partic-
ular place depends partly on local circumstances (such as the mining and smelting 
operations of the Center/West or the acute iron hunger of the East), but it is also 
affected by what other deities are present in any local complex of cults. By “local 
cult complex” I mean the ensemble of cults found in a particular place, which is 
likely to include both several orisa found more widely and others of more local 
currency, perhaps even locally unique. These complexes are the practical, con-
crete reality of Yoruba religion, rather than the pan-Yoruba pantheons—models 
or idealizations that give the orisa their particular characters, temporally and spa-
tially standardized, and set them in a system of complementary relations with one 
another—that dominate the literature.49
What is generally held to be distinctive of an orisa is also qualified by the fact that all 
orisa are required by their devotees to provide much the same range of general benefits: 
protection, health, guidance, children, wealth, and so on. This means that female orisa 
(such as the gentle and fecund river goddesses Osun and Yemoja) sometimes take on 
traditionally male qualities like fierceness, while orisa with predominantly male func-
tions (such as Ogun or Sango) can also reward their female devotees with fertility.50 
The mobility of orisa, whether as a consequence of the migration of their ordinary 
adherents or through the promotional zeal of their priests, also promotes shifts in the 
character of orisa. An incoming orisa may find its special niche (as the deity of the 
new yam, or smallpox, or hunting) already occupied, or it may seek to carve out a new 
niche for itself. Even the thunder god Sango, who seems the most essentially male of 
deities, can come to be represented as female where he is a latecomer to a commu-
nity that already has a male thunder deity.51 The unending push and pull between the 
homogenization and the differentiation of cults that takes place in the Yoruba religious 
marketplace means that no single cult can be considered in isolation.
As the god of the farm, whose main cult emblem was an iron stave made from 
hoe blades, Orisa Oko overlaps with Ogun in respect of the application of iron 
technology to agriculture. Though variously described as male or female, Orisa 
Oko is most commonly represented in myth as a hunter who turned to farm-
ing. His/her main cult center was at Irawo, a small town in the far northwest of 
Yorubaland, where there was an important shrine for the settlement of witchcraft 
accusations. According to the Rev. Thomas King, an Egba, Orisa Oko was the 
most esteemed and prominent deity worshipped by women at Abeokuta and was 
handed down in families, where its first acquisition “was always originate[d] from 
the accusation of witchcraft and sorcery.”52 Initiation was expensive, but member-
ship carried social privileges: devotees (recognized by red and white marks on the 
forehead) could not be seized for debt, might cross war lines, and were exempt 
from tolls.53 The interdict against their coming into contact with corpses suggests 
the relevance of the same complex of ideas about pollution and death that pertain 










































to the cleansing role of the blacksmith’s forge. A striking case of functional overlap 
at Abeokuta between Orisa Oko and Ogun was evident when, in order to promote 
cotton as a cash crop, the CMS introduced a roller gin to clean the raw cotton. Its 
erection and operation aroused great interest among the Egba, some reckoning it 
to be “a sort of mysteriously acting fieldpiece . . . for the use of the Egbas against 
their enemies,” while others, contemplating it in silence, took it to be a manifesta-
tion of Orisa Oko.54 In view of Ogun’s celebrated adaptation to modern technol-
ogy, it is noteworthy that in this instance from the mid-1850s it was Orisa Oko who 
took that part—as “a god represented by iron,” explains our witness.
In the CMS reports from Ibadan, Orisa Oko figures rather differently. There is 
less emphasis on the elite status of Orisa Oko’s devotees, and more on the commu-
nal importance of the cult. Because Abeokuta was founded as an amalgamation of 
many small towns, which kept each its cultic peculiarities, there was virtually no cult 
that embraced the whole town save that of Oro, the collective ancestors.55 Ibadan’s 
population was even more heterogeneous in its origins, but its early settlers were so 
scrambled that townwide festivals could coalesce more readily. The Egba pastor of 
Ibadan, Daniel Olubi, considered that, because “the whole town” was involved in 
them, the three principal deities of Ibadan were Orisa Oko, in whose honor “every 
gate and street are full of soup and pounded yams,” along with Ogiyan (one of the 
“white deities,” related to Obatala), and Oke’badan (Ibadan Hill, the genius loci).56 
Orisa Oko’s importance, shown by his association with the New Yam festivities, rested 
on the Ibadan people’s recognition of his key role in the annual reproduction of their 
community. When the second rains of 1883, much needed and expected, arrived in a 
nightlong downpour in mid-August, a pastor overheard many people in the street the 
next day attribute them to Orisa Oko, whose feast was due at the next new moon.57
All this seems to be just what we would expect for the chief agricultural deity; 
and insofar as Ogun could also have agricultural functions, we can consider Orisa 
Oko to have taken some of the semantic space in the West that Ogun occupied in 
the East. The exact converse has been noted by J. R. O. Ojo in a western Ekiti town 
where Orisa Oko had been introduced from an Oyo source: finding Ogun already 
clearly associated with farming, Orisa Oko had to assume a much more general 
role, as healer and protector against witchcraft and the like.58 Another illuminating 
case is provided by Ila-Orangun, the main Igbomina town, which stands on the 
border between the East (where Ogun is the major civic deity) and the Center/
West (where Sango and Orisa Oko have a strong presence). Here, according to 
John Pemberton’s careful analysis, Ogun stands in a complementary relationship 
to Orisa Oko as hunter to farmer, the two aspects of subsistence provision.59 But 
the ceremonial placing of the New Yam ritual was not simply a matter of anchoring 
it to the festival of the main agricultural deity. While it was very widely attached 
to Orisa Oko in the Center/West and to Ogun in the East, other orisa figured too: 
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and even Sango at Ijaye.60 Its linkage with a particular orisa seems to have been 
governed by local and practical considerations as much as by what was symboli-
cally most appropriate, though in the towns of the East (as well as some old towns 
in the Center/West, such as Iseyin and Ede) Ogun was always bound into a cer-
emonial sequence that linked him with collective and royal ancestors, and with the 
forces of annual renewal, of which eating the New Yam was a powerful symbol.
O GUN AND SANGO
As a force to build empire, Ogun is challenged by Sango, the early Alafin of Oyo dei-
fied as the god of thunder. J. L. Matory has persuasively shown that Sango was much 
more than just the official cult of the Oyo regime: he was the very icon of the means 
and manner of the Alafin’s rule through his messengers (the ilari), the royal wives, 
and the Sango priests, who all stood symbolically as wives to the god-king as possess-
ing husband.61 Matory goes on to contrast Ogun with Sango as a deity who was more 
effective as a pathfinder or culture hero than as a ruler, and whom myth represents 
as failing to sustain his marriage with Yemoja. This is fair enough for Oyo but does 
not capture the manner in which Ogun’s cult realized its communal importance, 
particularly among the eastern Yoruba. The central feature is that, despite his linkage 
with royal ancestors, Ogun’s was typically a civic rather than a royal cult: a deity wor-
shipped “from the king to the poorest man,” as M. J. Luke put it for Ilesha in 1889.62 
A clear sign of this is the occurrence during Ogun festivals—as at Ilesha and Ila—of 
mock battles between palace and town chiefs, ritual dramas that present the expres-
sion and resolution of conflicts between the king and the people as lying at the heart 
of the public life of the community. At Ilesha, it was chiefs particularly connected 
with Ogun/iron who mediated the tensions between the king and the people.63
In the 1820s the imperial order of Old Oyo gave way to seventy years of turbu-
lence among its successor states and their neighbors, which Matory sees as an Age of 
Ogun following an Age of Sango. The newly dominant social forms of the period—
the warlords (ologun) and their retainers or “war boys” (omo-ogun), their vast mili-
tary households, their prominence in the title systems of new towns such as Ibadan, 
Abeokuta, and Ijaye—have been well described by historians.64 Matory’s is quite a 
Yoruba way of putting it, in terms of successive ages (aiye) that have each its distinct 
character, and there is some evidence that contemporaries saw it this way too. A 
babalawo, in discussion with an African catechist in Ibadan in 1855, put down the 
wars to God’s having sent Esu (disorder) and Ogun (war) “to execute His vengeance 
on men upon the earth for their disobedience.”65 Two decades later, a rather similar 
diagnosis was made by another babalawo, also in Ibadan.66 God had sent Ogun and 
Sopona (the god of smallpox) into the world to “render unto everyone according to 
his deeds.” As he went on, “Ogun is armed with four thousand short swords, and he 
goes out daily on the earth to slay, for his meat is to drink the blood of the slain.” The 










































babalawo ended by referring to Sango, “a very mighty god, and when he is about to 
go [into] the world, he is always cautioned by Ifa and Orisanla to deal gently with 
their own special worshippers.” So both Ogun and Sango, like Esu and Sopona, are 
here seen as destructive deities, in contrast to the saving deities Ifa and Orisanla 
(Obatala). But the overall message is less that Yoruba considered this as uniquely 
Ogun’s age than that they recognized Ogun as one of the major forces shaping it.
For as far as levels of individual devotion go, there is no evidence that Sango was 
displaced by Ogun. On the contrary, by the CMS evidence, Sango appears along-
side Ifa as the most popular deity of late nineteenth-century Yorubaland, though 
less pan-Yoruba in the spread of his appeal than Ifa. Accounting for as many as 38 
percent of all orisa referred to in Other Oyo towns (see table 3.1) and 27 percent 
in Ibadan—a difference explicable by Ibadan’s significant population of non-Oyo 
origin—Sango attains 16 percent at Abeokuta, and still reaches 8 percent, equal to 
Osun, in the East, right outside his home territory. References to Ogun run at much 
lower levels, except for the East (where Ogun stands at 14 percent). Though these 
two sets of figures for Ogun and Sango are misleading as direct measures of their 
relative importance, they do shed valuable light on the social character of the two 
cults. For I suggest that the number of reports of Sango expresses not merely his 
popularity but also the sometimes spectacular appearance of his cult and the zeal 
with which he was promoted, both of which gave it a very high profile in nineteenth-
century Yoruba towns. Sango’s cult survived the collapse of the old imperial capital 
where it had been based, and it thrived vigorously in the new world of the warlords. 
It made its way through the belief of its devotees in its protecting power, through 
the way that it both frightened people and offered them relief from their fears, and 
through sheer predation, in the form of the purification fines or fees, backed by the 
threat of violence, that it levied after a house had been struck by lightning.67 While 
priests of Ogun are never mentioned in the CMS reports68 (except to the extent that 
a blacksmith might implicitly serve as one), priests of Sango are the next most fre-
quently mentioned religious specialists after babalawo and Muslim alfa. The senior 
Sango priests at Ibadan were clearly formidable figures who had to be treated with 
circumspection by the ruling war chiefs of the town,69 whereas the cult of Ogun does 
not appear as a distinct force in the politics of the town at all.
The adaptability of the Sango cult shows up equally at whichever end of its range 
we view it. As an instrument of rule, its potency was most evident at Ijaye, which 
until 1862 was Ibadan’s only rival as the military successor state to Oyo. Ijaye’s ruler 
Kurunmi—functionally a man of Ogun, if ever there was one—took the headship 
of the Sango cult himself and made it a mainstay of his regime. But Ijaye was an 
Oyo town, whose people already held Sango in awe. More impressive in its way 
was the extent to which Sango started to make inroads into Ogun’s heartland of the 
East, regions that war and trade had opened to Oyo influence as never before. At 
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king,70 and their confident public praises of their god excited some popular resent-
ment.71 The reasons for these developments at Ilesha are obscure, but for Ondo we 
have a much better picture. In the late 1870s Ondo was afflicted by a run of small-
pox epidemics. Though Sango was said in 1877 to be “worshipped here by only a 
few . . . [and] looked upon with some degree of contempt by the mass of the people,” 
two years later he had “many worshippers,” who conducted an impressive festival.72 
In 1879 and 1880 the chiefs gave large amounts to some newly arrived Sango cult-
ists for sacrifices to expel the disease. The sheer chutzpah of the Sango people in 
promoting their god as the solution to the epidemic—something for which he was 
not previously known—can only be wondered at, especially when they called at the 
CMS compound afterward to mock the Ondos for their gullibility.73
Ogun’s relevance to the public sphere was realized differently from Sango’s. In 
all areas of Yorubaland, the nexus of killing, pollution, purification, and retribu-
tory justice was cardinal to it. Kurunmi, who avoided close contact with his moth-
er’s cult of Ogun as snake, is reported to have turned to Ogun on two occasions, 
which both involved the claim to righteous vengeance. An adulterous wife of his 
was killed, and her organs were torn out “in the front of his house before his Ogu, 
his god of iron”; and an old woman was killed for an unspecified offense at his Ifa 
festival, again before his Ogun, who this time received his usual sacrifice of a dog.74 
At Ota the place for executing criminals was a little grove of trees near one of the 
town gates, known as Ojugun (The Face of Ogun).75 Ogun’s role as the sanction of 
justice, which was most usually expressed in the practice of swearing on iron, is 
closely linked to his role in purifying the just shedder of blood. Here every black-
smith’s shop was potentially a shrine: after the egungun at Ibadan had executed 
the adulterous wife of a chief, the actual killer had to sleep in a blacksmith’s shop 
for several nights, to be released from blood guilt.76 Both sides at the Kiriji battle-
field had shrines of Ogun whither heads of the slain were taken,77 which sound 
similar in their general form to the hunters’ shrines of Ogun marked out by the 
cheekbones of elephants.78 That of the Ekitiparapo was a grove in the middle of the 
camp where sacrifices were made, and there was also a smithy that could serve as 
a sanctuary, like other blacksmiths’ shops.79 Ogun, even in relation to the butchery 
of war, was far from being gratuitously bloodthirsty. He was not even always the 
deity who received human sacrifices: when the war staff (opagun) was propitiated 
at the beginning of Ibadan’s campaigns, it was Oranyan, not Ogun, for whom a 
man was killed.80 Unlike Sango’s, the cult of Ogun was not predatory.
O GUNDIPE AS MAN OF O GUN
Yoruba religion is distinguished equally by the variety of its orisa and the reality of 
personal cultic choice. It has long been suggested that as a result there might be a 
close match between the personality of the devotee and the character of his god. This 










































idea is strikingly confirmed in the case of that individual worshipper of Ogun about 
whom the CMS missionaries tell us the most, the Egba chief Ogundipe. A revealing 
incident is told by the English missionary J. B. Wood, who reckoned him a friend and 
had many dealings with him.81 Ogundipe trained as a blacksmith, and even into his 
old age—he was now around seventy—continued to work at his forge. Wood once 
called to see him and knew he was at work from the smoke curling up in the evening 
air from the back of the house. Since no member of Ogundipe’s household dared to 
interrupt him in his smithy, Wood had to wait and finally had to leave after more 
than an hour without seeing him. The story discloses not only Ogundipe’s commit-
ment to his “mystery” but the awe, even fear, in which his people held him. Like other 
great warlords, he maintained a large, polygynous household, which he ruled as its 
absolute master. If a wife or a slave absconded, he would pursue his rights with fero-
cious persistence, and on at least two occasions he killed adulterous wives.82 His end 
was tragic. In failing health and fearing plots against him, he kept revolvers and a rifle 
always at his side, and he shot one of his wives, whom he suspected of poisoning his 
sleeping mat.83 His death a few days later was suspected to be by his own hand—or 
perhaps someone in his household could stand his rage no longer.
If all this recalls the myths of Ogun’s propensity for violence and his own fraught 
marriage, other sides of Ogundipe’s life fit more positive aspects of the mythical 
template. The Methodist missionary J. F. T. Halligey called him “not only a brave 
warrior, but a very skillful mechanic—quite an artist in metal work”: he made his 
own staff of brass, ornamented “with curious figures.”84 Ogundipe’s artistic inter-
ests extended to music as well as to metalwork: he composed songs, which he set 
to his own music and had sung by a choir of his wives. Halligey actually met him 
“engaged in one of those interesting rehearsals,” conducting some twenty-five 
women who accompanied their singing with a gentle rhythmical swaying and clap-
ping. The words of the song, alluding to recent conflict in the town, were as follows:
They who destroy other men’s houses really destroy their own;
The war chiefs sent their men to pull down the houses of the white men.
The houses of the war chiefs must now come down.
Cowards and thieves these war chiefs are.
Strangers who visit us in peace they plunder.
Ah! When the Dahomians come, these chiefs will flee.
We seem here to have a synthesis between the topical chants associated with 
the Oro cult (performed by men),85 the Christian practice of conducted choral 
singing, and perhaps an element of praise poetry (oriki, performed by women). 
The expressed sentiment of retributive violence, of course, is most thoroughly 
Ogun’s.86 And even as they sang their husband’s praises, the women could not have 
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Yet despite Ogundipe’s capacity for violence, J. B. Wood insisted that in the 
public life of Abeokuta “he was admired, feared and respected. As a judge he was 
well-liked, since his judgments were regarded as fair, whilst his charges were mod-
erate.”87 The Egba attributed the failure of the second rains of 1887, shortly after his 
death, to the passing of a great man.88 He had first come to attention in the 1850s 
as the lieutenant of the enlightened chief Ogunbona, on whose death he became 
in turn the chief patron of the missionaries. He staunchly supported them during 
the crisis of 1867, when the Europeans were expelled from Abeokuta in response 
to the policies of the British governor of Lagos. Ogundipe’s policy was always to 
keep trade routes to Lagos open and to encourage cultural innovation. When he 
argued, against those who wanted to maintain the blockade of the river linking 
Abeokuta and the lagoon, that “the river was made by God and is for him, and 
that whatever is made by God is made for the Common use of all his creatures,”89 
the Ogun theme of open roads converges with ideas of Christian enlightenment.90 
Ogundipe was widely known by the sobriquet Alatise,91 a name that alludes to a 
proverb promoting the ideal of active responsibility: its meaning comes close to “a 
man’s got to do what a man’s got to do.”92 Toward the end of his life he modified it 
to the title Alatunse (The One Who Restores Things).93 Though this seems to allude 
directly to his role in the installation of an Alake (the Egba paramount) in 1884, it 
also clearly echoes a recurrent missionary theme: that their preaching was about 
atunse aiye, “the restoration of the world” from its present state of confusion.94
O GUN IN HISTORY
Of the two main ways in which anthropology can be historical—in dealing with 
the past as other and in addressing the problem of change—this chapter has 
concentrated on the former, attempting to give an account of the cult of Ogun 
as it was in the second half of the nineteenth century. The variations that have 
concerned us have chiefly been variations across space, not across time, and par-
ticularly as they link with variations in levels of missionary reportage of different 
orisa. The problem of Ogun’s greater prominence in the Yoruba East proved less 
intractable than that of the apparently low level of his reportage in the Center/
West when compared with that of some other orisa, notably Sango. To some 
extent, functions ascribed to Ogun in the East are taken up by other orisa in the 
Center/West, such as the agricultural deity Orisa Oko. The case of Sango, how-
ever, was quite otherwise: it was a matter less of competition for the same func-
tional niche than of a general challenge posed by a cult that was distinctly orga-
nized, aggressively promoted, and endowed with formidable sanctions. Ogun, 
by contrast, was a cult much more implicitly grounded in a range of mundane 
activities that were vital to the welfare of the community, all arising from the per-
ceived importance of iron. These respective characteristics ensured that Sango 










































would get the maximum publicity in missionary reports whereas Ogun would 
tend to be underreported.
When the otherness of past practice is clearly shown—as here, most strik-
ingly, with the largely female cult of Ogun as snake—the problem of change soon 
demands attention too. The conundrum here is that, although it is the differences 
between present and past that pose the problem, the past has to be seen as provid-
ing essential conditions for the present. The great fact about Ogun’s recent history is 
his singular relative success, over a period in which orisa cults in general have been 
in marked decline, in adapting to the circumstances of modernity. Whereas Orisa 
Oko has declined with the marginalization of subsistence agriculture and the Sango 
cult has lost its most potent sanctions, Ogun never depended on such sanctions 
and still possesses a large field in which he is the implicit controlling force. Though 
some of his areas of functional relevance have shrunk in importance—subsistence 
farming, hunting, local warfare, and mining/smelting operations—there has been 
a vast expansion in others, such as the use and repair of iron implements. If we see 
Ogun qua iron in the center of the picture, then it is a shift away from the producer 
to the user end of iron technology. I suggest that the demise of Ogun’s snake cult 
was an aspect of this shift. Most notable of all, perhaps, have been the uses of iron in 
relation to modern travel, where Ogun’s traditional connection with the open road 
has been reaffirmed. The nexus of mechanics, drivers, motor-park touts (agbero), 
party thugs, and so on—the milieu memorably depicted in Wole Soyinka’s play The 
Road—extends back to some of the values of the nineteenth-century war boys.
How far the modern manifestation of Ogun has been affected by his perception 
as a culture hero or as the archetype of the artist, as Soyinka has expressed it,95 is 
hard to say. Suffice it to note that, whatever his personal religious beliefs, Soyinka 
stands directly in a tradition that runs back to the central figures of late nineteenth-
century Egba Christianity. His great-grandfather, the Rev. J. J. Ransome-Kuti, was 
doubtless among the clergy and elders whom the Rev. Tom Harding assembled at 
Ake church in 1888, the year after Ogundipe’s death, to provide collective answers 
to a questionnaire about Egba religion and who gave it as their view that Ogun was 
“the chief of all the many gods of the Yoruba people; . . . when other gods are con-
sulted, their reply is ‘worship Ogun.’ ”96 The aggregate evidence of the CMS archive 
is hardly compatible with quite such a sweeping view. But perhaps we may inter-
pret the opinion as a sign for the future as well as a statement about the past, as 
showing that a body of leading Yoruba Christians was already prepared to regard 
Ogun as an acceptable symbol of some widely shared values of their culture.
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The intellectual ambition of Harvey Whitehouse’s project on divergent modes of 
religiosity (hereafter DMR) compels respect:1 no less than to develop a general 
theory of religion.2 Though there have recently been others,3 what makes White-
house’s somewhat different is that it has grown out of the ethnography of a par-
ticular region, Melanesia: one marked by a religious scene of remarkable diversity, 
where the confrontation between local tradition and missionary Christianity has 
not only produced a range of movements drawing on both, but has forced the 
contrast between different kinds of religion to the center of analytic attention. The 
tension between anthropology’s ambition to develop a theory of a general, even 
universal, scope and its main research practice of regionally based ethnography is, 
of course, very much what drives it as a discipline. Yet if the history of anthropol-
ogy shows anything, it is that its high ambition to be a science of man or a natural 
science of society has continually faltered in the face of the problems of regional 
and historical specificity that ethnography throws up. While it is true that eth-
nographic research has sometimes been inspired by theoretical concerns of high 
generality, what has happened repeatedly is that what were born as theories have 
survived as models: that is, as conceptual instruments for the more precise de-
scription and analysis of particular cases. The subject has tended to be centrifugal, 
in that theories are evaluated on the grounds of whether they are useful or have 
heuristic value in relation to the problems thrown up by particular local (or, at 
most, regional) studies. Whitehouse’s aim is centripetal, in that it seeks to draw on 
local studies to test and refine the theory.
As Whitehouse points out, his distinction between imagistic and doctrinal 
modes of religiosity has a definite affinity with many of the other dichotomous 
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contrasts that have been proposed in the sociology of religion, from Weber and 
Durkheim onward.4 The central focus of these dichotomies has usually been on 
the content of the religions: with what they are about or with their orientation to 
life and the world. Thus Ruth Benedict’s contrast of Apollonian and Dionysian 
religions is to do with the ethos that they express and promote; while Turner and 
other anthropologists of Africa have distinguished between cults that are primar-
ily oriented to ancestors, or forces of society, or to deities/spirits of the land, or 
forces of nature. Of course, such variations in content will tend to be linked to 
other attributes, such as with their forms of organization or with their range or 
scale, but it is the linkage of such features with content that has tended to be the 
crucial issue both in sociological arguments about the functional importance of 
various features of religion and in historical arguments about the impact of par-
ticular religions on the direction of social change.
The distinctiveness of Whitehouse’s approach shows up most instructively when 
we contrast it with Weber’s, since there is much overlap in their content. Weber’s 
sociology of religion pivoted on a distinction between traditional, primitive, or 
small-scale religions and world religions. Though this may seem to imply a pri-
mary concern with the effects of scale, Weber was essentially concerned with dif-
ferences in their soteriological content: with whether salvation is a material, this-
worldly matter or whether it has other-worldly objectives, as is the case with world 
religions; with the various directions that the search for salvation may take; with 
the affinities between different notions of salvation and the orientations of par-
ticular status groups; and with the consequences of these cultural choices for other 
areas of life. For several decades now the most impressive work in the Weberian 
tradition that covers much of the same subject matter as Arguments and Icons has 
been Bryan Wilson’s Magic and the Millennium.5 Its comparative analysis of move-
ments in Africa, North America, Melanesia, and elsewhere is based on a sevenfold 
typology of their responses to the world. The sheer empirical variety and complex-
ity of religious phenomena that led Wilson to this diversification of the original 
Troeltschean two-term typology of sect vs. church is for Whitehouse a means to 
the more strenuous testing and refinement of his dichotomous typology and its 
theoretical underpinning. Wilson points out that sociologists of religious move-
ments have been largely preoccupied by the issues of doctrine, organization, and 
the relations between them (and that often in ways shaped by their Christian ante-
cedents). But for Whitehouse it is neither the content of doctrine (or as he prefers, 
revelation) nor organization that is the pivot of his typology but the way in which 
the core revelation of a movement is encoded and transmitted. It looks to Darwin 
rather Weber, since it is about what religions have to do/be in order to survive and 
perpetuate themselves; and its premises are drawn from cognitive psychology.
Any revelation’s accurate transmission over time depends upon the mecha-
nisms of memory that it can call upon. Again, the emphasis of the theory of DMR 










































is not on how the content of memory may be influenced by external forces but on 
the effects of different forms of memory.6 These are of two kinds: episodic memory, 
which is of particular personal experiences; and semantic memory, which is of 
the generalized knowledge, whether practical or theoretical, that people acquire 
or have been taught as members of a community. Corresponding to these are two 
ideal-typical modes of religiosity: an imagistic mode, wherein adherents’ grasp of 
their religion is encoded in personal recollections of relevant experiences, particu-
larly of an emotionally arousing kind, such as of a terrifying initiation or a dramatic 
conversion; and a doctrinal mode, which derives from such means as sermons, cat-
echizing, and rituals of a more routine kind. From an evolutionary viewpoint, each 
mode has its own limitations. The imagistic mode, since it depends on the recall of 
exceptional, irregular, and personally variable experiences, tends to generate cults 
that are limited to small, local communities and are susceptible to constant modi-
fication. The standardized and constantly repeated forms of the doctrinal mode do 
facilitate its spread to populations of varying local circumstances and ensure a rela-
tively faithful transmission of its revelation. The main problem faced by the doctri-
nal mode is that repetition creates boredom and so reduces the motivation of par-
ticipants. Any religion that managed to combine appropriate elements from both 
modes would find the prospects for its transmission and spread greatly enhanced.
As already noted, the first impetus to the theory of DMR came from trying to 
make sense of the religious diversity of Melanesia, where the initiation rites of peo-
ples like the Orokaiva or the Baktaman suggested the imagistic mode; and the very 
different face of mission Christianity, the doctrinal mode. Whitehouse insists that, 
though the two modes are only tendencies and most actual traditions contain ele-
ments of either, the strength of their respective internal logics means that in prac-
tice Melanesian traditions “gravitate strongly” to one or the other, or if toward both, 
they do so “within readily distinguishable domains of operation.” The evolutionary 
framework of his argument enjoins us to look less at what gives rise to either mode in 
general than to what enhances the survival prospects of particular cults or religions.
Yet the question of origins is pertinent to the general argument in one respect. It 
seems highly likely that the imagistic mode is more ancient, possibly going back to 
the Upper Palaeolithic era, and that the doctrinal mode, since it depends so much 
on codification by means of writing, came much later. So it is not surprising that 
Durkheim, when he came to characterize the forms of religion in general, drew his 
example from a Stone Age religion of a markedly imagistic kind. Here Whitehouse 
is led to comment that Durkheim overgeneralized, ignoring the different ways in 
which the doctrinal mode operated. But it is less the deutero-Durkheim of The 
Elementary Forms than the proto-Durkheim of The Division of Labour who comes 
closer to the matter.7 For having first proposed that there are two forms of social 
solidarity, mechanical (deriving from conscience collective) and organic (deriving 
from the division of labor)—of which the former progressively gives way to the 










































latter as society becomes modern—Durkheim turns round to argue that conscience 
collective nevertheless remains basic to the very existence of society. So too, it seems, 
with modes of religiosity: though the doctrinal is more characteristic of modern 
and world religions, these cannot altogether dispense with the imagistic. For the 
vitality of any religion must depend on its adherents feeling that their doctrines 
articulate the past occurrence, and the possible reoccurrence, of some more-than-
ordinary contact between the human and the divine, which calls for the imagistic 
mode. Weber made much the same point with his argument that an access of cha-
risma is the foundation of all religions, however much it is later institutionalized.
A theory such as DMR is one of those middle-range theories that social scien-
tists have often asked for, mediating between highly abstract propositions drawn 
from cognitive psychology and ethnographic-cum-historical material of great 
empirical richness. So there are two broad approaches toward applying it. One 
would use a particular body of empirical data to test and refine the relations pos-
tulated between the variables of the theory at the abstract level; the other would 
apply a more pragmatic test and ask how far the theory enhances our understand-
ing of a particular body of regional data. Here I shall take the latter approach, and 
especially with respect to what seems a crucial possibility suggested by the DMR 
theory: how the two modes may be combined or integrated in particular cults, 
religions, or local systems of religious provision.
• • •
As an ethnographic region West Africa has some similarities to Melanesia. It too 
is an area of diverse local religions, which over the past century and a half has 
witnessed extensive activity by Christian missions and large-scale conversion to 
them against a background of sweeping social change induced by colonialism. 
The cultural gap between the two kinds of religion, the pressures of colonialism, 
and the desire of Christian converts to seek power according to their own under-
standing gave rise, as in Melanesia, to movements of substantially Christian idiom, 
initiated by charismatic local leaders, that have variously been termed syncretist, 
prophetist, millenarian, and so forth. These similarities have often led to the inclu-
sion of movements from West Africa and Melanesia within the same comparative 
and analytic frame. Yet in other respects the West African setting is very differ-
ent. Most of its communities were far larger, including precolonial kingdoms with 
complex political hierarchies, large settlements with developed class and occu-
pational structures, markets, and long-distance trade. Consequently, many indig-
enous religions and cults were much more extensive in scope and scale than in 
Melanesia; and there was the centuries-old existence of Islam—itself testimony to 
the region’s extensive links with the outside world—which interacted in complex 
ways with indigenous cults, and in some areas both anticipated and complicated 
the encounter between them and Christianity.










































The DMR dichotomy evokes several of those current in the West African litera-
ture, and so we are led to ask whether it offers a more precise and profound charac-
terization of differences already and independently recognized as real and signifi-
cant. But here a caution needs to be registered: a theoretically cogent dichotomy is 
a powerful cognitive magnet, tending to draw other, related distinctions into itself. 
Then dichotomies get stacked up on top of one another, so that significant differ-
ences of emphasis get elided or reduced to aspects or implications of the master 
dichotomy. Two dichotomies in particular have been much used in studies of reli-
gion in West Africa. First, between traditional (or primal) and world religions, or 
preliterate religions and religions of the Book, which is the same distinction empir-
ically but viewed from a different angle. There is a more theorized version in Robin 
Horton’s contrast between microcosmic and macrocosmic cults, which embodies 
a crucial shift of emphasis since it expressly allows for representations of the mac-
rocosm to occur within the idiom of traditional religion.8 Second, within the latter, 
anthropologists have made various closely related contrasts between two kinds of 
cult found widely in indigenous African religion: ancestors vs. deities, spirits of 
society vs. spirits of nature, political vs. fertility rituals. In all these cases distinc-
tions that are manifest in empirical or synthetic form may be reworked analytically 
so as to highlight aspects considered to be of particular theoretical relevance.
So how far may either of these distinctions (traditional vs. world religions, 
ancestor vs. nature cults) be aligned with the DMR antithesis of the imagistic vs. 
the doctrinal? It is obvious how the former does, but its pertinence to the latter is 
not so clear. The argument to follow rests on the assumptions that the imagistic 
mode is primary (both in the sense that it emerged first and that it remains basic to 
the appeal of religion) and the doctrinal mode came later. The semantic memories 
sustained by the doctrinal mode are the generalized codification of what is taken 
to follow from the original episodic memories—that is, of those individuals who 
experienced divine revelation and communicated it to their fellows—on which all 
religious establishments and many social orders depend. It explores, first, how the 
ground for the doctrinal mode was prepared within the traditional religions of 
West Africa, later to be realized in a fairly pure form in the evangelical Christianity 
brought by the missionaries in the nineteenth century; and second, how the imag-
istic mode has been reconstituted within the born-again Christianity that is its 
dominant manifestation in West Africa today.
For our present purposes what most crucially distinguishes cults of the ances-
tors and of the earth or natural spirits is that the former are highly embedded 
socially, often to the point of being hardly more than the ritual aspect of the lineage 
structure that they regulate. Their membership is ascriptive and closed, whereas 
the latter tend to be freestanding religious institutions that have to take deliberate 
steps to reproduce themselves, for their memberships are open and fluctuating. 
Many ancestor cults, indeed, seem almost to stand outside the imagistic/doctrinal 










































contrast, needing neither doctrine nor high-arousal experiences to motivate their 
practices but merely the habitus of quotidian relations with elders and the sponta-
neous remembrance of them after their decease, autobiographical memory gradu-
ally blending into semantic.9 So it is understandable that ancestral cults in Africa 
tend to be poorly supplied with such mnemonic devices as myths or images. It is 
significant that in the Yoruba case, it is in the cult of a lineage’s and town’s collective 
ancestors, called egungun (as also with royal ancestors of importance to the com-
munity at large), that iconic representation bulks larger, with specialized priest-
hoods, annual festivals, and in general some degree of assimilation to the other 
kind of cult, of orisa or spirits of nature.10
The Yoruba orisa are a highly developed example of this category, since (though 
associated with natural features or substances) they were imagined as personalized 
deities, many of them with specialized functions or pronounced personal charac-
teristics. Since, unlike ancestors, the orisa cults did not ride on other institutions, 
they needed to develop specific ways to ensure their survival: they had to moti-
vate their adherents—which meant above all to provide cogent evidence of the 
presence and power of their god—and they had to offer an adequate rationale of 
the ritual and behavioral requirements of the cult. In respect of the former, their 
dominant mode was strongly imagistic: if an individual had not been dedicated at 
birth, it was often an acute personal crisis interpreted by the diviner as a call from 
the orisa that first drew members into the cult; orisa on occasion possessed their 
most active adepts and priests, who temporarily became their vessels and might 
offer further revelations; the cult members met regularly to renew their special 
relationship with the orisa through shared sacrifice; at annual festivals, accompa-
nied by drumming and dancing, praise singing, and public parade of their images, 
links between the community and the orisa were reaffirmed. All this was highly 
performative—devotees were said to manifest their orisa’s active power by playing 
or enacting them11—and often generated states of high arousal.
There was a doctrinal aspect too. Partly it was implicit in the epithets of the 
praise poetry and in the symbols and images of the orisa—the red and white clay 
beads on the forehead of the Orisa Oko devotee, the thunderbolt-axe of Sango, 
Obatala’s white cloth—because such served as mnemonic pegs for stories (itan) 
about their origins and attributes. Cult knowledge was esoteric, and authority 
within any social unit—whether cult, craft, lineage, or town—went with mas-
tery of relevant itan. So access to knowledge was both highly stratified—priests 
and adepts having a deeper knowledge than ordinary adherents, and these than 
outsiders—and segmented into parcels not shared by everyone. But there was a 
body of generally knowledgeable people in the babalawo (fathers of secrets), the 
practitioners of the system of divination known as Ifa. The corpus of Ifa divina-
tion verses was the largest archive of myth and cosmology available to the Yoruba, 
and (since most people consulted babalawo occasionally and heard some of these 










































verses) was probably the most widely available source of general religious knowl-
edge. Of Ifa itself, more shortly.
Taken as a whole, Yoruba orisa cults were remarkably effective in staving off 
the two threats to survival that, according to the DMR theory, all cults face. The 
major cults, at least, were able to generate enough motivational interest—partly 
through their attachment to the major crises in human lives, which created a high 
level of personal identification with them, and partly through their own vivid pre-
sentation of orisa power at festivals, through possession, and so forth—as well as 
sufficient understanding of their theory and practice to achieve both wide geo-
graphical spread (extending in some cases well beyond the Yoruba-speaking area) 
and impressive stability over time. In this achievement of spatial and temporal 
extension, they may be contrasted with the nonlineage cults among peoples such 
as the Akan and the Kongo, whose spiritual forces—respectively, abosom or deities 
and minkisi or fetishes—not only lacked the personality and cult organization of 
the major orisa but, apparently like many traditional cults in Melanesia, showed a 
cyclical pattern in their rise and fall, as old ones lost their appeal and new crises led 
to the emergence of new ones.12 Here cults established in conditions of social crisis, 
high emotional arousal, or both, seem to have lacked either the doctrinal elabora-
tion or the social infrastructure to keep them perduringly in existence, though 
the cultural conditions for later revivals of similar movements remained in place.
The historical terrain created by missionaries in their project to convert adher-
ents of indigenous religions to Christianity is likely to be especially fruitful for 
examining the interplay of the two modes of religiosity. For it contains move-
ments that reach out in either direction: anticipations of the doctrinal within reli-
gious systems predominantly imagistic in character and movements to recover 
the power of the imagistic by those placed within strongly doctrinal settings like 
missionary Christianity. Of the former an excellent example is provided by the 
Yoruba divination cult of Ifa, which was held to be the special province of a par-
ticular deity, Orunmila. It was not the only system of divination, for the priests of 
other deities gave oracular guidance too, typically through some form of trance or 
possession. Ifa, however, relied not on its babalawos being possessed by their orisa 
but on their mastery of a technique that entailed the capacity to remember a vast 
corpus of verses. The babalawo began by manipulating a handful of palm nuts to 
produce one of 256 (16 x 16) configurations (odu), to each of which corresponded 
a sequence of verses that described mythical precedents; these were then recited 
by the babalawo, and the client selected one that spoke to his situation. The source 
of the problem and the steps to be taken to resolve it, by a specified sacrifice to a 
particular orisa, would then be clarified by casting lots in response to the client’s 
questions. Though Orunmila thus sustained the system of orisa cults as a whole 
(which indeed he belonged to), he also represented himself as somewhat above 
and outside it, as the sole channel of wisdom from the supreme being, Olodumare, 










































who was the source of the Ifa verses. And as if to underscore this autonomy from 
the rest of the orisa, Ifa sometimes advised its clients that the answer to their prob-
lem was to become Muslim or Christian—that is, to worship God directly, rather 
than through the orisa.
It is thus not surprising that missionaries accorded considerable respect to 
babalawo, who were ready dialecticians and their most astute critics but also very 
ready to learn from them.13 Moreover, the marks indicating the selected odu that 
the babalawo drew in the sacred powder on his ritual tray were widely interpreted 
by Yoruba pagans as a kind of literacy avant la lettre, and the reception of both 
Koran and Bible was conditioned by what was required of Ifa verses: to predict 
and to solve problems. In fact this degree of preadaptation to some of the features 
of the doctrinal mode may well have been written into Ifa from its origin, for it 
appears that the sixteen-options systems of divination, found widely throughout 
sub-Saharan Africa and Madagascar, all ultimately derive from Islamic sources.14
Yet though Ifa was the most doctrinal of the orisa cults and provided a doctri-
nal component to the system as a whole; though it became the most pan-Yoruban 
of all cults, and spread far beyond the Yoruba-speaking region, east to the lower 
Niger and west to the Volta region;15 though its practitioners were able to enter into 
a serious engagement with Muslim and Christian clergy, it still fell short of being a 
full-blown realization of the doctrinal mode. First, it remained dependent on oral 
modes of transmission. Hence, though it was considered as sacrilegious to add to 
or subtract from the corpus, and steps were taken to prevent these (by such means 
as the stringent training of neophytes and Ifa-recitation competitions between 
experienced babalawo), there was almost certainly a slippage of content as well 
as some regional variation in what was put out. Second, since Ifa was a pragmatic 
and client-centered system of oracular consultation and not a congregational 
religion, it worked in practice to embrace a multitude of individual perspectives 
(albeit within a common framework of cosmology and ritual practice) rather than 
impose any kind of collective ideology—hence, indeed, its openness to Islam and 
Christianity. Third, it enshrined the principle of secrecy, for the expertise of the 
babalawo was that only they knew how to access secrets or hidden things (awo). 
Secrecy is bound to undermine the diffusion of standardized, common under-
standing of religious knowledge, which is at the heart of the doctrinal mode.
• • •
By contrast, missionary Christianity was in the strongest sense a religion of the 
Book, its converts being initially known in Yoruba as onibuku (book people). 
Instead of the pragmatic and personalized advice of Ifa were universal ethical 
injunctions; and instead of Ifa’s emphasis on secrets (awo) it was vital that the 
Word of God should be made openly available in the language of the people. The 
other religion of the Book, already well ensconced by the mid-nineteenth century, 










































had already been modified by the demands of Yoruba culture. The not-to-be-
translated Koran lent itself to esoteric and magical uses, and quite a lot of the 
doctrinal/imagistic distinction seems to appear in the contrast between two faces 
of Yoruba Islam: the one communal and egalitarian, associated with public wor-
ship, Koranic exegesis, and sermons, and learning to recite the Koran; the other 
individualist and hierarchical, when people consulted alfa for Koranic charms or 
sought access to esoteric power through Sufi shaykhs. While there are difficulties 
in simply labeling the latter popular or heterodox—since it always drew in learned 
Muslims and had deep roots in the mainstream—there is no doubt that it could 
attract the criticism of preachers for encouraging wrong attitudes and is the target 
of contemporary reformism. Yet it provided a way to meet some basic Yoruba reli-
gious expectations that missionary Christianity found difficult to match. This was 
a primary stimulus to the independent religious movements and churches that 
burgeoned in the early decades of the twentieth century.
Here we come to the reassertion of imagistic practices within African Christianity, 
as against the anticipation of doctrinal ones within traditional religion. African 
independent churches (or AICs) have given great scope for typology.16 While 
most classifications are derived from labels used by the churches themselves—
such as Ethiopian/Zionist in South Africa or African/Aladura in Nigeria17—they 
have given rise to binary typologies of a more analytic character. So, for example, 
James Fernandez constructed four types based on two cross-cutting continuums: 
one (nativistic/acculturated) dealing with the movements’ primary cultural orien-
tations and the other (expressive/instrumental) having to do with the manner of 
their responses to the colonial situation.18 Neither of these has much to do with the 
imagistic/doctrinal contrast. Yet the DMR theory does seem, in retrospect, to be 
pertinent both to certain empirical contrasts made in my study Aladura (1968) and 
to the searching critique of its approach expressed by Fernandez in an influential 
general review of the field.19
The Aladura are a cluster of churches founded by African religious innovators 
who triggered a series of revivals—involving healing through sanctified water, 
witchcraft confession, mass destruction of idols, and some millennial preaching—
between 1918 and the mid-1930s. Their basic aim was to make the power of prayer 
(adura: hence their name) more available than it was in the older Protestant mis-
sions for such this-worldly objectives as health, fertility, protection against witch-
craft and danger, guidance, prosperity, and success—in sum, that state of all-round 
well-being that the Yoruba call alafia. While Aladura’s theological content is strongly 
Christian, its ritual forms as well as its ontology of the spirit world owe much to the 
indigenous religious background. Dreams, visions, and ecstatic tongues—gifts of 
the Holy Spirit—are seen as vehicles of divine power and guidance, recalling aspects 
both of orisa-cult groups and of Ifa divination, but with prayer substituting for sac-
rifice as the medium of human address to God.20 There had been early influences 










































from an American faith-healing group called Faith Tabernacle, but a more signifi-
cant external input came when, from 1930 onwards, the Aladura became somewhat 
variably subject to the influence of Pentecostalism, initially through a British group, 
the Apostolic Church. The outcome was a spectrum of churches ranging from some 
of a more home-grown idiom (with African-style music and liturgy, the wearing 
of white prayer-gowns, elaborate hierarchies of spiritual offices, a rich repertory 
of ritual symbols, and the use of such items as candles, incense, and holy oil) to 
those more conformed to Euro-American Pentecostal norms, with their emphatic 
scripturalism and aversion to complex ritual symbolism. Aladura took for compari-
son two churches standing toward either end of this spectrum: the Cherubim and 
Seraphim (C&S) and the Christ Apostolic Church (CAC).
The approach of Aladura was intellectualist, in that, in contrast to studies 
of new religious movements in the Third World of Marxist and/or functional-
ist inspiration,21 it sought to explain Aladura belief and practice as intellectually 
cogent responses, granted the cultural premises of young Yoruba Christians, to the 
problems and dilemmas they confronted at a time of midcolonial crisis. But from 
their shared roots C&S and CAC tended over the years to diverge. I was struck by 
how C&S, with its more African idiom, tended to revert to what may be called the 
Yoruba cultural default system, becoming flexible and pragmatic in its search for 
spiritual power, whereas the more consciously Pentecostal CAC held much more 
to doctrinally grounded lines of conduct, even against the promptings of Yoruba 
culture (e.g., its rejection of polygamy or its categorical ban on any use of medi-
cine). I further related these differences to organizational ones:22
The C&S see themselves . . . as a society of people which God had supremely invested 
with spiritual power, and the prophet or “spiritualist” .  .  . is their most distinctive 
religious type. The spiritual clientage is the form of grouping associated with such a 
man; and this is modified to being the general clientage of a big man, or an associa-
tion of people after the same spiritual goal. . . . Wider organization than these they 
have found difficult.
CAC members are equally concerned with the fruits of spiritual power, but they 
are being educated by their leaders to explain it differently. Personal authority of var-
ious kinds has always been, and still is important, but the possessors of it have used it 
to spread the idea that their church is the one which embodies correct doctrines, and 
so has spiritual power. This has been the work of intellectualist pastors. . . . Doctrines 
are open, public, arguable things, and favour the growth of pastors who expound 
them; the pastors derive their legitimacy from the church, the embodiment of the 
doctrines.
It is evident that this contrast may be rephrased in terms of the DMR theory: 
the C&S being more imagistic, the CAC more doctrinal—within a fairly nar-
row band of difference, it is true, but still with the organizational correlates that 
Whitehouse argued for.










































There is a complex ebb and flow at work here. The C&S responded most directly 
to the dissatisfaction of African converts with an insufficiently inculturated British 
evangelicalism: its apparent inability to summon prayer power for mundane needs 
and, more diffusely, their hunger for symbolically (that is, imagistically) richer 
forms of engagement with the divine. The CAC, by contrast, thanks to the influ-
ence of Pentecostal mentors, seemed in some ways to have moved back some way 
toward the evangelical baseline—a less imagistic (or at least more doctrinal) form 
of faith—but yet seemed no less successful for that. I interpreted this in terms of a 
long-term process of religious rationalization, à la Max Weber, which I linked to 
the fact that its social bearers were modernizing, educated young men. It was this 
assumption that Fernandez called into question.23 He argued, in terms that almost 
uncannily anticipate those of the DMR theory, that my intellectualist approach to 
Aladura and to African movements more generally projected a kind of imageless 
thought onto them. Instead, because African thought is socially embedded, ana-
lysts of religious movements needed to attend to the argument of images that they 
employ. This was applied in his analysis of the Bwiti cult among the Fang of Gabon 
and the former French Congo, one of the finest studies of an African religious 
movement ever done.24 The colonial experience was extremely traumatic for the 
Fang, but what Bwiti offered was less a monovalent solution to its problems than 
a microcosmic pleasure dome created through a complex play of symbols and rit-
ual, syncretizing themes from Christianity, the ancestral cult, and images from the 
rain-forest environment, from which any adept may take what s/he needs. Bwiti 
is one of the very few African cults to make use of a psychotropic drug, eboga, in 
its rituals. Its use of symbols is highly polysemic, and its sermons employ what 
Fernandez called “an elliptical riddling style” to produce “edification by puzzle-
ment.”25 If it is a mark of the imagistic mode, as Whitehouse observes, to generate 
a “dynamic . . . towards creative elaboration rather than faithful repetition, and the 
production of local differences rather than regional homogeneity,”26 then Bwiti fits 
the bill perfectly. But at the same time, this implies that the approach advocated by 
Fernandez, with movements of this type in mind, will be less helpful for those that 
stand closer to the doctrinal pole, such as the Nigerian CAC.
• • •
It is not easy to generalize about the direction of change within African Christian-
ity as whole over the last three decades, but if there is a single dominant trend, it 
is the rise of neo-Pentecostal or (as it is colloquially known in Nigeria) born-again 
Christianity. The Africanizing ethos of the older AICs like the C&S, with their lo-
cal idioms and resonances, yields to something a great deal more nearly universal-
ist in its sense of itself. Neo-Pentecostalism is a global movement in Christianity, 
with much circulation of people and media between West Africa, its epicenters in 
the American South and West, and even such places as Brazil or Korea. While this 










































is certainly a response to wider processes of globalization, it does not mean that 
churches of a strongly local idiom do not continue to attract many Nigerians.27
Surveys of churches in the Yoruba metropolis of Ibadan in the 1990s showed 
a great burgeoning, not merely of the newest born-again churches or “ministries” 
(as they often style themselves), as well as of older Pentecostals such as Apostolic, 
Foursquare Gospel, Assemblies of God, and others, but also of the Celestial Church 
of Christ, a C&S-related body that has the most ritualized practices of prayer, heal-
ing, and prophecy of the “White-garment” churches, as the Aladura nowadays 
are often described. Of the churches once regarded as Aladura, it seems that it is 
those at either end of the imagistic/doctrinal spectrum (e.g., Celestial and CAC) 
that have grown the most, whereas churches in the middle—most C&S branches 
or Church of the Lord (Aladura)—that have languished. One great irony is that 
though Pentecostalism first entered Yoruba Christianity through the Aladura move-
ment in 1931, the terms “Aladura” and “Pentecostal” are now regarded as mutually 
exclusive, falling into different sections of the national umbrella body, the Christian 
Association of Nigeria. CAC is now emphatic that it is Pentecostal, not Aladura, and 
has had close relations with some of the newer born-again groups, especially Deeper 
Life. A further irony is that the current market leader among born-agains, the 
Redeemed Christian Church of God, actually began as a breakaway from the Eternal 
Sacred Order of Cherubim and Seraphim but was radically reconstructed by its well-
educated second leader, Pastor E. A. Adeboye. Like other born-again churches, it is 
anxious to make out that a chasm separates it from the Aladura, who are stigmatized 
as mixing pagan or demonic elements into their practices. Former members of the 
Celestial Church sometimes denounce it in testimonies given at Redeemed revival 
services as engaged in works of Satan, to be renounced by the born-again.
The fact that people can still be drawn in large numbers to Africanizing 
churches like the Celestial Church of Christ, even though the main flow of prefer-
ence is to the more globally oriented born-agains, should counsel us against seek-
ing to explain the success of the latter simply as an adjustment to the spirit of the 
times. Pentecostalism is a global form of Christianity, but then so is Catholicism, 
even though since Vatican II inculturation, or the adaptation of its theology 
and liturgy to local cultures, has been strongly promoted. But granted that the 
ethos of global modernity projected by neo-Pentecostalism is part of its appeal, 
and that this pushes it toward the doctrinal mode since it has to rely on semantic 
memory to create understandings that can be shared across an international com-
munity of believers, how is born-again Christianity so successful in combating 
the tedium effect (with consequent loss of motivation) that threatens all forms 
of Evangelicalism, with its austere symbolic repertory, sustained Bible study, long 
sermons, and so forth?
Here we may return to Whitehouse’s view that the source of the doctrinal mode 
presented in missionary Christianity (of all denominations) lay in the Reformation’s 










































onslaught on the imagistic practices of late medieval Catholicism.28 A weakness in 
his argument at this point is that, in jumping directly from the sixteenth century 
to the nineteenth, it elides some critical shifts in how the two modes have fig-
ured within evangelical Christianity. We may distinguish three main paradigms 
in chronological order: Puritanism, Evangelicalism, and Pentecostalism. In the 
first of these, Puritanism up to the end of the seventeenth century (or in America 
the early eighteenth), the doctrinal mode in a fairly pure form could often be 
applied in religiously uniform communities—Geneva, Scotland, New England—
where the tedium effect could, at some cost, be suppressed by social controls. It 
is hardly a historical accident that it was when these started to break down, in 
the early eighteenth century, making it necessary to find some other means to 
revive motivation, that a new form of the imagistic mode came into being. Hence 
Evangelicalism, distinguished sociologically from Puritanism by its focus not on 
the closed community of the Elect but on the perception (in John Wesley’s words) 
of the world as its parish, and theologically by its voluntaristic conception of God’s 
saving grace freely offered to all who would receive it. Evangelicalism saw itself not 
as disclosing new doctrinal truth but rather as reviving the faith of the believer. So 
in the terms of the DMR theory there was the paradox that, though in one sense it 
was as doctrinal as any other version of Protestantism—as dependent on preach-
ing and reading the Word—Evangelicalism also made vital use of a new form of the 
imagistic mode. For it created powerful experiences of divine grace, whose deposit 
in autobiographical memories—of ecstatic revival meetings, of the moment when 
one first knew the Lord Jesus—would supplement the semantic memories of rou-
tine religious instruction. Hence the Methodist societies as they initially related to 
the Established Church markedly resembled such splinter groups of the mainline 
Paliau movement as the Noise or the Second Cult.29 Compare the name assumed by 
the movement in colonial America, “the Great Awakening,” with the Melanesian 
cultists’ use of the metaphor of waking up. “Imagistic” is a term that may mislead 
if it is felt to point exclusively to visual icons; for the autobiographical memories 
activated in the evangelical religion of the heart depended not on visual images but 
on words and music.
With its institutionalization in churches, evangelical religion tended to slip 
back to a greater reliance on the doctrinal mode, with little iconic or ceremonial 
richness to offset the danger of tedium. As John Wesley himself said, in a passage 
famously quoted by Weber: “I do not see how it is possible, in the nature of things, 
for any revival of true religion to continue long.”30 So too the evangelical mission-
aries of the Anglican CMS in Yorubaland came to lament the cold, formal religion 
(which, reversing Wesley’s line of causation, they thought gave rise to worldli-
ness) of their flock in the second generation.31 Yet revival—a form of religion in 
the imagistic mode—was still contained within evangelical culture as a memory 
and a hope, at both individual and collective levels, to be periodically reactivated. 










































The 1859–60 revival in Britain and Ireland (monitored from afar by missionaries 
in West Africa) led on to the Keswick Convention from the 1870s, which over the 
next three decades sent out a series of evangelists to conduct revivals at the behest 
of the Lagos churches.32 African CMS candidates for ordination in the 1880s and 
1890s, many of whom were converted at these Keswick revivals, were asked to 
write autobiographical statements, of which a key element was their account of 
this experience.
An issue that needs to be explored in relation to mission is how this evangelical 
culture of periodic revival interacted with indigenous historicities in which there 
were cycles of social renewal, involving such imagistic episodes as antiwitchcraft 
movements or the accession of new sources of power. Take the case of the Ulster 
evangelicals who set up the Qua Iboe Mission among the Anang of southeastern 
Nigeria. Its pioneer, Samuel Bill, was moved first in the late 1870s by the visit to 
Belfast of the American evangelists Dwight Moody and Ira Sankey in one of the 
“last waves of the Ulster revival”33 and started out in Nigeria in 1887. By the 1910s 
the mission was making fair progress under the aegis of colonial rule, opening 
churches and schools, winning converts, but yet dissatisfied: “The Christians in 
Ikotobo . . . have not grown in grace as they have grown in numbers. . . . The mis-
sionary, joined by a few earnest souls, has been much in prayer for a true revival.”34 
Over a decade later it was still reported that “our churches and services and all our 
carefully built organisation are futile for doing God’s work without the life-giving 
Spirit.”35 It finally came in 1927, triggered by a young teacher but taking the mis-
sion completely by surprise, to produce what was known as the Spirit Movement, 
marked by witch confessions, mass destruction of idols and charms, contagious 
enthusiasm, glossolalia . . . The missionaries, of course, saw it in terms of the arche-
typal Day of Pentecost, and of precedents such as the Ulster revival or the Welsh 
revival of 1904. The Anang precedents are less easy to discern, and certainly some 
of the immediate conditions, arising from tensions produced by colonial rule, 
were strictly unprecedented; but later cycles of upheaval suggest that this fluid 
society, with rather unstable chiefly authority—in that, more like Melanesia than 
the Yoruba were—was prone to cycles of routine and revitalization.36
Faith missions like the Qua Iboe were already on the cusp between classic 
Evangelicalism and Pentecostalism, the third main manifestation of the Protestant 
tradition. The ideal of being born again in the Holy Spirit had been present within 
West African Evangelicalism from its very origins: it was a prominent theme in 
the preaching of Rev. W. A. B. Johnson, the famous German CMS missionary who 
converted hundreds of liberated Africans during his ministry at Regent in Sierra 
Leone, as far back as 1817–23. So what exactly did Pentecostalism bring that was 
new? Pentecostalism incorporates several of the recurring features of nineteenth-
century American Protestantism—perfectionism, premillennialism, fundamen-
talism, dispensationalism—and also draws down, through its African-American 










































origins, a strong current of African religious sensibility (which would of course 
reconnect potently with local cultural demand when it got to Africa). Perhaps 
what most set it apart it from earlier (and largely European) expressions of evan-
gelical religiosity was the emphasis placed on the physical tokens of divine favor, 
notably speaking with tongues as the mark par excellence of baptism of the Holy 
Ghost, and miracles of healing. As studies of its worldwide diffusion show clearly, 
Pentecostalism is an extremely protean phenomenon, even within particular 
countries or churches.37 Whether its impact is politically conservative or cultur-
ally radical, what its natural class affiliation is, what its main practical thrust is—
whether holiness teaching, divine healing, gospel of prosperity, deliverance from 
demons and ancestral spirits, predictive prophecy—are questions all hotly debated 
(probably because each and all of these alternatives comes up in the appropriate 
context). Neo-Pentecostalism taps as deeply into the springs of indigenous African 
spirituality as the older AICs but manages to do it in an attractively modern and 
transnational idiom. Its success may be seen, in terms of the present argument, as 
arising from its unique ability to bring together, sometimes close to the point of 
fusion, the two modes of religiosity.
The DMR theory is about how the ability of a religion to pass on its revelation is 
affected by the way it is encoded in memory, not about how the content of that rev-
elation may relate to its context. Still, the connection between religious content and 
mode of religiosity will always call for attention. Here I come to a final dichotomy 
apparent in the fluctuating religious orientations of both Aladura and born-agains, 
which may be called holiness vs. empowerment. Holiness is essentially a concern 
to conform oneself to the will of God, following the dictates of scripture and prayer, 
typically by living a life of spiritual self-discipline. Empowerment is whereby one 
seeks to enlist the power of God, above all through prayer and revealed means, to 
achieve a full, rich life and to defeat any forces that oppose it. While holiness looks 
inside the self for the solution to existential problems, empowerment looks outside. 
Yet despite this contrast the two orientations have common elements, and holiness 
can easily flip over, as when self-discipline comes to be regarded instrumentally, as 
a means analogous to sacrifice in gaining the favor of a god. In their first encounter 
with religious modernity, the Yoruba had an early version of the holiness solution 
presented to them by evangelical CMS missionaries—change yourselves inwardly, 
and then your institutions will be transformed, and your country will become 
good—while they looked to the mission for direct techniques of empowerment.38 
It goes without saying that the missionary version of holiness teaching was firmly 
in the doctrinal mode.
The trajectories of Aladura (from the 1920s) and the born-agains (from the 
1970s) show striking similarities. Both began as prayer and Bible-study groups 
largely composed of earnest young people with a marked orientation toward 
holiness. Faith Tabernacle (CAC’s precursor) and the Praying Band of C&S were 










































composed of young literates,39 and fellowships of campus Christians were the germ 
of the massive born-again ministries of recent years.40 Chastity and monogamy, 
abstention from alcohol, regimes of fasting, reliance on prayer alone for healing, 
not wearing jewelry (in the case of women), and a generally disapproving attitude 
to the flamboyant display of Yoruba social life were some of its hallmarks. So what 
are the conditions under which it becomes plausible, even compelling, so to go 
against the grain of Yoruba culture? Holiness, presenting oneself to God as a living 
sacrifice, is an appropriate response to the expectation that the millennium, the 
end of the present dispensation, is imminent. Premillennialist anticipation was 
widespread in Nigeria in the years after 1918 into the early 1930s and still animates 
the more holiness-oriented of the larger born-again churches, such as Deeper Life. 
But a complex blend of zeitgeist and Bible-based teaching is needed to hold the 
holiness orientation in place, and if either condition fades, it may be expected to 
yield to the perennial Yoruba search for empowerment, where its moral restraints 
will be resignified as conditions for effective prayer. The concern for empower-
ment tends to reassert itself when what start as small holiness fellowships grow 
into large ministries, though differences of emphasis may still remain: of the larger 
bodies, Deeper Life still stands toward the holiness end of the spectrum, whereas 
the Redeemed Christian Church of God or Winners’ Chapel stands toward the 
empowerment end.41
In asking how the holiness/empowerment distinction correlates with the DMR 
contrast, it helps to consider what challenges the two tendencies respectively have 
to face. Holiness groups need above all to keep their members from slipping over 
to born-again churches closer to the general cultural mainstream—that is, those 
of the empowerment tendency. Their integrity is grounded in the doctrinal mode, 
in Bible study, sermons, and pamphlet literature, but this is motivationally boosted 
by the imagistic impact of intense emotions aroused by prayer and the work of 
the Holy Spirit, particularly in small fellowship groups. The challenge facing the 
empowerment tendency (which includes most of the largest and highest-profile 
born-again organizations) is more from rival operators offering similar products 
in the same crowded religious marketplace, including Aladura churches like the 
Celestial Church of Christ. What they most have to do, rather like orisa cults in 
the nineteenth century, is project a clinching public image of their effectiveness as 
mediators of divine power. So here the relative importance of the imagistic and the 
doctrinal tends to be reversed.
Revival is here more of a continuous preoccupation than in the older evan-
gelical churches: Redeemed has a Holy Ghost Night every month, drawing tens 
of thousands of people to its Redemption Camp off the Lagos-Ibadan expressway. 
In cities like Lagos or Ibadan big revivals and crusades take place almost continu-
ously, often with visiting pastors on the born-again circuit (including prestigious 
figures from abroad). They are attended by much advance publicity and make full 










































use of all the techniques of religious showbiz as developed in the United States. I 
earlier noted that the term “imagistic” may seem oddly applied to Evangelicalism, 
granted its poverty of visual icons, as witness the declination from the Catholic 
crucifix to the plain cross of the Protestants to no cross at all in many neo-
Pentecostal auditoriums. But visual imagery has been able to stage a triumphant 
reentry through the born-agains’ confident exploitation of electronic media: TV 
coverage, videos of preachers and revivals, and video movies such as those made 
by Mike Bamiloye’s Mount Zion Faith Ministries. Yet even here all is not imagistic. 
Complementing these revivals is a network of prayer fellowships and Bible-study 
sessions, where the doctrinal mode is paramount. Within a fortnight I have seen 
the leader of the Redeemed Christian Church of God, E. A. Adeboye, conduct a 
studious afternoon Bible-study meeting at the University of Ibadan’s Protestant 
chapel and preside at the tumultuous praise worship and ecstatic spiritual effu-
sions of a Holy Ghost Night. It is in how it has found ways to combine imagistic 
and doctrinal modes of religiosity that much of the effectiveness of the born-again 
movement is to be found.
88
We live in a world of expanded limits and in an age that we are no longer certain 
how to categorize.1 Our use of terms like “postsocialism” and “postcolonialism” (like 
several other “posts”) indicates our reluctance to give a positive definition to the 
character of our age at all and suggests that we may have finally thrown off a notion 
that has been basic to Western social theory since the Enlightenment, that the salient 
features of every age can be best made intelligible in terms of its place in an evolu-
tionary sequence of stages leading to a determinate climax. Now at last it seems to 
be goodbye to all that—or at least seems so to those who prefer to pluralize the age 
as one of modernities. It is outside the West that the most definite conceptions are 
now entertained of what modernity is, along with the aspiration to progress in that 
direction. The concept of late capitalism—a last echo of the Marxist variant of social-
evolutionary thought, absurd because it implies a time schedule that makes sense 
only within the terms of a historicism that is ostensibly disclaimed—has given way to 
neoliberalism, a less tendentious way of characterizing our age. While neoliberalism’s 
primary reference is economic, to the hegemony of the free market, it is also usefully 
suggestive of other freedoms, particularly (in this context) of religion in formerly 
socialist states, where a plurality of competing faiths has largely replaced states’ at-
tempts to control, monopolize, or eliminate the expression of religious belief. With 
the removal of many of the previous barriers to the circulation of religious messages, 
the activities of transnational religious organizations have burgeoned. State socialism 
fancied itself as postreligious; postsocialism has seen the revival of religion. In that 
respect the Soviet bloc, whose historic aim had been to blaze an entirely different trail 
for the social evolution of humanity, has rejoined most of the rest of the contempo-














































The opening up of the former Soviet bloc to new religious influences has 
occurred at a time when, owing to religious developments elsewhere in the world, 
transnational flow-patterns of religious influence have become much more poly-
centric and multidirectional than we have hitherto thought of them as being. 
Catherine Wanner presents a particularly striking instance of this:2
When a Nigerian opens a church in Ukraine that sends Ukrainian believers to the 
US, Germany and elsewhere to save the unsaved and church the unchurched, it is no 
longer a case of core exerting influence on the periphery. Rather the interconnec-
tions and the cultural flow of ideas, objects and people are also significant among 
non-Western regions and from the so-called Third World to the West.
What she describes as occurring in Kiev is an entirely novel conjuncture of 
religious currents, of the postsocialist and the postcolonial. A full account of the 
Nigerian background will open the way to a full appreciation of the paradoxical 
way in which the postcolonial has here come to the postsocialist world.
The founder of the Ukrainian Pentecostal church known as the Embassy of 
God is a Nigerian, Pastor Sunday Adelaja, who came to the Soviet Union as a 
student (like many Nigerians before him) in 1989. His name tells us he is not just 
a Yoruba but an Ijebu. The Ijebu are one of the most distinctive of the Yoruba 
subgroups, inhabiting a cluster of towns once organized in an ancient kingdom 
in the close hinterland of Lagos, Nigeria’s largest city and former capital. They 
were conquered by the British in 1892 in order to break their stranglehold on the 
trade route that ran from Lagos to the interior; but after the conquest (having pre-
viously excluded missionaries) many Ijebu embraced the world religions—both 
Islam and Christianity—with alacrity.3 Now, it happens that there was an earlier 
Pastor Adelaja, a trader who migrated in the 1920s to Kano, in Northern Nigeria. 
He was active in a prayer circle called Faith Tabernacle and later played a key role 
in the establishment of Nigeria’s first independent Pentecostal church, the Christ 
Apostolic Church.4 It is almost certain that his father was one of those who became 
a Christian—very likely an Anglican—in the great wave of Ijebu conversion after 
the conquest of 1892. Perhaps this first Adelaja to be a Christian was even the 
John Adelaja, an Ijebu migrant rubber trader, who headed the tiny congregation 
at Ife in 1899.5 Pastor Adelaja of Kiev may or may not be the great-grandson of 
this John Adelaja or the grandson of Pastor Adelaja of Kano, for Adelaja is not 
an uncommon name among the Ijebu. But if we imagine he was, then we have a 
hypothetical patriline of four generations that encapsulates the whole history of 
Ijebu Christianity as it developed over the colonial and postcolonial periods: the 
early convert to evangelical Anglicanism in the wake of the British conquest; his 
son who left Ijebu as a trader to Northern Nigeria and was active in one of the 
new independent Aladura churches, a man whose life span fell entirely within 
the colonial period; a putative grandson whose life must have spanned the rise 










































of nationalism and the early decades of independence; and fourth in line, Sunday 
Adelaja himself.
This fourth Adelaja came to adulthood in a grim period of Nigeria’s history, 
one of corrupt military rule and chronic economic mismanagement. It was also 
marked by new levels of religious enthusiasm—for born-again or neo-Pentecostal 
Christianity and for newly reformist and politically engaged forms of Islam—
and by the growing public saliency of religion, extending to episodes of violent 
conflict.6 The sequence that runs from the missionary evangelicalism to which 
Adelaja I converted, through Adelaja II’s adoption of an independent Christianity 
that turned Pentecostal in the 1930s, to culminate in the globally oriented born-
again Christianity of Adelaja IV represents not just a consistent religious trajectory 
but a series of mediated responses to the colonial and postcolonial experiences of 
Nigerians. The liftoff of neo-Pentecostal Christianity in Nigeria, as in many other 
countries, is linked to the deepening crisis of the postcolonial state from the mid-
1970s onward, though it is surely not to be reduced to it.
Historically, most missions have gone from the advanced, richer, and more central 
society to the backward, poorer, and more peripheral one; so what is the import of mis-
sions going the other way? The Adelaja sequence shows that Yoruba Pentecostalism, 
despite its American ancestry, still stands in an orthogenetic local tradition in Nigeria 
now going back more than a century. How then can Pentecostalism, seemingly more 
than any other new religion, manage to graft itself so successfully into a society such 
as the Ukraine, with an ancient Christian tradition to which it seems radically exotic, 
or into diverse other local cultures in the former USSR? Far-reaching questions are 
raised here about both society and religion. What is it about the postsocialist situ-
ation—really a range of situations, as the diverse studies in Mathijs Pelkmans, ed., 
Conversion after Socialism (2009), show—that creates needs and opportunities to 
which Pentecostalism has so widely been such a cogent response? What is it about 
Pentecostalism that has enabled it to offer this solution, and thus to become such a 
remarkable bridge between peoples in such diverse social contexts?
• • •
Katherine Verdery has already made a strong case for bringing the study of post-
socialist and postcolonial societies together, essentially on the empirical basis that 
there has now come about “the full incorporation of both the former colonies and 
the former socialist bloc into a global capitalist economy.”7 While that perception 
is cogent enough, it is still worth reminding ourselves that the globalization that 
is everywhere spoken of today is neither so novel nor so essentially economic as 
Verdery’s view may be taken to imply. Socialism, an ideology of economic organi-
zation before it became anything else, was initially a response to the emergence of 
capitalism as a systematic material reality in the late eighteenth century. Whereas 
the socialist internationals were a response to the global outreach of capitalism 










































from the late nineteenth century, the most prominent religious internationals of 
our own day—Catholic, Muslim, and Pentecostal—are based on universalist faiths 
that do not just rest on specific theological assumptions but are inspired by histori-
cal traditions reaching back to the empires of antiquity. (Let us not forget that the 
Soviet Third International was in a sense the legatee of Holy Russia’s claim to be 
the Third Rome.) The European colonial empires of the twentieth century were 
not able to stop socialist ideas entering the late colonial world as part of anticolo-
nial ideology and becoming a major theme of African and Asian nationalism. Yet 
despite this influence from the Second to the Third World, it is still essential—
especially in the light of later religious convergences—to begin by drawing out the 
differences between the African colonial world and the Soviet Eurasian world as 
regards the relations between socialism, nationalism, and religion.
In the USSR there was a full-blooded state socialism and, among its many con-
stituent communities, a number of ancient and coherent nations. Marxism had 
always seen the proletariat as the universal class that transcended all national 
boundaries (though it could regard certain nationalisms as situationally progres-
sive and give them conditional and pragmatic support).8 The policy of socialism in 
one country, adopted in the 1920s, entailed a certain reinterpretation of the inter-
nationalist ideal, in that the destinies of the universal class were now seen as con-
tingently aligned with those of the Russian state; but other nationalisms were still 
regarded as potentially dangerous and reactionary. Stalin’s nationalities policy—the 
limited recognition of nations as entities within the Soviet overarching state, the 
folklorification of national cultural forms, and so forth—was intended to neutral-
ize nationalism, and for a long time seemed to have succeeded in doing so; but the 
USSR’s collapse rapidly led to a renewed assertion of national identities, often with 
religion as an integral part of their expression.
African states, by contrast, were in nearly all cases externally imposed by the 
colonial powers and rarely had any significant link with any preexisting indige-
nous nations (of which few can be said to have existed). African nationalism was a 
movement led by educated colonial subjects to take control of these states from the 
metropolitan ruling cadres, but it was undertaken in the name of the mass of colo-
nial subjects whom the nationalist elite claimed to represent; but their claim rested 
more critically on their sharing a racial rather than a cultural identity with the 
mass. It was by a kind of courtesy that these states, upon their independence in the 
1960s, were referred to as nation-states or new nations, as if political independence 
was itself enough to create nationhood. In fact, the nationalist leaders who came to 
power at independence were intensely aware of just how weak their nations were, 
how prone to faction and fission based on ethnic and regional loyalties. And thus 
in Africa socialism, so far from being threatened by nationalism—in some form it 
was professed by most nationalist leaders—was seen as part of the answer to the 
weakness of the nation. This was so in two respects. First, it gave legitimacy to the 










































single-party states that became widespread in Africa in the decade or so after inde-
pendence as the best means for forging the nation, in a collective march toward 
political and economic development. In this, Eastern Europe seemed to offer an 
attractive model, and the USSR exploited this situation in its bid for African allies 
for its own Weltpolitik. Second, socialism—more particularly African socialism—
enabled the African past, with its communal values, lack of private property in 
land, and supposed classlessness, to be seen as a springboard to the future. Few 
things are more consoling than to believe that an aspired-to future—a developed 
nation—is somehow prefigured in the past. But in reality the weak nations of 
Africa exhibited a weak, largely rhetorical form of socialism. Paradoxically it was 
more about building up a new, postindependence class based on political access 
than about demolishing old classes based on control of the means of production.9
The key comparative question to be asked is: How did religion stand in relation 
to the two other great ideologies, socialism and nationalism, as between the two 
regions? Marxist-Leninist dogma objected to religion on two distinct grounds: first, 
that it was offensive to scientific reason and so a source of backwardness; and sec-
ond, because it served to legitimize the position of the ruling class. So in the Soviet 
Union religion was at the worst suppressed, though on occasion or in certain cir-
cumstances it had to be tolerated or could be used by the regime to its own ends—
mainly because of its linkage with particular ethnic or national interests. Things 
were very different in colonial Africa. There was little general antipathy to religion 
on the first of these grounds: first, because spiritual forces were generally regarded 
(by elites as well as by the masses) as governing the real conditions of existence and 
so compelling respect;10 and second, because Christianity—I shall here leave Islam 
out of consideration—was so strongly linked with modern education that it was 
more plausibly regarded as a force for progress rather than for reaction. It was only 
during nationalist mobilization, continuing into the period of postcolonial social-
ism, that many elites came to feel distinctly ambivalent about Christianity (despite 
the fact that most of them had had a mission education), because it was seen as hav-
ing legitimated colonialism. Yet it was rare for this feeling to be extended to inde-
pendent African churches, still less to a generalized antagonism to religion as such.
• • •
These generalizations are best made concrete through a consideration of three 
countries that constitute varying degrees of exception to them on account of their 
having tried most seriously to emulate the Soviet socialist model: Benin, Mozam-
bique, and Ethiopia. I shall consider them in sequence from the least to the most 
like the situation of Soviet Russia.
Benin (the former French colony of Dahomey) stands closest to the African 
norm, in that it had no European settlers and gained independence in 1960 without 
a violent anticolonial struggle. It was a society that had both a traditional religion 










































of great tenacity—the source of Haitian Voodoo—and the most educated elite 
of French West Africa through the efforts of the Catholic Mission. A decade of 
extreme political instability, arising from acute ethnoregional factionalism played 
out against a deepening economic crisis, resulted in a coup in 1972 that brought to 
power Colonel Mathieu Kérékou. In 1974—significantly, at the place where the last 
king of Dahomey had surrendered to the French; for this was about nationalism as 
much as it was about socialism—Kérékou declared Marxism-Leninism to be the 
ideology of the state. Yet the superficiality of Benin’s socialism—in popular humor 
it was mordantly known as Laxisme-Beninisme—expressed the absence of the social 
structures and historical experiences that are needed to give weight to a revolution-
ary agenda. Its coercive, incorporative statism was always more apparent than real, 
with the Roman Catholic Church, as easily the largest and most powerful institu-
tion of civil society, the obvious prime target. While the takeover of church schools 
was understandable for a regime that saw itself as committed to scientific social-
ism, it is some measure of how shallow and desperate this project soon became that 
it adopted Vodun as the state religion: a gesture of nationalism because a cultural 
rebuff to the church. Yet the church kept its grass-roots support, and as the regime 
staggered to its end in the late 1980s, its social strength made it the only force that 
could chair the national conference that paved the way for a return to multiparty 
politics in 1991. Kérékou lost the election despite announcing that he had become 
a born-again Christian, but he was elected again in 1996, one of the great survivors 
of African politics.11 Since the 1990s, under a democracy renewed “at a chameleon’s 
pace,”12 there has been a diverse resurgence of religions, from the neo-traditionalism 
of the irrepressible vodun cults to a Pentecostal boom, flooding in from Ghana and 
Nigeria along the coastal corridor with a message of modernity, rupture from the 
past, empowerment, and openness to the world, especially to the Anglosphere.13 One 
Pentecostalist quoted by Claffey drew a contrast between “a suffering Christianity 
as Francophone and Catholic . . . [and] his own, which he [saw] as American and 
Protestant with a strong emphasis on health, wealth and success.”14
In Mozambique colonialism began much earlier and lasted nearly twenty years 
longer than in most of Africa. Though the Portuguese first established coastal foot-
holds in the sixteenth century and created settler estates up the Zambezi Valley 
in the seventeenth, the colony did not assume its modern form till the end of the 
nineteenth century. Since Portugal was one of the poorest countries of Western 
Europe, its colonialism was correspondingly archaic and undercapitalized, relying 
heavily on forced labor and the supply of contract labor to South Africa. In accor-
dance with the right-wing dictatorship of Antonio Salazar in Portugal (1926–74), 
the Catholic Church was a key ideological mainstay in all its colonies and held 
a privileged position in the field of African education. As a result the national-
ist leadership (much of it drawn from Protestant mission schools) was markedly 
anticlerical. Further radicalized by Portuguese political intransigence, the main 










































nationalist party, Frelimo, turned to armed struggle. Independence came only in 
1975, after disaffection among the Portuguese military had spread to Lisbon and 
led to the overthrow of the Salazar regime. In 1977, amid the economic wreckage 
from years of war, Frelimo adopted Marxism-Leninism and soon took measures 
against religion as superstitious and counterrevolutionary: churches closed, activi-
ties banned, missionaries excluded, property confiscated.15 There ensued more 
than a decade of civil war against regional and other opponents, backed by white 
South Africa; but before it ended in 1992, Frelimo had abandoned socialism for 
the World Bank’s prescriptions. The establishment of a free market in religions had 
occurred some years earlier, resulting in a phenomenal growth in Pentecostalism 
in particular. In this, southern Mozambique was much subject to influences from 
South Africa; the refugee camps were a fertile terrain for the propagation of char-
ismatic religion; and the Lusophone connection prepared the way for the entry of 
dynamic groups of Brazilian origin, notably the Universal Church of the Kingdom 
of God, reputedly the largest Pentecostal church in the world.16
Our third case, Ethiopia, comes closest to the Soviet paradigm. Here was an 
ancient sacred monarchy closely bonded with an Orthodox Church that was the 
cornerstone of national identity. These institutions rested upon a material base 
more characteristic of Eurasia than of the rest of sub-Saharan Africa: namely a 
plow-based agriculture and a feudal class structure wherein landlords held estates 
under service tenure from the emperor and extracted rents from a peasantry.17 
In the late nineteenth century the core Christian kingdom not only beat back 
European colonialism but engaged in imperial expansion itself, bringing under 
its sway a vast area to the east and south, ethnically very diverse and overwhelm-
ingly non-Christian in religion. The revolution of 1974 was the work of a radicalized 
intelligentsia (extending into the army) that, disgusted with the failure of Emperor 
Haile Selassie’s attempt at a form of conservative modernization, saw a Marxist-
Leninist command state as the only solution to the country’s backwardness. Its own 
mistakes (particularly in the agrarian sector), natural catastrophe, and the draining 
effect of war against Eritrean secessionism kept the regime—known as the Derg or 
revolutionary council—in fairly permanent crisis, despite Soviet aid and backing. 
When this dried up in 1989, the socialist experiment was abandoned; and the Derg 
collapsed in 1991, a pendant to the final debacle of state socialism in the USSR.
The vicissitudes of religion in the trajectory of Ethiopian socialism have been 
brilliantly analyzed by Donald Donham from the perspective of one of the southern 
peripheral regions of Ethiopia, Maale.18 (The story evokes several parallels with the 
experiences of the peripheral non-Russian peoples within the Soviet Union, such 
as the Nenets and Chukchi.)19 Though the Orthodox Church reached Maale as part 
of the structure of imperial overrule in the 1890s, its local impact was minimal, and 
Christianity made slow progress until the Sudan Interior Mission (SIM) started to 
make significant numbers of converts in the 1950s. The great irony was that, while the 










































SIM had originated in Canada as a fundamentalist-faith mission strongly opposed to 
the liberal Protestantism of the day—and to that extent was antimodern—in Maale 
it became the very epitome of local modernization (and as such opposed to the 
Orthodox Church, which seemed both reactionary and a tool of alien control). As a 
result, when the revolution spread from the Ethiopian heartland, the young converts 
of the SIM were naturally its first allies in Maale. But a few years later, when the Derg 
was forced into defensive turmoil by Somalia’s invasion of the Ogaden, it sought to 
consolidate national morale and its own legitimacy by reversing its policy of hostil-
ity to the church (in a manner strikingly reminiscent of Stalin’s rehabilitation of the 
Russian Orthodox Church during the straits of World War II). Then, in line with 
the replacement of the USA by the USSR as Ethiopia’s major foreign ally and arms 
supplier, a further shift in the regime’s religious alignment took place: Protestant 
churches of North American origin (so recently local supporters of the revolution) 
found themselves stigmatized as antirevolutionary fellow travelers of imperialism 
and capitalism, foreigners who “rejected the nation and the revolution.”20 It is inter-
esting that they were also labeled as Pentecostals or “pentes,” even though none of 
the major missions such as the SIM or the Lutherans was Pentecostal and there were 
as yet very few Pentecostal missionaries. Only in 1967 was Ethiopia’s first Pentecostal 
church founded, among students in Addis Ababa, though the imperial government 
refused to recognize it. But the Derg rightly divined its ominous potential, a straw in 
the wind that would blow strongly after Ethiopia was liberalized in the 1990s. There 
are now estimated to be several million Pentecostalists in Ethiopia.21
So the soft socialism that usually accompanied African nationalism turned in 
a handful of cases into a much harder kind when hopes for national development 
faltered in the 1970s. The weaknesses of the Soviet model were not yet apparent, 
and the geopolitics of the Cold War created opportunities. But there was another 
predisposing condition, which points the way to appreciating how religion fitted 
into both the rise, and the demise, of these socialist regimes. The more a regime is 
founded on an integral bond between the nation/state and a single church or reli-
gion, the more likely it is that, if that regime is challenged or overthrown, it will be 
replaced by an alternative of the left that mirrors its integralist character but with 
an inverted, antireligious content. Thus, strongly Catholic or Orthodox national 
regimes, as in Spain or Russia, were much more likely to generate anticlerical atti-
tudes and vigorous communist movements than Protestant regimes were, whether 
the latter had state churches of nearly universal membership along Scandinavian 
lines or a high degree of religious pluralism as in Great Britain and (to an even 
greater extent) the United States. Something of the same correlation is also seen 
to occur in Africa when we contrast former British colonies, none of which—not 
even the most left-wing ones, like Nyerere’s Tanzania or Ghana under Nkrumah—
took its socialism to the extreme of Marxism-Leninism with the three countries 
we have considered. For British colonies tended to have more missions operating 










































in them, missionaries of more diverse national origins and a higher proportion (if 
not a majority) of Protestants—all making for a more plural religious scene—than 
French or Portuguese colonies did, and a fortiori than a country like Ethiopia.
Moreover, this pluralism, besides being unpropitious for the emergence of an 
antireligious socialism, was also the best climate in which Pentecostalism might 
take root and flourish. Late fruit of the evangelical revival, Pentecostalism first arose 
in the most plural of all religious contexts, the United States, and soon after in the 
more peripheral regions of Protestant Northern Europe. Unsurprisingly, it found 
its first African footholds in English-speaking milieus like South Africa and British 
West Africa (Nigeria and Ghana) in the first decades of the twentieth century.22 But 
in countries outside the Anglosphere like Benin, Mozambique, and Ethiopia—to 
say nothing of the countries of the former Soviet bloc—a turn to Pentecostalism 
after Marxism-Leninism represented a radical change of cultural direction.
• • •
The sociological explanation of religious change consists largely of showing the fit 
between the demands of a novel social situation and the potential of a religious tra-
dition. Or, if this sounds too functionalist, it is about why and how answers to the 
predicaments that people newly find themselves in are drawn from particular tra-
ditions. Before we ask why Pentecostalism has so widely been taken as the answer 
to the predicaments of the present age, it is worth emphasizing the link between 
the extraordinary diversity of the situations that Pentecostalism has answered and 
(what has made this possible) the extremely protean quality of Pentecostalism itself. 
Simply on the basis of examples from the papers presented at the Halle conference 
entitled “Conversion after Socialism,” Pentecostalism and closely related forms of 
evangelical Christianity have made significant headway in at least four quite differ-
ent kinds of setting in the former Soviet bloc: first, among Roma or Gypsies in East-
ern Europe; second, among some peoples of the northern peripheral regions, such 
as the Nenets and Chukchi; third, on a small scale, among some Muslim peoples 
of Central Asia, such as Uighurs and Kyrgyz; and fourth, the Embassy of God in 
the heart of Ukraine. There could hardly be more variety here—in prior religion, 
cultural context, rural or urban location, mode of life, political placement—so what 
accounts for the extraordinary range of Pentecostalism’s appeal?
We may see grounds for the adoption (or rejection) of a new religion or church 
in terms of two very general criteria of religious value.23 The first is that potential 
converts must feel that its message expresses the reality of things: what we may call 
its truth value. The second is that they must regard the identity conferred by joining 
the new religion to be compatible with what they feel or want themselves to be, in 
relation to other identities, especially communal, ethnic, or national ones: what we 
may call its identity value. In stable religious situations, truth and identity values are 
likely to be in accord, and in periods of steady adaptive change, truth values may be 










































adjusted without identity values being undermined. In times of crisis, the truth value 
of a religion is perhaps more likely to be first called into question, and if conversions 
to an ostensibly truer religion result, it may create tensions with existing identities. 
This was often the case with early Christian converts in Africa who thereby became 
estranged from their communities, resulting in an agenda for the Africanization of 
Christianity. On the other hand, it was often those whose identity attachments had 
been undermined (e.g., by being sold into slavery) who were most responsive to the 
preaching of Christian truth; whereas provided that communities (and the identi-
ties they sustained) remained viable, prosperous, unchallenged by defeat or natural 
disaster, they were likely to remain content with the truth that they had.
Pentecostalism now goes back a century, and the wide variety of forms it now 
exhibits is ample proof of the adaptability of its basic themes.24 Its core truth has 
always been its vision of the self as reborn and empowered through the Holy 
Spirit, as described in the charter biblical narrative of Acts II. Bible and Spirit are 
indeed the two cornerstones of the movement, and many of its current tensions 
and options can be seen in terms of the emphasis distributed between impulses 
that flow from either of them. Pentecostalism’s first constituency in America was 
drawn from poor, recently rural people, both white and black, experiencing the 
dislocations of urban life in a quickly developing capitalist economy. The funda-
mentalism of its use of the Bible as a source of validation came out of a long tradi-
tion of popular Evangelicalism. But its great innovation was to complement the 
ascetic disciplines of Protestant morality with a lively sense of the corporeal gifts 
of the Spirit. These ranged from the ecstasy of speaking in tongues (which was 
the main thing immediately distinctive of the new movement), to divine heal-
ing, prophecy, the casting out of evil spirits, efficacious prayer, and the possibil-
ity of miracles. In effect this new orientation represented a fusion of two distinct 
strands within American religion: the perennial this-worldliness of African belief 
mediated through African-American practice, and the new acceptance within 
Protestantism at large of wealth, health, and happiness as legitimate rewards of 
faith.25 Finally (and somewhat paradoxically in the light of the last point), a kick of 
urgency was given to the new teachings by a fresh wave of millennial expectancy.
This repertory of themes proved highly flexible in application, enabling 
Pentecostalism both to connect with the aspirations of diverse audiences and 
to move with the times. Its two sides, the scriptural and the pneumatic, enabled 
members to strike a variable balance between discipline and ecstasy, adjustment 
and mobility, as their particular circumstances required. Because the gifts of the 
Spirit might be variably construed in terms of intrinsic or expressive rewards and 
of external or instrumental ones, Pentecostalism could connect both with the self-
improvement techniques of popular psychology and with rituals to exorcise evil 
spirits that block one’s progress. Though “an option for and of the poor”26 (which 
still remains a fair characterization of the bulk of its adherents across the world), 










































Pentecostalism has never encouraged class ressentiment; but neither has it worked 
to reconcile the poor to their poverty—rather to empower them within it so that 
they may move up out of it. So, sidestepping Marxism’s strategy of class action, it 
has facilitated social mobility, initially of individuals but also (especially where 
adopted by ethnic minorities or in peripheral regions) collective self-enhancement.
Pentecostalism soon started to move up in the world. By 1950, it was no lon-
ger solely a religion of the poor and marginal: it had risen with the growth in 
population and wealth of its American heartland in the South and West, and some 
churches were acquiring fine buildings and facilities. Of the various doctrinal 
developments of the following decades, none was more telling than the so-called 
faith gospel, also known as the gospel of prosperity, which was reciprocally related 
to this growth: it both appealed to members’ material aspirations and generated 
large revenues for church expansion. To the small, egalitarian congregations of ear-
lier days were added a number of megachurches run by high-profile and wealthy 
charismatic preachers, prominent among whom was a handful of celebrity televan-
gelists, for Pentecostalism had responded with alacrity to the new opportunities 
offered by the electronic media. The movement became more consciously identi-
fied with American values, and it entered into a phase of energetic transnational 
outreach and exchange: in Africa and Latin America Pentecostal missionaries now 
far outnumbered those of mainstream denominations. Yet this was never a univo-
cal or one-way process, never just a matter of “exporting the American Gospel,”27 
since Pentecostalism lends itself so readily to selective appropriation. In Africa the 
1970s saw a massive takeoff of neo-Pentecostalism, initially in Anglophone coun-
tries like Nigeria and Zimbabwe, where it could build on an existing Pentecostal 
tradition going back many decades.28 Yet even though this depended on African 
initiatives, it adopted a markedly more internationalist (which means in effect 
American) style. The economic and political backdrop of this—the crisis of the 
postcolonial state—was, of course, what had also led to the Marxist-Leninist turn 
in Benin, Mozambique, and Ethiopia.
Now that state socialism, as a form of political and economic organization, is 
exhausted, some variant of neoliberalism is pretty well the only main course on 
the menu. Whereas Marxism-Leninism, like its integralist predecessors, aspired 
to be a total social system and tried to generate its own cultural underpinnings—
and when it came to religion, fell down badly—neoliberalism can afford to be 
more eclectic. As a main course, it can be combined with cultural side dishes à 
l’africaine, islamique, russe, or whatever, but it has to be said that few religions 
match its flavor better than Pentecostalism. As a product of the most demanding 
religious marketplace in the world, Pentecostalism is better able than most other 
religions to express the experiential truth of the conditions in which people and 
communities in today’s world have to seek development. And this is also a practi-
cal truth, since Pentecostal churches, by their lifestyle teachings and social support 










































systems, also do much to equip their members to survive—and in some cases to 
prosper—in the neoliberal environment.
Pentecostalism is also persuasive in another way that expresses the spirit of 
modernity. Compared with the two other great transnational movements of our 
day, Pentecostalism has nothing of Catholicism’s hierarchical structure, or of the 
central places of Islam and Catholicism, or a unifying ritual like the Muslim hajj. 
Its unmistakable unity in diversity is realized through a dense, many-stranded, 
noncentered global network of exchanges, employing a distinct but ever-shifting 
stock of themes and motifs. This permits its participants both to feel their fellow-
ship as part of a movement across which there is much sharing and borrowing, 
and to draw on this stock and to innovate as they respond to the demands being 
made in their part of the network. The unbounded and noncentered unity of global 
Pentecostalism strongly evokes the character of the Internet. Like the Internet, 
Pentecostalism bears many signs of its American origins, and America is where the 
mesh of exchanges within the whole system is at its densest. But despite its influ-
ence, America is not formally privileged as its center: Pentecostalists may look to it 
as the epitome of modernity but not in the way that others look to Rome or Mecca.
Accepting the truth of Pentecostalism brings a new identity with it: indeed one 
may say that its truth and identity values fuse in the figure of the person who is 
born again through the Holy Spirit. This self-defining experience serves to mark 
off the born-again in two dimensions: from their own past and from other indi-
viduals who are not reborn. Clearly, any act of individual conversion implies some 
degree of dissatisfaction with the personal past as well as a readiness both to break 
from it and to associate with a new group of people: an act of both severance and 
attachment. In Pentecostalism’s early days, the wider identity implications of this 
were limited in two respects. First, the born-again came from the same Protestant 
American milieu as the unregenerate, and—insofar as they had a wider message—
it was largely to recall them to traditional values that they had neglected. Second, 
Pentecostalism was the product of a highly individualistic society, and its regenera-
tion was imagined as extending not to society as a whole, merely to the aggregate of 
other born-again individuals. (In one widely held Pentecostal belief the born-again 
are to be raptured into heaven at the end time, leaving the mass of the unregener-
ate to their fate.) But when Pentecostalism went abroad, these two conditions were 
often not met, so the issue of how it would sit with other identities became more 
pressing. In postcolonial and in postsocialist societies, it typically came as a religion 
bearing American attributes with the promise of modernity and global mobility. At 
the same time, despite its appeal as a powerful vector of individualism (especially 
among the young), it was also often looked to as a vehicle of collective regeneration. 
So in Nigeria in recent years, it has become commonplace for Pentecostal leaders 
to offer renewal, deliverance, and prosperity to the nation, as if in reproach at the 
failure of the nationalist state to deliver the fruits of development. (See chapter 10)










































Now, where a community is the focus of renewal, such that the Spirit is antici-
pated to work its signs not just on the human body but also on the body politic, the 
issue of the balance between rupture and continuity presents itself in a particularly 
acute form. For this implies that the community, by the very fact of its being worth 
renewal, is seen as a site of positive value. But since Pentecostal conversion rests 
on the conviction that the prevailing state of affairs is profoundly corrupt, there is 
inevitably a problem about how to reconcile the rupture that this implies with the 
continuing value that attaches to the communal identity of its potential converts. A 
resolution is not always easy to achieve, and the shifting and variable outcomes have 
led to some interpretive schizophrenia, at least in the literature on West African 
Pentecostalism. Some observers, following the common self-representations of 
Pentecostalists, have perceived a radical rupture, “a complete break with the past,”29 
of which the demonization of ancestors and local spirits, and the provision of ritu-
als of deliverance from them, are a conspicuous sign; whereas others have seen in 
the emphasis on healing and prosperity the strength of values drawn from primal 
or traditional religion.30 The concrete reality is always a mix, and it is a mix whose 
formula can only be worked out in situ. It is in the protean genius of Pentecostalism 
that it has so often enabled this to be done, turning rupture into redemption.
Several of the postsocialist cases illustrate how the tensions between rupture 
and continuity may work themselves out.31 At one pole is the Embassy of God in 
Kiev, an American-style megachurch like several other Nigerian ministries, which 
has succeeded in implanting itself as a genuinely Ukrainian movement: a singular 
achievement when one considers that such a church in London (of which there are 
several) would have been strongly tied to a mainly Afro-Caribbean constituency.32 
Ukraine’s own tradition of religious pluralism was helpfully permissive, but the 
critical factor for the Embassy of God’s success was how it linked its truth for indi-
viduals—its message of redemption from alcohol, drugs, and other personal prob-
lems—with a cogent claim to share the identity of the new, democratic Ukraine 
and to be a positive force in the rebuilding of its civil society.
At the other pole stand the cases where Pentecostalism (or evangelical Baptism, 
which is close to it) has been taken up not at the heart of a large historic nation but 
among marginalized ethnic minorities. Take the case of the Nenets:33 here the ten-
sion between truth and identity presents itself more starkly yet is resolved with a 
striking paradox. With the survival of much of the old shamanic worldview and the 
influence of Russian Orthodoxy largely erased by decades of official atheism, both 
face the challenge of reframing their identities after the collapse of the Soviet order. 
Laur Vallikivi describes the faith of Nenets Baptists (many of whom are born-again) 
in terms that recall the discourse of African Pentecostalism: “total transformation,” 
the old spirits pushed into a “demonic periphery,” the “negation of the past,” and so 
on. Yet he also characterizes their use of language in prayer as “represent[ing] at the 
same time continuity and rupture” and “creating a clear continuance with the past” 










































in their conviction of the power of the Word in relations with the spirit world.34 
At the same time, the new faith serves both to integrate the Nenets into the wider 
society by its adoption of the Bible in Russian and to preserve their identity within 
it by a faith that stands in contrast to Russian Orthodoxy.
One way in which rupture may be reconciled with continuity is through their 
placement at complementary levels, individual and collective, respectively, as 
Ludek Broz shows in his account of evangelical Christians in the Altai Republic of 
southwest Siberia.35 Here, because the core truth value of Evangelicalism lies in its 
promise of individual self-renewal, of liberation from an old life of sin and addic-
tions like alcoholism, the theme of rupture from the past is most strongly evident 
in what Broz calls “personal narratives of discontinuity.” But while a new and for-
eign religion is well suited to be a vehicle of such personal liberation, the charge 
of alienness—which its rivals throw at it—is embarrassing; so it makes sense that 
evangelicals have responded by being warmly enthusiastic in their support for 
Altai language, music, and customs. This is a claim to belong through the asser-
tion of continuity with the local cultural past. Here the Altai evangelicals faced a 
problem similar to one that challenged the inculturation of Christianity in Africa. 
Though there was no indigenous Altai concept of religion, local identity was 
deeply bound in with practices that evangelical Christians could not but regard as 
heathen, such as some of the rituals involved in Chaga, the celebration of the New 
Year. As often in Africa, the solution was to draw a novel distinction between what 
was religion and what was culture, so that the latter could be embraced as part of 
Christian practice. Thus the demands of truth and identity might be reconciled in 
a specific blend of rupture and continuity.
Of course, Pentecostalism does not always manage to achieve this elusive rec-
onciliation, as Johannes Ries’s study of Pentecostalism among the Transylvanian 
Gypsies shows.36 Of the two main components of the Gypsy population, the rela-
tively privileged Corturari, who retain much more of Roma culture, have been 
impervious to the appeal of Pentecostalism, whereas it is the impoverished but 
culturally more assimilated Tsigani who have started to turn to it. Rupture would 
cost the Corturari too much by way of ethnic identity loss; by contrast, the cultural 
value attached to Tsigani identity has been so far eroded that Pentecostalism can 
offer the converts an altogether new kind of solidarity, as members of a trans-
ethnic family of God. Elsewhere, movements other than Pentecostalism have met 
the yearnings of the postsocialist world, though it is notable how often they echo 
Pentecostal messages and have Pentecostal groups as their main competitors.
• • •
The range and flexibility of Pentecostalism have enabled it to put down roots in 
very diverse social contexts. The two very broad categories of context that I have 
considered here, the postsocialist and the postcolonial, though each of them is now 










































the designation of a distinct academic subfield, are themselves internally very het-
erogeneous as well as overlapping. In relation to the new religions that now flood 
across them, their main overarching feature is that they both have had to come to 
terms with the exigencies of the neoliberal order. Behind that lies the failure of the 
state, whether (in the case of the former Soviet bloc) of long-established socialist 
states, or (in the case of the African Marxist-Leninist countries) of postcolonial 
socialist regimes that lasted barely two decades, or of the majority of African for-
mer colonies, including the Anglophone ones, that had adopted a softer African 
socialism. When the crisis of the postcolonial state first hit Africa, in the 1970s, 
there were two very different responses: a turn to Marxism in a handful of cases 
and a dramatic surge of Pentecostalism in others. Of course these cannot be seen 
as strictly analogous or alternative options, though it is significant that as responses 
they could not be combined. But when Marxism-Leninism’s failure became evi-
dent, at the end of the 1980s, Pentecostalism was widely seen to be some kind of 
answer. But an answer to what, and what kind of answer? Religions just don’t have 
viable answers to the problems of political and economic organization posed in 
today’s world, though some Muslims think they do, in such forms as Sharia law or 
Islamic economics.37 But Pentecostalism is happy to leave this task to the engineers 
of neoliberalism and to complement it by fashioning subjectivities that enable indi-
viduals to make practical sense of the experiences of living in a world so organized.
If the operational requirements of neoliberalism, then, are lessons that tend to 
flow from North to South or West to East (via agencies like the World Bank), the 
modes of experiential adaptation to it—of which, I have argued, Pentecostalism 
is one—now often move in other directions: South to North (or from the old 
Third to the old Second World), as from Nigeria to Ukraine, or South to South, 
as from Brazil to southern Africa. This is not surprising, since experiential solu-
tions have to take account not just of the objective external conditions but of the 
cultural personalities of those on whom the adaptation is imposed. In creating 
these transcontinental bridges, Pentecostalism has the great asset that, behind 
the North-Americanness of its expression, its ease with the electronic media, its 
modernity, and its individualism, it is also the bearer of a much older religious 
ethos, concerned with healing, visionary guidance, the various ways in which the 
spirit may imprint on the flesh. This is what has enabled it so often to click with 
newly urbanized ex-peasants, or tribal populations caught in the peripheries of 
modern states, or transnational migrants in search of a better life, to achieve, in 
some cases, paradoxical combinations of the old and new or unexpected fusions 




The world religions present social anthropology with a serious challenge. It came 
to them relatively late but with a body of theory and method honed on the analysis 
of primitive or tribal religions. The larger project by which the classic monographs 
were framed was in one sense paradoxical: it was to use materials from societies 
few of which had so much as a concept of religion to develop theories about what 
religion (or else ritual) was in general. But now we have to move from a large num-
ber of small religions to a small number of very large ones; from religions that have 
no awareness of themselves as such to religions that are highly self-conscious of 
themselves and of their boundaries; from religions that had to be treated as having 
no time depth to ones that not only are “the longest lasting of civilization’s primary 
institutions”1 but have complex ways of remembering their own pasts. It is these 
world faiths that have been spreading through mission and migration, generating 
new forms of religious expression and new situations of pluralism and conflict.
So it is hardly surprising that over recent decades a fast-growing number of 
impressive studies of particular world religions has appeared and that attempts 
have begun to be made to organize them intellectually as subfields, in the form 
of programmatic statements for anthropologies of Islam (most elaborately), 
Christianity, and Buddhism. These various attempts have typically been based on 
the corpus of studies of the particular religion, referring to the salient empirical 
questions to which it has given rise and to more general criteria of anthropological 
reason; but they have made little use of the notion of world religions or employed 
comparisons between them as a means of deepening their analysis. That may 
not matter so much if the religions exist as cultural isolates, but there has been 
much historical interaction between them—notably between Christianity and 
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Islam—and they coexist in a growing number of situations in the contemporary 
world, where people compare them in practice and so encourage various kinds of 
exchange to occur between them.
Our primary framing category of world religions stands against one of tribal or 
primitive religions, in terms of a complex of interrelated features: that they have 
written scriptures, seek (or at least acquire) converts, tend be transvaluatory, and so 
on.2 But the distinguishing feature that I want to start from is the differentiation of 
religion and society. The classic ethnographers—Raymond Firth, John Middleton, 
E. E. Evans-Pritchard, say—soon found themselves having to refer to religion when 
they set out to elucidate such things as Tikopia chiefship, Lugbara lineages, or the 
Nuer’s relationship to their natural environment. By contrast, the links between 
world religions and the societies or communities where they are practiced lacks this 
quality of immediate and necessary mutual implication. Even where a world religion 
is strongly held by everyone to the exclusion of any other, provides the charter for 
the basic forms of social life, and is regarded as a key component of group identity, 
people are aware that it has come from another time, or place, or both. They know 
that their forebears converted to it; and their clergy—whatever exact form these 
take—have to remind them regularly that their practice of it falls short of its highest 
normative standards. Implicit here is comparison: with the practice of another place 
or time (or both), or with the practice of other religions. This gap between religion 
and society means that the analysis of world religions can never be purely contextual 
and functional, as the classic monographs of primitive religion have been. It must 
be both comparative, because of world religions’ inherent awareness of alternatives, 
and historical, because their normative ideals have a once-and-future character.
Paradoxically, all this may be better appreciated when we take a view not from 
the heartlands of a world religion, where it has been long practiced and become 
deeply woven into local culture, but from its frontiers or periphery. The point has 
been made before. Fernand Braudel remarked that “it is most often on the border 
that the most characteristic aspects, phenomena and tensions [of a civilization] are 
found.”3 More recently, the historian of medieval Islam Richard Bulliet has argued 
that the growth of the Muslim umma as a transcultural entity is better understood 
by taking a “view from the edge” (in this case from Khurasan)—that is, to look at 
how Islam’s non-Arab converts were brought into it—rather than by following the 
conventional approach of tracing its expansion outward from its Arabian point 
of origin.4 So too with the Yoruba. What makes their case even more exemplary 
is that the age of conversion, being for most people only two to three generations 
back, has not entirely faded from the communal memory; and everyone is aware 
that there are alternatives to the religion that they practice, for they are also divided 
roughly half-and-half between Islam and Christianity. As a result, history and 
comparison are inherent in the religious situation—part of the lived experience 
of every Yoruba—and not brought to it, or imposed on it, by the external analyst.











































It is quite possible for excellent, even classic, studies to be written about particular 
Christian or Muslim groups or movements by authors who are not interested in ask-
ing questions about the inherent or distinctive attributes of the religion as such. Such 
was the case for a long time with anthropological studies of Christianity—a religion 
that presented the additional problem that it seemed so close to the culture that had 
produced the anthropologists as not to merit their attention in the same way as reli-
gions deemed exotic to Europe. Their focus was divided between two distinct spheres, 
which gave rise to two bodies of literature about different kinds of Christianity, seem-
ingly almost unconnected with each other. First, there were studies of peasant or folk 
religion in areas long Christian, such as the Catholic or Orthodox Mediterranean or 
Latin America. These generated the well-used distinction between great and little tra-
ditions, which spread into the study of other world religions and so worked against, 
rather than for, any deeper inquiry into the character of Christianity as such.
Second, there were forms of Christianity arising in the wake of European 
mission and colonial expansion: cargo cults in Melanesia, nativist movements 
employing Christian symbols in North America, prophetist movements and inde-
pendent churches in Africa. Here, the question of how far, or in what ways, they 
were to be seen as Christian usually did not interest anthropologists, though it 
was a preoccupation of many missionary writers under the rubric of syncretism.5 
Insofar as it concerned them at all, the Christian expression of these movements 
was treated as incidental rather than integral to them: anthropologists were much 
more concerned to show how it was underlain by indigenous, pre-Christian con-
cerns and beliefs. (A partial exception to this may be seen in the comparisons 
sometimes drawn with earlier outbreaks of Christian millennialism, for example 
through Norman Cohn’s classic studies of the Middle Ages, though here too what 
gave more satisfaction was the discovery of indigenous notions of periodic societal 
renewal.)6 Often the framing questions were more to do with politics than religion, 
as in the debate about how far they were to be seen as movements of anticolonial 
protest and precursors of nationalism.7 Were they better explained with reference 
to a Marxist analysis, in terms of interests, or a Weberian one, in terms of ideas?8
Still, Christianity slowly rose up the anthropological agenda, of which a sig-
nificant marker was Wendy James and Douglas Johnson’s Vernacular Christianity 
(1988). Important as this was in arguing for the gap between the two litera-
tures to be closed, it was still some way from adumbrating an anthropology of 
Christianity as that has developed in the last decade through such scholars as Joel 
Robbins, Fenella Cannell, Matthew Engelke, and others.9 These scholars typi-
cally had their roots firmly in one or the other of the two spheres of Christianity 
distinguished above—like Cannell on popular Filipino Catholicism or Robbins 
on Pentecostalism in the New Guinea Highlands. As we shall see, their specific 










































proposals for an anthropology of Christianity tend to bear the imprint of these 
backgrounds.
The aim of the anthropology of Christianity (as of other world religions) is to 
give a sharper intellectual organization to a spread of empirical inquiries that are 
cognate (in that closely related thematic issues keep cropping up within it) and 
also disparate (in that diverse local concerns clutter the foreground). It embraces 
questions both of method (i.e., how the study of religion X should be set about) 
and of substance (i.e., what concrete issues are central to its study). Though there 
is no sharp distinction between these two kinds of question, the main emphasis 
of different authors may be directed one way or the other. A common strategy for 
anthropologies of religion X,Y, or Z is to select some substantive feature deemed 
particularly characteristic of the religion, which is then treated as a fixed point 
to which studies of its diverse manifestations may relate. So Robbins proposes 
that discontinuity be seen as a central feature of Christian culture. The problem 
about any such particular proposed focus is that, however plausible it may be, 
it is likely to be at once logically arbitrary and factually overdetermined by the 
researcher’s own research area. So while Robbins’s idea of discontinuity fits very 
well with his research on Urapmin Pentecostalism, does that make it paradigmatic 
for Christianity in general? If he had worked on, say, Coptic Christianity in Egypt, 
is it conceivable that he would have proposed discontinuity as the leitmotif of 
Christianity? The key principle of method here is that no particular form of a reli-
gion can be privileged over any other as the starting point of an anthropology of it.
Cannell’s proposed focus is quite different: Christianity’s propensity for various 
kinds of dualism, especially as between the transcendent and embodied dimen-
sions of faith—the unresolved character of which leads her to dub it “the impos-
sible religion.”10 This perspective can surely yield real insights for the study of 
Christianity; but like the problematic of great vs. little traditions with which it 
has an obvious affinity,11 the idea of a tension between the transcendent and the 
embodied does not seem to be peculiar to Christianity. Is it not equally a ten-
sion in other world religions (as her own passing references to work on Hinduism 
imply)? Taken together, the proposals of Robbins and Cannell highlight a general 
problem of method: how to steer a middle course between the Scylla of too much 
specificity and the Charybdis of too little.
As these questions imply, any proposal for a substantive agenda for an anthro-
pology of religion X or Y carries comparative implications, whether or not these are 
explicitly addressed. The obvious kind of comparison is substantive: What concrete 
features of religion X most usefully serve to distinguish it from religions Y and Z? 
But sometimes the comparison has to do more with method: Robbins’s argument 
for the anthropology of Christianity to be grounded in the notion of discontinuity is 
counterposed to what he sees as the continuity thinking ingrained in anthropology’s 
approach to cultural phenomena. He has a good point here; for certainly the study 










































of movements like cargo cults and African prophet movements has been strongly 
disposed to emphasize their roots in precontact local culture and to downplay their 
Christian originality. What is curious about Robbins’s argument is that implicitly 
it runs against one common criticism made of the anthropology of religion: that 
it imports assumptions derived from Christianity (especially liberal Protestantism) 
into its analysis of other religions. That precisely was the thrust of Talal Asad’s well-
known and widely accepted critique of Clifford Geertz’s seminal essay “Religion as 
a Cultural System.”12 It is Cannell who stands closer to Asad here, with her idea that 
Christianity has functioned as the repressed—an active but unacknowledged force—
within the culture of anthropology itself. Perhaps it is not so unacknowledged as 
she claims. For as David Gellner shows in his masterly review of the anthropology 
of Buddhism, European scholars—both anthropologists and orientalists—have 
made much use of the categories of Protestantism and Catholicism to get a theoreti-
cal fix on the many variants of Buddhism: Mahayana and Theravada, traditional and 
modernist.13 Nor is this necessarily distorting, provided the comparisons are suffi-
ciently tentative and provisional, used as methodological scaffolding rather than as 
substantive rafters for the anthropology of Buddhism.
Now, if there is one general problem of method that is relevant to the anthro-
pology of any world religion, it is how to conceptualize it as a theoretical object 
without essentializing it. Essentialism, one may say, is pretty much anthropology’s 
Sin Against the Holy Ghost. By contrast, most believers consider that there is a 
timeless, essential, transcontextual core to their faith. Typically this also has a nor-
mative force, providing criteria for defining certain beliefs and practices as illegiti-
mate and excluding deviants from the faith community. Anthropology, of course, 
cannot get into the business of religious norm-setting by privileging one form of 
a religion against others. What a large majority of believers may consider as het-
erodoxy or deviation, even to the extent of placing it outside the faith community 
altogether, anthropologists will rightly wish to see as standing in the tradition of 
that religion as much as its dominant or mainstream forms. Indeed, a religion’s 
tradition may be very fruitfully viewed precisely as a set of running arguments 
about just what is essential to it.14
One seeming solution to the problem presented by the contrast between the 
essentializing faith of the believer and the variety of forms encountered by the 
anthropologist is to try to dissolve it by pluralizing the religion, making as many 
Christianities and Islams as there are contexts in which they are practiced. That 
would be to abandon any serious program for the anthropologies of religions X 
or Y, and a fortiori any comparative anthropology of the world religions at all. But 
it is hardly a solution, since particular variants or versions of a faith, or groups or 
communities that consider themselves to practice it, all presuppose the prior exis-
tence of a body of diverse but cognate traditions such as is implied by the notion 
of a world religion. Those complex, variegated, historically given ensembles are 










































bound to be fuzzy at the edges—Does Mormonism belong to Christianity? Do 
the Druse or Ahmadiyya belong to Islam? Does Chrislam15 belong to either, or to 
both?—but it surely suits the purposes of anthropology to take an inclusive view 
and count marginal cases as being in rather than out. The strategy of pluralizing 
world religions, rather than accepting them for the complex unities that they are, 
ignores both the prime source of their resemblances and the issue of why their 
disparate members are typically so keen to claim for themselves the name of what 
they assuredly see as one religion.
An extreme form of this pluralizing strategy to deal with the problem of rec-
onciling the linked tensions between unity/diversity and believer/outsider per-
spectives has been proposed by some anthropologists of Islam.16 This is to regard 
Muslims, rather than Islam, as the object of anthropological inquiry. Daniel 
Varisco goes further, to argue that, “the anthropologist observes Muslims in order 
to represent their representations of Muslims; only Muslims can observe Islam.”17 
An initial appeal of this solution is that it neatly gives unity to the believers and 
keeps diversity for the anthropologists, thus keeping the latter well away from 
the lure of essentialism. But can it possibly make sense for anthropology to be 
restricted to a study of believers’ representations? Of course it is widely accepted 
across the whole field of religious studies that believers must be treated as the priv-
ileged witnesses of their own faith; and that includes their representations, as they 
are evident to the anthropologist in the context of his field encounters.18 Data of 
this kind are surely the starting point for anthropology’s distinctive contribution 
to the study of world religions. But if we want to go beyond this in the descrip-
tion of a religion, or to advance from description to comparison and explanation, 
then a very large part of the evidence, such as the social and material conditions 
of those representations, the whole of the religion’s past (including its scriptures), 
its institutional forms, and so forth, is not subject to believers’ privilege. In so 
doing, we will be talking about the world religions as given bodies of tradition that 
provide preconditions for the beliefs and practices of their contemporary adher-
ents. The complex historical reality of Islam is presupposed by the existence of the 
contemporary Muslims, with all their diverse views of what true Islam is, who are 
encountered by anthropologists. The same must be true, mutatis mutandis, for any 
other world religion.
I I I
It is more than odd that the programmatic wave of writing on Christianity should 
refer so little to work on Islam, and not just because the anthropology of any 
world religion is at least implicitly comparative with respect to the others. For the 
anthropology of Islam is unquestionably much more developed, with a lively criti-
cal literature (now going back more than 30 years) in response to the impressive 










































build-up of monographs.19 No single contribution to it has occasioned as much 
comment as Talal Asad’s essay The Idea of an Anthropology of Islam (1986). Since 
it offers the most cogent attempt so far to steer a viable course between pluralism 
and essentialism in the analysis of a world religion, it has lessons for those inter-
ested in other religions, though these are not Asad’s main concern.
Asad’s question is how Islam may be conceptualized as an object of anthropo-
logical inquiry. He quickly disposes of two answers: that Islam is merely a conve-
nient label that covers all its concrete instances, as emically defined (the position 
of Michael Gilsenan); and that Islam has no value as an analytical category at all 
(as Abdul Hamid El-Zein argued). What he is especially concerned to critique are 
the views of those like Ernest Gellner and Bernard Lewis, who see Islam in sub-
stantive terms, as a historic formation that has shaped the life of Muslims and the 
forms of their societies in particular and distinctive ways. Inevitably, comparison 
comes quickly to the fore here, but Asad is oddly resistant to it. He brushes aside, 
rather than engages with, still less refutes, Gellner’s contention—hardly original 
with him—that a highly distinctive and historically momentous feature of Islam, 
compared with Christianity, has lain in its relationship with political power. Islam 
offers, Gellner argued, the “blueprint of a social order,” a political aspiration con-
solidated by its rapid ascent to being a world empire. By contrast, Christianity’s 
normative separation of the things of God and Caesar is to be referred back to 
its early formation among the politically marginalized. Asad, however, finds it 
“impossible to accept” that Christianity throughout its history has been less inti-
mately concerned with political power, citing cases from the emperor Constantine 
to “colonial missionaries.”20 His refusal to recognize difference at this point begs 
quite a few questions about the precise modalities of how the two religions have 
related to political power. As if sensing this, Asad at once avers that he has “noth-
ing in principle against comparison between Christian and Muslim histories,” and 
instances a couple of cases;21 but these are perfunctory and play no role whatever 
in his argument. It is clear that for Asad the path to an anthropology of Islam 
does not lie through comparison with other world religions as regards substantive 
features of any kind, that derive from its origins or early history and exert some 
characteristic effect on its subsequent instances.
So where does Asad look for it instead? He wants to find a framework that can 
encompass the many diverse realizations of Islam that anthropologists encounter 
without privileging any one of them in terms of its substantive content. He finds 
this in a notion of Islam as a discursive practice, a tradition of argument among 
Muslims about the correct forms of belief and practice. Such a discursive tradition 
is necessarily both rooted in, and oriented to, the past, but it is always conducted 
in some particular present, which is where it becomes the object of anthropologi-
cal analysis. Now, while this is pitched at a very general level and appears as more 
methodological than substantive in its import, it is not hard to see something 










































more concrete glimmering behind it (rather as Pentecostal revivalism glimmers 
behind Robbins’s notion of Christian discontinuity). I mean the absolutely central 
role within mainstream Islam of argumentative recourse to the Koran and the had-
ith in the ongoing normative self-constitution of the community of Muslims, the 
umma. Of this, Sharia is the consolidated summation.
That is, if you like, the strong version of Asad’s argument, perhaps stronger than 
he wants to make it, since he does not explicitly mention Sharia. But we may also 
see a weaker version, which has the potential to serve as starting point for other 
world religions too. The relation between the present and the past, or rather the 
way that the present serves as the fulcrum between the past and the future, is abso-
lutely central to all religious traditions and to all religions as traditions. A body of 
knowledge and practice is received from the past, but never inertly: it has to be 
engaged with, worked upon, and so its reproduction is also, to varying extents, 
always a process of development or transformation. Pace Robbins, while we can-
not ignore the ruptural potential of Christianity, the latent continuities must not 
be neglected either—even in its most ruptural forms, like Pentecostalism22—for 
in a larger view it is the tension or balance between rupture and continuity that 
marks the reproduction of all religious traditions.
Yet despite its promise, Asad’s program for the anthropology of Islam leaves 
one with a pronounced sense of anticlimax. Substantive lines of inquiry pursued 
by other anthropologists are dismissed, yet his own core concept of discursive tra-
dition remains very sketchy, almost empty of content. He has little to say about 
what distinctive cast may have been given to Muslim life by the vehicles of this 
tradition: the Koran, ancillary media such as hadith, tafsir, legal commentaries, 
and so forth; then historical works—both copious and distinctive23—from the sira 
(biography) of the Prophet onward, and other traditions that give Muslims a sense 
of their past, including mnemonics set in ritual practices (such as the hajj); and, 
moving further from Islam’s normative mainstream, forms of custom and culture 
linked to Islamic identities in particular ways. And beyond all this, is the tradi-
tion of Islam to be seen purely as a matter of discourse? Does it not carry definite 
institutional implications? Asad implicitly points us toward this when he writes of 
“the alim [scholar], khatib [Friday preacher] or Sufi shaykh” as among those who 
activate the discursive tradition of Islam.24 For these all denote statuses that are 
socially instituted in enduring structures that are distinctive of Islam—statuses 
that may be contrasted with those of other world religions, such as the monks of 
the Buddhist sangha or the clergy of a Christian church. Why is it so difficult for 
us to imagine Islam as having monasteries, or Christianity Sufi brotherhoods?25 It 
is as if Asad’s argument describes a circle: he has begun by leading us away from 
the substantive approach of an Ernest Gellner, but ends—albeit inadvertently—by 
leading us back to the kind of substantive question about the impact of Islam over 
time that engaged Gellner.











































The two basic components of the anthropological analysis of world religions are 
context and tradition. Ever since the revolution that displaced the older evolution-
ary paradigm and created modern anthropology in the 1920s, it has been widely 
agreed that its central interpretive strategy is to proceed by “placing social and cul-
tural phenomena in context.”26 The notion of a context may be understood in vari-
ous ways: subjectively, as the epistemological frame for the questions the anthropol-
ogist asks of the phenomena, or objectively, as the given conditions that frame the 
existence of the phenomena themselves. In the latter case—which is what concerns 
me here—it is vital to distinguish between, rather than to yoke or conflate, social 
and cultural notions of the context. It helps to bring out the theoretical difference 
by noting what they are respectively set against. To emphasize the cultural con-
text is to insist that social and material conditions, routinely treated as predictably 
leading to similar effects in all contexts where they are present, are insufficient to 
explain the phenomena. In other words, in the name of cultural variation between 
contexts, it is a protest against an oversimplifying universalism. On the other hand, 
an emphasis on explanation in terms of the social context tends to go with a distinct 
presentism: things are to be made intelligible in their concrete immediacy solely 
through their mutual relations with other features of the context. This is above all 
a protest against any recourse to the past, any attempt at explanation of the phe-
nomena in terms of how they have come about, or to what has preceded them. Of 
these, the former is typical of American anthropology in the Boasian tradition; the 
latter, of British social anthropology, particularly after Radcliffe-Brown gave a more 
strictly sociological cast to the presentist functionalism pioneered by Malinowski.
It is only superficially a paradox that, when our objective is to analyze a cultural 
phenomenon, such as a world religion viewed as tradition, the social context is the 
best place to begin. What makes the notion of cultural context unhelpful as a start-
ing point is that it tends to take for granted precisely what we are seeking to explore: 
how religions realize themselves over time, as they pass through successive contexts. 
Culture being “precisely the organization of the current situation in the terms of 
a past,” as Marshall Sahlins has put it,27 if continuity between past and present is 
presumed, then invoking the cultural context is all too likely to lead to a vacuous 
redescription of what we are seeking to explain in the first place. Of course, in nearly 
all settings there will be important long-run continuities from past to present; but 
the relationship between them needs to be examined open-mindedly. So although 
no one would be proud to call himself a functionalist now, it makes good sense that 
anthropologists still usually start their analyses by looking at how the thing that they 
are interested in is conditioned by its immediate material and social circumstances.
The notion of social context is a static conceptualization, a synchronic model of 
the interplay of social forces that corresponds to the present of the anthropologist’s 










































encounter with his subject. But viewed concretely, it is also a site through which 
multiple temporalities flow, from the relatively short span of individual lives to 
the longer-spanned lives of institutions, with world religions virtually the longest-
spanned of all. How should we characterize the relations of present and past rep-
resented by the tradition of a world religion? The obvious and to some extent ines-
capable way is to see it in terms of a descent, the transmission of an inheritance or 
deposit from the past, subject to a degree (often large) of variation from its original 
form through the impress of later circumstances: that is, of the cumulative effect 
of the successive contexts through which it has passed. Tradition and context thus 
stand in a two-way relationship. Contexts are given to religious traditions at every 
moment of their empirical instantiations, but they are also subject to modification 
by them, as they strive to realize in novel situations the specific and distinctive 
forms that they bring from their pasts. Thus it is that as traditions pass through suc-
cessive contexts of practice, they are partly reproduced and partly transformed.28
The utility of a notion of tradition here may be reached by another route. In order to 
recognize the multiple commonalities among the members of a class without  making 
the assumption of a single underlying essence—as sociocultural phenomena of all 
kinds typically require—anthropologists have often invoked the idea of polythetic 
classification.29 This derives from Wittgenstein’s metaphor of family resemblances, 
but a fruitful implication of this metaphor is rarely drawn out: that such resemblances 
are intelligible only on the basis of shared descent from a common ancestor.
If we apply a neo-Darwinian model of descent with modifications, as suggested 
by W. G. Runciman for cultural and social phenomena of all kinds, this may be 
expected to lead to a gradual but continuous drift away from their original forms.30 
But in the case of world religions, a countervailing force comes powerfully into 
play, one that we may call recursion. This arises from the fact that the past is not 
just an objectively given anterior state to the present, the baseline on which change 
works, but is often regarded as something of such intrinsic positive value that seri-
ous attempts are made to download it for contemporary application. However, 
this does not lead to a unified or determinate relation between past and present. 
Valuing the past may lead to an active concern to preserve its institutional, monu-
mental, and documentary traces, so that it can be genuinely known for what it 
was and so be a means for genuinely assimilating present to past. But where the 
demand for normative support from the past is strong but the means to recover 
it are weak, the past easily becomes more like a site on which present interests are 
projected, as Malinowski famously argued.31 So we have the paradox that, for all 
their supposed traditionalism, the religions of preliterate peoples are particularly 
likely to be labile, though for lack of evidence their histories are notoriously hard 
to recover.32 Even when literacy enables religious truth to be fixed in a scriptural 
canon, the very prestige of a source that is viewed as giving access to an author-
itative past, like hadith in Islam, may encourage traditions to be invented on a 










































massive scale.33A world-religious tradition may alternate between periods when 
the past is largely replicated, but within a slow drift of little-noticed change, and 
other periods, perhaps triggered by some sense of crisis, wherein the past is delib-
erately turned to as a source of guidance34—sometimes with far-reaching transfor-
mative effects, as notably with the Protestant Reformation.
But while recursion plays a key role in the actualization of world-religious tra-
ditions, it is powerfully constrained by what they make immediately available, 
even when allowance is made for the possibility of drawing on the resources of 
the remoter past to leapfrog the bequest of the more recent past. Now, whereas 
the anthropologist is chiefly concerned with the most recent past, since that is 
what a religion’s adherents practically engage with as they reproduce and modify 
its tradition, these latter will usually set much more store by what they believe 
of its remote foundational past, which they access through scriptures, mnemonic 
rituals, and the institutions that carry and interpret them. Since this past serves as 
the common point of reference for all the diverse contemporary manifestations 
of their faith, it also serves as a key reference point in the marking of religious 
identity at the global level. Yet despite the mythologization to which it is invariably 
subject, all students of the religion have to take this past as standing in some sort of 
relationship—however highly refracted—with a definite historical reality, namely 
the religious entity as it was when it started its movement through time and space 
down to the diverse contexts of the present.
Between these two points stretches a vast historical terrain crossed by tracks 
that diverge, sometimes intersect, and occasionally converge, since they are subject 
not just to the continuous impress of influences specific to each new context that 
they pass through but to less frequent movements within the imagined oikoumenē 
of each religion that cut radically across contexts—such as (say) the Evangelical 
Revival in Protestant Christianity or the Wahhabist movement in Islam, both 
coincidentally originating in the eighteenth century. Religions go through golden 
ages and periods of decline, episodes of restoration and revival, all of which fur-
ther inflect their traditions in particular ways. Over time, world religions acquire 
many additional attributes, whose historical contingency does not make them any 
less consequential, at least for a time. They establish alliances with various cul-
tural and political formations, and though these have their own distinct histori-
cal trajectories, the concurrence between them and the world religions, with the 
two-way influences that result from it, may result in what amount practically to 
near-fusions of religion and culture or polity. So Islam’s linkages with some par-
ticular peoples—such as the Turks (so that, in a seventeenth-century Christian 
European perspective, to become Muslim was to “turn Turk”)35 or the Fulani in 
parts of West Africa36—were of great contextual importance, though of course nei-
ther had the foundational character that created the integral bond between Islam 
and Arabic. Christian history evinces two long-lasting phases of the near-fusion of 










































religion and culture, far-reaching in their effects but still in the end time-limited. 
The first was the medieval emergence of Christendom, a joint effect of the papacy’s 
ambition to turn itself into a universal monarchy, the absorption into the Western 
Church of so much of the value system of a Germanic military aristocracy,37 and 
the confrontation with Islam. Undermined by the Reformation and the rise of 
the nation-state, Christendom eventually mutated into “the West”—but only after 
a long period in which Christianity was seen throughout much of the world as 
the white man’s religion, the ambiguous traveling companion of Europe’s imperial 
outreach.38 Then as Christianity has moved south over the past two centuries while 
Europe became more secular, the contingency of its long and intimate concur-
rence with Europe’s history has become increasingly apparent.
If we emphasize those features that a world religion derives from the political 
and cultural context of its first emergence and treat them as a deeply engrained, 
primary deposit within its tradition, we clearly open ourselves to the charge 
of essentializing it—that is, to treat it as if it stood outside history. To this, two 
responses may be made. First, a world religion’s early years are in fact likely to have 
the most far-reaching and wide-ranging relevance for its later manifestations. We 
are speaking here not just about its scriptures, especially if they are seen as a foun-
dational revelation absolutely prior to any institutional development of the religion 
(as believers often suppose), but also about the ritual and institutional forms with 
which they are closely implicated. But, second, what is at stake here is not features 
assumed to be necessarily present in all instances of a particular religion, as an 
unvarying and essential ground of their being such, but something less than that: 
features so characteristic of a religion and attributable to its early history that they 
repeatedly recur in diverse later contexts and, when taken in the aggregate, serve 
to distinguish instances of that religion from those of others. But as the metaphor 
of family resemblances suggests, we can regard mandibular prognathism as being 
a characteristic feature of the Habsburgs without seeing it as an invariable trait, still 
less a defining attribute, of all the descendants of the emperor Frederick III.
We may illustrate this by comparing how the formative years of the three great 
world religions endowed them not just with characteristic answers to the prob-
lems posed by human existence, but in particular with very different core social 
institutions: the Christian church (ekklēsia, “assembly”), the Muslim umma, and 
the Buddhist sangha. The church is a collectivity of believers that presupposes the 
parallel existence of a secular collectivity, even where their memberships closely 
coincide, whereas the umma unites the faithful in a single collectivity that origi-
nally and ideally is both religious and political. The basic conditions of this differ-
ence are much as Ernest Gellner suggested: that Christianity grew up within a state 
that it did not create (though it eventually “annexed” it), whereas Islam created its 
own state. But whatever their links to the state, religious collectivities soon require 
organization, which inevitably has a political dimension; and the structures that 










































the two faiths developed again corresponded to their respective political place-
ments. In the case of Islam this was tantamount to the organization of its own 
polity, which is why its fundamental (and enduring) internal cleavage of Sunni vs. 
Shia concerned the nature of legitimate authority within the early Islamic state.39
The Christian Church, by contrast, had little alternative but to develop a specifi-
cally clerical hierarchy. While facilitated by belief in the mediated sacred power of the 
priestly heirs of the apostles—something abhorrent to early Islam—this was really 
necessitated by Christianity’s development over its first three centuries as an entity 
outside the state. Paradoxically, lacking organizational models of its own, in this 
process it borrowed extensively from Caesar’s domain: territorial dioceses, priestly 
vestments copying those of secular magistrates, great church buildings modeled on 
the law courts (basilicas) of imperial Rome, and so forth. But being no more than 
a quasi polity, the Church still needed to look for a mutually supportive relation-
ship with rulers whose original legitimacy came from elsewhere but who could be 
remodeled as Christian kings. Here there are notable parallels with the independent 
case of Buddhism, which also developed outside the state.40 Where early medieval 
Europe had its Woden-descended kings, southeast Asia had its Hinduized sacred 
monarchies; and in both cases, convert kings derived new legitimacy from such 
pious acts as endowing monasteries.41 But there is a major difference. While both 
Buddhism and Christianity have a laity in a sense that Islam lacks, the sangha, as a 
corporation of monks, is not a kind of church. For Buddhism, unlike Christianity 
and Islam, is not a congregational religion—a feature that the latter two derive from 
their shared Judaic roots. This three-way comparison, which puts Christianity in the 
middle, rests on two axes of variation. The first, dealing with the structural context of 
its emergence, gives rise to the parallel with Buddhism, whereas the second, deriving 
from the religious tradition from which it came, produces the affinity with Islam.
Clearly, these classical forms of the three religions, with the values and roles that 
ride on them, are not guaranteed to reproduce themselves fully (or even, on occa-
sion, at all) in all subsequent instances, owing to the contingent circumstances of 
history. For considerable periods in the history of Buddhism in South Asia, accord-
ing to Michael Carrithers, the sangha virtually disappeared.42 For us, the contrasting 
trajectories of Islam and Christianity are especially illuminating, not just for their 
vicissitudes but for the ways they impacted on one another. The primary ideal of 
the umma—a community of believers undifferentiated horizontally as between reli-
gious/political or vertically as between laity/clerics—started to come under pres-
sure almost at once, with the death of the Prophet and the rapid conquest of a vast 
empire. Eventually there emerged a social group that ever since has been regarded 
as distinctive of Islam: the scholars or ulama, those credited with the authority to 
determine the content of prophetic tradition that was critical to the systematiza-
tion of Sharia law, which was starting to occur around this time (eighth and ninth 
centuries c.e., 150+ years a.h.).43 Their rise was a response to the fading of direct 










































oral memories of the founding years, coupled with the rising flood of non-Arab 
converts seeking normative incorporation into the umma. The political alignment 
of the ulama was uncertain: the legal advisors and so usually the allies of the rul-
ers, they were also sometimes the focus of popular opposition to them (especially 
where the latter was of alien origin). Yet despite these developments, the ulama were 
always very different from a Christian clergy, just as Sufi shaykhs and muqaddams, 
new religious roles within Islam that emerged a century or so later, differed from 
the ascetic spiritual guides that were primary within Buddhism. For it remained 
the case that these new roles were set within a wider institutional and ideological 
matrix that was a particular and unique product of Islam’s earlier history.44
Islamic institutions would face a more complex challenge where Muslim popu-
lations came to exist as minorities under non-Muslim rule—as in large parts of 
South and Southeast Asia, sub-Saharan Africa, and (latterly) Western Europe—and 
so lacked the political means to guarantee the routines of Muslim life as originally 
imagined. As Olivier Roy argues for Muslims in the West today, a whole range of 
responses to this predicament is available in principle, from the radical ones of fol-
lowing the Prophet’s precedent of hijra or withdrawal to a Muslim-ruled territory 
or trying to annex the country to Islam by jihad, to various forms of accommoda-
tion, such as creating religiocultural enclaves or settling for a much more church-
like social existence, based on local congregations.45Across the long span of Islam’s 
existence in Nigeria, several of these options have been realized as the varying 
circumstances of time and place have allowed. Roy suggests that among Muslims 
in the West, several reduced forms of the umma exist concurrently: most con-
cretely as a local congregation; as an imagined but deterritorialized world com-
munity; or and as a virtual community accessed through the Internet. Even where 
the adherents of a religion are able to realize, or are happy to settle for, much less 
than its normative ideal—that is, for Muslims, the umma as a religious community 
politically organized within its own space—it tends to retain a potent and recur-
rent appeal, especially for its clerics and literates, who know it from its scriptures 
and traditions, or from its practice in the past or in other places. Even though the 
characteristic traits of a religion are not invariably reproduced, their presence in 
past tradition makes it more likely that they rather than randomly possible others 
will recur; and—to anticipate the Nigerian case study to come—a comparison of 
the divergent features of two religions in a single situation may bring out sharply 
the potentiality of what lies latent in their distinctive traditions.
V
“Compare and contrast” goes the old cliché of examination papers. The implica-
tion of this phrasing—that comparison looks for similarities; and contrast, for dif-
ferences—is misleading, since productive comparison always depends on finding 










































the right interplay between similarities and differences. Even so, comparison shifts 
between moments where one or the other mode predominates. Anything can be 
compared with any other thing, however unlike; but to be fruitful the process has 
to begin from establishing a similarity, some shared features to provide a frame 
within which questions about difference can be posed. When faced with puzzling 
novelty, the first human impulse is to get some kind of preliminary fix on it by 
looking for similarities with what is already familiar. Thus the Spanish conquis-
tadors initially called Aztec temples “mosques”—the impressive buildings of an 
alien religion46—or (as implausibly) the London Evening Standard suggests to its 
readers that Professor Tariq Ramadan may be seen as Islam’s Martin Luther.47 Such 
ad-hoc comparisons are very likely to be tendentious, because cognitive consid-
erations are subordinated to practical ones, such as the pressure to reassert moral 
boundaries challenged by otherness, or to quell anxiety by domesticating the alien.
It is when the grounds for comparison are elaborated and the two comparanda 
are subsumed under some more general notion that the real cognitive possibilities 
of comparison open up. Such a notion is fundamentalism. Curiously, this term ini-
tially implied only an intra-Christian comparison, since it was used around 1920 
as a self-identification by conservative evangelicals to distinguish themselves from 
liberal Protestants given to a nonliteralist reading of Scripture. Only later was it 
turned the other way, often by secular-minded commentators, to stress—usually 
with negative overtones48—the similarities between diverse contemporary move-
ments within Christianity, Islam, and other faiths. Subsequent attempts to theorize 
the term have not proved very productive, because the phenomena themselves are 
so diverse; so that what we are left with is the valid but much watered-down claim 
that there are many partial and overlapping resemblances among the movements 
so designated. I shall argue later that the careless use of the term has led, in the 
Nigerian context, to the ignoring of important differences between Muslim and 
Christian forms of so-called fundamentalism.49
Drawing out the similarities between world religions can shed much light on 
some key features of their operation, especially those that arise from common 
structural conditions. To take one example, we may abstract and generalize from 
a trajectory that Carrithers identifies in the history of Buddhism, by which the 
renouncer, the monk devoted to the individual exemplary pursuit of spiritual 
merit, becomes the specialist, someone whom that very merit enables to provide 
ritual and magical services for a lay community. Something analogous can be seen 
in other religions: for example, in the way in which Sufi shaykhs in West Africa 
came to be valued more as miracle workers than as mystical guides, or (a less 
exact parallel) in the transit of West African Pentecostal churches from a primary 
focus on the pursuit of holiness through ascetic self-discipline to the provision of 
effective prayer for mundane needs. The sheer diversity of the settings in which 
something like this trajectory shows up indicates a recurrent dilemma that world 










































religions face. They all originated in a radical, world-rejecting vision that down-
graded the significance of the here-and-now in favor of a transcendental vision 
of reality.50 It is surely significant, as Max Weber emphasized,51 that this perspec-
tive was typically grounded in the experience of social groups—traders, craftsmen, 
officials, minor aristocrats, and so on—who were marginal to the imperatives of 
subsistence production in overwhelmingly agricultural or pastoral societies. But 
as the religions spread, the old this-worldly pressures—especially for healing and 
magical services—inevitably reasserted themselves. The tension between the two 
orientations became a perennial stimulus to reform movements as it came to be 
felt that the founder’s elevated vision had got too overlaid with baser concerns. 
At this point, however, our comparative focus needs to shift back from similarity 
to difference, for the responses to this situation are also strongly inflected by the 
traditions of each particular religion. So notwithstanding the existence of what has 
been called Protestant Buddhism in Sri Lanka in the nineteenth century,52 it would 
seem that Buddhism is less prone to reformism of the sort just outlined than are 
the two Abrahamic faiths, since lacking their monotheist and exclusivist character 
it can more readily offload the provision of health, fertility, prosperity, and such-
like onto cults of local deities that can easily coexist with it without compromising 
its transcendental message.53
When anthropology moves from its primary task of contextual analysis to com-
parison, it usually has to decontextualize its objects of analysis. Taking religions 
out of their social context and treating them for comparative purposes as things 
in themselves is routine in the field known as comparative religion, whose aim 
may be no more ambitious than to show the comparability of religions through 
applying phenomenological categories taken to be universal.54 It is presumed in 
any project whose aim is to compare them solely in terms of their theologies or 
internal logics or how they address what are taken to be universal problems of 
human existence, such as John Bowker’s study of the ways they respond to human 
suffering.55 But decontextualization does pose a problem for the social-scientific 
study of religion insofar as that aims to explain the variable social impact of the 
world religions, because the myriad contextual circumstances in which this occurs 
cannot be controlled. The ceteris-paribus proviso that is presumed in any rigorous 
analysis of the social impact of differences between religions can hardly obtain if 
the contexts are full of random variation. There is no doubt that this is a major 
methodological problem that dogs Weber’s Sociology of Religion, master work of 
historical sociology though it is.56
The logically optimal conditions for comparing world religions are not eas-
ily met, as we see in the case of Geertz’s Islam Observed, widely regarded as a 
foundational text for the anthropology of Islam.57 Because this treats Islam as the 
constant, and the two cultures in which it has found a context—Morocco and 
Indonesia—as variables, it ends up telling us less about Islam than about the two 










































cultures that have each imprinted a very different ethos on it. The book’s most 
general message—that Islam is susceptible to enormous variety in its concrete 
realizations—is mere conventional wisdom for anthropologists, whereas it may 
be found challenging by Islamicists and even more so by orthodox Muslims. 
What is essentialized by Geertz here is not Islam but the two cultures in which 
it is set. They are portrayed in the manner of Ruth Benedict’s Patterns of Culture, 
consistently opposed to each other in a series of maximally heightened contrasts, 
whereas Islam itself, though described in its local specificities, never receives any 
kind of overall characterization.58 In Geertz’s shorthand, Islam in Morocco is mar-
aboutism, whereas in Indonesia it is illuminationism.59
But when Geertz comes to his longest, pivotal chapter, entitled “The Scripturalist 
Interlude,” which deals with the contemporary religious situation as observed in 
the present time of his own fieldwork, there is a notable shift in the balance of 
similarity and difference in his argument. He sees the Islamizing movements in 
both countries as astonishingly similar, though differing in the details of their 
local course and impact.60 To explain this he invokes three conditions: Western 
colonial domination, the growing influence of a new kind of legalistic, scriptural 
Islam, and the emergence of an activist nation-state, all of which working together 
have shaken the old order of things in a manner analogous to the complex joint 
impact of Capitalism, Protestantism, and Nationalism in Europe.61 One cannot 
but be struck by the contrast between his thoroughly anthropological emphasis 
on difference in his characterization of the two classical cultures and his readi-
ness, when he switches into macrosociological mode, to stress sweeping similari-
ties between expressions of religion across great gulfs of historical time and cul-
tural space. Resemblances on this scale obviously require explanation in terms of 
broadly similar and highly general social-contextual conditions, such as are here 
denoted by the overarching labels of Capitalism and Nationalism.
But the third condition, “the increasing influence of . . . scriptural Islam” (or, 
Geertz implies, of a kind of Protestant Islam), is different from the other two. 
For it is a cultural rather than a social condition, and it brings with it the ambi-
guity so common with cultural explanations: it seems to be as much part of the 
explanandum as one of the explanantia. For what we are dealing with here is the 
operation of a tradition, reaching back into the past and interacting reciprocally 
with other features of the situation or situations through which it passes. Geertz 
makes mention only of “the Koran, the Hadith and the Sharia, together with vari-
ous standard commentaries on them,” when he gets to the “Scripturalist Interlude,” 
as if they had not been significant factors in the prior history of Islam in the two 
countries.62 To use a musical metaphor, Islam Observed is like a pair of variations 
without any prior statement of the theme: we have maraboutism and illumina-
tionism first, placed in contrasting cultural contexts, then their shared nemesis 
Scripturalism, which is placed in a mainly social context. But the operation of the 










































Islamic tradition as an object of anthropological inquiry—which would require 
the analysis of its reciprocal interaction with the contexts wherein it is taken up or 
of the interplay of the cultural and the social—is barely attempted.
VI
This interplay of the social and the cultural, or (what is the same thing) of context 
and tradition, is at the very heart of understanding how religions are realized in 
human practice. As in all other areas of social life, religious action is always doubly 
constrained: by the features of the context to which agents have to respond and 
by what tradition—beliefs, values, and institutions received from the past—makes 
available to them. But never is it completely determined. Virtually all contexts yield 
options for action, and traditions are open to be revised or reinterpreted. Tradition 
shapes the selection of options, and context inflects how tradition is received.
Granted this necessary dialectic, it is remarkable how often attempts are made—
whether by social scientists or by lay social actors—to deny its operation by insist-
ing that one or the other side of it counts for everything. Such perverse one-sid-
edness typically has its taproot in moral or ideological considerations regarded as 
being of overriding practical importance. Take a real-life case from Nigeria, which 
touches on matters to be considered later. The Right Rev. Josiah Idowu Fearon, 
Anglican bishop of Kaduna, is reported as having said of Boko Haram, the violent 
Islamist organization active in the northeast of Nigeria since 2007, that it “is a 
resistance movement against misrule, rather than a purely Islamic group.”63 Since 
it is quite possible (and it is in fact the case) that Boko Haram is both these things, 
why should he want to present it as a matter of either/or rather than both/and? The 
bishop is active in interfaith dialogue—very much needed in a city where severe 
religious rioting occurred in 2000 and 2002—and knows that many Muslims are 
strongly opposed to Boko Haram’s activities too, and so he is reluctant to stress 
its Islamic character.64 It may well be, too, that he wants to counter the common 
tendency among his fellow Christians to explain everything they see as negative 
in Muslims as being due to their Islam. (Muslims tend to view Christians through 
the lens of a similar religious essentialism, such homologies being routine features 
of religious confrontation.) If these are his motives, they are certainly not malign 
or ignoble ones. But an ecumenical spirit is not necessarily the best guide to a full 
and cogent analysis of why Boko Haram does what it does.
With less excuse, Olivier Roy takes a position similar to Bishop Fearon’s but 
elaborates it methodologically, in an attack on what he terms “culturalism.”65 He 
sees this as widespread across a very wide range of opinion: Samuel P. Huntington 
of course, “orientalists” such as Bernard Lewis, “the man in the street,” funda-
mentalist and conservative Muslims, even some “opponents of Islamophobia 
and  .  .  . moderate Muslims.”66 Altogether quite a coalition of error! Roy’s own 










































stated approach is strongly of the either/or variety. “Neofundamentalism and 
radical violence are more linked with westernization than with a return to the 
Koran,” he argues, so that we need “a transversal approach to Islam, rather than 
a diachronic approach [which would look] to history to understand the roots of 
‘Muslim anger.’ ”67 So in trying to understand new trends among Muslim youth, 
it is more useful to look for parallels with other forms of modern religiosity than 
“trying to reread the Koran.”68 But again we have to ask: Why should it be a mat-
ter of either/or rather than of both/and? In fact, Roy has already undermined his 
own prescription—and his book is much the better for it—by its very subtitle, The 
Search for a New Ummah. For a “new Ummah” implies an old Ummah, which is at 
the same time (transversally) a distinctive element in how Muslims respond to the 
predicament of modernity that is absent from how Christians or Buddhists may 
respond to it, and (diachronically) one that entails the duality of reception and 
interpretation, the two-way exchange between present and past that is how reli-
gious traditions work. It is fine to begin from a transversal approach to religions 
in the modern world, but it is arbitrary to limit it to a search for similarities and to 
ignore the differences between them; and once difference is admitted, it becomes 
impossible to exclude the past from the analysis of the present. So when Roy says 
that “the key question is not what the Koran actually says, but what Muslims say 
the Koran says,” he offers us another false choice.69 For if arguments about the true 
import of the Koran and other sources of faith are a crucial part of how Muslims 
conduct their lives—as Asad was right to insist—it is hard to see how this work of 
interpretation can be understood by ignoring what it is that is being interpreted.
In examining the interplay between context and tradition, our method must 
not be to start with the origins of the tradition or its foundational texts and specu-
late about what their implications must be for its later practice, as some recent 
antireligious polemicists like to do,70 but the reverse. We must place ourselves in 
the midst of a concrete realization of the religion and look to see what elements of 
its tradition are presupposed by it. A religion’s tradition is thus seen as embodying 
a set of potentials that make particular outcomes more or less likely but that can 
be fully assessed only in their realization. This task is made much easier if it is pos-
sible to compare two religions in the same context, thus enabling factors specific to 
each religion to be identified—a strategy opposite to Geertz’s: not one religion and 
two contexts, but one context and two religions. While there are many plural reli-
gious settings, the optimal conditions for such a comparison are not easily found, 
for the two religions need to be equally copresent. It is not easier to think of a case 
that fits the bill better than the Yoruba of southwestern Nigeria, who are divided 
roughly fifty-fifty between Islam and Christianity. So to this I now turn.
Though Christianity and Islam have coexisted since the very birth of Islam, 
their relationship has usually been very asymmetrical, as with two of its main con-
temporary modes: in the Middle East, where historic but rapidly eroding Christian 










































communities exist, as they have for many centuries, within Muslim-dominated 
societies; and in modern Europe, where Muslim communities have come to exist 
through migration, mostly over the last few decades, amid a Christian or post-
Christian majority. There is also a third mode: where Muslims and Christians, 
whether through migration or conversion, have come to coexist in settings domi-
nated by a third religion, as in Susan Bayly’s account of how Islam and Catholicism 
have adjusted to a Hindu context in southern India.71 The Yoruba situation began 
like this, but over the past century it has changed to the point that the traditional 
religion has been drastically curtailed in its range and reduced to the preserve of a 
small minority (though its memory and ethos still exert a large, diffuse influence). 
Nowadays, the two world faiths are to be found in virtually every community, 
though their regional distribution is markedly skewed. The presence of Islam goes 
back much further in time, but both religions can now be regarded as fully and 
equally at home in Yoruba society and culture. There are high levels of social inter-
action between Muslims and Christians, and virtually no residential segregation 
between them. Interfaith marriages are not uncommon; many extended families 
contain both Christian and Muslim members; and mutual participation in each 
other’s ritual festivities is a standard feature of Yoruba social life as well as a source 
of cultural pride.
Since this remarkable pattern of coexistence has come about over the past 150 
years, comparison of the two religions cannot be a static exercise. It has to be ana-
lyzed as the evolving outcome of the interaction between the two world religions 
with the antecedent culture of the Yoruba, into which paganism had been seam-
lessly woven, and with each other. More than that, as Yorubaland has become ever 
more involved in the social and cultural networks that constitute Nigeria, inter-
religious relations have been affected by developments at the pan-Nigerian level, 
particularly since the 1970s. Here another comparison becomes relevant, between 
the religious harmony of Yorubaland and the pattern of recurrent religious vio-
lence that has become endemic in Northern Nigeria. So the two religions are to 
be seen as dynamic entities, not just subject to change but initiatory of it, ever 
reworking both themselves and the social contexts in which they are active. This 
dynamic capacity, or determination to make history, which we see actualized in 
the agency of individuals and collectivities, is fueled by what each religion brings 
to the Yoruba and the Nigerian situation from its own past. The various ways for 
these distinctive heritages of Islam and Christianity both to enable and to con-
strain their ongoing self-realization must lie at the center of our comparison.
125
The Yoruba have a sense of themselves as being exceptionally tolerant of religious 
difference—and now particularly as having harmonious relations between Islam 
and Christianity. Let me illustrate the point through two vignettes from field 
research in Ibadan in 2009.
The local-ward development committee in Yemetu Aladorin meets to launch 
a primary health-care program for women and children. It is chaired by a local 
imam, and the six committee members present comprise four Muslims and two 
Christians. At the end of the proceedings, the imam recites the surat al-fatiha (the 
short first sura of the Koran) in Arabic, and I notice even the Christians trying to 
follow it with their lips. One of the Christians then says a short informal prayer in 
Yoruba, ending with l’orukọ Jesu Kristi Oluwa wa! (In the name of Jesus Christ, our 
Lord!), to which everyone responds Ẹ yin Ologo! (Praise the King of Glory!).The 
imam rounds off by saying Hallelu! three times.1
Two ladies from St. Paul’s Anglican Church take me on a tour of the back alleys 
of Yemetu to explore the great variety of little churches and mosques to be found 
there. We come to the small Akabiako mosque, whose elderly imam belongs to the 
Bamidele sect. The two women teachers in the primary school attached to it are 
both eleha (wearing full black purdah). Before we get to our discussion, which might 
touch on sensitive religious differences, one of my companions recalls to the imam an 
incident a little while back. A female pupil of the mosque school had been knocked 
down by an ọkada (motorbike taxi) in the main road. The church lady picked her 
up, sorted her out, and brought her back to the mosque. The imam thanks her again 
warmly for what she had done, and our discussion proceeds. A common ground 
of Yoruba humanity has been reaffirmed. No surprise that the imam later says that 
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Muslims and Christians, while they go their different ways for religious purposes, 
should still regard one another as ọmọ-iya (children of the same mother).2
By and large this self-image is well justified, especially compared with the pattern 
of intermittent violent conflict that has developed in many areas of Northern Nigeria 
over the past thirty years. The Yoruba like to see their tolerance as an enduring cul-
tural trait, and it does surely derive support from the live-and-let-live ethos of the 
orisa cults; but if we want to explain it, it is more fruitful to regard the relationship 
between Islam and Christianity as potentially conflictual, and also as one that is not 
static but evolves under changing historical conditions. In fact, we view it better as 
an ongoing historical accomplishment than as a cultural given, the product of the 
kind of ground-level interaction in local communities of the kind just described. 
Nowadays this takes place in full awareness not only of the situation in Northern 
Nigeria, where things are so different, but also of the strong rivalry between the two 
faiths in Yorubaland. I will suggest that the classic form of this interfaith harmony 
belonged to the late colonial period and lasted through independence, in 1960, but 
came under severe pressure from the late 1970s. Though substantially restored in the 
1990s, it can no longer be taken so easily for granted as before.
So I begin by looking at the evolution of this pattern of interfaith relations since the 
beginning of the colonial period. My analysis will hinge on the concept of commu-
nity: the overarching framework of the Yoruba community, the communities created 
by the two religions, and the relations between them. Here Yoruba community must 
be understood as an expanding hierarchy of levels: at its center the town or historic 
community known as the ìlú; below this the town’s quarters, and (at the bottom) the 
family compound; above it a level of subtribes (Ijesha, Ekiti, Egba, etc.), often related 
to colonial administrative divisions, and at the top the pan-Yoruba level, which was 
progressively emergent over the colonial period.3 In what follows, my narrative will 
move through three stages: the process of conversion, the formation of the new reli-
gions as communities within the wider community, and the impact of nationalist 
and postnationalist politics on the pattern of religious coexistence between them.
EXPL AINING YORUBA C ONVERSION
From their modest numbers at the end of the nineteenth century, both world reli-
gions experienced a dramatic growth within a few decades after the imposition of 
colonial rule in the 1890s. By the later 1930s, probably a majority of Yoruba had 
become Muslims or Christians; by the early 1950s nearly 90 percent were; today 
virtually everyone is. This correlation suggests an obvious explanation, at least for 
Christianity: its association with colonial power—whether in a general, symbolic 
way, or as a mystical way of accessing the white man’s power, or through such 
specific modalities as passing through the school system, which was largely set up 
and controlled by missions. But this explanation won’t work for Islamic conversion 
unless that is seen as a path to empowerment that avoided symbolic identification 
with colonialism, or even as some kind of symbolic resistance to it. But neither 
of these views—which would treat conversion to the two faiths as presenting two 










































quite different patterns and problems—fits with what we know of the local phe-
nomenology of Yoruba conversion; and this suggests that the two processes ran 
concurrently along similar lines.
The problem of Yoruba conversion to the world religions has to be addressed in 
the light of two general principles:
 1.  What needs to be explained is a single overall pattern of change, where the 
two world religions advanced at roughly the same pace over time, but very 
unevenly over space.
 2.  Paradoxically, it proves easier to work down from the broad social trends to 
a rationale that makes subjective sense at the individual level, then to work 
upwards from personal reasons for conversion to explanation of the overall 
movement. The latter approach—such as I once employed in a household 
survey of Ilesha to collect, inter alia, family histories4—tends to produce a 
great array of personal motives and circumstances that tell much about the 
How? of individual conversion but will not yield a coherent answer to the 
overall Why? of the whole process.
Here Robin Horton’s general theory of African conversion is promising on both 
counts, since it is so set up as to apply equally to both world religions, and it fol-
lows the classic Durkheimian strategy of treating social facts as things and relating 
them to other facts of the same order.5 It explains the social fact of conversion not 
as a response to colonial power per se—as in explanations of the “adopting the 
religion of the conqueror” type6—but as an adjustment to a general social experi-
ence that colonialism contingently brought about: to wit, an increase in the scale of 
social relations, a move from the microcosm of life lived mostly in local communi-
ties to the macrocosm of lives opened to wider influences (such as labor migration, 
expanded trade networks, growing cash crops for world markets, the expansion of 
horizons by education and the press).
As to why such a change of experience should produce such an ideational 
change as a principal effect, Horton argues that it depends on the character of 
indigenous belief. From that perspective, Islam and Christianity are essentially 
cults of a High God, who functions as a general ground of being within the indig-
enous cosmology but receives little direct ritual attention. That mostly goes to 
subordinate deities, orisa in the Yoruba case, since they are seen as addressing 
the conditions of existence of people whose lives are mainly preoccupied with 
local concerns. A shift of focus from orisa to God can therefore be expected 
wherever the vital concerns of a population shift away from the microcosm to 
the macrocosm. Colonialism in Nigeria certainly provided a sufficient condition 
of such an outcome but evidently not a necessary one. From our viewpoint, the 
vital implication is that if Christianity gained converts under colonialism, it was 
less because it was the Europeans’ religion than because it was locally the most 
available monotheism; and that where Islam was more available, then colonialism 
would deliver converts to it.










































So we have a coherent and elegant explanation of the temporal and geographi-
cal pattern of conversion to the monotheistic faiths in Yorubaland. It depends 
essentially on the relationship between two factors: first, the timing and inten-
sity of the colonial impact (in terms of adoption of cash crops, communications, 
administrative presence, etc.), which tended to spread out in waves from Lagos 
toward the remoter parts of the North and East, and second, the relative strength 
of existing Christian or Muslim contacts and influence, when and where the gen-
eral disposition to convert appeared. The first of these explains the general disposi-
tion to adopt a monotheistic religion, and the second explains which particular 
monotheism would be its principal beneficiary in any area.
In the light of the map, we can discern five distinct regional patterns.7
 1.  Ilorin. This was the only area of Yorubaland to be conquered in the jihad 
that established the Sokoto Caliphate, of which in the early 1820s it became 
the most southerly emirate.8 Initially its Muslim ruling class presided over 
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a mainly pagan population, whether of slaves or of free peasants. Under 
colonialism it was assigned to Northern Nigeria, which impeded missionary 
activity and so facilitated Islamization, resulting in a large Muslim majority, 
though some peripheral areas to the east became more Christian.
 2.  Lagos. After a decade of informal control through what was called a consul-
ate, British rule was imposed in 1861, more than thirty years before the oc-
cupation of the Yoruba interior. Islam had a significant presence well before 
the missions arrived, in 1851, and spread rapidly in the 1860s and 1870s, 
especially among the followers of the exiled king, Kosoko.9 By the 1890s, 
to missionary chagrin, Islam had succeeded in claiming the allegiance of a 
majority of indigenous Lagosians.
 3.  The North and West. This embraces most of the savannah region and 
extends into the forest areas settled by Oyo in the nineteenth century. Here 
the missionaries established their early bases at Abeokuta and Ibadan in 
the1840s and 1850s, finding Muslims already there: not many, but the alfa 
were well placed, with networks ramifying toward the North.10 When the 
conditions for mass change came, in a series of rising surges (the 1890s, 
World War I, the cocoa boom of the 1920s), Islam picked up more converts 
than Christianity did, particularly among Oyo-Yoruba.
 4.  The East. This vast area, extending into what had been Kabba Province of 
Northern Nigeria (now part of Kogi State), is mainly forest, fading north-
ward into savannah woodland. It had been substantially beyond Oyo con-
trol or settlement, and Islam had little or no presence prior to Christianity. 
Missionaries reached Ilesha around 1860 and Ondo in the late 1870s, but the 
work of conversion came in strength only after the 1890s.11 Here Christianity 
came to claim a large majority of the population, with the boom coming in 
the 1920s and especially the 1930s, when the Aladura revival created a mass 
conversion movement.12 The proportion of Muslims rises somewhat in the 
far northeast (Akoko), an area subject to the influence of the Muslim Nupe 
in the late nineteenth century.13 An instructive case is Ife itself, where back 
in the 1840s a party of Oyo refugees (when they must have been almost en-
tirely pagan) were allowed to form an adjacent settlement called Modakeke. 
The importance of Oyo links as a vector of Islamic influence is shown in the 
fact that, many decades later, while indigenous Ife went mainly Christian, 
Modakeke went mainly Muslim.14
 5.  Ijebu is the most complex case of all.15 Close to Lagos and athwart its main 
trade route to the interior, Ijebu had refused the missions all entry in the 
nineteenth century. By the 1880s there were close links with Muslims in 
Lagos and Ibadan, which had a fair number of Ijebu residents. Ijebu was 
the only Yoruba kingdom the British needed to crush with a full-blown 
military expedition (1892), and this defeat triggered within a few years the 
first mass movement toward the world religions. The theological response 










































to the defeat, as noted by an African pastor in Ibadan, was Ọlọrun ni a o sin! 
(It is God we shall serve!).16 But not exclusively the white man’s God. The 
missions did indeed gain massively—by the 1920s over a third of Yoruba 
Christians were Ijebu, with many becoming teachers and clergy—but so 
did Islam. In fact Muslims came to comprise over two-thirds of the capi-
tal, Ijebu Ode. There is no way that the Islamic option can be regarded as 
anticolonial, since the chief who led it, Balogun Kuku, was the principal 
local ally of the British in the wake of the conquest. He built himself a grand 
mansion, Olorunsogo (God Has Wrought the Glory) House in the high-
bourgeois style of Victorian Lagos.
But whereas Ijebu Ode went mainly Muslim, the smaller subordinate towns of the 
Ijebu kingdom went mainly Christian. Although this may partly be due to reaction 
against the capital’s choice—Yoruba subordinate towns are always looking for the 
opportunity to assert their autonomy—the critical condition was that, being towns 
with populations of farmers rather than traders, they lacked the prior links with 
Muslims in Lagos and Ibadan that Ijebu Ode had.17 A further feature of the Ijebu case 
sits especially well with Horton’s theory. A major aim of the British conquest had 
been to break Ijebu’s stranglehold on the trade route between Lagos and the Yoruba 
interior. A further effect of this, as well as the weakening of the capital’s control over 
the district towns, had been to throw the Ijebu into a trading diaspora: they crop up 
everywhere along the new arteries of colonial trade over the next twenty to thirty 
years, often as pioneers of Christian congregations in other parts of Yorubaland 
or following the line of rail into Northern Nigeria.18 Thus the scale of their social 
experience was more abruptly and radically expanded than occurred with any other 
Yoruba group, with just the religious effect predicted by Horton’s theory.
A final general observation may be made about the conditions of conversion 
after 1892. Although Islam’s expansion was greatly accelerated by colonial condi-
tions, Christianity’s overall rate of expansion, starting from a much smaller base, 
was undoubtedly greater. Two additional factors, which both stand outside the 
terms of Horton’s theory, would seem to explain this: the enhanced attractiveness 
of the specific empowerment package offered by Christianity under colonial con-
ditions;19 and the greater effectiveness of Christian missionary institutions, com-
pared with Muslim ones, in proactive outreach into new areas where neither reli-
gion had better prior contacts than the other. I shall return to the question of their 
respective institutional endowments shortly.
AFTER C ONVERSION:  PR AGMATISM,  LOYALT Y, 
AND TOLER ANCE
So what did conversion to these monotheistic faiths, with their aspiration to create 
exclusive religious loyalties and to reshape individual and community life, mean 










































for the new Christians and Muslims? What sort of faith communities emerged 
from the protracted conversion process? At their heart, I suggest, we may see a bal-
ance between three attitudes, all to some extent carried forward from the old reli-
gion and closely implicated with one another: pragmatism, loyalty, and tolerance.
Even after conversion, the Yoruba still largely rationalized their religious adher-
ence in pragmatic terms—it often comes up when individuals talk about their 
personal religious choices: What does it bring by way of spiritual empowerment 
or secular advantage? These were not evenly spread between the two religions. 
Christianity’s greatest relative advantage was its virtual monopoly of access to 
modern education in the early colonial period. Still, those who see this as the 
primary explanation for Christian conversion have to explain why those Yoruba 
who became Muslim were apparently indifferent to it. Islam also had its secular 
advantages—such as giving access to certain trading networks or craft skills or to 
chiefly patronage—but these may have been less important than the magicospiri-
tual techniques deployed by its clerics (alfa). In time Christianity would develop its 
own responses to these, in the missions’ various medical facilities and in the prayer 
power offered in the Aladura churches. In the early colonial period, Islam still had 
the negative advantage over Christianity that it demanded less from potential con-
verts by way of cultural renunciation (e.g., in the matter of polygamy), though as 
the number of Christian converts grew, the churches perforce soon became more 
tolerant of Yoruba custom. Each religion was aware that it had certain weaknesses 
in relation to its rival, and so their competition, conducted within the shared moral 
framework of community membership, led to considerable interchange between 
them—a topic to be explored at greater length below in chapter 9.
At the same time, despite these pragmatic reasons and rationalizations, con-
verts were rapidly drawn into new bonds of fellowship, expressed in each religion’s 
distinctive rituals and activities, which fostered loyalty to their new faith. Intrinsic 
satisfactions and identities must have worked to reduce the likelihood that con-
verts would be led by pragmatic considerations to subsequently swap their reli-
gion, though this seems to have been common right at the beginning, with many 
first-generation Muslims being prepared to send their children to school, even 
though it might well result in their conversion to Christianity. With the entrench-
ment of the colonial order by 1920, the appeal of education got even stronger, leav-
ing committed Muslims—with some exceptions20—with a clear choice: to keep 
their children out of mission schools or to organize schools of their own.
A crucial challenge presented by the world religions to Yoruba society was how 
these new loyalties might be reconciled with their existing communal loyalties. One 
positive condition for this was the pragmatism that had powerfully underpinned 
conversion in the first place, since it worked to undercut the kind of exclusive iden-
tification with the transcendent values that world religions seek to instill in their 
converts. It encouraged Yoruba to view all religious attachments as provisional on 










































their capacity to deliver benefits, as had been the case with the membership of the 
orisa cults. This view underlay and was reinforced by the large-scale shift of religious 
identities that occurred between 1910 and 1940. Membership of one’s ìlú (town) or 
of its smallest subunit (the ilé, family, compound) was nothing like so provisional 
as that. Religious tolerance was a corollary of this combination of personal religious 
choice and the nearly absolute givenness of community membership.
The culture and practice of tolerance had deep roots in the past. An elder once 
expressed it in response to some unwelcome hellfire preaching from a Yoruba evan-
gelist in Ijebu back in 1878: “Let the Ifa man worship his Ifa; let the orisha man 
worship his orisha; and let the slave follow his Shango priestcraft for his food.”21 
Sentiments like this occur widely into the twentieth century, the orisa varying 
according to the locality: Ẹ j’onifa o bọ Ifa, ẹ j’ọlọsun o bọ Ọsun, Ẹ j’elegun o bọ Egun 
rẹ, k’aye le gun (Let the Ifa devotee worship his Ifa, let the Osun devotee worship her 
Osun, let the Elegun worship his Egun, that the world may be straight) was a song 
current near Osogbo.22 Pragmatic considerations—the thought that because there 
were many powerful orisa, it was imprudent to neglect any of them—as well as a 
spirit of live and let live between cult groups, underlay the practice of tolerance. Even 
so, this tolerance was not unconditional: in many places both world religions were 
persecuted at the outset, whether because of their alarmingly absolutist claims or 
the fear that they would cause the neglect of local cults that local people regarded as 
essential for community welfare.23 But tolerance returned as soon as it became clear 
that the new cults could be domesticated and were themselves keen to contribute to 
the well-being and solidarity of the community. The reassertion of tolerance during 
the period of mass conversion is uniquely described in many of the biographies of 
notable Yoruba men and women that have appeared in the past two decades. Here 
are two haphazard examples chosen from different parts of the country.
The first concerns Mrs. Folayegbe Ighodalo (b. 1923), the first woman to become 
a permanent secretary in the civil service of Western State, who grew up in a large 
compound in Okeigbo, a middling-sized and eventually mainly Christian town 
northwest of Ondo:24
Her father, Benjamin Akintunde, was baptized in 1915, but the compound head 
(baale), his great-uncle Bello Aromoye, was a Muslim. The compound had its own 
egungun (ancestral masked spirit), as well as shrines of other orisa. As a devout 
Christian, Akintunde forbade his children to enter any of the shrine rooms, to go 
out during the Egungun festival or to eat any of the sacrificial food of the orisa 
worshipped by some family members. “Still, he realized the futility of forbidding 
them to watch the entertainment part of the festivals and never defied the instruc-
tions of the [baale] that the eldest child of each family in his compound must attend 
the ritual slaughter of a ram during the Muslim festival, Id el-Kabir [Ileya].” Fola’s 
brother attended, but under strict instructions not to eat any of the meat. Members 
of Akintunde’s family “always contributed to and attended the naming ceremonies, 










































marriages and funerals of their Muslim and traditionalist relatives, [and] Muslims 
in the family always attended the festivities . . . of their Christian relatives.”
What is impressive here is how tactfully individuals manage to combine a fairly 
strict view of the lines they need to draw to meet the demands of their own faith 
within a shared social framework that requires their recognizing the equal claims 
of others—and more than that, how the Christians show respect to the Muslim 
baale by acknowledging the special status of his celebration of Ileya.
The second instance comes from a much smaller place, Joga-Owode, a village 
in Egbado (now known as Yewaland), the birthplace of Professor Biyi Afonja (b. 
1936), an eminent statistician:25
He grew up in a religiously mixed family: of his father’s eight paternal siblings, 
only two were Christian, the others Muslim, but two others on his mother’s side 
were Christian. But they all attended the major ceremonies of both faiths. “Every 
[New Year’s Eve], our village church St John’s was filled with as many Christian and 
Moslem worshippers outside as there were inside. At exactly midnight, the church 
leader would ring in the New Year by joyously shouting, Da muso, muso! [that is, 
“Hip, hip, hip!”] and the congregation would give a thunderous Muso! [Hurrah!]. As 
we all trooped out of church singing the hymn Ọlọrun t’ọdun t’o kọja, “O God Our 
Help in Ages Past,” bonfires would be lit and the loud noise of bangers would rend 
the air. . . . Conversely, during Ramadan young Biyi would join his Muslim uncles 
at the 4.30 meal called sari before the day’s fast and (though he didn’t usually fast 
past midday), he’d be present at the evening prayer (asamu) before joining in the 
meal afterwards. At Ileya, his father would actually don a turban and accompany his 
Muslim brothers in the grand procession to the prayer ground.
In this small Egbado village, people clearly took a more relaxed view of what 
their religion required of them than in Okeigbo. One reason for strong Muslim 
attendance at the New Year service may be that, because the ritual calendar of 
Islam operates on a lunar cycle, the solar calendar of Christianity is better able 
to provide an idiom for annual transitions and is to that extent more compatible 
with traditional ideas about the need for a yearly fresh start. It is worth noting 
that the Christian villagers of Joga-Owode called Christmas ọdun kekere (the little 
festival), while the ọdun nla (the great festival) was the New Year. Life-cycle ritu-
als, now expressed in Christian or Muslim idiom, rather than the public rituals of 
the new religions themselves, came to be the prime occasions for individuals to 
express solidarity across the Muslim-Christian divide.
But the public expression of communal religious amity still depended vitally 
on two institutions carried forward from the past, though both would be modi-
fied in the process. The first was the festivals of a small number of important orisa 
that were felt to embody the identity of the whole town, such as Sango in Oyo, 
Agemo in Ijebu, or Ogun in Ilesha, Ondo, and other eastern towns. For decades to 
come, Christians and Muslims continued to join in these annual festivals, though 










































they gradually came to see them in more secular terms, as cultural events; or they 
reconfigured them in newly devised festivals aimed at community development.26 
The second key institution was the ọbaship. As a quasi-divine being himself—ekeji 
orisa (second to the gods)—the ọba’s most essential role was to serve as the point 
of articulation between the town and the orisa whose goodwill ensured public 
welfare. It is thus is not surprising that ọbas tended to be religiously more conser-
vative than their subjects. But as the balance between the old cults and the new 
ones tipped in the 1930s, the ọba’s patronage shifted toward the world religions, 
though in a similar spirit as with the old cults. Whatever his own convictions, he 
had to be the father equally of all accepted faith groups in the town: attending their 
major festivals (usually with a small retinue of chiefs, attendants, etc.), receiving 
their leaders at the afin (palace), contributing to their building funds, and so forth. 
In any case, by this time increasing numbers of ọba were Muslims or Christians 
themselves, very often men who had lived and worked for some time outside the 
town, so acquiring a degree of ọlaju (enlightenment).27 By the 1940s, so widely was 
it coming to be felt that a town’s progress depended on having an enlightened ọba 
that several strongly Muslim towns were moved to choose a Christian to be their 
ọba,28 on the grounds that he would be best able to represent their overall interests, 
a striking testimony to both their pragmatism and their tolerance.
INSTITUTIONS AND C OMMUNIT Y:  CHRISTIANIT Y
The two religions organized themselves as segments within the larger commu-
nity in very different ways expressing their own prior institutional histories. 
Christianity’s main institutional form was the churches or denominations set up 
by the missionary societies. By the 1920s, these were beginning to recede into the 
background as Yoruba pastors headed congregations, chaired local church coun-
cils, and managed church schools. European missionaries remained in power at 
the highest levels but were increasingly concentrated in educational, training, and 
medical work. Yoruba Christianity is predominantly evangelical Protestant, with 
Anglicans (CMS) historically the largest and most prestigious church, followed by 
Methodists and Baptists. The Roman Catholics, though important for their hos-
pitals and schools,29 were less numerous and remained dependent on foreign mis-
sionary priests for much longer.
The mainline churches became considerable bureaucracies, employing thou-
sands of people (especially teachers); owning extensive property in church prem-
ises, schools, and other facilities like hospitals and clinics, training centers, presses, 
and bookshops; and developing systematic evangelization strategies. Apart from 
their training colleges like St Andrew’s College Oyo or the Baptist Seminary at 
Ogbomoso, their apex institutions were grammar schools, the focus of intense 
local as well as church pride in places like Lagos, Abeokuta, Ibadan, Ijebu Ode—the 










































top flight of these were known as the Aionian schools, a sort of Ivy League. And 
even when such schools were owned by the community rather than the church 
(as Ondo Boys’ High School, Oduduwa College at Ife, or Ilesha Grammar School 
were), they were often headed by Anglican clergymen.
The clergy of the interwar years, the age of high colonialism—the sons of the 
nineteenth-century pioneers, the fathers of the postwar generation of nationalist 
politicians and professionals, so to speak—were major figures in their communi-
ties. The archetype of them all was the Rev. A. B. Akinyele (1875–1968), a member 
of one of Ibadan’s oldest and most distinguished Christian families.30
His early career was typical. From the CMS Grammar School in Lagos he went on 
to its training institution for native teachers and then, after a few years teaching 
(mostly in Abeokuta), he caught the attention of the bishop and was sponsored to 
attend Fourah Bay College, in Freetown, then the only institution of higher educa-
tion in West Africa. Graduating in 1906, he returned to pastoral work in Ibadan 
and was ordained priest in 1910. When Ibadan Grammar School was founded, in 
1913, under CMS auspices but with strong support from local people—land for it at 
Oke Are was given by a prominent Muslim chief, Balogun Shittu—Akinyele was the 
obvious man to be its first principal. He remained so for twenty years, and as such 
presided over the production of the next generation’s elite. Church affairs apart, he 
was much consulted informally both by the chiefs and by colonial officers (some of 
whom he instructed in the Yoruba language) and was active in all the doings of his 
fellow ọlaju (enlightened people). A powerful axis of influence linked him with his 
junior brother, I. B. Akinyele, who was active in local politics, becoming a chief in 
1933 and slowly climbing the hierarchy till he got to be Olubadan (king of Ibadan, 
1955–64). In 1933, A. B. was appointed assistant bishop of Lagos, based in Ondo, but 
he returned to Ibadan as first bishop of its new diocese in 1952.
A proper social and cultural history of this important group of men remains 
to be written, though much of it can be excavated from the many commemora-
tive local church histories that have been produced.31 For the present, the most 
vivid evocation of this world is to be found in two memoirs by Wole Soyinka: the 
autobiographical Aké, mostly about his mother’s family (the Ransome-Kutis) in 
Abeokuta, and Ìsarà, a quasi-fictional treatment of his father’s circle of young ọlaju 
in a small Remo town.32 These men stood outside the formal structure of the native 
authority, local government by ọba and chiefs, as sanctioned by indirect rule, but 
they were often their advisors. They tended to be active in the town improvement 
societies and progressive unions, which combined local patriotism with the pro-
motion of ọlaju. Here they joined with educated traders (often former mission 
teachers), commercial or government clerks, and even a few educated Muslims—
though the societies’ ethos was distinctly but undogmatically Christian.33 At the 
same time, there was an important pan-Yoruban dimension to their work lives: 
against local dialects they promoted the CMS-derived Standard Yoruba language 










































in church and school; in their early careers (often starting as teachers) they were 
liable to be transferred all over Yoruba country, forming regional networks; a 
handful of them went annually to Lagos for the diocesan synod, the nearest thing 
to a parliament for the ọlaju of Yorubaland in the interwar years, where they dis-
cussed issues going far beyond the narrowly ecclesiastical.
These years of rapid church growth brought their conflicts and tensions, of 
which two waves of breakaway or independent churches were the outcome. What 
are known as the African churches emerged between 1891 and 1918: opposed to 
paternalist policies and the restriction of African advancement in the mainline 
Protestant missions, particularly the CMS, they advocated a greater acceptance of 
African culture and custom, but in doctrine and church order they remained close 
to the missions from which they had seceded.34 At one level the Aladura or praying 
churches, emerging between 1918 and 1940, were a response to a widespread sense 
of social dislocation arising from the rapid growth of the cash economy in the 
1920s followed by the depression of the early 1930s.35 They offered a much farther-
reaching Africanization that did much to close the gap with Islam though the pro-
vision of Christian techniques of healing, divination, and protection. The Aladura 
movement created new organizational forms, such as the followings of charismatic 
woli (prophets), but over time they tended to move back toward the template pro-
vided by the older churches as they too began to acquire property and needed to 
develop stable systems of leadership succession.
INSTITUTIONS AND C OMMUNIT Y:  ISL AM
The primary organization of the Muslim community differed markedly from that 
of Christianity (and still does), even though there has been some adoption of 
Christian forms. Islam famously has no church, which is because as a religion it 
set out to be none other than the organization of a spiritual polity. In Yorubaland, 
except for Ilorin, it spread without corporate institutions of any kind, bottom-
upward rather than top-downward, without jihad or the constraining force of 
Islamic rule. The main agents of its expansion were Muslim clerics or alfa, a social 
category whose two defining features—some measure of Arabic learning and the 
provision of religious services—were extremely variable, though the most essen-
tial function of any alfa was to be a professional man of prayer.36 They ranged 
from those with just enough Arabic to be able to offer magicospiritual services to 
clients both Muslim and non-Muslim,37 to those whose better command of Arabic 
enabled them to run Koranic schools, as well as to perform the public prayers and 
life-cycle rites of the Muslim community.
Though the alfa began more as entrepreneurs than as missionaries, they readily 
organized those who gathered around them into congregations. As the numbers 
of Muslims grew, augmented by visiting traders and their local contacts, in every 










































significant community there emerged a jumat or central mosque for Friday prayer, 
often located close to the ọba’s palace (even in mainly Christian towns like Ilesha and 
Ife). Here there clustered those alfa with the greatest reputation among their peers 
for Arabic learning, often the descendants of pioneers who had come from Ilorin, 
Hausaland, or farther afield. They occupied the chief imamship and other offices of 
the central mosque, which tended to become hereditary among their descendants. 
Spread throughout the town were many small, so-called ratibi mosques, usually set 
up by an alfa under the patronage of the baale or compound head, where local resi-
dents gathered for the five daily prayers. These might be no more than a large room 
in a house or a small building within the compound and were typically known by 
the name of the founding alfa or the compound itself, being regarded simply as a 
Muslim spiritual facility for the neighborhood. This has led some to regard conver-
sion to Islam as being collective—the coresident members of a lineage deciding to 
convert together—in contrast to Christian conversion as individual. I see no good 
evidence for such a contrast, though the conversion of a big man might lead many 
of his followers to convert, as with the Arẹ Latosa in nineteenth-century Ibadan or 
Balogun Kuku in early twentieth-century Ijebu. The central mosque apart, mosques 
thus tended to be more numerous but smaller than churches.
This basic pattern became more complex as Muslim numbers grew and the 
varieties of Islam diversified. As the population of Ibadan rose to more than a 
million in the course of the colonial period, with over 65 percent of its indigenes 
Muslim, the simple structure of central and ratibi mosques became insufficient. 
From the mid-1950s onward, a middle tier of more localized central mosques 
for Friday prayer emerged throughout the main localities of the vast town, thus 
replicating the urban hierarchy of town, quarter, and compound. In addition, 
over roughly the same period, various sects and societies established their own 
mosques, which formed their own groupings more analogous to Christian denom-
inations, with some having their own central mosques for their fraternities in the 
town as a whole. Here the way was led by modernist Muslim organizations, such 
as Ahmadiyya, which came to Lagos in 1916 and operated much like a Christian 
missionary society, with a directing overseas headquarters (in the Punjab), mov-
ing into the interior and opening schools, among which Ahmadiyya Grammar 
School in Ibadan proved especially important.38 It showed the way for other soci-
eties of modern-oriented Muslims, which also opened schools and had their own 
mosques: Ansar-ud-Deen (1923) and Nawair-ud-Deen (1936).39 At the other end 
of the spectrum were societies like the Zumratul Mumin, popularly known after 
its founder as the Bamidele, a religiously conservative group founded in Ibadan in 
the 1940s whose branches operate more like Aladura churches (including a certain 
proneness to factional splits).40
So Islam, weak in principles of corporate organization above the level of the 
single congregation, made some use of the denominational form characteristic 










































of Christianity but relied mainly on whatever structures of community prevailed 
locally. Whereas churches are a distinctly religious form of organization, differen-
tiated from the communities they work in and also working across many commu-
nities, Yoruba Islam aspires to be, as it were, the community in its Islamic aspect. 
Some very characteristic effects of this have appeared in patterns of leadership and 
conflict, particularly in strongly Muslim towns, such as indigenous Lagos, Ibadan, 
and Ijebu Ode.
There has often been a strong mutual influence between the chiefly hierarchies 
of the town and the Islamic community, especially around its central mosque. At 
Ijebu Ode, it was the custom that appointments to the two senior Muslim posts, 
the chief imam or Lẹmọmu and his deputy, the Noibi, were ratified by the ọba—
something that no church would have judged appropriate—which meant that it 
might fall to a Christian ọba to install the chief imam by capping him.41 This went 
with the obligation of the Lẹmọmu and his fellow alfa to go and pray for the ọba 
every year at the Ileya festival. In Iseyin, a town where Islam was established very 
early, the imamship came to rotate between the four quarters of the town much as 
an ọbaship might rotate between the main segments of the royal lineage.42 Ibadan 
developed its own unique system of succession to the imamship, which again mir-
rored that of the town.43 Because it had been founded in the nineteenth century 
as a war camp and lacked a crowned ọba, it came to be governed by two parallel 
ranked lines of chiefs, respectively civil and military. Men from the leading fami-
lies were appointed to a low rung on either of these ladders and progressed upward 
as deaths opened vacancies above them, while succession to the headship of the 
whole town alternated between the two lines. Over the twentieth century, a norm 
emerged for Ibadan’s central mosque to be governed by two lines of chiefs, known 
as the Mọgaji and Alfa lines, filled respectively by sons of previous imams and by 
self-made men of Islamic learning. (A mọgaji in Ibadan is the heir to the head-
ship of one of the major families.) This can be seen as a way of recognizing both 
descent and learning as criteria for the imamship, but the system of choosing the 
imam from the two lines alternately has often not worked smoothly in practice. 
There are various criteria for choosing an imam—learning, popularity, descent, 
character—and they rarely converge in one man. So to the regret of many educated 
Muslims, especially those aware of normative patterns elsewhere in the Islamic 
world, imamship succession disputes have tended to resemble Yoruba chieftaincy 
disputes in general.
A further result of the interpenetration of Muslim and town organization has 
been that conflicts arising in one sphere have readily spilled over into the other, in 
a way that has rarely happened with Christianity. These cleavages—whether origi-
nating over doctrinal or ritual issues (or both), or over rivalry for office, or matters 
of mosque management or control—might run on for years, morphing over time 
from one leading issue to another. Muslim unity in Lagos was first fractured by 










































an alfa from Ilorin who during Ramadan 1875 preached the all-sufficiency of the 
Koran, without recourse to hadith, for determining Islamic practice. His follow-
ers thus came to be known as the Alalukurani or Koranic Muslims. So heated did 
feelings become that the governor felt it prudent to post troops during Id al-Fitr 
to prevent violence and later presided at reconciliation meetings; but he refused 
requests to use his authority to ban the Alalukurani.44 In 1901 another cleavage 
opened up, initially over the management of the central mosque, one faction 
following the chief imam, hence known as the Lemomu group, the other as the 
Jama’at (congregation) group. The great flashpoint in secular Lagos politics in the 
early twentieth century was the government’s plan to introduce a water rate, which 
polarized opinion into anti- and pro-government parties. By 1916, the existing split 
among Lagos Muslims had become aligned with this, the Lemomu group support-
ing the government, while the Jama’at people opposed it, thus becoming the popu-
lar base for what evolved into a protonationalist party, the NNDP.45 The leadership 
of the NNDP was provided by educated Christians—notably Herbert Macaulay, 
the grandson of Bishop Crowther—but they were involved as individuals, not as a 
faction of any church or of the Christian community at large.46
At Ijebu Ode too, cleavages in town politics impacted reciprocally on those in 
the Muslim umma. In the late 1890s, a dispute over the quality of the Arabic learn-
ing of the chief imam (Lẹmọmu) became entangled with the main conflict in the 
town at large, between the king (Awujalẹ) and his overly mighty subject, Balogun 
Kuku. Whereas Kuku gave his backing to the Lẹmọmu’s critics, the Awujalẹ sup-
ported him; and by 1907 the Muslim cleavage had hardened to the point that 
there were two Lẹmọmus and two Noibis, with occasional fights between the 
two factions. It took eleven years for the conflict to be resolved, and finally only 
through the intervention of the district commissioner and town council, which 
included several lay Christians.47 A running sore of Ijebu Ode politics in the 
late colonial period was the unpopularity of Awujalẹ Gbelegbuwa II (1933–59), 
whom the British virtually forced on Ijebu as they wanted an enlightened ruler, 
despite the general view that he was ineligible by descent and excessively high-
handed in his dealings with people. Gbelegbuwa was a Christian, and as such 
drew some support from his coreligionists, though his most doughty opponent, 
Chief Timothy Odutola, was also a Christian; and not just that, but a member 
of the same church (St Saviour’s Anglican), with the title Asiwaju (leader) of 
Ijebu Christians.48 This was in recognition of his being, as a highly successful 
entrepreneur, the wealthiest Ijebu of his day. As a subject fit to rival his king, 
Chief Odutola was rather like a latter-day Kuku. Yet the dispute came to affect 
the Muslims of the town more than the Christians, since different quarters of the 
town split over the imamship, and rival candidates were anti- or pro-Awujalẹ, 
even with an Awujalẹ so generally unpopular among the mass of Muslims as 
Gbelegbuwa was.49










































LEADERSHIP AND THE YORUBA MUSLIM DILEMMA
At least since the early twentieth century, Yoruba Muslims within Nigeria have faced 
a continuing dilemma, whether in religion, culture, or politics: How far do they ori-
ent themselves toward their Christian fellow Yoruba or their non-Yoruba fellow 
Muslims? The dilemma arises from a double sense of inferiority that has challenged 
them: the sense of being regarded as less enlightened than their Christian compa-
triots, and as less complete Muslims than their coreligionists in Northern Nigeria. 
Education was critical to addressing the problem on both fronts.
On one side, the virtual Christian monopoly of Western education in the early 
colonial period was an enormous disadvantage to Muslims, felt especially in Lagos. 
The government took some steps to rectify this, appointing Edward Blyden as direc-
tor of Muslim education (1896). But Muslim parents still tended to be suspicious, not 
least since the government’s aims were sometimes undermined by the appointment 
of Christian teachers. On the other side, there was the low level of Arabic scholar-
ship of most Yoruba ulama. For many of them, this did not extend to much more 
than a few years’ attendance at a local Koranic school, which gave them just enough 
Arabic to make a living by selling charms and divining. The necessary dual upgrad-
ing took place over many decades, and involved not just some synthesis of Arabic 
and Western syllabuses and educational methods but drawing on links with Ilorin, 
the North, and the Middle East.50 By the 1940s, some Yoruba had attended Al-Azhar 
in Cairo, and in the 1950s two major centers of higher-level Arabic/Koranic train-
ing were established at Elekuro in Ibadan and Agege, near Lagos. The latter, the 
Centre for Arabic and Islamic Studies, was founded in 1955 by an Al-Azhar graduate 
from Ilorin, Shaykh Adam Abdullah al-Ilori (1917–92), the greatest Yoruba Arabic 
scholar of his generation, trained entirely outside Western institutions.51 In his own 
writings in Arabic, al-Ilori showed himself to be well aware of the two sides of the 
Yoruba Muslim dilemma. He responded critically to the Rev. Samuel Johnson’s pro-
Christian account of Yoruba origins and history; but he also asserted the integrity 
of Yoruba Islam, defending it from “reckless accusations of infidelity” by the over-
zealous orthodox, including the leading Salafist intellectual of the North, Abubakar 
Gumi.52 In the last thirty years, another source of Arabic expertise has come into 
play: Yoruba graduates of Saudi universities, especially the Islamic University at 
Medina. They pride themselves on the fluency of their Arabic, and there is some sta-
tus rivalry between them and the Nigeria-trained ulama, who regard them as narrow 
in their attitudes. They were the core of an organization founded in 1982, Tadamun 
al-Muslimin (Islamic Solidarity), which with some others under the umbrella of a 
larger grouping calling itself Ahl us-Sunna (People of the [Prophet’s] Way) has pro-
moted a Salafist perspective within Yoruba Islam, though so far with limited success.
In theory, Islam has no priesthood, but here there is the paradox that in a non-
Arabic-speaking society like Yoruba the sacred and esoteric prestige of Arabic 










































for Muslims inevitably produces a distinction between ulama and laity that is 
in some ways more marked than that between pastors and lay people in Yoruba 
Protestantism. Though churches are institutionally distinct from society, the cul-
ture of Christian ọlaju is shared by clergy and educated laymen, as witness the 
ease with which university lecturers (often in scientific subjects) have become the 
leaders of Pentecostal churches. They are distinguished from their members less 
by their possession of specialist knowledge than by the charisma that is attributed 
to them. But among Muslims, Arabic learning and Western education remain dis-
tinct sources of authority, and their respective possessors—the serious ulama and 
the educated Muslim laity—vie with one another to speak for Islam, since few peo-
ple stand really high in both categories apart from university graduates in Arabic 
and Islamic studies. Thus there is some tension between the League of Imams and 
Alfas (LIA), an organization of and for the Yoruba ulama across a broad spectrum, 
and a body like the Muslim Ummah of South-Western Nigeria (Muswen), inau-
gurated in 2008 after several years’ discussion among modern Muslim profession-
als (lawyers, academics, doctors, etc.). They felt that the LIA leadership was not 
educated enough to articulate the collective Muslim interest under the peculiar 
conditions of Yorubaland, where Christians were so much seen as the bearers of 
modern civilization.53
The third source of leadership in the Muslim community is wealthy laymen, 
typically traders or businessmen. Some of them have a smattering of Arabic, 
and most have a measure of Western education, but it is their power of mate-
rial patronage that gives them standing and influence (e.g., to appoint imams to 
mosques they have founded or to settle disputes within the umma). Until his death 
in 2014, the preeminent figure here was Alhaji Abdul-Azeez Arisekola Alao, who 
had a few years of Koranic school and completed his primary education at a CMS 
school in one of Ibadan’s villages before getting a job as a distributor of agricul-
tural chemicals.54 His commercial activities diversified, but it was not till the 1990s 
that he really made it big through a contract, gained through his friendship with 
General Abacha, to supply food to the Nigerian troops in Ecomog, the peacekeep-
ing force in the Liberian civil war. After something of a playboy youth, he started 
taking his religion more seriously at the end of the 1970s, and in 1981 agreed to be 
turbaned as Arẹ Musulumi (Commander of Muslims). His most conspicuous work 
of patronage was his building a large mosque with a conspicuous golden dome 
on the Iwo Road in Ibadan, which he got the chief imam of al-Azhar in Cairo to 
come and open. Arisekola paid the salaries of at least three imams. Yet the style of 
his leadership owed more to the Ibadan warlords of the nineteenth century than 
to any Islamic paradigm,55 as struck me forcefully when I visited him in his vast 
walled compound at Ikolaba, a respectable suburb in the northeast of Ibadan:
We enter through great double iron gates set in a concrete wall about 15 feet high, 
in front of which runs a mucky stream which looks somewhat like a moat. Security 










































is intense: several tough-looking henchmen hang around a small guardhouse, and 
we wait in the car for over twenty minutes after having phoned to announce our 
arrival before being admitted, while other vehicles are checked as they come or go. 
Inside there is a large main house, other buildings including a mosque, plenty of 
parking and well-maintained grounds which are said to include a menagerie with 
ostriches. We are received in a large audience chamber upstairs, decked with drapes 
in the Nigerian colours of green and white, and in the corners are set enormous 
coloured photographic portraits of Arisekola’s late parents on their return from the 
hajj, as well as of General Abacha. Arisekola’s manner is relaxed, self-confident and 
genial. We sit on a sofa by a glass table on which he lays a small array of cell-phones, 
which ring periodically throughout the 90-minute interview. He answers briskly, 
Tani yen? [“Who is that?” or “Do I know you?”] to what appear to be requests for 
money or favours. Two or three times an attendant comes in and speaks in a low 
voice to Arisekola, who rummages in the front pocket of his big gown and brings out 
wads of banknotes to be distributed. On the way out, we pass by a large antechamber 
with thirty or more people still waiting to see the Arẹ: men and women, all sorts and 
conditions, but including several quite prominent people known to my companion 
(who is an experienced journalist).
Arisekola was not the only wealthy Muslim to receive a title from the League of 
Imams and Alfas: his friend and political associate, the late Chief M. K. O. Abiola 
from Abeokuta—of whom more shortly—was styled Baba Adinni (Father of the 
Religion). This conferment of pan-Yoruba Muslim chieftaincy titles was an organi-
zational innovation at the time.56 Titles have long been given to senior lay leaders 
in both Islam and Christianity, but usually at the level of the single congregation, 
as with the Baba Ijọ (Father of the Church) or Iya Suna (Mother of the [Islamic] 
Faith). In the extension of this to the highest levels of the communal hierarchy—
like Oyo, Ogun, or Lagos States, or Yorubaland as a whole—we see again Yoruba 
Islam’s propensity to draw organizational form from the wider community or pol-
ity in which it is set. These wealthy laymen offer a kind of leadership that has no 
close equivalent within Yoruba Christianity today. While their largesse is eagerly 
received, their power is also resented, especially by some of the ulama, who feel 
that those qualified by learning and piety for Islamic leadership should not have to 
defer to big men whose conduct sometimes falls short of the religious ideal. It is a 
tension that harks a long way back in Muslim history, recalling the attitudes of the 
ulama, then still emergent as a force within Islam, toward the Umayyad caliphs.
RELIGION AND NATIONALISM,  1940S  THROUGH 
L ATE 1970S
Nationalism—the movement after 1945 to take over control of the colonial state in 
the name of the mass of the African people—had its roots in the agitation by edu-
cated young men a decade or so earlier to challenge the system of Indirect Rule, 










































which had restricted power in local communities to ọbas and chiefs. In both cases 
leadership was overwhelmingly provided by Christians, even in mainly Muslim 
towns, since they were so far ahead in the Western education needed to challenge 
the institutions of the colonial state. Because effective representation of communal 
interests was always the paramount issue, Muslims were on the whole happy to 
accept Christians as their community representatives. The main vehicle of Yoruba 
political aspirations, the Action Group (AG), was not strictly a Christian party, 
even though its leader, Obafemi Awolowo, and most of all his closest political 
associates were Christians, and its program was strongly infused with the Yoruba 
Christian value of ọlaju.57 Still, some Muslims were uneasy about these affinities, 
and in 1957 a Muslim party, the National Muslim League, was founded—though 
it was quickly and effectively stamped on as religiously divisive. Measures were 
taken to gain Muslim favor, such as setting up a pilgrims’ welfare board and more 
provision for Islamic instruction in schools.
Where party-political divisions in Yorubaland did come to have a religious 
aspect, this arose contingently, as a by-product of the religious profiles of particu-
lar communities, as we can see from a comparison of Ibadan and Lagos. Many 
of the same factors were present in both places, such as a strong Muslim major-
ity among the indigenes, but under different local conditions they led to diamet-
rically opposed outcomes. At Ibadan those chosen at the first elections in 1951 
were mostly from the local Christian elite, members of the Ibadan Progressive 
Union drawn to a politics of ọlaju, and they naturally affiliated themselves with 
the Action Group at the level of regional politics. Popular disaffection with this 
elite arose less directly from the fact that the mass of Ibadan people were Muslim 
than that they were linked by ties of personal attachment to the compound heads 
or mọgaji, descendants of the warlords of nineteenth-century Ibadan, whose posi-
tion was under threat from the rationalizing reforms to the court and taxation sys-
tems intended by the Action Group. What further alienated them from the Action 
Group was that, as a party with a strong pan-Yoruba identity, it had no option but 
to support the demand of the so-called native settlers to be allowed to acquire land 
rights in the town. These were immigrants to Ibadan from other Yoruba towns, 
especially the much-resented Ijebu—of whom Awolowo was one, with a house at 
Oke Ado, where his legal practice was based. There emerged a communal party, 
the Mabolaje Grand Alliance,58 under the leadership of a flamboyant Muslim pop-
ulist, Adegoke Adelabu, which allied itself at the regional level with the Action 
Group’s rival, the NCNC.59 Since Islam (though fairly recently adopted in most 
cases) had fused rather effectively with status values deriving from nineteenth-
century Ibadan, Adelabu combined radical socialism at the national level with 
cultural conservatism at the local level.60 Though as well educated as most of his 
Christian compeers and possessed of an excellent command of English, Adelabu 
was a polygamist who kept open house in traditional chiefly style, and he made 










































good use of Muslim networks—such as the ratibi mosques—to build a strong pop-
ular base. He was well supported by the generality of the ulama, and in fact there 
was nearly a rebellion against the leadership of the chief imam of the day, Muili 
Abdullahi, because one Friday in 1957 he introduced Awolowo (who was Muili’s 
personal friend) into the central Mosque.61
One might have expected the NCNC to have become the political voice of the 
Muslim indigenes in Lagos too. It had been founded in 1945 as the successor to 
Herbert Macaulay’s NNDP, which (as noted earlier) had its popular base in the 
Ilu Committee, closely linked to the Jama‘at faction at the central mosque; and the 
NNDP had indeed attracted “the traditionalistic, predominantly Muslim indig-
enous masses” of Lagos.62 Now, this was a period when the population of Lagos 
was growing rapidly, through immigration not only from the Yoruba interior but 
from farther afield (including many Igbo), and the census in 1950 showed that as a 
result Christians had come to outnumber Muslims. The Lagos indigenes felt that 
they were becoming marginalized in their own city. Of the two main parties, up 
to the early 1950s the NCNC was master of the field in Lagos, so the Action Group 
faced the problem of how to break into it. Now, whereas the NCNC was more 
a pan-Nigerian party, the Action Group was more a pan-Yoruba one; and while 
this worked against it in Ibadan, where the indigenes saw the main threat to their 
position as coming from other Yoruba as native settlers, in Lagos the threatening 
outsiders were culturally much more diverse, and the Action Group—unencum-
bered by the wider ethnoregional commitments of the NCNC—was better able 
to target its appeal at the Lagos indigenes.63 In particular, it built a network of 
effective support through the market women, led by such as the formidable (and 
piously Muslim) Madam Abibatu Mogaji. The effects proved long-lasting: there 
emerged a lineage of progressive Muslim politicians—L. K. Jakande, Bola Tinubu, 
Raji Fasola64—attached to the Action Group and its successor parties (UPN, AD, 
ACN, APC), which have controlled Lagos State down to the present.
Awolowo remained the political hero of most Yoruba, whether Christians or 
Muslims, for the rest of his life.65 His reputation was only enhanced by his impris-
onment for alleged treason between 1962 and 1966, at the hands of a coalition of 
his enemies, headed by the Muslim premier of the Northern Region, the Sardauna 
of Sokoto. At least on the Yoruba side, this opposition was always coded in terms 
of North vs. South, or Hausa vs. Yoruba, rather than Muslim vs. Christian. In 
fact Awolowo’s onetime lieutenant, who was seen as having betrayed him to the 
Sardauna, Chief S. L. Akintola, was a Christian from Ogbomosho, and the act-
ing leader of the Action Group while Awolowo was in prison was a Muslim from 
Abeokuta, Alhaji D. S. Adegbenro. Up to the late 1970s, the conventional wisdom 
was that religion—in the sense of the Muslim-Christian divide—was essentially 
irrelevant to Yoruba political conflict except as an occasional accompaniment to 
communal divisions.66 But this would change.










































POST-NATIONALIST TURBULENCE,  
L ATE 1970S  ONWARD
The second half of the 1970s, a period that led up to the restoration of civilian gov-
ernment after thirteen years of military rule, marked a decisive watershed in the 
history of Nigeria after independence. Religion came onto the political agenda as 
a factor in its own right, not just as an additional aspect of communal or regional 
difference. This first showed itself in the dispute in the constitutional assembly in 
1977–78 about whether there should be a federal Sharia court of appeal. Yoruba 
Muslim opinion was divided but in general came down against it, fearing its 
potential to divide the community.67 (Of this I will say more in chapter 8, below.) 
About the same time, there emerged onto the public stage new and more strenu-
ous forms of devotion on both sides: Islamist reform movements and charismatic 
or born-again Christianity. In both cases the new movements had global or inter-
national links, and these tended to weaken those local attachments that had done 
so much to restrain religious conflict in Yoruba communities.
When we consider the articulation of religious identity and Yoruba ethnicity, the 
so-called Second Republic (1979–83) brought about a paradoxical double effect. On 
the one hand, the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN), led by Chief Awolowo, won a much 
larger overall share of the Yoruba vote than its Action Group predecessor had done, 
even though it was defeated at the national level by its main rival, the NPN, led by a 
Muslim Northerner, Shehu Shagari.68 Yet at the same time Muslims became a more 
distinct and assertive political force within the Yoruba arena. There were several rea-
sons for this: the Sharia debate of 1977–78 had raised the Islamic consciousness of the 
most active; the dominance of Nigeria’s government by Muslims (which continued 
after the return of the military in 1983) offered a political resource to be exploited; and 
Muslims’ level of education had increased, so that they were less prepared to look to 
Christians to provide political leadership. In Oyo State, with its capital at Ibadan, the 
NPN picked up the threads of the old anti–Action Group tradition, now with a more 
strongly Muslim flavor. The state’s UPN governor, Chief Bola Ige, was the particular 
target of Muslim criticism for pro-Christian bias in his appointments and educa-
tional policies, with the Muslim Students Society (which had recently become much 
more radical) taking a highly militant stand against him. A new role was played by a 
group of wealthy Muslims, most notably the Baba Adinni M. K. O. Abiola, who made 
alliance with the Northern Muslim establishment the cornerstone of his politics. 
Abiola, famously satirized in the 1970s for his corrupt business practices,69 and well 
known for his lavish, philandering lifestyle, the very epitome of the Yoruba big man, 
used his business links with Northern politicians to good advantage for Muslims 
(though it must be said that non-Muslims also benefitted from his largesse). Federal 
contracts and funds came their way, as well as Saudi money for approved projects; 
and Abiola used his National Concord newspaper to support the cause of Sharia.










































In 1985 there erupted the highest-profile public confrontation between Muslims 
and Christians that the Yoruba had known: the Ibadan-cross controversy. It was 
triggered by a reckless speech given by Abiola at the opening of a large new 
mosque—largely funded with Saudi money—on the University of Ibadan campus. 
About two hundred yards away from the mosque and in clear view from it, there 
had stood since 1954 a large, white, monumental cross, at a crossroads close to the 
Catholic chapel. Abiola took it into his head, possibly without premeditation, to 
demand that the cross be demolished. Other issues of Muslim grievance—essen-
tially arising from their diffuse sense of their marginalization in an institution 
whose staff and students were overwhelmingly and often assertively Christian70—
came into the dispute, which deepened when the Muslim side invoked the inter-
vention of the federal commissioner for education, a Northern Muslim. The dis-
pute ran on for many months but ended in a compromise: the cross stayed, but a 
concrete screen and a suitable Muslim emblem were erected nearer the mosque.71 
When the dispute was eventually settled, there was a great sense of relief at having 
pulled back from the brink of something very nasty and un-Yoruba—the more 
because of the intermittent outbreaks of serious religious violence that were by 
then occurring widely in Northern Nigeria.
At the end of the 1980s, the military head of state, General Ibrahim Babangida, 
a Northern Muslim, announced a program for a return to civilian rule: two parties 
were set up, with carefully vetted candidates. M. K. O. Abiola was approved as the 
candidate of the SDP, no doubt regarded (in view of his recent record) as a safe 
choice. But as the campaign got under way, an unexpected turnaround occurred. 
Because his opponent in the contest for the presidency, also a Muslim, was a 
Northerner, Abiola became the candidate of the South in the 1993 elections, and 
particularly the vessel of Christians’ hopes to see the overthrow of the Northern-
Muslim-military complex (to which they had come to apply the sobriquet “the 
Caliphate”). If ever a politician was defined by the hopes vested in him by his sup-
porters rather than by the force of his own political convictions, it was Abiola. The 
military took fright at Abiola’s victory and annulled the election.
There was an interim period before yet another Northern Muslim general, Sani 
Abacha, seized power, and Abiola (after a year of dithering) was imprisoned. So 
this most un-Awolowolike of politicians found the mantle of Awolowo placed 
around his shoulders and assumed the role of another Yoruba victim of Northern 
oppression—a role for which the Christian template of the suffering servant of 
his people was well suited. From having been a force to accentuate the Yoruba 
religious divide in the 1980s, in the 1990s Abiola became—virtually in spite of 
himself—a bridge across it. In some quarters this erstwhile advocate of Sharia 
even became seen as a kind of honorary Christian. While in Nigeria in 1994, I 
was once astounded to see a newspaper headline MKO Born-Again? The wish 
was surely father to that thought. Yet the born-again rhetoric of breaking with 










































the past and receiving fresh empowerment in the spirit aptly expressed the yearn-
ing of many Yoruba of both religions for a fresh political start. Conversely, this 
was a difficult time for Yoruba Muslims, since their loyalties could not be quite 
so undivided. Alhaji Arisekola Alao, the Arẹ Musulumi, was nearly lynched by 
students in 1995 on an ill-advised visit to the University of Ibadan campus, on 
account of his friendship with Abacha. Even so, in general Yoruba Muslims were 
as strongly committed to Yoruba interests and the democratic cause as Christians 
were. Kudirat, Abiola’s senior wife, was assassinated at Abacha’s behest, and his 
most persistent legal opponent, the radical lawyer Gani Fawehinmi, was a Muslim 
from Ondo. The issue of Abiola’s imprisonment put a very severe strain on rela-
tions between Yoruba and Northern members of the Nigerian Supreme Council 
for Islamic Affairs.72
By the time that both Abiola and Abacha died, in 1998, religious tension had 
subsided from the high levels of the 1980s, as Muslims and Christians again found 
common Yoruba ground in their opposition to the North. An ugly side of this was 
the anti-Hausa violence of the Oodua Peoples Congress, a vigilantist organiza-
tion that emerged in the late 1990s, particularly active in and around Lagos.73 The 
election of Olusegun Obasanjo in 1999 as president of Nigeria—the first Yoruba 
to hold the office that Awolowo had wanted so much—had a complicating effect 
on the religious alignments of Yoruba politics. Though a Christian himself, he had 
never stood close to the pro-Awolowo political mainstream; this was one thing 
that recommended him to the elders of the PDP, which stood roughly in the lin-
eage of the Northern-led coalitions of earlier years. In fact, most Yoruba cordially 
detested Obasanjo,74 and in the 1999 election they showed their fidelity to the 
Awoist tradition by supporting the AD (later AC), though this support was later 
eroded by the PDP’s exercise of power. Significantly the PDP first broke through in 
Oyo State, the mainly Muslim heartland of earlier resistance to the Yoruba politi-
cal mainstream, from Adelabu to the NPN, whose exemplary figure was Ibadan’s 
notorious political godfather, Alhaji Lamidi Adedibu.75 But this did not last: after 
2011, in disgust at PDP misgovernment (and, more than that, in growing disaffec-
tion with the Nigerian national project), the five Yoruba States of the southwest 
returned to Awoist parties. The key element here was Lagos State, which alone 
had rejected the PDP massively and consistently since 1999. The ironical outcome 
here was that a political tradition that at its outset in the 1950s had been so largely 
dominated by Christians now had as its main standard bearers the Muslim politi-
cians who for decades had controlled Lagos.76
The master theme of this chapter has been the evolving patterns of Yoruba com-
munity over the past century. Community, we may say, emerges from the continu-
ous interplay between two spheres of human action: an external or political sphere, 
concerned with defending (and defining) the community against other entities of 
like kind; and an internal or social sphere, constituted by the associational activity 










































of community members in pursuit of their various life goals. The original and 
primary focus of Yoruba community, the ìlú (city-state or town), has been sub-
jected to two distinct but connected forces of change. As a result of incorpora-
tion into the Nigerian state, it has been extended outward to higher-order levels 
of community, to the Yoruba as an ethnic group and to Nigeria as a nation. But 
what has concerned us more here is how the ìlú has had to accommodate the 
new identities brought by the world religions, each intent on enlarging its con-
stituency and realizing its own conceptions of community. The Yoruba have suc-
ceeded remarkably in domesticating them, to the extent that they are well suffused 
with Yoruba criteria of value, such as religious tolerance and the expectation that 
they deliver this-world benefits, whether for individuals or for the community. Yet 
Yoruba community, as configured by religion, is always historically provisional, 
never finally realized. At present, its political and its sociocultural aspects stand in 
a state of potential tension. On the one hand, as the foregoing narrative has sug-
gested, Yoruba Muslims seem at last incorporated in a common political project 
with their Christian compatriots. On the other hand, currents within the religious 
sphere, principally but not exclusively on the Muslim side, are working to dif-
ferentiate Muslims and Christians culturally more sharply than in the past. This 
differentiation is the theme of the next chapter.
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There has been a reciprocal and long-sustained relationship between the making 
of the Yoruba and the efforts of the world religions to plant themselves at home in 
 Yoruba society. For more than a century, Christianity has been at the forefront of this, 
through the CMS adoption of “Yoruba” as an ethnic designation and the creation of 
a Standard Yoruba form of language for use in church and school, which became the 
main vehicle for the modern Yoruba identity. Both culturally and politically, Yoruba 
ethnogenesis has had its high moments, of which the most notable were the efflores-
cence of cultural nationalism in the 1890s1 and the articulation of a political program 
by the Action Group in the 1950s, in both of which Christians played the leading part.
Yet those Christians who defined Yoruba language and history, such as Bishop 
S. A. Crowther and the Rev. Samuel Johnson, were ready to adopt and adapt 
Muslim materials, including the very name “Yoruba” itself, which passed from its 
distant Arabic origins through the Islamic polities of the savannah to designate the 
people of the Oyo Kingdom. The very first specific reference to them comes from 
Mali, by Ahmad Baba of Timbuktu (d. 1627),2 and only later from Hausaland. It 
is an irony that Muslim Yoruba later adopted a tradition of having migrated from 
the Islamic east, when their Islam actually first came from the west, along the trade 
corridor provided by the river Niger. A trace of that origin survived in the com-
mon Yoruba name for Muslims, Imale, even though the memory of what it had 
once signified was lost. A deposit of vocabulary is also owed to these Malian roots, 
some of it denoting specifically Islamic items, some of it joining the religiously 
unmarked general lexicon of Yoruba.3 One of these words, bọrọkinni (gentleman, 
respected man of comfortable means), came to connote a Yoruba cultural ideal, as 
indicated by its adoption in proverbial expressions.4
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It is unlikely that at the beginning of the nineteenth century Islam had been 
adopted by more than a small minority of the Oyo-Yoruba and hardly at all by 
non-Oyo. For a long time its spread was so slow and gentle, unforced by violence 
and uncomplicated by dogma, that an easy cultural intimacy, involving influences 
running both ways, grew up between Islam and the (Oyo) Yoruba, sometimes so 
unobtrusive as almost to escape notice:
One morning in 2008, I call to visit an imam and find him counseling a young 
 couple engaged to be married. At the end of the session, the man hands the imam 
a 100-naira note (a trifling sum, less than the cost of a newspaper) with his thanks. 
The imam replies, Ọlọrun gba (God receives). The donation is technically a saraa, a 
word derived from the Arabic sadaqa (alms), but in Yoruba contexts often rendered 
as “sacrifice.”5 The verbal formula derives from what was said when kola was thrown, 
in the simplest of all Yoruba forms of divination, after a sacrifice to an orisa to deter-
mine if it was acceptable: orisa gba (The deity receives).
So far as I can see, this benign little ritual contains no idolatrous implications, 
though it would surely be condemned by today’s Salafists as being without explicit 
authorization in the sunna of the Prophet. What is tacitly carried forward from 
orisa religion to Islam is an identification of the imam, as a man of God, with his 
God, just as an orisa priest, when he receives a donation for his services, receives it 
as the orisa’s representative. But the continuity in the form of the ritual goes with an 
emptying out of its content; and as with all such traces of the past, it is hard to tell 
if its origins mean anything (still less, are even known as such) to the participants.
By such mutual exchanges, Islam quietly made itself at home in Yorubaland, 
and the Yoruba absorbed elements of Islamic culture without any requirement of 
conversion. When, in the second half of the nineteenth century, through Christian 
agency, the term “Yoruba” began to be adopted by non-Oyo, and when, in an inde-
pendent movement over roughly the same period, Islam began to spread from its 
Oyo heartland into non-Oyo areas, Islamic traits were easily adopted into the habi-
tus of non-Oyo, thus coming to be seen as generically Yoruba. This process has con-
tinued, with Muslims continuing to contribute to the stock of items that serve to 
mark out what it is to be distinctively Yoruba, in such areas as language, dress, and 
music. So alongside Juju music, played mainly by Christians and greatly indebted 
to hymns, choruses, and the Afro-Christian music of independent churches, there 
is the Muslim-derived Fuji, whose chief source is the accompanied vocal music 
called were, sung to wake people up for the predawn meal (sari) during Ramadan. 
The enjoyment of either style of music is no longer religion-specific.6 Fuji and Juju, 
when taken together, are unmistakable markers of modern Yoruba culture, in con-
trast to the musical styles popular among, say, Ghanaians, Igbo, or Congolese.
The three entities here—one ethnic culture and two world religions as locally 
realized—are all in continuous transformation and impact on one another 










































in complex three-way interactions. Yoruba society has welcomed Islam and 
Christianity, and proved subtly capable of bending them to its ethos—up to a 
point. For while they compete vigorously with each other, they have had to do 
so under Yoruba rules—which have the tendency not only to domesticate them 
directly but to draw them into a process of mutual emulation that further enhances 
their shared Yoruba features (as I will explore in detail in the next chapter). Yet, 
being the kind of entities they are—global faith communities, conversionary and 
exclusivist, anchored in scriptures that constantly serve to remind their adherents 
of how imperfectly they are practiced—they cannot find this situation entirely to 
their liking. They are compelled by their own traditions to try to realize their own 
distinctive visions.
So how have Christianity and Islam sought to position themselves in relation 
to Yoruba culture and society? In the early days—around the 1870s, let us say—
Christians were widely seen as standing right apart from it; and Muslims, as much 
more at home in it. The guiding question I want to ask, which for the sake of argu-
ment I state in a strong form, is this: Has it come about, over the past century and 
a quarter, that as Christians have found ways to reconcile themselves with Yoruba 
culture, Muslims (or at least the most Islamically self-conscious among them) have 
sought to distance themselves from it? Can we even say that a kind of reversal has 
come about, such that now it is Christians who are Yoruba undifferenced, whereas 
it is Muslims who are Yoruba marked by religious difference? The contrasting tra-
jectories of the two faiths, it would seem, are in accord with their respective cul-
tural logics: both have been true to themselves in the histories they have produced.
CHRISTIANIT Y:  INDIGENIZ ATION AND 
 CULTUR AL NATIONALISM
A good place to start is with some comments by Edward Blyden, the West Indian–
born pioneer of African nationalism, adopted citizen of Liberia, critic of the mis-
sions, and admirer of Islam’s cultural achievements in West Africa. In Christianity, 
Islam and the Negro Race (1887), Blyden compared Christianity unfavorably with 
Islam as regards its local adaptation, which he linked to the continuing enthrall-
ment of Christian converts to their missionary mentors. Whereas with Islam, he 
argued, “the Arabic superstructure has been superimposed on a permanent indig-
enous substructure, so that what really took place, when the Arab met the Negro 
in his own home, was a healthy amalgamation, and not an absorption or an undue 
repression . . . ,” the local Christians remained mere imitators, who “try to force their 
outward appearance into, as near as possible, a resemblance to Europeans.”7 Despite 
this, he felt that they challenged heathenism less effectively than Muslims—Blyden 
was no primitivist—and failed to bring about real cultural change. This severe indict-
ment was actually shared by some in the missions, notably the Rev. James Johnson, 










































pastor of Breadfruit Church in Lagos, as fiery a nationalist as he was an evangelical 
and an evangelist. “Christians,” he wrote in 1874, “are regarded as a people separate 
from [the mass of Lagosians], as identifying with a foreign people, and the dress they 
assume has become a mark of distinction.”8 Johnson responded by putting strong 
pressure on his parishioners to wear African dress and insisted on giving Yoruba 
names in baptism. In the wave of cultural nationalism in the 1890s, the adoption of 
Yoruba names and dress was a sign of commitment to the cause. Names and dress, 
the key personal markers of social identity, are themes I will return to later.
It was both paradoxical and painful for Christianity, a religion that had put pro-
vision of God’s Word in the language of the people at the very heart of its evangelis-
tic strategy, to find itself treated as alien compared with its rival, which had insisted 
on keeping its Word in the language in which it had first been delivered, a language 
incomprehensible to all but a handful of Yoruba Muslims. Even the imam’s khutba 
or sermon was ideally first given in Arabic and afterward rendered into Yoruba. 
Since the missionaries—including radicals like James Johnson—were neither ready 
nor able to do much to modify the content of the Christian message to the Yoruba 
(e.g., as regards polygamy, the provision of charms, or domestic slavery), there 
were only two things to be done: to hope that with cultural change under colonial 
conditions Christianity would come to be positively valued and lose its aura of 
strangeness; and to find ways to persuade the Yoruba that, despite its strangeness, 
Christianity was actually the fulfillment of their historical destiny and the realiza-
tion of the best potential in their old religion. The framework within which such 
potential was eventually achieved was the new extended category Yoruba—that is, 
the Yoruba as we know them today, including all the non-Oyo groups—which the 
Church Missionary Society first conceived. This was built on a combination of two 
values—the richness of their traditional culture and their modern enlightenment—
that might once have been thought of as opposed or incompatible.
To this project, works on religion and on history were critical: religion because 
that was where Yoruba culture was at its most distinctive, and history as the medium 
through which the relations between tradition and modernity needed to be articu-
lated. As to history, all other early historical writing by Christian clergy or laymen 
pales into insignificance besides the scale and scope of the Rev. Samuel Johnson’s 
The History of the Yorubas. (See chapter 2, above.) The Christian literature on Yoruba 
religion is more varied and sustained but contains no single work of the caliber of 
Johnson’s History.9 Yoruba religion, qua discursive construct, was something devised 
by Christian evangelists to further their project of conversion. It served to throw a 
single concept round a body of practices that had not previously been so unified 
by those who engaged in them; and it treated as a single pan-Yoruba phenomenon 
what was in reality a spread of local-cult complexes. (See chapter 3, above.) However 
conceived, Yoruba religion was complex, but undoubtedly the orisa cults were its 
centerpiece: they above all were what converts had to renounce, handing over their 










































images for destruction. The greatest such staging of conversion was the mass icono-
clasm at the Aladura revival at Ilesha in 1930–31, where the abandonment of orisa 
was linked with the renunciation of other works of evil—witchcraft, bad medicines, 
charms or “juju”—in a grand demonization of past ritual practice.10 But since the old 
religion had met real and continuing needs, this dramatic rupture at the phenom-
enal level had to be combined with functional alternatives at the existential level, 
through the Aladura prophets—like Muslim alfa before them—providing their own 
means of healing, guidance, and protection against enemies.
But demonization, however leavened with practical substitutes, could not gen-
erate pride in tradition. For that other strategies were needed. One was desacral-
ization, where items of heathenism were rendered inoffensive by being taken out 
of the category of religion. This was first attempted with the Ogboni society—in 
its religious aspect a cult of the earth—which was argued to be none other than 
African freemasonry; and then (since many were not persuaded by this) became 
further refined into the Reformed Ogboni Fraternity, the brainchild of that inter-
esting man Archdeacon T. A. J. Ogunbiyi. Then a homegrown euhemerism allowed 
orisa to be reconfigured as kings, heroes, and great men of old who had been deified 
after their deaths. This enabled them to be honored by Christians as ancestors and 
founding fathers. In recent decades, as already noted, a highly reified concept of 
culture has proved very serviceable, allowing the annual rituals of the patronal dei-
ties of the community to be promoted as cultural festivals pure and simple (though 
again, as we’ll see, not everyone is happy to go along with this redefinition).11
Of all the traditional cults, that of Orunmila, the orisa of the Ifa divination cult, 
stood in a class of its own. Its priests, the babalawo, were treated with a unique 
degree of respect by the Yoruba clergy.12 Ifa was reinterpreted in two ways. First, 
following the desacralization strategy, its corpus of oracular verses (the Odu of 
Ifa) was seen as containing Yoruba philosophy, a body of ancestral wisdom, a cul-
tural archive. Ifa was, wrote the Rev. D. O. Epega, “the embodiment of the soul of 
the Yoruba nation, and the repository of their knowledge, religious, historical and 
medical.”13 This outlook continues strongly in the work of Yoruba scholars work-
ing in various cultural fields down to today. And second, its sacred character was 
allowed but treated as an anticipation, even a partial prerevelation, of Jesus Christ. 
The Rev. E. M. Lijadu, in particular, glossed the name Orunmila as “It is heaven 
that knows reconciliation” and saw it as pointing to Christ as his fulfillment. 
The culminating work in this tradition was a remarkable Ph.D. thesis—unfortu-
nately never published—completed in 1976 by the Rev. E. A. A. Adegbola, “Ifa and 
Christianity among the Yoruba: A Study in Symbiosis and the Development of 
Yoruba Christology.”14 But this was always a tricky line-call for clergy of a cultural-
nationalist inclination to make, since they ran the risk of valorizing Orunmila 
to such an extent that he, rather than Christ, came to be seen as Africa’s savior 
and redeemer. In fact, this was what some people came to think. A short-lived 










































Ethiopian Church, founded by a Prophet Adeniran in Lagos in 1918, argued that 
each people had its own savior: Jesus for the Europeans, Mohammed for the 
Arabs, and Orunmila for the Africans.15 There followed an Ijo Orunmila (Church 
of Orunmila), modeled on a Christian church but with an Iwe Odu Mimọ (Book 
of the Holy Odu) in place of the Bible, founded in 1934, which continues to exist, 
a minor current within the broad stream of Yoruba religiosity.16 Professor Wande 
Abimbola’s contemporary promotion of Ifa as itself a potential world religion 
belongs to the same tradition17—though nowadays the main audience for such 
views is in America rather than Nigeria. (See chapter 11, below.)
So Yoruba Christianity’s efforts to reconcile itself with Yoruba history and cul-
ture, when set alongside institutional developments such as the emergence of the 
African and Aladura churches and the Africanization of the mainline mission-
founded churches, especially after 1945, ran parallel to the general narrative of 
nationalism. Indeed the political nationalism of the period 1945–60 is better seen 
as following rather than leading developments in the religious field.18 The sym-
bolic apogee of nationalism was surely Festac, the Second World Festival of Black 
and African Arts and Culture, which took place in Lagos in 1977: a grand cultural 
jamboree sponsored by the Nigerian state, then flush with new oil revenues, which 
was intended to mold its diverse traditional cultures into a national culture and to 
proclaim Nigeria’s standing among all people of African descent.19
Yet this event evoked protests, not merely for its extravagance and the corruption 
that it gave rise to but on religious grounds also, from both Muslim and Christian 
groups angry that the promotion of African culture should be the occasion for 
putting on performances that (as they argued) served to showcase idolatry.20 That 
some Muslims were not happy with this is not surprising (for reasons shortly to be 
explored). What is more striking is the new indication of Christian estrangement 
from the cultural-nationalist project that mainstream clergy had had such a large 
part in shaping. This reaction against the trajectory of nearly a century was headed 
by the emerging Neo-Pentecostals: it was in protest against Festac that Pastor 
E. A. Adeboye’s Christ the Redeemer Ministry—now a core agency of RCCG—
was born.21 This was the first public showing of not so much a new attitude as the 
revival of the old strategy of demonizing, rather than desacralizing, what was left of 
the old religion. Thus it came about that the new movements in both Christianity 
and Islam found common cause in a postnationalist cultural agenda, though their 
prescriptions for what should replace it were deeply at variance with each other.
ISL AM: FROM THE LO CAL TO THE UNIVERSAL
So what had meanwhile been going on in Yoruba Islam? The first thing to note 
is how relatively unengaged it was either with colonialism or with the national-
ist reaction to it. Although colonialism had created conditions for the massive 










































expansion of Yoruba Islam in the early decades of the twentieth century, it was 
never symbolically associated with it in the way that Christianity was, as the reli-
gion of the oyinbo (white man). But neither was it intrinsically hostile to it, as much 
Muslim opinion in Northern Nigeria was. That is not surprising, since there the 
British had overthrown an Islamic state and, as many saw it, subjected Muslims to 
the shameful and unnatural condition of being ruled by Nasarawa (Christians).22 
As a result, radical nationalists in the North, like Sa’adu Zungur, critical of the way 
the British had co-opted the emirate structure, were well able to ground both their 
socialism and their nationalism in their Islam.23 It is illuminating to draw a contrast 
here between Sa’adu Zungur and Adegoke Adelabu of Ibadan: both Muslims, both 
professed socialists, and both affiliated to the NCNC in opposition to the dominant 
parties in their own respective regions. But Adelabu, though his populist Mabolaje 
Grand Alliance had its core support from Muslims and took on a certain local 
Muslim style, made no connection between his religion and his politics. In fact, in 
his robust exposition of his political credo, Africa in Ebullition (1952), he referred to 
his own Muslim identity as being “by chance,” even as something he “deprecate[d] 
. . . more so when you import it into the political arena.”24 As Northern Muslims had 
a religious motive for nationalism that Yoruba Muslims lacked, so Yoruba Muslims 
did not have the motive for Africanizing their religion that Yoruba Christians did. 
We may even argue that if Africanization is parallel to nationalism, the dominant 
trend in Yoruba Islam was counternationalist since it was a movement away from 
the Africa-specific toward a more universalizing Islam. This trend had begun halt-
ingly in the 1930s but accelerated in the late colonial period, and so the apparent 
step-change at the end of the 1970s did not come from nowhere.
A telling episode in this process occurred in the mid-1950s. It had become cus-
tomary for the senior alfa of Ibadan to visit the Olubadan and chiefs annually on 
the tenth day of the month Muharram—Ileya, as the Yoruba call it—to pray for 
their welfare and to divine for the coming year. Rituals would be performed to 
help realize good predictions and avert bad ones; and afterward saraa would be 
given to the alfa to make a feast for their people. This was known as Gbigbohun-
Tira (Listening to the Voice of Scripture).25 Both in form and in function, it closely 
followed the model of a rite called Odifa-Odun (Casting Ifa for the New Year), 
which babalawo had used to perform. Controversy had raged among Muslim cler-
ics since the 1930s about the legitimacy of this practice: Was it an idolatrous abuse 
of the sacred text of the Koran, or a justified expedient to replace Ifa with some-
thing more Islamic and to give a more Muslim face to public authority in Ibadan? 
The person who saved the ulama from further argument by abolishing the custom 
altogether was the first Christian to be elected Olubadan (1955–64), the ascetic I. B. 
Akinyele, who was also head of the Christ Apostolic Church. The irony of the situ-
ation was not lost on Shaykh Murtada, who celebrated his triumph in an Arabic 
poem he circulated to his colleagues: “You abused the book of Allah by taking it to 










































a place filled with filth on all sides. . . . When the Christian among you ascended 
the throne, he removed from Islam some of its evils by saying, ‘I don’t want your 
book, my Christianity rejects it.’ What sort of wonder [is this]?” His opponent, 
Ahmad al-Rufai, had cited a hadith in which the Prophet had backed some of his 
companions who had taken a sheep in payment for having given magicospiritual 
help to a pagan Arab chief: a once-cogent precedent that no longer had such force.
One thing that this episode highlights, when we set it alongside the treatment 
of Ifa in the Africanizing theology of this period, is how differently Islam and 
Christianity related themselves to this unique feature of Yoruba religion. Islam 
and Ifa went back a long time together in Yoruba history: indeed, I am persuaded 
by Louis Brenner’s suggestion that Ifa actually arose as a Yoruba response to the 
stimulus of Islam, possibly as far back as the sixteenth century.26 Thereafter, Ifa 
and Islamic divination existed in parallel; by the nineteenth century, their respec-
tive practitioners could actually cooperate with one another on difficult cases.27 
Christianity, of course, encountered Ifa only in the 1840s. The cognitive bridges 
that the two world religions respectively built between themselves and Ifa were 
very different. A Muslim legend of the origin of Ifa attributes it to one Setilu, who 
can be identified with Satih, a magician of pre-Islamic Arabia.28 Ifa was thus set 
fully within an Arab-Islamic genealogy that carried the implication that it, like 
other works of pagan jahiliyya, must in due time be set aside for Islamic truth. By 
contrast, the Christian theology of Ifa, as proposed by a cultural nationalist like 
Lijadu (who actually went to the trouble of taking instruction from a babalawo), 
saw it as a partial revelation of God to the Yoruba, which could therefore serve as a 
praeparatio evangelica, a springboard into a distinctively Yoruba Christianity. This 
Christian invention of a continuity with something with which it had no prior 
historical links stands in contrast to Islam’s insistence in principle on rupture from 
something with which it had a long historical relationship.
So some more Islamically self-conscious elements struggled—against the incli-
nation of most ordinary Muslims, one has to say—to disown aspects of their own 
local past, to cast aside some of those syncretistic practices that had earlier given 
Islam an entry into Yoruba society. Increasingly the Middle East is looked to as a 
source of best practice, particularly by those of Salafist views. Among these, A.-R. 
Shittu drew an interesting contrast for me between the ways in which the two 
world religions had come to the Yoruba.29 Christianity, he suggested, had come 
in a fairly pure form directly from its centers in places like Rome and Canterbury, 
but Islam had come through many African intermediaries, picking up a lot of bid‘a 
(innovation) along the way.30 Shittu’s view of the history of Christianity is no doubt 
too generous, but it entails a characteristically Muslim perspective: that the move-
ment away from the Arabian point of origin, which was equally temporal and 
spatial, unavoidably carried a declination from primordial truth. (We may note in 
passing how different Shittu’s assessment of African Islam is from Blyden’s, whose 










































praise for Islam presupposed a quintessentially Christian view of the proper rela-
tionship between religion and culture.) So there is a logic to his argument, against 
mainstream Muslims who accuse him of wanting to import Saudi customs, that 
the Islam of its heartland in Saudi Arabia must be considered more nearly pure, 
less subject to bid‘a, than the Islam of its spatial periphery.31 This perspective was 
no doubt encouraged in the experience of Yoruba undertaking the hajj, whose 
numbers boomed in the 1950s, and again in the 1970s.32
The Middle East may be said to have first intervened directly and decisively 
in Yoruba Muslim affairs in the early 1970s. In 1970, the World Muslim League 
formally declared Ahmadiyya to be a non-Muslim organization, on the grounds 
that its founder, Ghulam Ahmad, had made claims about his inspired status that 
contradicted Mohammed’s unique position as Khatam an-Nabiyyin (Seal of the 
Prophets).33 This fed through to Nigeria by 1974, after the Saudi Arabian embassy 
announced it would no longer grant visas to Ahmadis wishing to undertake the 
hajj.34 The Sultan of Sokoto—ever keen to burnish his credentials with the Saudi 
royal family and more than ready to fall in behind the Saudi initiative—called on 
all Nigerian Muslims to dissociate themselves from the Ahmadis. The impact of 
this fell almost exclusively on Yoruba Muslims, since Ahmadiyya’s membership 
was virtually limited to Yorubaland. The most dramatic casualty was Professor 
I. A. B. Balogun—the doyen of Yoruba Arabists (with a doctorate from SOAS), 
imam of the UI mosque and an Ahmadi for forty years—who recanted after 
much soul searching. This caused consternation in Ahmadiyya ranks, since he 
took many others with him.35 A large group seceded, calling themselves Anwar 
ul-Islam; nearly all the schools Ahmadiyya had founded were eventually lost to 
it; and though it has since been reorganized from its headquarters in Pakistan,36 
the moment has surely passed when Ahmadiyya made its most important con-
tribution to the development of Yoruba Islam. Taken together, the pressure on 
local syncretisms like Gbigbohun-Tira and the expulsion of Ahmadiyya amount 
to a kind of pincer movement on the distinctively Yoruba expression of Islam, 
squeezing it at both the traditional and the modern end of its range in such a way 
as to move it overall closer to the orthodox Sunni mainstream and to reduce the 
differences between it and the Islam of Northern Nigeria. Ahmadiyya had been at 
the forefront of Yoruba Muslim modernity, but it had become by now rather an 
old-fashioned kind of modernity, once symbolized in the kind of formal dress that 
Ahmadi leaders had favored: a double-breasted suit with a red fez. Non-Ahmadi 
Muslims also resented a certain exclusiveness in Ahmadis, expressed in the feeling 
that they preferred to pray behind an Ahmadi imam. They also had a definite feel of 
the colonial period about them: politically they had been pro-British and strongly 
opposed to violent Islamic militancy. The takfir against them allowed other con-
ceptions of Muslim modernity to come forward: more militant and assertive, and 
more in tune with contemporary currents in the wider world of Islam.










































No Muslim organization registered these changes over the course of the 1970s 
so closely as the Muslim Students Society (MSS).37 This had been founded in 1953 
by a group of students attending various secondary schools in Lagos, led by a pupil 
at King’s College, Abdul-Lateef Adegbite.38 In its early years MSS—whose base 
would soon move to the universities—was mainly concerned with giving social 
support and promoting fellowship among Muslim students in institutions where 
they were massively outnumbered by Christians; but over time its focus shifted 
more toward the intersection of religion and politics. It changed its motto twice 
in its first twenty-five years: from its original “Peace, Love, and Community” to 
“Peace, Faith, and Brotherhood,” and finally to the Kalimah itself, “There is no 
god but Allah. . . .” That sequence tells its own story: the development of a more 
defined and self-consciously orthodox Muslim identity. In 1969, over half the area 
chairmen of MSS had been Ahmadis (which is not at all surprising, granted their 
high level of education);39 and one effect of the takfir had been to clear the way for 
a much more radically inclined leadership to take over. In the early 1980s, some 
MSS activists actually received paramilitary training in Libya—itself a token more 
of militancy than of orthodoxy.
This sharpening of Islamic identity went with a desire both to pull apart from 
some institutions in which Yoruba Muslims had joined with Christians (such as 
Boy Scouts and Girl Guides) and to establish closer ties with their Northern coreli-
gionists. MSS, as a body originating in the Yoruba South, was at first regarded with 
reserve by Northern Muslims, though it made a point of appointing some emirs 
as patrons; and eventually it did establish itself firmly on Northern campuses. At 
a higher level, MSS’s founder, by now Dr. Adegbite, was active in setting up the 
first all-Nigerian Muslim body, the Nigerian Supreme Council of Islamic Affairs 
(NSCIA).40 This was triggered by the embarrassment felt by Nigerian Muslims at 
a conference in Libya in 1973, when there was no single national voice to speak 
for them. Dr. Adegbite took discreet soundings with the Sultan of Sokoto, who 
first suggested that Yoruba Muslims should simply join Jama‘atu Nasril Islam (JNI: 
“Society for the Victory of Islam”), which had been set up in 1962 in the context of 
the Sardauna’s Islamization campaigns in the North. Adegbite advised against this: 
he must have known very well how it would have played in places like Ikorodu 
and Ijebu-jesha. Even as it was, the sultan became president of the NSCIA and 
an official of JNI; his close relative Ibrahim Dasuki (later sultan himself) became 
its secretary-general, and Adegbite had to settle for the post of legal advisor. This 
was undoubtedly humiliating, and it amply confirmed suspicions that Northern 
Muslims regarded the Yoruba as very much their junior partners. It meshed with 
the stereotype, still widely current today though denied by some senior figures, 
that Hausa or Fulani Muslims are reluctant to pray behind a Yoruba imam.
Though Yoruba Muslims sometimes find the existence of their fellow Muslims 
in the North a useful counterweight to the influence of Yoruba Christians, their 










































relationship with them is very ambivalent. It has surely worked toward a more uni-
form and presumptively more orthodox practice of Islam throughout Nigeria—
though here Yoruba Muslims have sometimes been able to outflank the sup-
posedly more correct Northerners. A perennially vexed issue has been over the 
fixing of the dates for key Islamic festivals—such as Ileya or Id al-Adha, the day of 
sacrifice at the end of the hajj—when the very strong normative ideal is that the 
whole umma should celebrate in unison.41 Tradition dictates that the exact date 
should be fixed by sighting the new moon, and the sultan had a procedure that 
settled it for the Sokoto Caliphate—but it sometimes led to a celebration one day 
out from other parts of the Muslim world. Many Yoruba Muslims have argued 
for following the lead of the grand mufti of Mecca, thus enabling them to claim 
they are more universalist as Muslims than the Hausa-Fulani are. Some bold spir-
its, such as Professor Amidu Sanni, imam of the Lagos State University mosque, 
have gone so far as to argue that the sultan’s claim to be regarded as the spiritual 
leader of Nigerian Muslims is un-Islamic because it depends on hereditary succes-
sion, which has no legitimacy in Sunni Islam.42 This is rather an adroit strategy of 
Yoruba self-positioning as more Sunni than thou.
THE DIFFERENTIATION OF MUSLIM IDENTIT Y
The search of Yoruba Islam for a greater religious authenticity, which has led it over 
several decades both to sever itself from some of its distinctive local forms and to 
associate itself more closely with currents in the wider Islamic world, has made many 
individual Muslims want to present themselves more distinctly as Muslims within 
the community through the two main social indicators of personal status: dress and 
names. (These were, of course, precisely the same markers that James Johnson chose 
in the 1870s when he wanted Christian converts to show that they were Africans and 
not black Europeans.) This self-differentiation seems linked to other kinds of dif-
ferentiation, actual or wished-for, that must tend to reduce the amount of symbolic 
commonality hitherto existing between Yoruba Muslims and Christians.
Dress. A generation ago, it was virtually impossible to distinguish people by reli-
gion in a Yoruba crowd, whether in a market or on a campus. Now it is much 
more common to be able to identify some people as Muslims, particularly women. 
Women in full black purdah (called ẹlẹha in Yoruba) are more often seen now, 
especially in the back quarters of towns like Ibadan. Once associated with tradi-
tionalist groups—such as Bamidele and Lanase’s followers—that adopted it from 
pious circles in Ilorin or Hausaland, purdah is now encouraged by newer groups 
of Salafi or Deobandi views like Ahl us-Sunna or the fast growing Tablighi Jama‘at, 
from Pakistan.43 There is strong criticism of purdah from within the mainstream 
ulama, who in general are firmly opposed to it, for making Islam look alien and 
for impeding the activity of Yoruba women as traders, but it seems to be growing.










































More novel is the wearing of indicative dress—hijab or full-length jilbab—by 
some Muslim women students on campus. A large notice-board authorized by the 
MSS outside the UI mosque proclaims: “O children of Adam! We have bestowed 
raiment upon you to cover the whole of your body and as an adornment and the 
raiment of righteousness” (Q. 7:26). Women so dressed, at least at the University 
of Lagos, are (or were) liable to have Sharia! shouted derisively at them by male 
students.44 The comportment of women students can be controversial within the 
Muslim community: a few years ago, some particularly ardent female Salafists at 
UI adopted the practice of sitting sideways at their desks during lectures so as to 
avoid making eye contact with their male professors—and were robustly criticized 
for so doing by the then–university imam, Dr. D. A. Tijani, in a Friday sermon. 
Whether such displays are due to a desire to follow Sharia strictly or to a more 
general wish to declare Muslim identity in public is a moot point. Certainly the 
adoption of hijab as part of the school uniform for girls in Islamic primary schools, 
which is quite common, has to be seen as the latter, since the Sharia is concerned 
only with what adult or adolescent women should wear.
As regards male dress, there were always some discreet indicators of Muslim 
identity, such as the wearing of white embroidered caps, and recent changes 
in appearance (such as the untrimmed beards sported by some Ahl us-Sunna 
members) have been less conspicuous than in the case of women. A couple of 
high-profile instances are more notable for what they tell us about Christian 
attitudes toward Muslims’ wearing un-Yoruba dress. As early as the 1950s, 
Awolowo is said to have rebuked the Alafin of Oyo for attending a meeting 
of ọbas wearing an Arab headdress—he had just returned from Mecca as an 
alhaji—rather than the customary beaded cap. A rather similar incident 
occurred between Awo’s political son, Bola Ige, and the then-leader of the MSS, 
K. K. Oloso, at a stormy meeting in 1981 over alleged pro-Christian bias in the 
Oyo state governor’s educational policies. Ige insultingly called Oloso an ọmọ-
ale (bastard) for wearing a long Arab gown; to this Oloso smartly retorted, 
“Who is more of a bastard?” pointing out, to the cheers of his followers, that Ige 
was wearing a smart French suit.45
There are complex and interesting questions about the evolution of Yoruba 
dress to be considered here. Many if not most kinds of dress that Yoruba now 
wear were introduced through distinctively Muslim or Christian channels and 
were likely at first to be seen as religious identity markers, though this was not 
inevitably the case. What is now regarded as the Yoruba man’s dress—the gown 
with voluminous open sleeves (agbada), usually hitched up onto the shoulders, 
embroidered at the neck, worn with a long-sleeved blouse (buba), loose trou-
sers (sokoto), and some kind of cap—is essentially of Northern Muslim origin. 
As late as the 1880s, it was not worn by local people in southeastern areas like 
Ondo, where Islam had no presence. A European missionary at Abeokuta may 
have been referring to its adoption when he wrote in 1847 that “Mahomedan 










































costume is become very fashionable with the young and gay,” adding that it “is by 
no means put on as a religious peculiarity.”46 Like many other items or concepts 
introduced from the Muslim North, this costume rapidly lost what connota-
tions of Islam it originally possessed and passed into the religiously unmarked 
cultural repertoire of the Yoruba. The same happened with the European dress—
shirts and trousers; suits for the wealthier—that once proclaimed Christians as 
such (and that James Johnson excoriated as culturally alien).47 From our pres-
ent perspective, two broad distinctions have emerged in how the Yoruba clas-
sify dress: between African or traditional and international or modern styles; 
and between dress that expresses religious identity and whatever is religiously 
unmarked. As regards the first, the two dress styles have virtually lost all the 
religious connotations, respectively Muslim and Christian, that they once had: 
Muslim bankers wear suits and ties like other bankers, whereas traditional dress 
is obligatory at weddings and funerals (and, since nationalism, for politicians at 
public events)—as well as for ọbas and chiefs. In general, educational settings 
require religiously unmarked modern dress, especially for the young, though (as 
noted above) some Muslim women now advertise their faith by their dress. As 
regards the second style, apart from the professional dress of clergymen, nearly 
all religiously marked dress is worn by Muslims, whereas Christians appear as 
Yoruba unmarked by religious difference (with, I think, the single exception of 
White-garment Aladuras on their way to church, when they actually look a bit 
like some Muslims).
It must be stressed that these distinctions are flexible and contested as regards 
their specific content: the value or meaning attached to a particular item of dress 
may change. So in the Ige-Oloso confrontation referred to above, Oloso surely 
intended a strong statement of his Muslim identity by wearing the Arab-style 
gown, just as the Alafin meant to express his pride as a new alhaji—though 
here I   presume with no combative intention—by wearing an Arab headdress at 
the meeting of traditional rulers with Awolowo. Yet something like the gown 
seen as Islamic when worn by Oloso in 1981—a straight, long-sleeved gown or 
caftan, reaching down to just above the ankles, worn with trousers underneath 
(sometimes known by the Hausa name dandogo) has since then come into fairly 
general use and may be worn instead of the agbada for occasions like going to 
church. Thus, it has lost its religious marking and become traditional or African, 
whereas other items—like the Arab headdress and the turban—have retained their 
Islamic character. In effect, then, it seems to have been Christians whose deci-
sion to adopt an originally Islamic dress item as theirs too makes it generically 
Yoruba. As in other spheres, they have fallen into the role of being the principal 
arbiters of what counts as general Yoruba culture. No doubt this is what lay behind 
Awolowo’s reprimand of the Alafin: an ọba, of all people, should be the complete 
embodiment of Yoruba tradition and not express a religiously partisan identity at 
an official meeting.










































Names. The choice of personal names—between European and Yoruba—was 
the other key focus of cultural self-reproach by Christian radicals in the 1870s. 
Who could consider somebody called Thomas Babington Macaulay or Joseph 
Pythagoras Haastrup to be a proper African?48 The pressure among Christians for 
Yoruba names to be given in baptism built up over many decades to the point 
that today, in any list of names (e.g., a student class list or an electoral register), 
the religiously unmarked (i.e., purely Yoruba) names will in the great majority of 
cases be those of Christians. Virtually all Muslims have a distinctively Muslim 
name (though most have Yoruba surnames) and are more likely to be known by 
it. A Muslim woman friend of mine now in her forties—let me call her Sidikat—
told me that while she was a student she was more than once asked (often with a 
note of reproach) by Christian fellow students why she didn’t use a Yoruba name 
like Aduke or Funmi. It is not surprising that Muslim politicians often prefer to 
use a Yoruba forename rather than a Muslim one—for example, Bola, rather than 
Ahmed, Tinubu—as they must appeal to a cross-religious public; and to use Yoruba 
versions of Muslim names (e.g., Lamidi or even just Lam for Abdul-Hamid; Lasisi 
for Abdul-Aziz). These differences—with Christians more likely to present them-
selves as plain Yoruba, whereas Muslims are more likely to advertise their religion 
in their preferred names—do not indicate any difference in the intensity of per-
sonal belief but are the outcomes of the cultural logics of the two faiths.
Religious language. Here we find the same logic at work as with dress and personal 
names, with the Christian adoption of a great deal of the religious terminology of 
Arabic derivation already in use among Muslims. Some of this had already lost its 
religious marking by the nineteenth century: words such as alafia (peace, well-
being) or anu (mercy). Some other words with a more definite religious content, 
like alufa (pastor, priest), adura (prayer), woli (prophet), iwasu (sermon) were 
soon naturalized as Christian terms, chiefly at the instance of Bishop Crowther, 
the principal translator of the Yoruba Bible. It seems reasonable to assume that 
the orthography he adopted in writing these terms comes close to expressing 
their actual phonetic values in nineteenth-century Yoruba speech—for example, 
as regards the insertion of the u in alufa, or the r in adura. Of the various names 
and epithets of God that were current in the nineteenth century, Ọlọrun (Lord 
of Heaven) was by far the preferred vernacular term among Muslims and was 
adopted without question by Christians, thus providing a common linguistic ref-
erence point for people of all faiths.
Subsequently there has been some movement of linguistic self-differentiation in 
Yoruba Islam. An interesting case is the use of waasi instead of iwasu for “sermon,” 
which is a shift to a Hausa form from the ancient and original Malian or Songhai-
derived word (both deriving from the Arabic wa’z).49 It seems most likely that this 
occurred as a spontaneous effect of the growing links between Yoruba and Hausa 
Muslims that occurred in the late nineteenth and the early twentieth century rather 










































than as a conscious attempt to differentiate Islam from Christianity. However that 
may be, its effect was to leave the old Muslim word as a Christian word. For “Muslim 
cleric,” alfa (or sometimes phonetically closer to popular speech, afaa) has long 
been the preferred usage, thus differentiated from alufa, “Christian clergyman.”
Two other shifts can be pinpointed more exactly to a new translation of the 
Koran published in 1977 under the auspices of the World Muslim League—made by 
a committee of senior ulama including Shaykh Adam al-Ilori—that has become in 
effect the “authorized version” for Yoruba Muslims.50 One is a very slight shift toward 
Arabic usage: for example, adua rather than adura for “prayer.” The other is equally 
slight phonetically but more telling in intention and potentially more momentous 
in effect: the substitution of Ọlọhun for Ọlọrun as the preferred Muslim rendition of 
“God.” This hardly registers in speech at all, since h is barely aspirated and r is rolled 
only lightly in Yoruba—both forms sound pretty much like Ọlọ’un—but in a text, 
like the Nasfat Prayer Book, the difference strikes the eye. A brief explanation of the 
change is given in the preface of the 1977 translation. Ọlọrun is said to be unaccept-
able because it literally means “the one who owns heaven only but [by implication] 
not the earth” (ẹniti o ni ọrun nikan ko si ni aiye). Ọlọhun is glossed as ẹniti o ni ọhun 
lori ẹnikẹni (the one who has ọhun over anyone), which is claimed to be the equiva-
lent of the Arabic Allahu or Allahuma (O God!). But what does ọhun mean?51 Not a 
word in very common use, it connotes “taboo” or “forbidden thing,” as in the phrase 
o ti j’ọhun (“he has done something he shouldn’t” or “he has incurred a penalty”). 
Evidently al-Ilori, as the leading translator, meant to convey by Ọlọhun something 
like “the one who has the right to possession or obedience.” Abubakre thinks it 
possible that ọhun may also have some of the connotations of the Arabic concept 
of haram (forbidden, but with the sense “holy” or “revered” when applied to God, 
like sacer in Latin) but still concludes that Ọlọhun is “a rare and difficult word for-
mation” in Yoruba. Despite the semiofficial status of the translation proposed by 
al-Ilori, many Yoruba Muslims—whether literate in Arabic or not—still use Ọlọrun 
or else are inclined to provide their own etymologies for the difficult neologism. I 
once heard a preacher at a Nasfat Asalatu service explain Ọlọhun by deriving it 
from olohun-gbogbo (owner of all things), which he claimed to be the equivalent of 
the Arabic phrase Rabi’l-’alamin (Lord of all created beings) at Q. 1:2. This may be 
theologically sound, but it makes no etymological sense in Yoruba.
But perhaps more significant than this small step away from the religious lexi-
con common to Yoruba of all faiths is the decision that al-Ilori and his fellow 
translators did not take: to decline to translate Allah at all and instead to intro-
duce the Arabic name of God into the Yoruba text. In fact, two other Muslim 
translations have done just this: one brought out by Ahmadiyya in 1976, and one 
published by Professor Y. A. Quadri in 1997.52 In principle, that might have been 
the first step toward naturalizing Allah as the Yoruba name for the Supreme Being 
among Muslims, as has happened in Hausa, Fulfulde, Mande, and the languages of 










































other peoples long established as Muslim (but notably not in Swahili), though that 
outcome is now effectively ruled out by the fact that so many Yoruba are Christian. 
The name Allah (in phonetic Yoruba form Aala) was not novel in Yoruba oral texts: 
it occurs not only in the popular Muslim devotional songs called waka but even 
in some Ifa divination verses.53 Granted this background, the decision not to use 
the word Allah for God has to be seen as highly deliberate. It is as if al-Ilori (who 
was always concerned to balance his Islamic with his Yoruba loyalties) wanted to 
set a limit to how far Yoruba Islam should distance itself from what was common, 
established, and characteristic in Yoruba culture. There was a danger in allowing 
Christians to take exclusive possession of the name that Yoruba had always applied 
to God. So I interpret the adoption of Ọlọhun, which sounds less different from 
Ọlọrun than it looks, as a carefully calibrated way of correcting but yet retaining 
the age-old Yoruba designation of God.
SHARIA AND C OMMUNIT Y
Potentially the farthest-reaching instance of the Muslim assertion of difference 
from common Yorubaness lies in the demand for Sharia. When the issue of Sharia 
came up in the constitutional assembly in 1977–78, Yoruba Muslims had had very 
limited experience of it, since the British had squashed the few incipient moves 
toward it early in the colonial period and required Yoruba of all faiths to live 
together under the same native law and custom.54 The issue was reignited in 1999–
2000, when twelve Northern States decided to adopt Sharia for criminal as well as 
civil cases.55 What first became clear in 1977 and has continued to be the case ever 
since is that whereas most of the formal Muslim leadership, whether lay intellectu-
als like Adegbite or Shittu, or Muslim titleholders like Arisekola, or leading mem-
bers of the ulama, profess themselves to be strongly in favor of Sharia, the mass 
of ordinary lay Muslims (including those who are traditional rulers or politicians) 
are far from enthusiastic about it. It is not hard to see why. The introduction of full 
Sharia in the North, although it generated much tension and (in some places, like 
Kaduna) violence, was at least in a region where religious and ethnic differences 
already tended to coincide, so that what Sharia implied was a deeper Islamization 
of groups that were already Muslim, leaving non-Islamic groups to their own legal 
devices (at least in theory). In Yorubaland, however, where not just all communi-
ties but also many families are mixed in religion, the notion of a separate law for 
Muslims must have an ominous potential to divide the community at all levels. I 
simply cannot see Sharia being generally implemented in Yorubaland in the fore-
seeable future, and I suspect that most of its advocates do not either.
Yet there is a substantial continuing literature—petitions, articles, books—in 
which the themes of the late 1970s are reiterated three decades later.56 It is passion-
ate but little focused on what the implementation of Sharia would mean concretely 










































in the Yoruba situation, on such issues as exactly how far Sharia law would extend, 
what its effects would be on the integration of local communities, how a law sup-
posed to apply only to Muslims could be made work for religiously mixed families, 
how to reconcile the Christian population to its introduction, and perhaps even 
more important, how to deal with the reservations of reluctant Muslims, some of 
whose freedoms would be curtailed by it. The arguments for it are typically very 
general, pitched at the level of high religious principle:57
Sharia is such a concomitant of Islam that to deny access to it is to infringe on [a 
Muslim’s] right to freedom of worship. This is because Islam is not just a set of rituals 
but a complete way of life. . . . Unlike other faiths, Islam provides for its adherents’ 
guidance in all aspects of human behaviour and obliges them to strictly follow that 
guidance. . . . Sharia is to a Muslim like a soul to a body.
This view is couched in such a way as to make it hard for Muslims to oppose 
the implementation of Sharia without opening themselves to the danger of takfir, 
of being declared not to be real Muslims—or of being, as one Ahl us-Sunna activ-
ist put it to me, referring scornfully to a leading Muslim politician in Lagos State, 
half Muslim and half Christian, which in his view was no Muslim at all. In fact, 
this kind of Sharia advocacy has little to do with Christianity and everything to do 
with trying to enlist the help of the state in the continuing campaign by rigorist 
Muslims, both lay and clerical, to put pressure on their more easygoing coreligion-
ists to adopt a more complete and (as they see it) correct practice of Islam.
The notion of Islam as a complete way of life presents a fundamental challenge to 
the way that most ordinary Yoruba Muslims have viewed the relationship between 
their religion and their culture. There are many popular sayings along the lines of:58
I will practice my traditional rites [oro ile mi, literally “the custom of my house”]. 
Christianity will not stop me, Islam will not stop me, from practicing my traditional 
rites;
or
When a Muslim is not hungry, he says he won’t eat monkey flesh [a Muslim dietary 
taboo]. When Sule is hungry, he’ll eat colobus monkey.
Since such attitudes, however much they obtain in practice, are not easy for 
Muslims to assert as the basis for open opposition to Sharia, there is instead much 
dissembling and foot-dragging. As the strongly pro-Sharia author of a Ph.D. thesis 
ruefully commented on the respondents in a survey he had conducted:59
Some Muslims were hypocritical in their opinions. They seemed to be sceptical . . . 
on [the] re-establishment of Sharia in southern part of Nigeria. Although they hypo-
critically supported its re-establishment, it seemed they cherished and professed the 
Western system, but pretended to us . . .










































In the absence of any articulated opposition to the implementation of Sharia on 
Muslim grounds—if that were possible—especially by recognized Muslim leaders, 
we find two ways of reconciling commitment in principle with the recognition 
of practical impossibility. One is to treat it simply as a very long-term objective, 
as I found in talking to a group of MSS activists, all vehement supporters of what 
had been done in Northern Nigeria. For the shorter term, they also had ideas 
about trying it out on a small scale, by doing a sort of hijra and establishing small-
scale communities where Muslims might realize the ideal of a common life lived 
according to Sharia.60 Another, more concrete but strictly limited experiment is 
the Islamic court set up under the auspices of the League of Imams and Alfas at 
Ibadan Central Mosque, where on a voluntary basis Muslims may submit cases for 
adjudication under Sharia, mostly concerning domestic issues.
The other approach is to argue that what is needed and can be realized in 
Southern Nigeria is a Sharia of the soul. This was expounded to me by Alhaji 
Abdullahi Akinbode, the Chief Missioner of Nasfat:61
If there is no institutionalized Sharia, [there can still be] personalized Sharia. If men 
are good, there is no need for the state to intervene. Let us make ourselves perfect. . . . 
You can be policeman of your own soul . . . we concentrate on the soul . . . [and seek 
to build] a disciplined personality rather than the disciplined state.
This would seem to fit well with the experience of Nasfat’s core constituency, 
educated Muslims who work alongside Christian colleagues in the modern com-
mercial sector, who can appreciate the sheer unviability of having a separate legal 
sphere for Muslim Yoruba. The ideal of personal piety expressed here also seems to 
have a definite affinity with the outlook of many born-again Christians, especially 
those of a holiness tendency.
So Muslims’ attitudes on the proper relation between their religion and Yoruba 
culture cover a wide spectrum, as can be seen from the views of two prominent 
figures who stand at either end of it. They are Chief Lanrewaju Adepoju, a famous 
poet in the Yoruba language and now a Muslim of strongly Salafist views, and the 
Alafin of Oyo, the most senior-ranking oba to be a Muslim. They used to be friends 
but are now bitter enemies over this very issue.
Adepoju is an entirely self-taught man who achieved renown in the 1960s for his 
practice of a kind of satirical poetry called ewi.62 He had his own radio program for 
many years and earned the sobriquet ọjọgbọn elewi (“professor” or “the wisest” of 
ewi poets). He was born a Muslim to poor parents in one of Ibadan’s farm villages 
but had no Koranic education and was not religiously observant. For a number 
of years, indeed, he became a sort of freethinking Christian and was drawn into 
some cultic activities that he later strongly repudiated. Eventually, after reading a 
biography of the Prophet Mohammed that he came across in an Islamic bookshop 
in London,63 he returned to Islam, espousing a rigorously Salafist position and 










































founding the Universal Muslim Brotherhood, which is part of the Ahl us-Sunna 
grouping. In his compound in Ibadan he has built a tiny mosque, complete with a 
minaret, next to his recording studio; his wives now go about as black-veiled ẹlẹha; 
and in his study he has many works of tafsir and entire sets of hadith. Adepoju 
insists that there is much more to Islam than just the Five Pillars, since it also 
requires “complete adherence to the Sunna of the Prophet” as evidenced in the had-
ith. Since for him Islam “is a complete way of life and itself a culture,” even the ques-
tion of a relationship with Yoruba culture seems to be theoretically precluded: it is 
simply a question of Yoruba Muslims’ adopting the supposedly complete culture of 
Islam. So in interview I did not find it easy to get Adepoju to specify how Yoruba 
values might contribute positively to a Yoruba expression of Islam—“respect for 
elders,” he eventually conceded. Instead, he was entirely concerned to stress how 
he had “broken from his ugly past” (sounding for a moment a bit like a born-again 
Christian). So he was vehement about what he called the “ugly aspects of Yoruba 
culture,” such as its funeral customs and cult practices, and denounced those whom 
he regarded as nominal and syncretistic Muslims, such as charm-making alfa and 
Tijaniyya adherents. In 1995, after a confrontation between Muslims and tradition-
alists over the conduct of the Oro festival at Oyo, Adepoju circulated an ewi on 
audio cassette that abused the Alafin by calling him ọba keferi (pagan king).64
Now, ọbas are at the center of these culture wars, for they are the embodied 
symbols of the unity and integrity of their communities and are thus expected, 
whatever their personal beliefs, to sponsor and patronize all forms of locally rec-
ognized religion as contributing to the welfare of the town. This norm has been 
somewhat eroded since the 1950s, both through ọbas’ refusing to take part in ritu-
als they personally find offensive and through pressure on them from religiously 
motivated outsiders. This has come from both Christians and Muslims, such as on 
the one side Olubadan Akinyele, who (before he discontinued Gbigbohun-Tira) 
had upon promotion to the title of Balogun refused to propitiate the war staff with 
the usual blood sacrifices, or on the other, the Awujalẹ of Ijebu, the Muslim Sikiru 
Adetona, who from early in his long reign, in the 1960s, has refused to participate 
in the annual Agemo festival, the major integrative ritual of the Ijebu Kingdom.65 
There has even come into existence an Association of Born-Again Christian Obas, 
which functions as a pressure and support group for rulers who want to pick and 
choose what rituals they engage in, sometimes against the wishes of their subjects.66 
Another Muslim ọba, the Ataọja of Oshogbo (where the famous riverside shrine 
of the goddess Osun now has the status of a Unesco World Heritage Site and is 
a potential tourist attraction), complains about the persistent nagging of the late 
Dr. Lateef Adegbite, who was “always in palaces . . . challenging the souls of rulers . . . 
he would want me to move 100% towards Islam . . . he [was] always saying, Kabiyesi, 
s’ẹ gbọ mi na o? [Your majesty, are you really listening to me?].”67 Yet, he adds, “it is 
not easy to divorce ourselves from our tradition, anyone who tries it will run into 










































trouble.” So the old expectations about ọbas have by no means lost all their power, 
and nowhere more than at Oyo, for all that it is now a predominantly Muslim town.
Alhaji Lamidi Adeyemi III, the Alafin of Oyo, is a genial and widely respected 
ọba, and at least a third-generation Muslim (in fact the son of that Alafin whom 
Chief Awolowo reprimanded for his lack of royal dress sense).68 He is also regarded 
as the earthly successor to Sango, the thunder god, whose cult is central to Oyo 
kingship. Well practiced in expounding Oyo history and culture to visitors, he was 
not at all fazed or embarrassed when I asked him how he reconciled the discharge 
of his traditional duties with his personal identity as a Muslim. He did it by means 
of an ingenious two-way assimilation between Islam and Yoruba culture. First, he 
read Islam a long way back into Oyo history, maintaining that even Sango, deified 
after his death for his magical powers, had been a Muslim and was actually given 
the epithet Akewugbẹru (One given a slave for reciting the Koran).69 At the same 
time, he interpreted Islamic conversion as an expedient policy of self-protection 
against the Fulani jihadists that at the same time allowed it to be subordinated to 
Yoruba values: “The Yoruba never allowed other religions to destroy their identity.” 
The Alafin’s vision of Yoruba history, in fact, has more in common with the Rev. 
Samuel Johnson’s than with Shaykh Adam al-Ilori’s, and his response to my ques-
tion on the Sharia issue was robust and indignant:
Is [Sharia] practical? Is it fair? . . . [Its effect on the Yoruba would be] to enslave their 
mentality, to bar their values and make them lose their identity. Yoruba is a nation, 
not a tribe, a nation!
Of Dr. Adegbite he was frankly dismissive, and as for Chief Adepoju, when I 
gingerly brought up his name, “he is like a bat [an ambiguous, ill-omened animal] 
dangling between two cultures.” The Alafin’s old-fashioned view as to the religious 
obligations of an ọba may be under pressure from the assertiveness of the new 
movements in Islam and Christianity, but it still has widespread popular support.
IMALE  NO LONGER?
There is now a widespread sentiment among Yoruba Muslims that the term Imale 
should be abandoned and replaced by Musulumi. Imale was a designation given 
them early in their history by the mass of non-Muslim Yoruba, who chose to iden-
tify them by where the bearers of their religion had come from. Islam is a reli-
gion that was first proudly named as such by itself (or by its Prophet)—unlike 
Christianity, whose adherents were first named “Christians” by critical outsiders.70 
The motive of Yoruba Muslims for wanting to change the name by which they 
have been commonly known for centuries is understandable. They want to declare 
their identification with the worldwide umma of Muslims, not to bear a name that 
seems to tie them into a local and particular history. Yet it is surely to be hoped, 










































particularly at the present juncture in relations between Islam and Christianity 
in Nigeria, that Yoruba Muslims do not at the same time abandon certain values 
associated with the “Imale tradition.”
Here we may contrast two main ways in which Islam has sought to realize itself 
in West African history, each with its distinctive bearers, social forms, and doc-
trinal rationale. The first is jihadist, its prime instance being the movement led by 
a Fulani cleric, Usman dan Fodio, in the first decade of the nineteenth century, 
which led to the establishment of an Islamic state, the Sokoto Caliphate. There have 
been other such movements both before and since, but none was as enduring in its 
effects as this one, not least because of the co-optation of so much of it—its system 
of emirates with their attendant Islamic culture—by the British as the basis of their 
regime in Northern Nigeria. So it was that a baneful heritage—the use of violence 
in the name of Islam to establish a “just” social order, and the intimidation, subor-
dination, enslavement, or exclusion of all sorts of religious other (the wrong kinds 
of Muslim, pagans, and Christians)—was perpetuated, thus bedeviling Nigerian 
politics down to the present.71 Boko Haram, even though the vast majority of 
Muslims in Northern Nigeria no doubt disown it, is only the latest, most extreme 
outcome of this tradition. After all, its yearning for an exclusively Islamic political 
space under Sharia law is an ideal shared by many respectable Muslims, at least in 
the North; and though it is set apart from them by its readiness to use violence to 
achieve this end, it can still invoke the most irrefragable of precedents for that line 
of action in the jihad launched by Usman dan Fodio two centuries ago.
Very different is another kind of Islamic tradition, which has been termed 
Suwarian. As far as the name goes, it is a scholarly artifact and would not find any rec-
ognition as such in Nigeria, though it perfectly fits the outlook of the Yoruba Imale. 
Appropriately, the name comes from a Malian cleric of circa 1500, Al-Hajj Salim 
Suwari, who articulated a doctrinal rationale for a peaceable and non-hegemonic 
Islam. He argued that it was legitimate for Muslims to live under non-Muslim rule 
provided that they were not impeded in the practice of their faith and that it was by 
their moral example, not by violence, that they should promote it; for “it was not the 
responsibility of the faithful to decide when ignorance [jahiliyya] should give way to 
belief.”72 This tradition was originally associated with the social situation of Mande-
speaking traders operating in non-Muslim areas, as was also the case with the Imale, 
who brought Islam to the Yoruba in the first place.
But the tradition has contemporary relevance in offering a model for the co -
existence of Muslims with other faiths in religiously plural societies. Crucial to it is 
the presumption of a shared public sphere that is neutral, as between the compet-
ing world faiths, yet is also valued by each for providing sufficient conditions for 
its unimpeded practice. This was guaranteed in Yorubaland by the institution of 
ọbaship, the symbol of community values that were anterior to both world faiths; 
and this is what, at the national level, Nigeria has failed to develop after more than 










































half a century of independence. Indeed, such a development was set back by the 
unilateral adoption of Sharia law in a third of its thirty-six states, spread across 
the high North, in 1999–2000. Behind this Islamization of the public sphere lies a 
yearning to realize as much as possible Usman dan Fodio’s ideal of a Dar al-Islam 
or House of Islam, in which the adherents of other religions exist on the sufferance 
of a Muslim majority—in effect as a kind of dhimmi (protected non-Muslim).73 The 
result is that Nigeria has gone a long way toward becoming two different countries 
within one inadequately functioning state: the one religiously plural within a secular 
framework (as Nigeria’s constitution proclaims it to be), the other an Islamic coun-
try. Yorubaland is firmly ensconced in the former sphere, though Yoruba Muslims 
are in the peculiar position that in principle they can operate in either. It says much 
that in a Northern city like Kaduna, where a large measure of religious segregation 
came about as the result of the post-Sharia riots in 2000 and 2002, it is virtually only 
Yoruba Muslims who are able to live safely in either the Muslim or the Christian/
mixed districts of the city.74 Their primary identity marker is then respectively either 
Muslim in a context of religious homogeneity or Yoruba in one of ethnic diversity.
Though the great majority of Yoruba Muslims realize that they are better off, 
whether personally or collectively, in the religiously plural contexts that they know 
from their home towns, a vocal and articulate minority of them would like to see 
Sharia introduced for Muslims, as it has been in much of the high North. The main 
arguments put forward in support of it are twofold. First, it is claimed that Sharia 
is both a right and an obligation for Muslims, since Islam offers a complete way 
of life, for which Sharia provides the template. This is aimed to gain support from 
reluctant Muslims. Second, it is claimed that Sharia affects only Muslims, which is 
intended to defuse the opposition of alarmed Christians. But these claims contra-
dict each other. For insofar as Sharia is taken to offer a complete system of social 
regulation for Muslims, it is bound to include within its remit relations between 
people of different religions; and in its classical forms it did so from the perspective 
of an absolute Muslim hegemony. In practice, even in the partial forms in which it 
has so far been implemented in the twelve states of the high North, the freedoms 
of Christians have been curtailed in several ways.75 Yet the most problematic fea-
ture of Sharia is not any specific provision that it has but its implication that each 
confessional community should have its own law—in the case of Muslims, one 
that is divinely mandated rather than humanly decided—instead of them agreeing 
together upon the laws under which all citizens will live together as members of 
one political community.76 It is the old traditions of the Imale, not those of Sokoto 
Caliphate, that can give a measure of cultural underpinning for Nigeria to become 
a religiously plural and democratic society.77
172
In this chapter I go further into the complex and ever-evolving patterns of cooper-
ation and conflict, of resemblance and difference, between Yoruba Christians and 
Muslims.1 There is no fixed correspondence between these two pairs of terms such 
that resemblance must go with cooperation and difference with conflict. Chap-
ter 7 explored the evolution of a situation wherein potential differences between 
Christians and Muslims were mainly overridden by resemblances grounded in the 
primordial values of community. If Émile Durkheim was our theoretical guide 
there, in chapter 8 it was Max Weber, since its focus was on how differences arising 
from within each religious tradition can work to challenge and disrupt communal 
amity, though how far this potential is realized depends on many contingent fac-
tors. The two movements described in those two chapters can be seen as working 
against each other, but they do not stand in a dialectical relationship such as we 
can see in the Yoruba reception of Christianity—missionary preaching (thesis), 
the “pagan” African response (antithesis), African Christianity (synthesis)—since 
all the time they run concurrently. So does the third movement to be explored in 
this chapter, continuously intersecting with the other two, so that all three must 
be taken together. The complex of forces of attraction and repulsion that is the 
Yoruba religious field may thus be viewed from three different angles. Each hinges 
on a particular key factor—community values, the ideological thrust of the world 
religions, the pragmatic values imposed on religions as they compete for popular 
favor—that sets limits to the historical working out of the other factors.
What concerns us now is resemblance arising from conflict rather than con-
flict arising from difference. There are many forms of sociation, to use Georg 
Simmel’s useful term, in which processes of conflictual or competitive interaction 
9
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can produce this effect.2 One example would be systems of warring states, par-
ticularly those within a common cultural zone like those of ancient Greece or 
precolonial Yorubaland, where emulation leads to the adoption of ideas or prac-
tices from one’s rivals because they appear more attractive or effective. Another 
would be markets, particularly as regards the competition between producers to 
command market share. There are ambiguities here, since at some times com-
mercial competition has been seen as antithetical to military conflict, whereas 
at others it has been seen as itself a nonviolent kind of warfare.3 The religious 
competition that concerns us here resembles market competition rather than the 
outright religious war that tends to occur during periods of general social crisis, 
since as a routine activity it is culturally framed. In the present case, the framing is 
provided by Yoruba rules (which we saw affecting the general practice of Yoruba 
religion in chapter 7, above.) Their most significant feature is that they require 
the world religions to pursue their conversionary ambitions peaceably, before the 
court of Yoruba opinion. Islam and Christianity thus have to engage in a para-
doxical double struggle: against each other to win converts, a struggle that impels 
them to make compromises with the ambient religious culture of the Yoruba; and 
against that same culture, as they strive to realize their own distinctive religious 
ideals. (See chapter 8.) The paradox has become even more acute since the 1980s, 
with the emergence of radical Islamic reformism and neo-Pentecostalism—both 
because they are more anxious to realize their own distinctive visions and because 
they are more driven by the pressure of competition to borrow from each other in 
order to win Yoruba favor.
Competition within a common framework creates homologies between entities 
that were previously more different, as with the use of a charged language of the 
conquest/annexation of the public space of Nigeria by the more militant forms of 
Islam and Christianity, or with the pattern of recurrent religious violence involv-
ing revenge attacks, such as has occurred in (say) Plateau State.4 But the form of 
competition that is most relevant to the Yoruba context is that between rival pro-
ducers to supply a market. This idea carries these principal implications:
 1.  The overall situation is plural: that is, one with a number of religious sup-
pliers who have to compete—not by the direct exercise of power or force on 
one another but by attracting the favor of the members of a religious public.
 2.  The members of the religious public are like consumers, disposed and able 
to choose between the various religious options that the suppliers make 
available to them.
 3.  Religion itself tends to be viewed instrumentally, as providing gratifications 
of particular kinds that the members of the religious public will judge for 
themselves rather than as a system of pregiven ends that obviate the need 
for making religious choices.










































 4.  While the pressure of competition to meet the demands of a particular mar-
ket tends to encourage convergences between the suppliers, there is also a 
countertendency to product differentiation, creating niches wherein general 
competition is reduced.5
As a model for the interaction of religions, the market is one that many religions 
will be uneasy with and that probably no religion will find entirely acceptable. It 
is perhaps not surprising that in Yorubaland neither Christians nor Muslims are 
entirely happy to acknowledge the extent of the resultant mutual borrowing that 
has occurred. But of all faiths, born-again Christianity is perhaps most likely to 
find the market congenial, since it is itself the product of the most demanding 
religious marketplace in the world, the USA, from which it has adopted many 
techniques of self-promotion. Conversely, Islam would seem likely to be more 
resistant to the idea of a religious market than almost any other religion, since in 
its heyday (and in some mainly Muslim countries to this day) Islam was able to 
impose a social framework for its coexistence with other faiths, which deployed 
the severest sanctions against Muslims’ converting to them.6 Conversion, in Islam, 
was seen as strictly a one-way street. The fact that under Yoruba conditions two-
way conversion between Islam and one or another faith has been common, with 
the alfa proving themselves to be highly effective religious entrepreneurs, has not 
erased the idea from the minds of quite a few Muslims that this is not, Islamically 
speaking, how things ought to be.
The notion of a religious marketplace does not merely prove useful as a model 
but has some anchorage within Yoruba culture. Aiye l’ọja, ọrun n’ile (The world is a 
market; heaven is home) runs a well-known adage. But this also serves to remind 
us of the countertruth that the idea of the market cannot encompass all aspects of 
the religious situation. Since ọrun (heaven) is the source of the Yoruba word for 
God (Ọlọrun), the adage implies that Yoruba religion is not just a pragmatic search 
for benefits but is also a place to feel at home. There is the further implication that 
religions are not infinitely flexible in their capacity to respond to market pressures. 
They also have a built-in inclination to strive to be true to themselves, or (in other 
words) to be constrained by their own ideally conceived pasts, as  chapter 8 showed.
EARLY T WENTIETH CENTURY:  MUSLIM-TO- 
CHRISTIAN INFLUENCES
For the first half-century of their coexistence, from the 1840s, Islam and Christianity 
seem to have little influenced each other. Each projected itself in its distinctive 
way, though the mass of Yoruba people, still unattached to either one, started to 
make comparisons in terms of their own criteria of religious value, which would in 
due course shape the interplay between them. It was not until the first decades of 










































colonial rule, as the two faiths came more closely into contact, especially in Lagos, 
that a two-way influence between them showed itself. What Islam then started 
to adopt from Christianity was more external: Western-style schooling (the bet-
ter to counter Christianity’s educational advantages), something of its organiza-
tional forms, even the imitation of its impressive church buildings. From the 1920s 
there emerged a distinctively Yoruba style of mosque architecture in which Muslim 
liturgical requirements were reconciled with Christian architectural forms, such 
as Gothic windows, twin western towers, pillared naves, Brazilian-style decora-
tive features.7 This lasted till the 1980s, when what may be called an international 
Islamic style took over. The two styles can be seen almost side by side in Nnamdi 
Azikiwe Street in central Lagos, in the vast Central Mosque built in the 1980s, with 
its four lofty minarets disposed around a domed prayer hall, and the little Alli Oloko 
mosque, completed in 1931, whose two square towers make it look like a church.
But the Christian borrowings were more to do with the religious essentials, 
particularly with what might be learned from Islam about making prayer more 
effective for personal needs. Already in the 1890s, in a circle around the Rev. James 
Johnson, a number of younger clergy had started to learn Arabic in order the better 
to understand and counter Islam.8 The most active of these were M. S. Cole, who 
later made the first Yoruba translation of the Koran, and T. A. J. Ogunbiyi, who 
wrote a number of pamphlets and tracts aimed at Muslims in English, Yoruba, 
or Arabic.9 As a Lagos indigene and the son of a chief, Ogunbiyi seems to have 
been more active in taking steps to counter the popular appeal of Islam than any 
of his contemporaries.10 We may well suppose that the example of the hajj, though 
very few Yoruba Muslims had then made it, influenced his decision to make a 
pilgrimage to the Holy Land in 1912, which caused a great stir—thus anticipating 
the many Yoruba Christians who nowadays make pilgrimages to Jerusalem. In 
1908 there was a formal motion at the Anglican synod expressing concern about 
Islam’s recent advances and speculating about the reasons for it;11 but the most 
effective responses came spontaneously from the grass roots. It is significant that 
their crucibles were Lagos, where most missions had their headquarters but whose 
indigenous population had become predominantly Muslim; and Ijebu, which in 
the wake of its conquest by the British was the scene of a strong competitive surge 
of the two faiths. Among the Christian responses two stand out:
Powerful names of God. These have an indigenous source in the oriki or praise 
names of the deities, enumerating their powerful attributes, which were invoked 
to elicit their favor and support.12 In traditional practice, they were much more 
commonly addressed to the orisa than to God. But the most immediate precedent 
was the Ninety-Nine Beautiful Names of God long established in Muslim devo-
tion. Beginning with Rev. S. M. Abiodun’s Akojọ Orukọ Ọlọrun (Collection of the 
Names of God, 1919), there was a flurry of little pamphlets over the next decade 










































or so, such as J. O. Shopekan’s The English-Yoruba Dictionary of the Names of God 
(which gives no less than 209 names) or Victor White’s The Elementary Names of 
God.13 The names are given in Yoruba and Hebrew (or apparent Hebrew), such 
as El-Shaddai, Yavah-Shammah, Eloi-Magen; and there is a lot of semantic over-
lap between the Yoruba epithets and the Yoruba renditions of the Arabic names 
used in Muslim prayer pamphlets down to this day, as with Ọba Alagbara (Mighty 
King) for al-Aziz, or Ọba Olupese (God the Provider) for ar-Razaq.14 Shopekan 
also provides a weekly schedule for using the names, each one to be said three 
times at three regular prayer times each day (which suggests the influence of 
Islam’s five canonical daily prayers). The invocations found their way into the little 
booklets of prayers for personal use that also appeared about this time, such as 
Ogunbiyi’s Adura Tetedamilohun (Prayers for Quick Answers) or Awọn Adura 
Banusọ ati ti Ọfọ (Prayers for Private Use and Incantation). Here a prayer fun 
wahala ẹjọ (for legal troubles) is addressed to JAH-SHAFAT (= Oluwa Onidajọ, 
Lord of Judgment), and one for ipọnjukipọnju (every kind of need) addresses JAH-
RAHAM (= Oluwa Alanu, Merciful Lord), perhaps with an echo of the invocation 
of God as al-Rahman, al-Rahim (The Merciful, the Compassionate) in the opening 
verse of the Koran. A positively rococo elaboration of this phenomenon was the 
seal names, or powerful invocations of God revealed in visions, which were a spe-
ciality of Prophet Ositelu’s Church of the Lord (Aladura) in the early 1930s. Here 
we find unmistakable phonetic allusions to Arabic, as with Ollahhummumjarrar 
(which evokes Allahumma, O God) or Arrabalhabad (cf. al-Rabb, the Lord).15 
What is also paralleled in Islam, and particularly in the ritual practices of the Sufi 
brotherhoods, is the notion that there is special power or virtue in verbal formulas 
of praise of God (wird) that have been revealed to the Sufi wali (saint).16
Night vigils. People nowadays, when they want to exemplify the influence of born-
again Christianity on Islam, will sometimes point to the latter’s adoption of vigils 
or watch-night services. But this is almost certainly a case of a debt being repaid. 
The historical question that no one has ever thought to ask is: Where did night vig-
ils in Nigeria’s churches come from, since they were not part of the parent evangel-
ical missionary tradition? I feel the answer probably lies in the first major Aladura 
church, the Cherubim and Seraphim, founded in central Lagos in 1925.17 When 
I first saw their ile adura (house of prayer) at Oke Seni, in Ibadan, in 1964, I was 
very struck that inside it felt more like a mosque than a church: no chairs, white 
robes, removal of shoes and washing of feet on entry, full obeisance to the floor 
in prayer. Regular congregational services did not take place there but only indi-
vidual prayers, as well as the climactic service of the week, a watch-night service of 
several hours over Saturday–Sunday. All this was said to follow the pattern set by 
the original Seraphim Society in Lagos. Now although there was no mission prec-
edent for the idea that nocturnal prayer is particularly powerful, a form of optional 










































prayer at dead of night called tahajjud—quite distinct from the five canonical daily 
prayers—is ancient in Islam and is recommended in several hadith as highly effica-
cious. But tahajjud is an individual, not a communal, form of prayer, so is it likely 
to have served as a model? Here it is pertinent, as I learned from two Muslim 
informants, that the first major modernist Muslim group, Ahmadiyya (which was 
brought to Lagos by missionaries from the Punjab in 1916),18 introduced an inno-
vation: to help one another realize the benefits of tahajjud, Ahmadis would go 
round in a group to other members’ houses to wake them up in time to say the 
prayer, thus giving it a communal dimension. The adoption of a modified form of 
tahajjud fits the pattern of other Islamic borrowings by the Seraphim.
Perhaps the most surprising of all the cases of Muslim influence on an Aladura 
group concerns the former village theocracy known as the Holy Apostles of Aiyetoro 
among the Ilaje on the coast of far southeastern Yorubaland.19 Founded in 1947, this 
was an offshoot of the Cherubim and Seraphim, which had spread eastward from 
Lagos along the lagoon in the late 1920s and early 1930s, taking on in many places 
the character of an antiwitchcraft movement. Aiyetoro was exceptional in that it 
practiced community of goods and the abrogation of normal residential patterns 
under the Spirit-led rule of a sacred ọba, which brought it to a high level of material 
prosperity. By the 1980s it had largely abandoned its “communist” features, though 
most of its religious practices were retained. The church’s prophets speak in a form 
of tongues known as ede ẹmi (language of the spirit), which phonetically has an 
Arabic ring to it, and which is even referred to sometimes as kewu (to recite the 
Koran). Children’s names are given through the dictation of the Spirit and include a 
number of Muslim ones: Sanni, Sadiku, Tawakalitu, Awawu, and so on. One of the 
community’s founding elders was actually known as Baba Lemomu (Father Imam). 
The white costumes of the community’s apostles and prophets, complete with tur-
bans, have a distinct resemblance to those commonly worn by alfa. Burial usage 
diverges from Yoruba Christian norms, being notably low-key and rather like what 
reformist Muslims press for: plain, unmarked graves with no elaborate mourning. 
Yet paradoxically, the Islamic provenance of these traits is not perceived as such by 
the Holy Apostles. In fact, Ilaje has perhaps a lower proportion of local Muslims 
than anywhere else in Yorubaland, so these “Islamic” practices can hardly be a local 
adaptation. It is more likely that they arise from an accentuation of traits carried 
from the Seraphim source in Lagos, possibly enhanced by their passage along the 
lagoon, whose middle stretch is dominated by the strongly Muslim town of Epe.
AL ADUR A AND THE SUFI  BROTHERHO ODS
From the mid-1930s, for several decades, there was little fresh influence of Islam 
and Christianity on each other. After the turbulence of the Aladura revivals, a 
fairly stable religious dispensation came into being, wherein new developments 










































were incremental rather than radical and came from within each religious tradi-
tion. I need to run over these briefly if we are to understand the religious terrain 
on which the forces of the last thirty years have impacted.
The Aladura movement consists of a large number of churches, many of them 
quite small, distributed between two poles or tendencies that can be called the 
White-garment and the Apostolic or Old-Pentecostal. The first group, so named 
from the white prayer gowns that they wear to church, employ expressive rit-
uals of a more eclectic and homegrown quality, with (as I have noted) a dis-
tinct Islamic influence. It includes the Cherubim and Seraphim, Josiah Ositelu’s 
Church of the Lord (Aladura), and from the late 1940s, the Celestial Church of 
Christ, which originated in the French colony of Dahomey and is today the most 
widespread and typical instance of the White-garment group. The other tendency 
has been more continuously influenced by Euro-American sectarianism, begin-
ning with the ascetic Faith Tabernacle in the 1920s, followed by the Apostolic 
Church in the 1930s, which first introduced specifically Pentecostal teaching. The 
Christ Apostolic Church (CAC) is now the largest church of this group. From the 
1950s, successive waves of Pentecostal influence came in, increasingly from the 
USA, and in the 1970s this tradition melded with a new movement of interde-
nominational evangelical piety that had emerged on university campuses.20 Thus 
neo-Pentecostalism or born-again Christianity was formed, growing rapidly in 
strength against the background of the crisis of the Nigerian state in the 1980s. 
Though born-again Christianity has important Aladura roots—its biggest single 
body, the Redeemed Christian Church of God, is actually a much-transformed 
breakaway from one of the oldest Seraphim congregations in Lagos21—it has 
also tended to define itself against the Aladura, especially the Celestial Church 
of Christ, criticizing them for having allowed themselves to be corrupted by 
demonic influences.
There was initially no direct Muslim equivalent or response to Aladura. It did 
not seem that there needed to be, since the alfa were already deemed effective 
providers of healing, protection, and guidance.22 But there are some parallels to be 
drawn between Aladura and a major element in Yoruba Islam that grew strongly at 
the end of the colonial period and into early independence: the Sufi brotherhoods, 
especially Tijaniyya.23 Though these had adherents among the ulama from the end 
of the nineteenth century and by the 1930s could claim some senior figures, they 
were still very much limited to respected alfa and elders. Sufi esoteric knowledge 
was judged just too powerful for the hoi polloi and the young: “If a young man 
joined the tariqa [brotherhood], he would be loved by God, and this would cause 
his early death.”24 Only in the 1950s did a modified form of Tijaniyya, promoted by 
Shaykh Ibrahim Niass, from Kaolack in Senegal, become a mass movement among 
the Yoruba. This followed developments in Northern Nigeria, where Reformed 
Tijaniyya started to take off in the late 1940s.










































In Ibadan, a key vector was Shehu Usman Lanase (d. 1954), who had returned 
as a young man from the Hausa town of Zaria.25 He was a controversial figure, who 
fell out with the elders at the central mosque and seceded with his followers to 
establish his own jumat mosque at Aremo quarter, where he encouraged the mass 
of his followers to adhere to Reformed Tijaniyya. But the first major charismatic 
figure in the Ibadan Tijaniyya was Alhaji Shehu Ahmed, of the Bere quarter, right 
in the center of town, who had spent many years at Kaolack and married a daugh-
ter of Ibrahim Niass. By the early 1960s his claim to wield esoteric powers had 
drawn many to him—like ants around a cup of sugar, according to one witness—
but eventually he got so out of hand that that he lost credit altogether.26 The next 
major Tijani charismatic was a Hausa from Kano named Sani Awwal, also a son-
in-law of Niass, who came to Ibadan, first to the Hausa quarter of Sabo; but find-
ing Tijanniyya already well established there, he eventually settled at Madina, on 
the southern edge of Ibadan, a complex established by Alhaji Adebolu, a wealthy 
trader and zealous Muslim, not an alfa but still with a reputation for powerful 
prayer. He became Awwal’s material patron, supporter, and friend: their tombs 
are now to be seen in adjacent rooms at Madina.27 Adebolu even built a house 
for Shaykh Ibrahim Niass, who declared him to be his representative in Ibadan. 
Niass died in 1975, and when Awwal and Adebolu followed him a few years later, 
Madina’s influence faded, and Ibadan lost what for two decades or so had been a 
mini-Mecca (or at least mini-Kaolack). Tijanniyya too has perhaps passed its apo-
gee, though it remains an important presence in Muslim life in Ibadan.28
Tijanniyya is not so much an organization as a loose network of initiates, 
spiritual clientages of individual muqaddams (initiating masters, otherwise styled 
shaykhs) who trace their authority back through a chain of initiators to the founder. 
Some of these have a zawiya (lodge) where the initiates meet for their spiritual 
exercises, but in most cases in Ibadan Tijaniyya initiates simply attend their local 
mosque and perform these exercises together after routine Friday or evening 
prayers. Tijaniyya has no regular head in any town, though a particular shaykh 
may enjoy exceptional prestige and influence, as happened with Sani Awwal at 
Madina in the 1960s and 1970s. The perennial irony of Sufism is that what began 
as a search for a closer relationship with God, through ascetic disciplines leading 
to esoteric knowledge, was converted under the pressure of popular demand into 
an attributed mystical power that was available for all the usual mundane objec-
tives of Yoruba devotion. What had been a technique of spiritual empowerment 
largely confined to the ulama acquired a mass character—appropriate to the age of 
nationalist mobilization in which it occurred—as a flood of lay initiates looked for 
material benefits from their masters. When Ibrahim Niass visited Ibadan around 
1971–72 and attended Friday prayers at the central mosque, people are said to have 
fought one another—non-Muslims as well as Muslims—to capture some of the 
water from his ablutions, as a medium of his baraka. The source of this demand 










































lay much more in Yoruba than in Islamic culture. It recalls nothing so much as the 
power attributed to the water blessed by Prophet Babalola in the Aladura revival 
of 1930–31, known as omi iye (water of life)—or, going further back, to the water of 
the river Ogun at Abeokuta sanctified by the prophetess Akere in 1855–56, which 
attracted large crowds over many months.29
In the 1980s, the Sufi brotherhoods came under sustained attack as a corrup-
tion of Islam. The onslaught came from various groups of Salafist inclination that 
are now grouped in a body calling itself Ahl us-Sunna (People of the Way [of 
the Prophet]). The main influences came from the growing number of gradu-
ates returned from Saudi universities and from Izala, the Northern organization 
directed to the eradication of bid‘a (innovation).30 A great many alfa in Ibadan 
have been initiated into Tijaniyya and even when they are not active any more in 
its collective exercises, they still see value in it and may still recite the dhikr (pl. 
adhkar: the verbal formulas of remembrance that are the substance of the ritual) 
privately for their own spiritual benefit. Apart from the ritual innovations that 
attract vehement condemnation from Salafists,31 even mainstream ulama have res-
ervations about several features of Tijaniyya that have a definite resemblance to 
what can be found in Aladura churches: extraordinary claims to charisma by some 
of its shaykhs, the demand for efficacious prayer and the performance of miracles, 
and the attainment of ecstatic states through its rituals. One educated cleric, who 
had been an active Tijani in his youth, told me he became deeply worried by the 
trancelike condition that the repetitive chanting of the dhikr induced among ini-
tiates. For him, this kind of ecstasy did not sit well with a proper conception of 
Muslim worship.
The treatment of the Sufi brotherhoods by Yoruba Muslim scholars is ambiv-
alent. On one side, they have misgivings about the impact of popular demand 
on them:32
Many people accepted the Shaykh [Ibrahim Niass] because they wanted to know 
God .  .  . some others accepted [him] in order to acquire sirr (secrets) about God’s 
name which they wanted for efficacious prayers . . . others because they thought they 
would become rich . . . [who] were eventually disappointed. . . . The Shaykh used to 
discourage his followers from praying to God for material needs and advised them 
to render a selfless service to God.
On the other side, they are aware that the permeation of the religious life of 
the brotherhoods by these pragmatic values has served to attach people to Islam:33
The Qadiriyyah clerics contributed in no small scale to the conversion of mysticism to 
local traditional practices . . . [as a result] the high ambitions of the classical Sufis have 
been watered down to a large extent. It however serves as a means to retain within the 
fold of Islam some converts who if failed by the Muslim clergy would not hesitate to 
seek aid even from heathen priests and may get attracted to other religions.










































The unidentified competition alluded to here must have been mainly the 
Aladura. They and the Sufis did not so much imitate each other as draw each on 
its own tradition’s resources to meet the same popular demand. The born-agains 
would present a more direct and formidable challenge.
The shift in the religious climate, as seen from a Salafist Muslim perspective, 
can be gauged from the successive introductions to a best-selling Muslim prayer 
manual, Abdul-Raheem Shittu’s Muslim Prayers for Everyday Success.34 In the first 
edition (1985), he wrote (p. 10):
There is no doubt that in the last fifty years or so, a great majority of Muslims have 
fallen victim to the devilish antics of non-muslim spiritualists and jujumen such as 
‘Aladuras’, Celestial Churches, ‘Babalawos’ and other magicians in their quest to solve 
the myriads of social, economic, matrimonial, spiritual and other problems which 
inevitably confront man in everyday life.
The opposition here is still seen as a mixture of Aladura-Christian and tradi-
tionalist agencies. In the preface to the fourth edition (2007), Shittu makes two 
points that show the current of things in the intervening two decades (p. 41):
In contemporary times, one observes the evolution of many so-called ‘Muslim 
Prayer Groups’ in the name of Alasalatu and so on. It is unfortunate that when you 
watch what goes on in some of these prayer-sessions, there is hardly any difference 
between them and Christian Revival Services with the peculiar characteristics of 
singing, dancing, free-mixing between males and females, improper and inadequate 
covering of the awra or beautiful parts of the female participants and so on. These are 
all Bid‘a and/or sins as Muslims are not permitted to copy Christians in their mode 
of prayers and other acts of worship.
Shittu also apologizes for some bid‘a of his own in the earlier editions that he 
has now removed, namely “the interpolation of the names of certain evil Jinns with 
those of Allaah and His Prophet .  .  . and certain prayer-methods objectionable 
to the true spirit of Islam” (p. 34). It is noteworthy that, although he clearly sees 
the problem posed by Christian initiatives, Shittu refuses to respond by slavishly 
imitating them. Rather, he sees the only way forward as being to cleave even more 
strictly to prayer texts that are explicitly authorized in the Koran or in hadith. 
These are given in the Arabic original, in a roman transliteration of the Arabic, 
and in an English translation, but not in Yoruba. Supplicants without a serious 
command of Arabic (i.e., nearly everyone, including Shittu himself) thus have to 
select the text that addresses their problem from the English and to use the Arabic 
transliteration in uttering the prayer.
Here market behavior is limited by constraints arising from within the religion 
itself. The idea of prayer handbooks for people’s quotidian practical use, written 
in Yoruba or English, was pioneered by Christians, in the form of little pamphlets 
like those written by T. A. J. Ogunbiyi and others before 1920. Over the years, these 










































got more elaborate and at some point started being emulated by Muslims. Shittu 
found a niche in the market waiting to be filled. With its successive editions, his 
Muslim Prayers for Everyday Success got longer and longer, and it is now (at 482 
pages) the most substantial such handbook in either religion that I have come 
across. But Shittu’s increasingly Salafist views have set limits on how far he is pre-
pared to supply people with what they want. He told me that he had turned down 
the request of a woman who had wanted him to reprint an earlier edition that had 
included a prayer invoking some powerful jinns, which she had found highly effi-
cacious. His decision to stick to scriptural prayer texts in Arabic may perhaps have 
a declining appeal in a market wherein the educated urban young, in particular, 
are attracted to the prayer styles of Pentecostalism.
MUSLIM ENTREPRENEURS OF THE SPIRIT
One can hardly exaggerate the variety of products on offer in the Yoruba religious 
marketplace,35 adapted to a range of tastes and different contexts—though what is 
common to most of them is their concern to offer spiritual solutions to people’s 
mundane needs. For the last thirty years the flow of influence has definitely been 
from Christianity to Islam—yet though this has coincided with the rise of born-
again Christianity, Aladura models are still widely emulated. It appears that the 
former appeal more to a younger, better-educated constituency, whereas the latter 
speak more to older, more traditional-minded people, particularly women. This 
has apparently been accompanied by a significant net flow of converts from Islam 
to Christianity, to which Muslims have responded, both “through the introduc-
tion of Islamic alternatives”36 and through the direct but selective appropriation of 
Christian idioms and practices.
At the top of a dusty side street in Ibadan, I used to pass a tiny mosque—barely 
more than a room—though at first I thought it was a church of some kind, since 
it had a board outside announcing its services, which ratibi mosques in Ibadan do 
not usually have:
Below a line of Arabic script, it announces itself as Jamuiyatu Qudiratu Lilhai Fidini 
Isilamu, a rough transliteration adjusted to Yoruba pronunciation of Congregation 
of the Power of God through the Muslim Religion, and under that, in Yoruba, as Ijọ 
Sehu Fatai Agbara Ọlọrun Osupa Imọlẹ (Church of Shehu Fatayi of the Power of God, 
Moon of Muslims). Below is a heading Eto Isin (Order of Service), a phrase normally 
used in Christian contexts at the top of the program for a funeral or commemorative 
event but here used to refer to the weekly services held at the mosque, which are then 
listed. Over Saturday night is Aisun Adura (Prayer Watch night); on Sunday morning 
is Asalatu (Public Prayer); on Friday late afternoon is a prayer session for pregnant 
women, and at Thursday noon is one for those seeking employment, children, or the 
like. There is no mention of the canonical prayers of Islam. The format of the ser-
vices is what one might find in any small Aladura church, and (with the exception of 










































the word Asalatu) the terminology and spelling used are Christian throughout (e.g., 
aisun rather than tahajjud for “watch night”). The Christian idiom of it all is not sur-
prising, granted that Fatayi, the leader of the group, is a young man whose spiritual 
mentor was a prophet of the Celestial Church of Christ. He encouraged Fatayi by 
telling him of a vision that his little building would one day become a jumat mosque.
The active Christian input here is perhaps unusual, though it surely indicates 
the sense of common objectives, pursued within shared assumptions about the 
world of spirit, that underlies the religious quest of all Yoruba.37 It shows that many 
Yoruba people, of either world faith, are perfectly ready to see divine power as 
manifesting itself through practitioners of the other one.38
Elsewhere, the adoption by Muslims of Christian, especially Aladura, models 
arises more spontaneously—as if they have become parts of a common Yoruba 
stock, just as over a century ago a significant part of the Muslim religious lexicon 
was adopted by Christianity. Moreover, this is facilitated by the fact that underly-
ing it are templates for religious action derived from orisa religion (though this is 
something that neither Muslims nor Christians are very ready to admit).
A case in point is the Fadilullah Muslim Mission, founded in Osogbo by Alhaja 
Sheidat Mujidat Adeoye in 1997.39 She was twenty-seven when one day at work—
trading in rice and beans—she became possessed. Her shouts and screams sub-
sided into a recital of Lahi lah illah ‘llah (There is no god but Allah), and after 
regaining normal consciousness she fasted and prayed for seven days. Mujidat 
interpreted her experience as a sign from God to leave her trade and instead to 
pray and prophesy for those who came to her for help: women more than men, 
Muslims and non-Muslims alike. Her following grew to the point that she and her 
husband built a mosque (able to accommodate two thousand people) and engaged 
an imam to lead Friday prayers. But many of Fadilullah’s ritual activities strongly 
resemble those of an Aladura church. Petitionary prayer (adura rather than salat) 
is the keynote of what Mujidat offers, whether on an individual basis or at prayer 
services that have lively choruses or in sustained cycles of prayer lasting seven, 
twenty-one, or forty-one days. Whereas Fatayi calls his Sunday-morning service 
asalatu, Mujidat gives hers the very Aladura-sounding name of Adura Isẹgun 
(Victory Prayer). Her assistants are called afadurajagun (prayer warriors), a term 
common in Aladura churches;40 and as with the Aladura, water and olive oil—
drunk, anointed, or bathed in—are used as physical media for the healing power 
of prayer.
Although Muslim women’s praying societies (known as ẹgbẹ alasalatu) have 
existed for decades, and senior women were given titles at the mosque, female 
Muslim charismatics like Mujidat seem to have emerged only in the past two to 
three decades, mostly with small and local followings. A similar phenomenon 
emerged in Christianity much earlier: in Lagos in 1925 a fifteen-year-old girl, 
Abiodun Akinsowon, fell into a trance and had celestial visions that led to the 










































founding of the Cherubim and Seraphim. The phenomenology of possession 
in Yoruba Christianity and Islam has clear precedents in orisa religion, where 
women were the main charismatics.41 The irruption of charisma into the scriptural 
monotheisms always creates problems for them, the more so for Islam, because its 
absolute insistence that God spoke his last words to humanity through the Prophet 
Mohammed means that it cannot have prophets in the sense that Christianity still 
can. So how do Yoruba Muslims understand their own charismatics? The charis-
matic gifts may be regarded simply as talents or natural endowments, to be forti-
fied by disciplines like fasting and prayer; and at the same time as signs (ami) of 
a divine commission. I have even been told by an educated alfa that women are 
by nature spiritually more powerful than men (which must be a carryover from 
pre-Islamic notions). Then a role may be claimed for the assistance of subdivine 
beings such as angels (maleka) or jinns (anjọnu), though this is treacherous, mor-
ally ambiguous ground, open to the charge of associating other beings with God, 
which is idolatry (shirk). Here the critique that Salafists (and indeed many main-
stream educated ulama) direct against the practices of popular Yoruba Islam par-
allels that of some born-again Christians against White-garment Aladuras (nota-
bly the Celestial Church of Christ), for having spiritual truck with demonic forces.
The cross-pressures—the impulse of religious inspiration, popular thaumatur-
gical demand, social pressure to conform with orthodox norms—work themselves 
through to varying outcomes. They may be more intense because, as all these 
cases suggest, charismatic inspiration and Arabic learning are so often inversely 
related. In 1982 Shaykh Abdul-Hamid Olohungbemi set up what in born-again 
parlance may perhaps be called a ministry, Shamsuddin ul-Islamiyya, to preach 
the Oneness (Tawhid) of God. His target was the traditional alfas of his home 
town, Ado-Odo, not far from Lagos, at whom he directed ferocious criticism for 
the shirk implicit in their healing and divinatory practices. So far, so orthodox; but 
Olohungbemi did acknowledge the support of visionary unseen helpers; and his 
own spiritual techniques sound as Aladura as Mujidat’s, since he used holy water 
and castor oil for healing. He is a great preacher in Yoruba, but the “delivery of the 
sermon has striking resemblance of the method adopted by Christian preachers 
because everything is rendered in native indigenous language”—“usually spiced 
up with beautiful . . . hymns”—including portions of the Koran “with little or no 
recourse to the Arabic text.” But he was persuaded by colleagues to moderate some 
of his procedures.42
More disconcerting to members of the mainstream ulama were the claims of 
another Muslim charismatic, Alhaji S. A. Olagoke. A lecturer in engineering with an 
Islamic background in Ibadan but with no formal Arabic education, he was inspired 
in 1983 to found a movement devoted substantially to healing, called Shafaudeen-
in-Islam. Guided by visions and trances, in which he was directed to biblical as well 
as Koranic texts, he interpreted their source as the Holy Spirit. But the real problem 










































was that he described himself as Rasool or Messenger—a title usually reserved for 
the Prophet Mohammed—as apparently revealed in a dream to one of his follow-
ers. When this became publicly known through the media, there were protests and 
questions from various Islamic parties ranging from the Muslim Students Society 
to the League of Imams and Alfas. Olagoke was called for questioning at the Ibadan 
central mosque. Anxious to retain Islamic respectability (and no doubt mindful 
of what had happened to Ahmadiyya), he toned down his claims: he was Rasool-
Shafau (Messenger of Healing), thus prudently distinguishing himself from the 
Messenger of God. It must have helped that he is politically astute and an effective 
networker, even getting an endorsement for his book from the Alafin of Oyo, who 
is quoted as calling him an anointed man of God (a very born-again expression); 
and being appointed as a Justice of the Peace or lay magistrate. Shafaudeen-in-Islam 
now has a substantial mosque complex in Ibadan, the center of a network of more 
than a dozen branches and various social-development projects.43
Olohungbemi and Olagoke are both men of little Arabic learning, and their 
Christian point of reference is more Aladura than born-again. The next case 
involves an Arabic literate whose Christian bearings are toward the neo-Pente-
costal surge of the last thirty years. This is Shaykh Rasheed Akinbile, who has led 
a Sufi group through many changes over more than two decades. I first became 
aware of him in 2002, when I saw the following proclamation on a banner adver-
tising a meeting at the Ibadan University mosque:
In the name of Allah, the Beneficient [sic], the Merciful. Caring and Sharing Sufi 
Centre (Inc.) Nigeria. Present RAMADAN CELEBRATIONS (30 Days of Spiritual 
Renewal and Manifestation of Miracles). Theme: Open the Floodgates of 
Prosperity.
This thoroughly born-again expression of what was evidently a Muslim under-
taking had a complex history behind it. Akinbile is the son of an Ibadan imam; he 
had learned to recite the Koran by the age of nine and went on to some study of 
hadith. He was school imam at Ahmadiyya Grammar School, in Ibadan, and later a 
leader of the MSS at Obafemi Awolowo University, Ife, where he completed a B.A. 
in demography and statistics. His Muslim fellow students presented him with such 
problems as what prayers would help them to pass exams, and why did they lack 
“self-sufficiency in prayer,” being unable to pray on their own, unlike their Christian 
compeers. His feeling that there “must be something deeper” than the “external 
part” of Islam (as he expressed it to me in interview) naturally pointed him in a Sufi 
direction, and he sought initiation into Tijaniyya (though he says he was also influ-
enced by the writings of Inayat Khan, the Indian Sufi teacher, whose ten volumes he 
found in the university library). His own meditations on divine unity led to mystical 
experiences, and in 1989, the year he graduated from Ife, his followers urged him to 
form a group, which he called the Islamic Brotherhood of Sufism. During the 1990s 










































he began to attract wider notice, at one point having his own TV program called 
Fountain of Wisdom, funded by a wealthy Muslim well-wisher.
Akinbile gradually came to feel that Sufism extended beyond Islam; he renamed 
his organization the International Brotherhood of Sufism, and he became active 
in interfaith dialogue. The activities of his group more and more came to echo 
born-again practices: meetings on Sundays, sitting on chairs, night vigils, men 
and women sitting together, testimonies and trances, the use of oil, water, hand-
kerchiefs, and tasbih (Muslim rosary) as vehicles of power through prayer, a choir 
(wearing robes and accompanied by organ, guitar, and drums) singing songs such 
as these in Yoruba:44
Alasalatu, ki l’a gbojule? Lahila ilalahu l’a gbojule, t’o ba d'ọjọ ikẹhin o!
Praying people, who shall we depend on? It’s “There is no god but Allah” we’ll 
depend on at the last day.
Kurani mi ni ng o maa ke, oso o l’agbara lori rẹ, aje o l’agbara lori rẹ, eniyan o l’agbara 
lori rẹ, Kurani mi ee, Kurani ni ng o maa ke.
It’s my Koran I’ll recite, wizards have no power over it, witches have no power 
over it, evil people have no power over it, this is my Koran, it’s my Koran I’ll recite.
Or the following chorus in pidgin English:
Winner o, winner, Allah you don win [have won] o, winner patapata [completely], 
you go
[will continue to] win forever, winner.
For such things to be done in the name of Islam was just too much for the radi-
cal activists of MSS—the more so, perhaps, because Akinbile had once been one 
of them. They declared jihad against him and broke up an interfaith meeting at 
the University Conference Centre, where his Sufi singers were performing in the 
presence of the Oyo state governor and his wife, both Muslims. By then Akinbile’s 
drift toward heterodoxy was causing concern among the Ibadan ulama at large, 
who surely were behind the personal plea of Arẹ Musulumi Arisekola, the wealthy 
lay chief of Ibadan’s Muslims, for him to join the League of Imams and Alfas, their 
professional body. But he did not wish to be subject to the restraints of clerical col-
legiality that this would have brought. Finally he announced in a newspaper that 
he was neither a Muslim nor a Christian but just a Sufi. Much of his following fell 
away, but Akinbile has continued to offer what he now calls spiritual counseling.45
NASFAT:  MUSLIM B ORN-AGAINS?
Many of the factors that drove Akinbile’s career are present in this final case, though 
they produced a very different outcome. This is an altogether more solid organiza-
tion, in fact the most striking new movement to have emerged in Yoruba Islam 










































during the last fifteen years: namely the Nasrul-Lahi-l-Fatih Society of Nigeria, 
always known by its acronym, Nasfat.46 Sometimes (but superficially) referred to 
by outsiders as Muslim born-agains, it is probably the most effective response to 
the born-again phenomenon, from which it has consciously adopted many prac-
tices and strategies. More than any other Muslim body, Nasfat has a distinct class 
base: modern-educated, urban professionals. It was founded in 1995 by a group 
of lay Muslims working in the commercial sector in Lagos, the key figure being 
Alhaji Abdul-Lateef Olasupo, now retired from his post as a senior manager with 
one of Nigeria’s largest banks but still chairman of Nasfat’s Board of Trustees. 
Its chief missioner, Alhaji Abdullahi Akinbode, is the son of an imam at Ibadan 
and, like Akinbile, went to its Ahmadiyya Grammar School. The perspective of 
Nasfat’s founders was that of the educated Muslim laity, lacking Arabic literacy, 
who felt that their own “[Islamic] knowledge was not so deep” and wanted a means 
to close the gap between “enlightened people and alfas.”47 The contrast between 
the two distinct status hierarchies, based on different kinds of knowledge, that 
divide the umma is very evident here. But Akinbode is ideally qualified to bridge 
that gap, since his credentials include both a B.A. in Arabic and an M.A. in inter-
national relations and diplomacy. In the 1980s he served on the Mission Board of 
MSS and—for he also has a fine singing voice—was the lead vocalist of its singing 
group, which released fourteen disks of what is somewhat incongruously known 
as Islamic gospel music.48
The challenge and example of the born-agains, while not averred as the primary 
stimulus for Nasfat,49 are nevertheless very evident in much of what it does. Its 
main regular events are an asalatu (prayer) session on Sunday mornings from 8:30 
to 12:30 and a tahajjud (night-vigil) session twice a month, between midnight and 
the dawn prayer. Their timing, length, and format are much more like the born-
again Christians’ than are the canonical salat prayers of Islam. While Nasfat’s 
website speaks discreetly of the intention “to maximise favourably the leisure time 
that exists among Muslims who laze away Sunday mornings,” the real problem 
was that this was when young Muslims were all too likely to go along with their 
Christian friends to the uplifting and entertaining services of the various born-
again ministries. asalatu begins, as born-again services do, with praise worship: 
with praise of God and the invocation of blessings on the Prophet Mohammed, 
for which Arabic texts (in roman transliteration) from an official Nasfat Prayer 
Book are used, chanted in unison. Sometimes there may be a guided recitation 
of the Koran (known as tankara) and hymns in Yoruba. There is a sermon—an 
hour or more, which is much longer than the sermons given at the regular Friday 
prayers—often given by a visiting preacher, and proceedings conclude with an 
extended session of individual prayer requests. Similar elements occur in the noc-
turnal tahajjud service, though they are deployed less formally and there is a much 
more fervent and ecstatic quality to the prayers.










































Many members of the ulama have severe misgivings about Nasfat’s innova-
tions, though they concede that they have done something to stem the appeal of 
rival religious attractions: “If they were not there, our people would flock to the 
mountain grounds and rivers,” as one mainstream imam put it to me.50 But for 
those who think that all forms of Muslim worship must be strictly authorized by 
the Koran or hadith, such as the members of Ahl us-Sunna, the Nasfat initiative 
is deeply problematic. Aware of this, Nasfat carefully justifies its activities as mus-
tahabb (recommended but not compulsory, in terms of the Sharia’s fivefold clas-
sification of actions) and as supererogatory, in that they do not—as its critics sus-
pect—release their members from the obligation to perform the five daily prayers 
and the other pillars of Islam (all of which are set out clearly in its prayer book). 
Nasfat’s aim, its leaders insist, is simply to make its members better Muslims 
without taking sides between Islam’s various tendencies, from Tijaniyya to Ahl 
us-Sunna (though the supposed excesses of the former evoke stronger disapproval 
than what is thought of as the extremism of the latter). That is not surprising, 
since Nasfat and Ahl us-Sunna, despite their differences, both aim to modernize 
Yoruba Islam, whereas the popular devotional practices of Tijaniyya are seen as 
part of its unenlightened heritage. Even so, Nasfat’s notably irenical tone toward 
radical Islamists is not much reciprocated by them, who sometimes disparage it as 
a ceremonial organization or charge its members with being mere social Muslims.
This conscientious Islamic orthodoxy is also combined with much use of a 
managerialist language that strongly recalls some of the larger born-again orga-
nizations. Nasfat’s website offers both vision and mission statements, and refers 
to its stakeholders. Leaders spoke to me of “marketing our product .  .  . in line 
with Sharia,” of the need to “strategize” their activities, of Nasfat “showcasing 
itself . . . as an enlightened Islamic organization” and of offering a “free market” 
to different Muslim groups; and even, in response to a question of mine about 
the prominence at the beginning of the asalatu service of the invocation of bless-
ings on the Prophet Mohammed, of its “adding value” to their prayers.51 A more 
extended instance of this blending of Islam with business values may be seen in a 
book entitled Leadership Strategies of the Prophet Mohammad by Mudathir Abdul-
Ganiyu, a journalist and lecturer, with a foreword by Nasfat’s chief missioner, 
Alhaji Akinbode.52 It is difficult to tell how far such expressions arise directly 
from the jargon of the world of business, media, and administration, where so 
many leading Nasfat activists are employed, or whether they are partly mediated 
through born-again Christianity, which came from its American sources already 
well saturated with the idioms of corporate business.
The self-conscious modernity of Nasfat also shows in the wide range of its 
extraritual activities: visiting prisons, microfinance for small businesses, edu-
cational programs (including its Fountain University, at Oshogbo), empower-
ment schemes for women, vacation camps for students, guidance and counseling 










































services for young people, medical outreach, a soft-drink manufacturing busi-
ness,53 and so on. Once more a born-again comparison is irresistible, especially 
with the Redeemed Christian Church of God (RCCG), whose parachurch activi-
ties are so extensive and well known that they must serve as a major point of refer-
ence. RCCG, like Nasfat, successfully projects itself as an organization that aims to 
attract an elite membership. In building up a portfolio of welfare and development 
activities that offer on a small scale what citizens tend to expect from an effective 
modern state—an ideal that Nigeria professes but conspicuously fails to live up 
to—Nasfat follows a trail that RCCG has blazed. A few miles down the Lagos-
Ibadan expressway from RCCG’s Redemption Camp, with its vast auditorium and 
many facilities, Nasfat now has a campground of its own, a Muslim facility rub-
bing shoulders with several Christian ones strung along the expressway.54
But the bottom-line commonality between Nasfat and RCCG is due not to the 
contingencies of recent history—the aspirations of the Yoruba professional class, 
the neoliberal context, Nasfat’s need to pay attention to what the religious market 
leader is doing—but to the age-old Yoruba demand that religion provide them 
with answers to the practical problems of human existence, particularly sickness 
and poverty. Both bodies contrast their own ways of responding to this demand 
with what they see as the doctrinally compromised practices prevalent within their 
respective faiths. The self-conscious modernity of their critique is expressed in the 
insistence that the basis of healing practices must be scriptural, biblical or Koranic 
as the case may be, not corrupted with elements specific to the Yoruba cultural 
repertoire: the immediate past of Yoruba tradition is to be negated by the distant 
foundational past of a world religion. So the born-agains denounce the errors of 
the White-garment churches (alasofunfun)—as they disparage the Aladura, par-
ticularly the Celestial Church of Christ, and the myriad of small autonomous or 
breakaway woli or prophet—for adopting illicit means to supplement Christian 
prayer. An exactly analogous point is made in modernist Muslim criticism of the 
healing and divinatory practices of the mass of ill-educated but often popular alfa.55
In the tangled undergrowth of popular religion, where pragmatism outweighs 
doctrine, there is now so much borrowing between Muslim alfa, traditional 
babalawo, and Christian woli, all engaged in much the same task, that the bound-
aries between them become blurred. Yoruba Islam differs from Christianity in 
that it harbors both a more elaborate corpus of syncretistic practice and a broader 
set of guidelines, mainly to be found in the hadith, for a theologically correct 
Muslim system of healing. Mr. Mustapha Bello, until lately a senior administra-
tor at Nasfat headquarters, has written a fascinating short book, part theological 
and part ethnographic, advocating reform to what he terms the practice of jalbu, 
defined as “the process of offering spiritual guidance and counselling to [a] dis-
tressed and troubled clientele on multifarious issues involving more than physi-
cal/medical attention.”56 Bello does not doubt that personal problems can have 










































mystical (or, as he would have it, metaphysical) causes, which need mystical solu-
tions, but he wants to see them tackled in ways that do not subvert the principle of 
tahwid or faith in the unity and all-sufficiency of God. At the same time, the born-
again influence is discreetly yet unmistakably present, not just in the language of 
counseling and consultancy but in his concluding assertion (p. 87) that man needs 
“a personal relationship with God.”
Yet just how significant is this partial adoption of a hegemonic discourse? For 
Bello has no sooner used this hallmark evangelical phrase—“personal relation-
ship with God”—than his argument turns in quite another direction from where 
evangelical Christianity would have taken it, for he immediately speaks of it as 
requiring a “soul receptive and submissive to divine rules and regulations as enun-
ciated in the Revealed Books and exemplified by His chosen Messengers.” This 
contrast says much. The born-again ideal of a personal faith rests on the theology 
of an incarnate God who has offered Himself as a personal savior: “What a friend 
we have in Jesus,” as the words of an old evangelical hymn put it. It is not easy to 
imagine Alhaji Akinbode addressing God in a Nasfat asalatu service as “Daddy,” 
as Pastor Adeboye of RCCG does. This whole doctrinal and affective complex is 
radically alien to Islam. Yet the austerity of the orthodox Sunni ideal espoused 
by Bello—that it is obedience to His revealed rules and regulations that brings a 
Muslim personally close to God—has often proved too arid for individual Yoruba 
Muslims, who have sought something more emotionally vibrant. This is a source 
of the perennial appeal of Sufism (as witness the career of Shaykh Akinbile) and 
may perhaps underlie the fervency of the collective invocation of blessings on the 
Prophet that is such a striking feature of the asalatu session. Still, one’s overriding 
impression of asalatu—the main congregation all men, sitting shoulder to shoul-
der in rows on the floor, wearing white gowns—is of a sober solidarity, of a char-
acteristically Muslim aesthetic of worship.57
The individualism and free emotionalism of born-again Christianity not only 
contrasts systematically with the restrained and collective ethos of Nasfat’s wor-
ship, as of Muslim prayer more generally, but seems to correlate with other, orga-
nizational, features. To be born again, with its main external token speaking in 
tongues, is understood as to receive a divine charisma; and charisma, qua the 
reception of extraordinary spiritual gifts, is the condition of leadership in the large 
born-again or neo-Pentecostal churches. Their founders and leaders—men like 
the late Benson Idahosa, E. A. Adeboye, W. F. Kumuyi, David Oyedepo, Matthew 
Asimolowo—are celebrities, variously credited with powers of healing, prophecy, 
deliverance, and so forth. In Muslim terms, they are more like great Sufi shaykhs 
than the leaders of an organization like Nasfat. Akinbode is a respected leader 
who can certainly give a forceful sermon, but as he says, he likes to work behind 
the scenes, as the chief clerical appointee of the board of trustees. Nasfat is set 
strongly against “hero worship”—whether more of the Sufi than of the born-again 










































kind is not clear—an attitude that fits well with something common among 
Muslims, a particular distaste, alike for the noisy, ecstatic quality of Pentecostal 
worship and for the kind of personality cult that envelops prominent born-again 
pastors. Despite the much-remarked resemblances between Nasfat and neo-Pen-
tecostal Christianity, the differences show the strength of what is distinctive of 
Islam. Indeed, if Nasfat realizes its founders’ religious aims, its long-term impact 
should be to make those who attend its services more aware of the Islamic tradi-
tion and of the options available within it.
192
There are certainly empirical grounds for drawing parallels between Christian 
Pentecostalism and Muslim Salafism—whether the frame for the comparison is 
Yorubaland, Nigeria, the West African region, or indeed the world at large. Since 
their members (and even more their leaders) are so strongly aware of themselves 
as belonging to worldwide fellowships of faith and sentiment, the movements 
themselves draw us outward from local to national, regional, and finally global 
frames for their comparison. But what has made the perception of parallels so 
compelling is less their empirical points of resemblance than the primary concep-
tual lens through which they have been viewed, namely fundamentalism. Rarely 
has a term moved so far from its original connotation: from being a term of posi-
tive self-description by a group of doctrinally conservative American Protestants, 
of small political import, to a pejorative label applied by outsiders to forms of reli-
gion deemed extremist—a designation that nowadays most often connotes radical 
political views within Islam.
Over time the use of the term “fundamentalism” has been subject to two 
counterpressures. On the one hand, attempts to develop it as an analytical concept 
have run into the problem that, as the range of empirical cases has been extended, 
with an ever-growing number of only partly shared and overlapping features, its 
explanatory power weakens.1 On the other, its appeal continues to be linked with 
a perception of the world as subject to a dangerous clash of fundamentalisms,2 
regarded as entities at once homologous and hostile to each other. The closely cog-
nate vision of Samuel P. Huntington, of world history as driven by a clash of civili-
zations,3 is typically deplored by historians and anthropologists, on grounds both 
normative and empirical.4 They are more inclined to look for the exchanges, links, 
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and compromises between cultures, though in so doing they tend to discount the 
influence of precisely those religious agents who in fact are driven by something 
like what Huntington’s view of the world imagines.
If the tone of the last three chapters was distinctly anti-Huntingtonian, this 
effect was due less to theoretical considerations than to the impress of the Yoruba 
context—though there was also the sense that forces of a more fundamentalist 
nature had grown stronger and needed to be fought off. But if we want to examine 
how far recent movements in the two faiths should be seen as homologous but 
opposed, as the notion of a clash of fundamentalisms implies, we ultimately need 
to move to a broader, looser context, defined less as a cultural community (like 
Yorubaland) than as a political arena (like Nigeria, or Northern Nigeria) or as 
merely a region where a range of common conditions prevails (like West Africa). 
A convenient starting point is an influential essay by Brian Larkin and Birgit 
Meyer that articulates the widely held view that the salient new forms of Islam 
and Christianity in contemporary West Africa—Pentecostalism and Salafism (or, 
as they term it, Islamism)5—should be seen as “doppelgangers, enemies whose 
actions mirror those of the other.”6
Though Larkin and Meyer frame their comparison in terms of West Africa as a 
whole, most of their data are drawn from the two very different societies that they 
know from intensive fieldwork: southern Ghanaian in the case of Meyer, Northern 
Nigerian in the case of Larkin. Logically, this framework is less helpful than there 
would have resulted if they had used two societies with a similar religious profile or 
(even better) a single society wherein both movements were present. For southern 
Ghana is overwhelmingly Christian (with many Pentecostalists); its Muslim minor-
ity is little influenced by Salafism—in fact there are many Ahmadis—and there is 
no serious interfaith conflict. On the other hand, Northern Nigeria is a crucible of 
both Salafism and interfaith conflict, but although the Christian body is substantial 
and internally diverse, Pentecostalism is less influential than in Southern Nigeria 
and is less prominent in interfaith conflict than some other churches are. Though 
Larkin and Meyer are right to emphasize the need to study movements in the two 
religions in their interrelations,7 they cannot do this properly, since Pentecostalists 
in southern Ghana and Salafists in Northern Nigeria are hardly in a position to 
interact with each other. So they have to fill out the empirical picture with material 
drawn from elsewhere, especially from Nigerian (largely Yoruba) Pentecostalism. 
This may sometimes be justified, granted the powerful influence of Nigerian evan-
gelists and religious media throughout the region, but it does foreclose on the 
question—critical for understanding such a protean faith as Pentecostalism—of 
how such external influences are modified by the receiving context.8
So what Larkin and Meyer give us is a rather general picture, particularized 
by illustrative material selected to support the similarity thesis but without any 
very close analysis either of interaction between the movements or of the play of 










































similarities and differences between them. They identify three basic commonali-
ties between the two: they both mount a vehement attack on local religious and 
cultural traditions; both offer their adherents new ways and means of becoming 
modern; and both have a strong sense of their participation in global movements 
in their respective faiths. We can even go further and point to other, more concrete 
similarities: their social grounding in the experience especially of the educated, 
urban young and their extensive use of modern media to diffuse their messages 
(where Pentecostalism particularly has shown the way). In both cases, too, there is 
the paradox that their modernizing critiques of the immediate past are grounded 
in the invocation of an older normative past: thus they both see themselves as 
movements of revival or renewal of their respective faiths. Moreover, both pro-
mote more than personal agendas, since they also offer critiques, albeit in rather 
oblique and ambiguous ways and with large differences in content, of how state 
and society have developed in West Africa since independence.
All this is well as far as it goes, but the real issue is to do with what significance 
is to be attached to similarities and differences. There are at least two great areas 
of difference between the two movements evident even in Larkin and Meyer’s 
account—indeed, they are far too conspicuous to be disavowed—but these are 
discounted in the authors’ analysis. For shorthand reference, let me label them 
“Prosperity” and “Politics.”
 1.  The authors’ account of Pentecostalism naturally lays much emphasis on 
what has become one of its dominant emphases across Africa, the Gospel 
of Prosperity—and particularly so in some of the larger churches, such as 
Winners’ Chapel or the Redeemed Christian Church of God in Nigeria or 
Action Chapel International in Ghana.9 Prosperity is typically combined, in 
varying proportions in different churches, with other pragmatic concerns: 
healing, oracular guidance, deliverance from demons, and so on. While 
the theological expression of this orientation can be traced to an authorita-
tive source in the so-called Faith Gospel, as propounded by such North 
American Pentecostalists as T. L. Osborn or Kenneth Hagin, it also meshes 
with the emphasis on powerful prayer that was prominent in the earlier 
wave of African independent churches (AICs).10 In noting this, Larkin and 
Meyer implicitly modify their earlier comments on Pentecostalism’s break 
with its cultural past.11 But what is more striking is the apparently complete 
absence of any similar orientation in the Salafist movements that they invite 
us to see as mirroring Pentecostalism. On the contrary, their only reference 
to anything like Prosperity is to Izala’s opposition to “the magical uses of 
Islamic knowledge for healing or prosperity.”12
 2.  Larkin and Meyer’s treatment of Islamism reads at times like an account of a 
religion with a radically different primary orientation from Pentecostalism, 










































despite their aim of making the most that can be made of the resemblances 
between them. In contrast to the extremely feeble velleities of some Ghanaian 
Pentecostal pastors toward the idea of a Christian state,13 which they mention, 
such Nigerian Muslim activists as Abubakar Gumi and Ibrahim Al-Zakzaky14 
were fully engaged in the political conflicts of the region (such as between the 
traditional political elite or sarauta and its populist critics), propounding reli-
gious ideas that require command of the state to be properly implemented and 
ready to align themselves ideologically and materially with the main power 
blocs of the Muslim world—Saudi Arabia vs. Iran—in order to achieve them.15
I I
In attempting to balance these differences against similarities in the comparison 
of Salafism and Pentecostalism, it should not escape notice that they are of a sig-
nificantly different kind: the similarities are chiefly a matter of form, whereas the 
differences are chiefly ones of content or substance. The three key points of simi-
larity, as proposed by Larkin and Meyer, all hinge on a contrast between tradition 
and modernity: both movements imagine themselves as bearers of modern values 
and set themselves in sharp opposition to cultural practices that they see as tradi-
tional. Now tradition and modernity, particularly as anthropologists view them, 
are notoriously empty categories: they tend to be filled situationally, with contents 
that shift from one context to another (and that may even, over time, shift from 
one category to the other), though always in antithesis to each other. The idea of 
a normative sacred past, relevant to both movements, is another such religious 
form, which is available to be filled with an indefinite number of possible contents 
as particular traditions may supply them.
Now, while religious forms undoubtedly have real historical effects, it is above 
all a religion’s content that will mainly determine its substantive impact over time, 
since this is the matrix of the distinctive orientations to action that it engenders 
in its adherents. So in the present case, the sets of orientations that I have labeled 
Prosperity and Politics can be seen as contrasting ways in which believers are 
prompted to realize themselves and so to shape their worlds. In the light of that 
widespread African ontology of well-being that brackets health and prosperity 
together, let Prosperity be understood more broadly as what the Yoruba call alafia, 
that condition of all-round this-worldly being at ease (with health its main com-
ponent) that sums up what individuals pray for and wish for one another. Two 
questions then occur. Why should this orientation be so salient in Christian rather 
than Muslim fundamentalism; and why should the contrasting political orienta-
tion apparently typify the Muslim rather than the Christian movement? Then do 
we interpret this contrast in the light of factors independently affecting the two 
religions, or in terms of some kind of overall unifying logic?










































It can hardly be supposed that African Muslims are intrinsically less interested 
in health, welfare, security, and the like than African Christians are. In the Yoruba 
case Muslim clerics adapted so well to the popular demand for spiritual technolo-
gies to attain these objectives that it was long before the Christians could catch 
up; and indeed the term that encapsulates them, alafia, is a word of Arabic origin 
introduced through Muslim channels,16 a word well naturalized in Yoruba by the 
nineteenth century. So how is it that it is Pentecostalism (like orisa religion and 
Aladura Christianity) that seems to have made the quest for alafia central to its 
project, whereas Salafism instead embraces a political agenda, which presents a 
much more radical challenge to the prevailing order of things?
That these agendas are not just different but to some extent alternative was sug-
gested by Matthew Schoffeleers in relation to churches that practice ritual healing 
in southern Africa. He argued that they are strongly inclined to political acquies-
cence, not just as a matter of contingent fact but from an underlying logic. This 
is because, he suggests, “healing . . . individualizes and therefore depoliticizes the 
causes of sickness.”17 The same would go for those churches that focus on pros-
perity through prayer or the conquest of demons that impede the realization of 
personal success. The distinctiveness of Pentecostalism’s healing agenda is further 
grounded by Murray Last, who brings the perspective of a medical anthropolo-
gist as well as a historian of Islam to the contrast between the two faiths.18 He 
argues that, despite the existence of a distinct Islamic corpus of medicine,19 heal-
ing (and the wider problem of suffering) has been much less central to Islam than 
to Christianity, a contrast that he traces back to the primary representation of 
Mohammed as the prophet of a divine law, not a worker of healing miracles like 
Christ.20 In Last’s view, the Sokoto jihad of the early nineteenth century involved 
“a deliberate project to take the experience of illness out of the religious sphere” as 
part of a campaign against the survival of pagan practices among Muslims.21 This 
seems to have been strongly revived in contemporary Salafism.
All this implies that while there is, broadly speaking, a common set of social con-
ditions that the two religions have to address (or that present them with opportuni-
ties), a good deal of free play or room for maneuver also exists between the demand 
arising from these conditions, and the supply offered by the religions. The first step 
in analysis must be to characterize the conditions of this demand; the second, to 
trace how it is shaped by what the religions are moved to supply. As to the former, 
Larkin and Meyer speak of a “reconfiguration of African states and the progressive 
disembedding of the African economies from the formal world market [that gener-
ate] . . . the unstable and often depressing flux of life in [contemporary] Africa.”22 In 
similar vein, Charles Piot typifies contemporary Togo as “a world of post-national 
sovereignty, of non-state-centric idioms of belonging, of horizontal networked 
forms of sociality, . . . of global immanence.”23 The conditions of what Piot calls the 
“neo-liberal moment” are not just a matter of political economy but are also (what is 










































very important) of material culture, particularly the electronic media, which coin-
cidentally came on stream in the 1990s and provided an essential condition if not 
for the initial emergence of Pentecostalism at least for its massive expansion. The 
chameleon character of Pentecostalism equips it particularly well able to respond to 
this situation, by fashioning subjectivities that enable individuals to make practical 
sense of the experiences of living under the exigencies of such a neoliberal order.24
Yet despite the elective affinity between the two, it is crucial not to merge 
them—as Piot comes close to doing when he shifts imperceptibly from speaking 
of “the neo-liberal moment” to “the charismatic moment.”25 For if the solution 
is thus virtually elided into the problem, the possibility of a dynamic interplay 
between social context and religious tradition all but disappears. Piot then con-
founds his binding of Togolese Pentecostalism into the present by simultaneously 
also tying it to the very distant past, tracing the genealogy of what he sees as its 
“instinctively anti-authoritarian” character back to the “the anti-imperial politics 
of the early Christian community [in the Roman Empire].”26 But this, surely, is to 
overdetermine contemporary Pentecostalism by positing something like an egali-
tarian essence mysteriously replicating itself over a vast span of historical time. In 
any case, it ignores how in both Nigeria and Ghana Pentecostalism has also taken 
some highly authoritarian forms under miracle-working charismatic pastors. In 
the light of this, it is not surprising that Piot ends up confessing his uncertainty 
about the political import of Pentecostalism.
There is a crucial problem of method here. While Pentecostalism, like any other 
religious movement, is shaped both by its context and by its tradition, these have 
always to be analyzed as working interactively, not independently of each other. 
Neither context nor tradition is a fixed given to the other: both are to be seen as 
yielding possibilities, albeit constrained ones. And the cultural work by which a 
religion reassesses its history in the light of its predicament is reciprocally linked 
to how it is guided by its past as it seeks to realize itself in the present. This is why 
I will conclude this chapter by comparing two recent historical interpretations of 
their faiths by Nigerians, respectively a Pentecostalist and a Salafist.
These abstractions become concrete when we start to compare the responses 
of more than one religion to the neoliberal predicament. Islam faces it too, but 
the solutions it supplies are its own. Take the yearning for renewal, particularly 
among the young, which is common to movements in both faiths. Whereas the 
Pentecostal paradigm is for renewal to occur first in individuals, empowered by 
the Holy Spirit according to the sacred promise of Acts 2, and then to spread out 
to energize the whole Church, the classic pattern of Islamic renewal involves the 
paradigm of a mujaddid who appears every century to reform the umma.27 Here 
the process of renewal proceeds in the reverse direction, for the mujaddid is called 
to reestablish the proper institutional framework for pious practice by individ-
ual Muslims, through implementing normative rules drawn from the Koran and 










































the hadith. This is inherently a much more political project. It would seem that 
Salafism, though its appeal implies a real ability to meet the experiential needs of 
individual West African Muslims, offers a much more refracted response to the 
neoliberal predicament, one more heavily mediated through the layers of its tradi-
tion, than Pentecostalism does. The weight of normative tradition is much lighter 
in Pentecostalism, its charter precedent much more open and permissive—and 
this seems to have made it easier to meet the age-old local demand for healing and 
other forms of alafia with such Christian confidence.
But I must now qualify the thrust of my argument so far. For healing, a gift of 
the Holy Spirit, is not only significant in its literal sense for Pentecostalists in West 
Africa but is also taken by them as a potent metaphor for their wider claim to be 
able to make all things over anew. Such an open potential clearly undermines the 
sharp distinction between healing (in the literal sense) and politics (in the conven-
tional sense) that I have been using, and so it requires us to probe more deeply the 
politics of Pentecostalism. Yorubaland provides an excellent place to start, since 
the relative time-depth of its Pentecostalism, and the fact of its being deeply rooted 
in earlier local forms of evangelical Christianity, enable us to view it in a historical 
perspective; while the copresence of Islam provides a check on any cause-effect 
relations that its history may suggest.
I I I
Looking back at more than thirty years of born-again Christianity from a van-
tage point in 2015, we are no longer tempted to see it simply as a grand ruptural 
moment, vital as this conception has been for numberless individuals swept up in 
it. No one has analyzed more profoundly the logic of Pentecostalism’s redemptive 
promise in Nigeria, of its “will to found anew,” than Ruth Marshall in her book 
Political Spiritualities. The book’s very title, taken as it is from an essay by Foucault 
on the Iranian revolution of 1979, as well as her remark that “in many respects, the 
Born-Again and [Islamic] reformist projects are doppelgangers,” suggest she too 
regards the two movements as fundamentally comparable and equally political 
projects.28 The broad commonalities she sees between them fall under two main 
heads. First, they are both concerned to evoke in their members a broadly similar 
kind of religious subjectivity, one that involves “a work of the self on the self ”;29 
and second, they have both become hegemonic projects competing in Nigeria’s 
public space but implying incompatible visions for the future development of 
Nigerian society. Pentecostalism, she insists, has a “highly political agenda.”30 But 
this is not an unnuanced judgment, since she also attributes to it “an ambivalent 
form of negative political theology”; and, though she regards it as rooted in many 
of the same aspirations as Salafism, she concedes that it displays “important his-
torical, socio-political and theological differences.”31 So what are these differences?










































The immediate origins of Yoruba neo-Pentecostalism lie in the early 1970s—
the years just after the Nigerian Civil War, when a dramatic growth in oil rev-
enues raised dizzy hopes for Nigeria’s national development, though significant 
roots run back to contacts with American Pentecostals in the 1950s and 1960s, 
and even earlier through the Aladura movement in the 1920s. During Olusegun 
Obasanjo’s first turn as head of state (1977–79), as leader of a military government, 
oil revenues permitted the vigorous pursuit of highly statist policies in health and 
education. There was a massive expansion of higher education, which facilitated 
neo-Pentecostalism’s earliest constituency, the campus prayer fellowships where 
so many of its early leaders were formed.32 Nigeria’s ambition for itself as a leader 
in the struggle for black and African advancement across the world was lavishly 
staged in Festac in 1977. This was when a Pentecostal group first entered the 
public arena (alongside like-minded Muslims) to protest against what it saw as a 
showcasing of idolatrous culture in the name of national pride. Apart from that, 
Pentecostal concerns and activities were still essentially limited to individual and 
private spheres.
All changed in the 1980s, when Nigeria found itself in a prolonged economic 
crisis due to collapsed oil prices combined with chronic corruption and misman-
agement by successive governments, first civilian and then again military. The state, 
while still a massive engine for private accumulation by the members of the political 
class, had progressively reneged on its promise to bring development to the mass 
of the people. Pentecostalism now moved off campus and, in the form of rapidly 
growing ministries under charismatic pastors, raised its public profile dramatically 
through all forms of media and by holding large, conspicuously advertised revival 
meetings across Nigeria. Shifts in the movement’s orientation started to appear. 
The first was a shift from its strong initial focus on holiness—typically taking the 
form of a quest for personal sanctification through ascetic self-disciplines—to a 
greater emphasis on external, this-worldly objectives, including the conquest of 
demonic enemies. This may be seen both as a trajectory characteristic of move-
ments of evangelical spirituality and as a substantial reversion to the default system 
of Yoruba religious culture.33
Accompanying this, and at some tension with it—recalling Schoffeleers’ sug-
gestion that healing and politics are essentially alternative orientations for reli-
gious movements—was the emergence of a new political relevance for born-again 
Christianity. What had begun as a redemptive promise of rebirth addressed to 
individuals, the more urgent through being set within a messianic end-time, came 
to provide a powerful idiom for collective renewal. This yearning grew through 
the 1980s against a backdrop of an ever-deepening economic and political crisis, 
which lasted through sixteen years of military rule under generals from the Muslim 
North. It reached its nadir in the mid-1990s, after the military had annulled the 
1993 presidential election, ushering in the brutal dictatorship of General Sanni 










































Abacha. Islam now clearly eclipsed paganism as the grand imagined spiritual 
enemy for Christians, though under the Yoruba etiquette of public amity between 
the two faiths, hostility was usually expressed in somewhat muted forms, such as 
the use of the term “the Caliphate” to denote the forces of Northern oppression. 
This apocalyptic mood was readily articulated in born-again discourse, which was 
widely taken up to prefigure and presage redemptive change in the condition of 
Nigeria. E. A. Adeboye, the leader of the Redeemed Christian Church of God, was 
widely credited with having prophesied Abacha’s sudden death in 1998.
But that was the high-water mark. With Obasanjo’s second coming in 1999 
as elected president of Nigeria, some limits of Pentecostal politics soon became 
evident. Even though he claimed to be born-again himself and gathered a cote-
rie of Pentecostal pastors around him,34 any promise of a redemptive politics was 
buried—or at least returned to its original sphere, the redemption of individual 
lives. If ever these pastors spoke truth to power, no significant effects were dis-
cernible, though some of them may have gained personal favors. Some individual 
pastors, such as Tunde Bakare, have persistently spoken out against the corrup-
tion of the political class,35 but in general prevailing secular status hierarchies 
are fully accepted. Obviously, wealth per se is no embarrassment for celebrity 
pastors who preach the Gospel of Prosperity; and the RCCG, in particular, has 
developed a highly successful strategy to establish congregations among the well-
heeled middle class with its so-called model parishes.36 Tremendous energy and 
resources go into church expansion, not only in Nigeria but along the networks of 
the Nigerian diaspora in Europe and North America. Yet alongside their disgust 
at the state of secular politics in their country, many Nigerian Pentecostalists take 
great pride as Nigerians in this expansion. It is true that Pentecostalism in general 
has some strongly postnationalist features—for example, the marked universalism 
of its aspirations expressing disappointment at the failures of the nationalist politi-
cal project—but in the case of Nigeria, it can also be seen as a form of national-
ism displaced: a projection of the nation onto the world through the medium of 
Pentecostal Christianity.
IV
Optimal conditions for a contextual comparison of Salafism and Pentecostalism 
are not easily found. Although Yorubaland is an excellent place to compare diverse 
forms of both Islam and Christianity, the two fundamentalist movements are not 
on an even footing there. For while Pentecostalism has a strong place within Yoruba 
Christianity, with local roots going back over a hundred years,37 enabling us to see 
it as a virtually endogenous movement, Salafism is not merely a minority (albeit 
growing) strand within Yoruba Islam but one that has only appeared within the last 
thirty-plus years. As argued in the last chapter, several other strands within Yoruba 










































Islam—Tijaniyya, Nasfat, and Tablighi Jama‘at—have more obvious points of 
resemblance to Pentecostalism than Salafism does.38 Though Yoruba Salafism—the 
grouping known as Ahl us-Sunna—owes its origins more to currents in the wider 
Islamic world than to the impact of the radical reformism of Northern Nigeria, it 
still draws inspiration from the latter and identifies with its major figures, such as 
Usman dan Fodio. So the most fruitful comparison for Yoruba Pentecostalism is in 
fact Salafism in Northern Nigeria. Though we lose the advantage of comparing the 
two movements in the same cultural context, we gain from being able to compare 
them at full expression in their respective home contexts.
Northern Nigeria offers a much looser context than Yorubaland. It is multicul-
tural rather than monocultural, but with one culture historically hegemonic over a 
large part of it: the Hausa-speaking Islamic culture of the Sokoto Caliphate. Since 
the 1970s, it has seen a succession of radical Islamic or Salafist movements of the 
kind discussed by Larkin and Meyer, the latest being Boko Haram. Amid their 
diversity, two features have been salient: vehement hostility to the Sufi brother-
hoods and pressure to implement Sharia law, both grounded in a Salafist vision 
of Islam. From the 1960s till his death in 1992, one man exercised a towering 
influence here, Alhaji Abubakar Gumi, the former grand khadi of the Northern 
States—there has been no remotely comparable figure in Nigerian Christianity.39 
Gumi was the guiding force of the best-known and most influential movement, 
known as Izala, an abbreviated Hausa form of its Arabic name, which means the 
Society for the Removal of Innovation (Bid‘a) and the Restoration of the Sunna.40
To understand these movements, we need to relate them not just to the imme-
diate past, which has directly bequeathed the situation Izala wants to reform, and 
the distant past of the credited founders of Islamic Salafism, which provide its nor-
mative exemplar, but to a middle-distance past that mediates these two temporal 
reference points. That is the Sokoto Caliphate, the Islamic state created through 
a jihad led by a Fulani cleric, Usman dan Fodio, in the first decade of the nine-
teenth century.41 The British conquered it a century later but preserved the system 
of emirates (with their Fulani Muslim ruling elites) to make it the classic terrain 
of Lugardian indirect rule.42 They greatly cut back the scope of Sharia law to the 
personal sphere, but Islam remained fundamental to the integration of Muslim 
society in Northern Nigeria and enjoyed a large demographic expansion. When 
nationalism arrived, fifty years later, it was intercepted by a scion of the ruling 
dynasty, Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto, who promoted a form of conser-
vative modernization drawing inspiration from his ancestor, Usman dan Fodio. 
The Sardauna was as much concerned with keeping out the corrosive influence of 
Southern politics as he was with securing independence from the colonial masters. 
Once independence came and lifted any need to reassure the British, he shifted 
quite quickly from a policy of One North, One People, in which Christians could 
feel they belonged as much as Muslims, to one of treating the North more as a 










































successor state to the old Caliphate.43 Seeing Islam as the only viable source of pub-
lic morality and political cohesion, he sponsored highly controversial Islamization 
campaigns in the non-Muslim parts of the North.44 Support for this came from 
a new organization, the Jama‘atu Nasril Islam (Society for the Victory of Islam), 
founded in 1962 to foster unity among Muslims and to promote the cause of Islam, 
in which both the Sardauna and Abubakar Gumi took active roles.
The Sardauna also arranged for many of the works of dan Fodio to be pub-
lished, in Arabic and Hausa. These covered such topics as the legal conditions for 
conducting jihad, the key question of just who is a Muslim, relations with non-
Muslims, principles of government and law, and so on. They even include a text 
entitled “The Revival of the Sunna and the Removal of Bid‘a” (which closely antici-
pates the name that Izala chose for itself), more than half of which consists of quo-
tations from the works of scholars across the Muslim world from the fourteenth 























































































Map 4. Nigeria: Regions and states.










































Wujub, was still circulating and actually being copied in Northern Nigeria in the 
1960s.46 Usman dan Fodio had belonged to the Qadiriyya, so it was only after the 
death of the Sardauna in 1966 that Gumi felt able to come out in outright condem-
nation of the brotherhoods for their bid‘a (innovation) and shirk (idolatry).47 So if 
(like Ousmane Kane) we want to emphasize the modernity of these movements, it 
is vital to see that their challenge to older ways arose from within a tradition that 
they reproduced as much as repudiated.
Izala’s assault on Sufism was part of a more general drive for the renewal of 
Muslim society in Northern Nigeria. In striking at the charisma of Sufi shaykhs 
and the esoteric knowledge-claims of traditionalist clerics more generally, Izala 
had a rationalizing and egalitarian tenor, which appealed to the educated young 
and to traders. Its import for women was ambiguous—as Adeline Masquelier has 
shown in her fine study of a town in Niger48—since it both enforced their stricter 
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here with the moral objectives of Pentecostal Christianity, where the Islamizing 
movements diverged radically from the Pentecostal ones was in that all their 
specific aspirations came together in the demand for Sharia, imagined as Allah’s 
instructions for a just and well-ordered society. After two top-downward attempts 
to institute Sharia in the late 1970s and the 1980s, a bottom-upward movement 
finally led to its adoption in twelve states of the high North in 2000 and 2001.49 
One primary drive was the desire of ordinary Muslims to hold their elites to 
account in terms of the moral framework of Islam that they shared. It was also, 
argues Last, rooted in a diffuse sense of insecurity among the Muslims of Northern 
Nigeria, a sentiment arising not just from social conditions such as poverty and 
unemployment (important as these are) but also from specifically Islamic aspira-
tions and anxieties. The young men (and some women) who enforce Sharia, the 
hisba, are often called vigilantes; but this is misleading, since though they take 
direct physical action against offenders, they act more like “concerned citizens” 
(as Last puts it), guided by the Koranic injunction to Muslims to “command right 
and forbid wrong.”50 We are dealing here not just with a discursive tradition but 
with institutional forms and precedents for action that have come down with it.51
V
The notion of different religious groups coming to resemble one another through a 
process of mirroring or directly copying one another has its most obvious applica-
tion in situations of competition and conflict, as the last chapter explored in relation 
to the vigorous but peaceful rivalry between Islam and Christianity in Yorubaland. 
So how far has it occurred in the context of Northern Nigeria, where violence in 
the name of religion has become endemic? And has Pentecostalism proved to be 
the hard edge of Christianity in its confrontation with Islam? Certainly it is widely 
so regarded. A prominent Northern intellectual, Sanusi Lamido Sanusi, attributes 
interreligious violence in the region, which he characterizes as a recent phenom-
enon, to “the emergence of Pentecostal Christian and extremist Islamist groups”; 
and tendentiously invokes Ruth Marshall (whose remarks specifically concerned 
only Yorubaland) to the effect that “Pentecostals began aggressively proselytizing, 
demonizing Islam and thus fueling the rise of Islamic fundamentalism.”52 Although 
this certainly conveys the alarm that many Muslims in the North have felt at its reli-
gious impact, it is highly misleading to imply that Pentecostalism coincided with 
or even preceded the appearance of radical Islamism, and so could be even partly 
responsible for it. It arrived much later. Moreover, religious violence, though more 
sporadic in its incidence, long predates the arrival of Pentecostalism and was at 
first intra-Islamic in its character: in the Sokoto jihad itself, in fighting between the 
two Sufi brotherhoods, in Izala’s challenge to them, and in the Maitatsine upris-
ing, which erupted in Kano in 1980.53 Apart from tit-for-tat episodes of violence 










































at a community level, the clearest case of mirroring at an organizational level was 
the foundation of the Northern Christian Association in 1964 in response to the 
Jama‘atu Nasril Islam in the context of the Sardauna’s Islamization campaigns. 
Its members were drawn from the main Protestant churches active in the North 
(which did not then include Pentecostals).54 This was the precursor of the endur-
ing Christian Association of Nigeria (founded 1976).55 But Pentecostalists did not 
make a significant public mark till the late 1980s, coming into an existing situation 
of tension between Muslims and Christians that had grown steadily since the early 
1960s.56 And if Adam Higazi’s fine microstudy of conflict in Plateau State is any-
thing to go by,  Pentecostalists have been less active as militants than members of 
some mainline churches, especially those linked with local ethnonationalisms, like 
the Church of Christ in Nigeria.57
The prominent role of young men in acts of religious violence is commonly 
ascribed to their impoverishment and marginalization. But this is not the only 
possible response. For the chosen target may be an ethnic rather than a religious 
other and the vehicle of their anger ethnic militias rather than radical religious 
groups. Of course the different dimensions of otherness often stack up, as in con-
frontations between (say) Muslim Fulani pastoralists and Christian Berom farm-
ers on the Jos Plateau, but still the dominant coding of the conflict, which is not 
reducible to socioeconomic causes, has telling effects. Here, religion has been 
salient in the North, whereas ethnicity has prevailed in the South of Nigeria; and 
it is not accidental that this correlates with the regional predominance of Islam 
and Christianity, respectively. The saliency of religion as a public identity marker 
in the North—that is, the politicization of faith—was strongly promoted by the 
jihadist Islam of the Sokoto Caliphate, continued through the colonial period, and 
was revived by the Sardauna after 1960.58 Christianity’s impact was more ambigu-
ous, for although it certainly created a new supralocal religious identity, this was 
often undercut by denominational rivalries and offset by its role in valorizing or 
reshaping ethnic distinctions through promoting local languages in the context of 
Bible translation. What is undeniable is that in the most heavily Christian part of 
Nigeria, the Southeast, the anger of young men has typically not gone into religion 
but into ethnic militias and vigilante groups, which often make use of traditional 
masquerade forms and magical charms, which are offensive to Pentecostalists.59
Between the polar cases of the Southeast and the Muslim North, the cases of 
Yorubaland and the Northern Christians present some instructive variations. At 
its height in the early 2000s the main Yoruba ethnic militia, the Oodua People’s 
Congress (OPC), had a broad membership across the religious spectrum, though 
in greater Lagos, where it was most active, it is likely that the mass of its activists 
(like their charismatic leader, Gani Adams) were young Muslims.60 It is wholly 
consistent with the general pattern of Yoruba politics that, for the mass of Yoruba 
Muslims, ethnicity trumps religion as a political marker; nor is it surprising that 










































the North has typically been their primary target, as in their past assaults on Hausa 
traders, and more recently their threat that any Boko Haram attacks in Yorubaland 
would meet with severe reprisals. One feature of the OPC’s support is of espe-
cial note: the religious group least likely to be involved in it appears to be active 
Pentecostalists. This is because Pentecostalists strongly oppose the “revalidation 
of traditional spiritual practices,”61 in the form of the fortifying charms and rituals 
provided by alfa, babalawo, and probably some Aladura woli for OPC activists. An 
analogous phenomenon is found among the mainly Christian Tarok in their con-
frontation with mainly Fulani Muslims in the lowland areas of Plateau State. Here, 
as in some vigilante groups in the Southeast, anti-Muslim activists employ the 
resources of their traditional culture, such as protective charms and masquerades 
associated with ancestral spirits.62 Since much of this culture is still belittled by 
the churches, there is dismay among many Christians at the revival of paganism, 
even though the traditionalists and the COCIN leadership are de facto allies in 
the struggle against local Muslims. I think it can be presumed that Pentecostalists 
would be the most opposed to this aspect of the religious conflict in Plateau State, 
as they are to similar practices in the OPC.
VI
Islamic reformism and Pentecostalism are embedded in radically different ideo-
logical and institutional complexes. Pentecostalism, deeply marked by the volun-
tarism and individualism of its evangelical origins, only has, as Marshall put it, 
a “negative political theology.”63 But Islam was formed in the crucible of a pro-
cess of statemaking reciprocally molded by its revelation—whether we think of 
the original Arab-Islamic Empire established by the Prophet and his successors 
in the seventh century or of the Sokoto Caliphate whose founders consciously 
modeled their actions on that precedent. Pentecostalism, by contrast, emerged 
in the USA and in northwestern Europe in the social space outside the state, yet 
within an order already guaranteed by it. The modes of political action adopted 
by Pentecostals in the public sphere are not in principle different from those of 
any other voluntary association in civil society: through converting individuals to 
their way of thinking, seeking to modify public opinion, acting as a pressure group 
on legislators and those who wield power, and so forth. It has nothing like a Sharia 
of its own to implement, and its tradition contains no models of direct political 
action of the kind that Muslims have deployed.
Both Muslims and Christians have very critical things to say about the Nigerian 
state, and at the individual level—to judge from many casual conversations with 
Yoruba people—I have hardly been able to distinguish between them. But when 
we consider the critique of religious groups, a distinct difference of emphasis is 
evident. This highlights the two general criteria that African states need to fulfill in 










































order to be seen as legitimate by their populations: they must be seen as just, and 
they must be seen to bring development. The Nigerian state performs abysmally 
on both counts.
Muslim groups have been more concerned with what they see as the state’s 
injustice. The demand for Sharia is of course the supreme expression of this. For 
attacks by radical groups on police stations, government facilities, the houses of 
corrupt politicians and traditional rulers, even churches—and in 2011 the wave 
of violent protest against what was seen widely in the North as an election stolen 
from them—are also fueled by an angry sense of injustice informed by Islamic 
ideals. So injustice tends to be linked to idolatry and unbelief (which especially 
means Christianity and its cultural concomitants). Again there is a precedent for 
such direct action in Usman dan Fodio’s career: first a hijra or retreat of the faith-
ful from the territory of corrupt so-called Muslim rulers, against whom takfir is 
declared; and then, at an opportune time, jihad to establish a Dar al-Islam, where 
justice will prevail.64 Yet dan Fodio’s work also contains ambiguities, notably his 
refusal to collapse injustice entirely into unbelief, as in the much-quoted conclu-
sion of the Bayan Wujub: “A kingdom can endure with unbelief, but it cannot 
endure with injustice.”65
Justice is preeminently a political virtue, and so it is not surprising that such 
an apolitical faith as Pentecostalism has little to say about it beyond the heartfelt 
though conventional criticisms that individual born-agains make of the behavior 
of Nigerian politicians. What, then, of their implicit critique of the Nigerian state, 
for failing to bring about development? It rests on the assumption that a key aim of 
religion is to bring about prosperity and the other good things of life. That makes 
the goal of development belong to the religious as much as the political sphere, 
and though it is pursued by distinct (that is, spiritual) means, these are felt to be 
quite complementary to secular, instrumental ones. At the same time, the larger 
Pentecostal churches have revived the missions’ engagement in education and wel-
fare projects, especially after state provision of these things faltered badly in the 
1980s. The RCCG has built up a vast complex of facilities at its campground on the 
Lagos-Ibadan expressway: a veritable town (now known as Redemption City) with 
its own electricity and water supplies, banks and supermarkets, schools and uni-
versity, media businesses, planned orderly housing, and all suchlike. It all amounts 
to what Asonzeh Ukah calls “an alternative society, properly equipped with all the 
necessary instruments of a functioning secular state.”66 It is an icon, or small-scale 
model, of the developed society that Nigerians aspire to. This was dramatically 
manifest at a Holy Ghost Night that I attended in 1994, when the church dedicated 
its new generator—that supreme index of the failure of the Nigerian state to guar-
antee a reliable power supply—which was switched on to joyous acclamations of 
Let there be light, and there was light! and scornful negative comparison with the 
public electricity supplier, NEPA.










































Compared with the Islamist critique, the Pentecostal one is pragmatic as much 
as ethical: the ineptitude of Nigeria’s rulers is condemned as much as their cor-
ruption. If this may seem rather contingent as a manifestation of Christianity, it 
does connect intimately with a core value of born-again Christianity in Nigeria: 
namely life or spirit. Pentecostalism in general rides on an ever-shifting balance 
between Logos (Word) and Pneuma (Spirit). Whereas its Logos derives from the 
parent evangelical tradition, its emphasis on Pneuma is both original and distinc-
tive, for it is this that empowers individuals when they are born again. Now, Spirit 
was translated into Yoruba as Ẹmi, a noun derived from the verb mi, meaning “to 
breathe,” and always carries connotations of life force, of what makes the difference 
between things living and things dead.67 This enabled Pentecostalism to connect 
with indigenous ideas about life and well-being. Here it is worth noting that the 
main charge that the born-agains bring against the older mainline churches is not 
for their moral failings but for their being dead. This value had already found 
expression in Yoruba politics in the Gospel-derived motto of its dominant party, 
the Action Group (AG): “Life More Abundant.”68 The Yoruba name for the AG was 
Afẹnifẹre, Lovers of Good Things, which expresses the same idea more explicitly 
from an indigenous viewpoint.69 This expression of development objectives in lan-
guage fusing Christian and Yoruba values, made possible by a century of cultural 
Africanization, was ready-made for incorporation into Pentecostal criticism of the 
Nigerian state. Once again it shows that continuities, whether acknowledged or 
not, are as essential to the appeal of Pentecostalism as its claims of radical rupture 
from the past.
VII
Since the stories that religions tell about themselves play such an integral role 
in their self-realization, there is hardly a better way to bring out the contrasting 
thrusts of Salafism and Pentecostalism, political and cultural, than through two 
accounts of them written by engaged insiders, both recently published in Nigeria. 
These are Islam in Nigeria: One Crescent, Many Voices (2007), by Abdul-Fattah 
Olayiwola, and A Heritage of Faith: A History of Christianity in Nigeria (2009), by 
Ayodeji Abodunde.70 Though both authors are Yoruba, each offers a Nigeriawide 
perspective on his religion. Neither one is a professional historian: Abodunde has 
a degree in science—engineering—and runs his own media company in Ibadan; 
Olayiwola teaches Arabic and Islamic studies at the University of Maiduguri. That 
is significant, since his views are much more characteristic of Northern than of 
Yoruba Islam.
Abodunde’s book takes a more conventional, narrative form, with six parts run-
ning from the nineteenth-century missions through Nigerian Christianity’s suc-
cessive phases up to the present. His own commitment is not explicitly elaborated, 










































though it is well evident in his overall conception of Nigeria’s Christian history 
and in the much greater space and detail he devotes to its later Pentecostal stages. 
Against all that has been said about Pentecostal rupture, Abodunde presents this 
history as a continuous work of the Holy Spirit moving through various individu-
als and churches in which a growing Christian heritage of faith is built upon. So he 
treats non-Pentecostals in a very ecumenical spirit, and even the religious eccen-
tricities of men such as the Aladura prophet Josiah Ositelu are treated gently.
Olayiwola, by contrast, does not offer a sequential narrative as such but rather 
a Salafist interpretation of the history of Islam in Nigeria. His book is polemi-
cal where Abodunde is irenical and is thus in an immediate sense a politically 
more engaged work. A question not to be avoided is whether these highly indi-
vidual works may also be taken to represent broader bodies of opinion. Olayiwola’s 
clearly stated antipathies—to the mixing Islam targeted by Usman dan Fodio, to 
the Sufi brotherhoods, to Ahmadiyya—show him to be a characteristic and con-
sistent advocate of a Salafist viewpoint.71 By contrast, while Abodunde’s book is 
strongly Pentecostal in its sympathies, it is not the only kind of history that a 
Pentecostalist might have written. One can easily imagine a history with a much 
more negative treatment of non-Pentecostal churches or of some tendencies within 
Pentecostalism, though a person subscribing to such notions would perhaps have 
been unlikely to want to write a history at all.
The most revealing differences between the worldviews implicit in the two 
books lie in how each author articulates his core religious subject matter with such 
adjacent themes as culture, nation, state, and politics. Where Abodunde treats 
Christian history as occupying a space alongside but distinct from the secular 
or political history of Nigeria,72 despite the points of interaction between them, 
Olayiwola gives no space to the secular: for him, Islam’s history in Nigeria has to 
be understood as a political history. The reason is clearly stated:73
Islam is a faith and a state. . . . Sovereignty belongs only to Allah . . . so any earthly ruler 
of Muslims must . . . rule them strictly in accordance with the injunctions of Allah as 
provided in the Holy Quran and the Prophetic Hadith. Justice is uncompromisable.
There is no doubt a weak politics running though church history of any kind, 
but it is the strong politics of Olayiwola’s kind of Islamic history that explains the 
prominence in it of two salient themes—violence and takfir—that have no pres-
ence or parallels in Abodunde’s Christian history.
Violence is precisely where Olayiwola’s narrative begins, more particularly 
Muslim-on-Muslim violence, the kind involved in the setting up of Islamic states 
and the correction of deviance in them. He traces the genesis of his work back to 
Jos in 1981, where he74
witnessed the first conflict between Muslims on account of differences of convic-
tion of faith. The conflict between Tariqah [Sufi brotherhoods] and Izalah [anti-Sufi 










































activists] was so elaborate that lives were lost. . . . Back home in Yorubaland, remon-
strance between scholars . . . never took that form. . . . it has never been allowed to 
degenerate to the midst of followers on the street. [He refers to his] shock and dismay 
when [he] found [himself] among Muslims, who according to the Qur’an are sup-
posed to be brethren, killing one another [even] within the premises of mosques.
Anyone other than a Salafist may perhaps draw an obvious inference from 
this contrast between peaceful Yorubaland and the violent North that it probably 
has something to do with the Yoruba culture of religious tolerance, grounded in 
the outlook of their pre-Islamic jahiliyya, in contrast to the tradition of jihadist 
state-formation in Northern Nigeria. But these are possibilities that Olayiwola 
cannot allow himself to entertain. For him, the only conceivable basis of Islamic 
unity, the social counterpart of divine unity (tawhid), is a rightly guided regime in 
accord with the Prophet’s revelation. It follows that responsibility for violence can 
never be laid at the door of those who promote this ideal but only of those who, in 
opposing it, are justly taken as the enemies of God and to be treated accordingly.
This gives Olayiwola his doctrinal key for the interpretation of the history of 
Nigerian Islam, namely takfir, the anathematization as non-Muslim of certain 
groups who falsely present themselves as Muslim and thus undermine the true 
unity of Islam. Takfir is equally a religious and a political act, since it is concerned 
with defining the boundaries of the umma. Its first major use in Nigerian his-
tory was by Usman dan Fodio, in order to challenge the legitimacy of the Hausa 
kingdoms (then Muslim in their own eyes for several centuries) against which he 
launched his jihad and to justify his stance against his most formidable Muslim 
rival, al-Kanemi of Borno.75 Takfir changes the status under Islamic law of those 
so anathematized, for it redefines them as apostates and so legitimates the use of 
violence against them. Olayiwola wholeheartedly endorses dan Fodio’s position 
and without cavil or qualification declares that “no ideal Islamic community . . . 
has ever been built in history without Jihad.”76
The ideal of the umma as a political community, the framework for the col-
lective life of Muslims, is at the center of Olayiwola’s thinking. Now, since he also 
happens to be Nigerian, the question cannot be avoided of how this may relate 
to the two other frameworks offered by Nigerian history: state and nation. These 
concepts are not of the same order, since the state is a definite material reality but 
the nation is an “imagined community.”77 A supposed merit of nation-states, as 
against any other kind of state, is that the moral and cultural attachments rooted 
in belonging to a nation may be harnessed to create the basis for state citizenship. 
Since the umma is also an imagined community (and as such provided the moral 
basis for the early Islamic Empire and many later Islamic states), it has potential 
rivals in any nation based on different principles, such as language, ethnicity, race 
or descent, shared historical experiences, territorial logic, and so on, though his-
toric compromises have often been found between them.78










































Nigeria figures in Olayiwola’s account in two contrasting guises. First, it is an 
imaginary Muslim country, but one that was never allowed to come to fruition. 
This Nigeria “could have been united on the basis of Islam,” but the “unifying revo-
lution . . . as commenced by Shaykh Uthman bn Fudi” was choked off by British 
colonial intervention.79 Then there is the real Nigeria, the one that was created by 
the British in 1914, a century after dan Fodio’s death, which Olayiwola represents as 
a country where “people who were brothers and sisters in Islam before the incur-
sion of the West have been reduced to warring parties over what the colonialists 
have indoctrinated them to . . . Nationalism and Patriotism.”80 Thus he objects to 
Muslims’ adopting communal identities and getting caught up in local conflicts, 
since it results in them “[ceasing] to see one another as Muslims first and fore-
most.” The idea of Nigeria as a nation is thus a chimerical distraction from the only 
identification that has value for him, that of the Muslim umma, whereas Nigeria 
as a state is a mere political space that he would like to see entirely filled with the 
Islamic content of Sharia.
If I have given more space to Olayiwola’s book than to Abodunde’s, it is because 
(although less rich as a history of religion) it is so much more revealing as a 
political document. That the Pentecostalist literature is so devoid of a religiously 
theorized politics of any kind is itself an indication of just how different the two 
movements are in this respect. Yet whereas Olayiwola is much concerned about 
the establishment of an Islamic state but has no time for nationalism, Abodunde 
is a nationalist who has almost nothing to say about the state. One may think 
his nationalism surprising, granted that the rise of born-again Christianity was 
linked to a loss of faith in the secular project of Nigerian nationalism. But here the 
sense of national destiny is restored through pride in what Nigerians are doing in 
the world, whether through the dynamic and innovatory forms of Christian faith 
that they have taken to other lands or their fidelity to the traditions brought by 
the Gospel pioneers. The fitting heroes of Abodunde’s last chapter are thus Pastor 
Sunday Adelaja, founder of the Embassy of God in the Ukraine,81 and Archbishop 
Peter Akinola, the staunch defender of traditional teaching on sexuality in the 
Anglican Communion. There is no contradiction here between Abodunde’s sense 
of Pentecostalism being a global movement and his proud conviction that “history 
has placed in our [Nigerian] hands the baton in this hour.”82
The contrasting attitudes to nationalism between the two movements also 
express attitudes toward culture more generally that are deeply rooted in their par-
ent religious traditions. The main focus of Pentecostalism’s hostility to the culture 
of African nationalism was where the latter was felt to promote idolatry (as in the 
anti-Festac protests). But Pentecostalists are not in principle opposed to cultural 
specificities, and they have often taken trouble to adapt and preserve the cultural 
markers of ethnic distinction, provided that they are free (or can be purged) of any 
idolatrous taint.83 The Babel of linguistic diversity, as a fact of human history—the 










































“Parthians and Medes and Elamites . . . Cretes and Arabians” of Acts 2—is not there 
simply to be erased. Rather, it has provided the occasion for two complementary 
responses: transcendence though the Pentecostal gift of tongues and translation of 
the Bible into vernacular languages.84 The latter, famously, has worked powerfully 
to valorize the nations that are the bearers of those languages. We can see a strong 
modern evocation of this conjunction of the universal and the particular in that 
favored mise-en-scène of big Pentecostal revival services, where the back of the 
stage, behind the preacher’s rostrum, is adorned with a row of national flags.85 The 
message is implicit but clear: the Gospel is for all nations, since Christ is less the 
source of any one culture than the redeemer of all.86
Salafists, by contrast, are very uneasy about cultural diversity because of their 
conviction that Islam offers a complete way of life87 This notion, if taken literally, 
would obviate any discussion of the relationship between Islam and particular cul-
tures, since it leaves no space for true Muslims to have any culture except what is 
derived from Islam. Even Olayiwola has to recognize that this is fantastical, and 
he concedes that “Islam permits the incorporation of people’s customs into the 
framework of Shari’ah.”88 The trouble is that in Nigeria, as he delicately puts it, “this 
concession . . . seems to have been overutilized,” so that Muslims from one part of 
the country are not able to recognize as Islam what they find Muslims practicing 
in the name of that same religion in another part. Without uniformity, he feels, the 
ideal of unity is always at risk, and so Nigerian Islam needs to be restored as closely 
as possible to that pristine form of social cohesion that Émile Durkheim called 
mechanical solidarity: “All should understand that our ability to remain united 
depends on how closely alike we are. The culture of Islam [is] good enough for any 
people [in] any age. The more tenaciously we hold to it—devoid of admixture—
the more united we shall be.”89
VII I
On the surface, these two narratives may just seem to be very different; but they 
also harbor deep incompatibilities: not primarily as regards the faith and practice 
of individuals but as to how the two religions should connect with the political 
community. Salafism tends to come with explicit views of the kind of Islamic state 
that it aspires to, but Pentecostalism shrinks from any statement of its own politics, 
save for the oblique criticism of the Nigerian state for its failure to bring about 
development and the expression of disgust at political corruption that is common 
among individual Pentecostalists (as among Nigerians in general). But is the apo-
litical character of Pentecostalism simply to be taken at face value? It is surely 
not helpful to regard all religions as equally political in principle, as a thorough-
going disciple of Foucault may be inclined to do, on the grounds that the play of 
power is all-pervasive in social life, and that power implies politics. Yet even on the 










































narrower view that the political is what relates to the polis or state, the most apo-
litical of movements may have important political consequences, whether from 
how the state responds to them (as Jehovah’s Witnesses have often found to their 
cost)90 or through the mobilizing and empowering effects that they may have in 
the sphere of civil society. It is also quite possible that any group of Pentecostalists 
may take up an active political position and feel empowered by their faith in so 
doing, but in that case they will need to get their political script from some source 
other than Pentecostalism.
The key point here is how far the political messages of a religion in any par-
ticular situation are to be seen as integral or contingent to it. What is striking here 
is how much more historically contingent are the messages carried by Nigerian 
Pentecostalism—it may be better to say “Pentecostalists”—than those of Salafism, 
such as its articulation of resistance to the Abacha tyranny in the mid-1990s or 
the various affinities that it has established with other social forces (such as the 
Life More Abundant theme of the Awoist political tradition in Yorubaland). It is 
precisely this protean character of Pentecostalism that has enabled it to flourish 
in such diverse social contexts. Putting the point another way, we may say that 
Pentecostalism, as far as politics goes, offers a much more empty or open religious 
disposition, one whose content is less constrained by its traditions, than Salafism 
does. There are certainly forms of Pentecostalism that enjoin strict codes of behav-
ior, but in general the Holy Spirit is a vastly more flexible guide, one far more 
open to what the contingencies of history may bring, than the Koran and hadith 
are. Whereas Pentecostalists, existing as they do in many varieties, presume (and 
therefore also tend to promote) an open, plural, and level religious field, Salafists 
strive to reinstitute the religiopolitical regime that they believe Allah revealed to 
mankind through his Prophet. To that extent, the two movements offer Nigeria 
radically incompatible blueprints for the placement of religion in society.
214
Once in 2008 I was flying back from East Africa and had to take a night’s stopover 
in Addis Ababa. The driver sent to collect me spoke such good English that I asked 
him if he had spent time outside Ethiopia, thinking he might have been a student 
in the United States or Britain. He replied that he had been to Lagos, where the 
headquarters of his church was. This turned out to be Winners’ Chapel, led by the 
charismatic Bishop David Oyedepo. Two years later I came across Oyedepo’s confi-
dently smiling features on a weather-faded poster in a small town in the interior of 
western Liberia, advertising a power summit at his church’s national headquarters 
in Monrovia. The Yoruba have exported their brand of neo-Pentecostalism all over 
sub-Saharan Africa, especially to major cities like Nairobi and Johannesburg. And 
to Europe too, whether to serve mainly their own diaspora or to light the Pentecos-
tal fire in a native white population (as with the Embassy of God in Ukraine). In the 
New World, the picture is more complicated, since Yoruba religion takes two forms: 
the orisa religion, which came more than 150 years ago with those forcibly trans-
ported there as slaves, chiefly to Brazil and Cuba, or later diffused from there since 
1950; and the faiths that Yoruba migrants have taken with them in recent decades.
But what are we calling “Yoruba religion” here? I think the term may be legiti-
mately used in either of two ways: as whatever religion is actually practiced by Yoruba 
people or as a religion of distinctively Yoruba origins and character. These two criteria 
do not need to coincide in theory and may not substantially do so in practice. Putting 
them together, we may today distinguish three main concrete realizations or circles 
of Yoruba religion over the past century or so, which I may characterize as follows:
 1.  Yoruba religion practiced by Yoruba in their homeland, or what is conventional-
ly called Yoruba traditional religion (YTR), to which the cult of orisa was central.
11
The Three Circles of Yoruba Religion










































 2.  Religion practiced by the overwhelming majority of Yoruba people 
 today, not of Yoruba origin but consisting of various forms of Islam 
and  Christianity.
 3.  Religion of Yoruba origin practiced in the world today, overwhelmingly 
outside Africa by people who are not Yoruba.1
Though the three circles are linked through the historical experiences of the 
Yoruba over recent centuries and in the trajectories of the various religions impli-
cated in them, this connectedness has not been adequately matched in scholar-
ship, which has been fragmented. The classic work of Pierre Verger was exemplary 
in bridging Circles 1 and 32 and has been followed in several recent collections on 
particular orisa: Ogun, Osun, Sango.3 The relationship between Circles 1 and 2 is 
central to all studies of religious conversion in Yorubaland, though it has to be 
said that, since the perspective and documentation comes mainly from the side 
of the world religions, that usually receives much more detailed coverage than 
the “pagan” side. (I don’t exempt my own work from that criticism.) But the gulf 
between Circles 2 and 3, though they have a common point of reference in Circle 
1, has been enormous. (The main exception has been the work of J. Lorand Matory, 
though he has relatively little to say about the place of Christianity in the Atlantic 
nexus.)4 Circle 1 is now increasingly of residual importance and hence attracts less 
original study; it is Circles 2 and 3 where the serious contemporary action is, both 
as regards religious practice and in its scholarly study.
My contention here is that the gulf between Circles 2 and 3 needs to be closed 
if we are to answer a glaring question prompted by their comparison. How can we 
explain that orisa cults have fared so badly in their homeland—where they have 
shrunk to a pale shadow of their former importance (many cults, indeed, have 
died out altogether) and become subject to attack from dominant Muslim and 
Christian groups as demonic—while they have flourished and expanded outside 
it, not merely among African-descended populations but attracting many people 
not of African descent? Since my own primary research has been limited to Nigeria 
(Circles 1 and 2), my remarks about the situation of Circle 3 are both secondary and 
speculative.5 Although I do not have an answer to the question that I have posed, 
I hope that the comparisons I make in this chapter will do something to clear the 
way toward it. A further implication of this inquiry, with its Yoruba subject mat-
ter, is that the partition that has tended to exist between students of orisa religion, 
wherever practiced, and of Christianity and Islam needs to be broken down.
CIRCLE 1
We must begin from the so-called YTR—or, less tendentiously, orisa religion—
since it was the baseline for the two trajectories of Yoruba religious development, 
in the homeland and in the New World. I begin here from a paradox: that in several 










































ways the very term “Yoruba traditional religion” gives a misleading picture of its 
historical reality. As with Voltaire’s famous quip about the Holy Roman Empire—
that it was so called because it was neither holy nor Roman nor an empire—there 
are things that are problematic about each of its three terms.
“Yoruba” is a Hausa name of Arabic origin, originally applied just to the Oyo, 
adopted by the (Anglican) Church Missionary Society in the 1840s as their name 
for the people they proposed to evangelize and extended by them over succeeding 
decades to many other cognate peoples (the Egba, Ijesha, Ijebu, et al.). There were 
many close resemblances of language and culture between these peoples, as well 
as traditions of common descent from Ile-Ife, and these resemblances explain why 
they were readily grouped under a common name in diasporic situations, where 
they stood against much more different cultural others: Nago in Brazil, Lucumi in 
Cuba, Aku in Sierra Leone. But the notion of a specifically Yoruba religion implies 
a content that is both common to all Yoruba and distinctive of them. Here the prob-
lem is less that important Yoruba orisa (e.g., Ifa, Ogun, Esu-Elegba) were widely 
found among neighboring non-Yoruba peoples than that the cults to be found in 
different Yoruba towns varied so much. For example, in the 1870s, the main public 
cults of Ibadan were considered to be Orisa Oko, Ogiyan, and Oke’badan, whereas 
in Ondo they were Ogun, Esu, Oramfe, and the royal ancestors.6 Sango, who bulks 
so large in orisa religion in the New World, was an Oyo deity regarded as alien to 
the Yoruba East (Ondo, Ijesha, Ekiti). Oduduwa, understood as a male ancestral 
ruler of Ife in the Center-East, was considered the female consort of the creator 
god in the Southwest.7 Of river deities, Yemoja belonged mainly to the West; Osun 
to the Center-East; and Oya, being linked with the Niger as well as the tornado, to 
the North. So what existed on the ground was less a single Yoruba religion than a 
spectrum of local-cult complexes that varied from town to town and from West to 
East. The more heavily forested East was remote from the control of Oyo as well as 
from the Islamic influences that came with it.
 1.  The great and persistent problem with the term “traditional” is that it is 
used to refer both to a state supposedly anterior to the cultural impact of 
colonialism and to a certain range of contemporary beliefs and practices, 
namely those that cannot be assigned to either Islam or Christianity. There 
is the typical implication that the traditional exists in a state of stability, 
handed down from previous generations. No doubt this was the ideal, but 
there is plenty of evidence that, even before the upheavals of the nineteenth 
century, the reality was dynamic and changing. This dynamism was fueled 
by two enduring features of Yoruba religion: the possibility of individu-
als moving between cults and the competitive, expansionist character of 
many of the cults themselves. Nineteenth-century evidence suggests that 
this was especially true of the cult of the thunder god Sango. It seems likely 
that it opened the way to conversion to Islam, which had been part of the 










































(Oyo-)Yoruba religious scene for at least four centuries, and started to make 
significant numbers of converts by the early nineteenth century. So the 
 notion that Islam and the “traditional” belong to absolutely separate circles 
is untenable.
 2.  Finally we have to ask the most radical question of all: Is precolonial YTR 
strictly to be considered a “religion” at all? People had identities as members 
of their communities and (in many cases) as initiates of the cult groups 
of particular deities but not as adherents of a generalized religion. The 
word ẹsin, which means “religion” in modern Yoruba, was introduced by 
Christians and Muslims to refer exclusively to their own self-consciously 
held faiths.8 It was not its adherents but missionaries who first discursively 
constructed YTR as such (initially under the rubric “Yoruba heathenism”). 
In so doing, they both delimited and expanded it: they cut it out from 
the wider field of practices by which Yoruba people sought to control the 
environment of their lives and they treated as a single pan-Yoruba entity—
one corresponding to the Yoruba nation that they had also identified and 
named—the spectrum of local-cult complexes, which was what YTR was 
in reality.
But despite these reservations about the portrayal of them as a unified and 
bounded entity, unvarying across time and space, the religious practices of this 
large and diverse area undeniably have many strong and distinctive commonalities. 
The main components, of variable form, content, and local presence, are the orisa 
or deities, strongly personalized but at the same time expressive of natural forces 
(rivers, mountains, meteorological phenomena) or associated with human activi-
ties linked to them (farming, healing, ironworking); a supreme being, Olorun or 
Olodumare, the author of all existence but mainly active in human affairs through 
the orisa; ancestors, who were represented in various ways, such as the egungun 
masquerade cult among the Oyo or the Oro society among the Egba, whose voice 
was heard as the whirring sound of the bullroarer; other forms of power embodied 
in human form, such as witches and the cults directed against them, like Gelede; 
medicines (oogun), quasi-animate embodiments of power in material substances; 
and a wide range of divinatory techniques, of which the most complex and pres-
tigious was Ifa.
At the heart of Yoruba religious action, whether undertaken by individuals 
or by communities, was the search for empowerment and protection through 
establishing relations with the unseen but personalized forces that controlled 
everything that occurred in the phenomenal world. Two principal modes of 
relationship linked human beings and the deities. One was possession, whereby 
divine power was made available through the orisa mounting (gun) or entering 
the body of a devotee.9 This was limited to the minority who were priests or active 
initiates and were thus enabled to mediate the power of their orisa to the laity. 










































The other, sacrifice (ẹbọ), involved virtually everyone from time to time, whether 
on the many mundane occasions when individuals sought oracular advice, at the 
periodic festivals of orisa when cult activists and the community reaffirmed their 
links with their divine patrons, or when exceptional sacrifices were needed since 
it appeared that something had gone seriously wrong and the anger of an orisa 
needed appeasement. Sacrifice involved a kind of gift exchange between the sac-
rificer and the orisa: something of value—maximally the life of a living creature, 
even a human being, but also cowries or other items—was offered to the orisa in 
anticipation of life being given in return. The maintenance of life, keeping death in 
abeyance, was indeed the grand objective of YTR, and largely remains so in all the 
three circles of Yoruba religion.
Ifa has often been seen as the apex or centerpiece of YTR, and in a sense it 
was: it was arguably the most pan-Yoruba of all the cults, and it played a role in 
their overall articulation through the mytho-legendary material about them con-
tained in its divinatory verses. Yet there were ambivalences in Ifa’s relationship 
with the other orisa cults. Ifa had its own orisa, Orunmila, whom it represents as 
superior to the others, indeed as the coeval associate of Olodumare himself. Yet it 
also stands in contrast to the other cults. Ifa was a strongly male-oriented cult and 
did not possess the babalawo. By contrast, many, if not most, orisa priests were 
women, and so too were the great mass of active devotees. The greatest paradox 
about Ifa was that, despite its centrality to the orisa religion of Circle 1, it also pro-
vided a link to the world religions that would engender Circle 2. This seems to go 
back to the very origins of Ifa.
The sixteen-options basic form of Ifa shows it to belong to a family of divina-
tion systems of West Asian origin, whose vector in sub-Saharan Africa can only 
have been Islam. But its positively indigenous content suggests it is best regarded 
as a local response to the challenge of Islamic knowledge, the appropriation of 
one of its techniques to serve the cosmology that underpinned ancient Ife. Yet 
Ifa’s emphasis on Olodumare as its ultimate source indicates an opening to mono-
theism unique within YTR, and many references to Islam within the Ifa corpus 
indicate a strong awareness of the activities of Muslim clerics; yet at the same 
time babalawo sometimes divined that the solution to a client’s problem was for 
him to become a Muslim.10 Ifa, for all that it retells precedents, has always played 
an important role in legitimating novel responses to new situations: it mediates 
between continuity and change. Its remarkable degree of openness and disinter-
estedness eventually extended to Christianity too, and in turn African mission 
agents gave babalawo a degree of respect that they accorded to representatives of 
no other orisa. The first local study of YTR by a Yoruba pastor, James Johnson’s 
Yoruba Heathenism (1899), treated Ifa and the orisa in sharply contrasting ways: 
Ifa was seen as pointing toward Christianity, whereas the orisa were seen as the 
work of Satan. Johnson’s chief informant was a figure from the nascent Circle 3, 










































an Ijesha babalawo called Arije or Philip Jose Meffre, who converted from a nomi-
nal Catholicism to a committed evangelical Christianity when he returned from 
Brazil in 1862.
CIRCLE 2
The roots of Circle 2 run back to the arrival of Islam in Yorubaland, perhaps four 
centuries ago, but only in the twentieth century has it been fully realized, during 
the colonial and postcolonial periods. The process took place in three phases: first, 
a slow buildup during the nineteenth century, when Islam was joined (from the 
mid-1840s) by Christian missions; second, mass conversion during the colonial 
period from the 1890s onward, reaching a tipping point in the 1930s and continu-
ing into the age of high nationalism up to the late 1970s; and third, the emergence 
within both world religions of new movements more stringently opposed to the 
surviving forms of orisa religion.
The crucial point about the competition between the world religions in the 
nineteenth century was that it took place under Yoruba rules. Except for an area of 
northern Yorubaland that fell under Fulani jihadist rule as the Emirate of Ilorin, in 
the 1830s, Yoruba Islam expanded by peaceful, decentralized means. It was chiefly 
spread by clerics (alfa) who operated as entrepreneurs, offering their magicospiri-
tual services to chiefs and people: at the public level it was a matter of means to 
deal with fires and epidemics, and to bring success in war; to individuals, it was 
the same kind of guidance, healing, protection, and material benefits that the orisa 
cults offered. The chief Islamic means were a kind of sacrificial offering known as 
saraa, made through the alfa, and charms made from Koranic texts written on 
scraps of paper and sewn into leather amulets (tira). Thus Islam became part of 
the Yoruba system of religious provision, without any strong pressure to convert. 
If people did decide to convert, there was not much strong pressure on them for 
further cultural renunciation. Many Yoruba Muslims continued active in the wor-
ship of their family’s orisa and ancestral cults: the orisa were often reconfigured 
Islamically as maleka (angels).
Initial expectations of Christianity ran along similar lines: seen as another cult 
of God above, like Islam, and a distinct source of empowerment, giving access to 
the white man’s power. But in general and officially, the missions could not make 
this power available in the magicospiritual forms shared by orisa religion and local 
Islam, though popular Christian belief might tend this way (e.g., the ABD reading 
primer understood as a protective charm). Moreover, in their early days the mis-
sions made very heavy demands for cultural change (e.g., over polygamy, slave-
holding, and participation in domestic rituals) and promoted ethical values that 
were strongly at variance with much of Yoruba life. The long course of instruction 
and catechizing that preceded baptism actually made it quite difficult to become a 










































Christian. Christian converts were often seen as a people apart and initially were 
mostly drawn from marginal social categories. Even in Lagos (annexed by the 
British in 1861) Islam won many more local converts than Christianity. It was here 
that radical Yoruba clergy first defined Christianity’s problem as being culturally 
alien and too close to the European colonial presence.
Yet the British colonization of interior Yorubaland in the 1890s radically 
changed the conditions of conversion to both world religions, giving a particular 
fillip to Christianity on account of its association with the white man’s knowledge 
and its virtual monopoly of Western education. Islam benefited too, especially in 
areas where it was already well established, but its educational weakness remained 
a major drawback. On the other hand, Christianity found ways to correct its two 
main weaknesses: its overall sense of estrangement from Yoruba culture and par-
ticularly its inability to address the popular demand for magicomedical services. 
So Africanization became a main item on its agenda for most of the twentieth cen-
tury. A key breakthrough was achieved in the Aladura (Praying) movement, which 
burst on the scene in the 1920s and 1930s. This was led by charismatic proph-
ets who developed Christian means of healing, guidance, protection against evil, 
and the relief of mundane needs, thus triggering mass movements of conversion, 
which led to the emergence of new churches that have flourished down to this day. 
The paradox of Aladura is that while it offered a Christianity well in line with the 
traditional values of Yoruba religion and incorporating some of its symbolic idi-
oms, it was also much more vehemently hostile to Ifa and the orisa cults than the 
mainline churches were. In fact the Aladura revivals of 1930–31 brought a massive 
wave of iconoclasm directed against idols and the association of orisa with demons 
and other “powers of darkness.”
The 1930s marked a watershed in the history of religion in Yorubaland, and by 
the early 1950s the world religions could claim a majority of nearly 90 percent, near 
equally divided between Islam and Christianity. Though orisa religion was in a pro-
cess of steady contraction—many of the smaller, more local cults seem to have died 
out in the wake of Aladura activity—cult festivals of major civic importance con-
tinued to be celebrated; divinatory and magicomedical services remained in high 
demand, even among Muslims and Christians, and much of the old cosmological 
framework still informed the practice of the world religions (e.g., belief in witchcraft 
and the power of “juju”). The culture of orisa religion also sustained a social ethos of 
tolerant religious coexistence that served to domesticate the potential intolerance and 
exclusivism of the monotheisms.11 By the late colonial period, Yoruba religion was 
conceived as like a stool with three legs, or a crossroads (orita) between three faith 
traditions.12 This dispensation continued through the nationalist period of the 1940s 
and 1950s and for nearly twenty years after Nigeria became independent in 1960.
A marked change began to show itself in the late 1970s, with two new devel-
opments reaching across Nigeria as a whole. First, the world religions assumed 










































a much greater saliency in the public sphere, as in the vehement debates about 
Sharia law that first erupted in 1977–78 during the debates that preceded the 
establishment of a new civilian constitution; and in the intermittent outbreaks of 
religious violence between Muslims and Christians, mostly in Northern Nigeria, 
which began in the early 1980s and have continued up to the present. Though the 
Yoruba continue as a beacon of religious amity, even here relations between Islam 
and Christianity are more tense than they used to be before 1980. This is linked to 
the second development, the rise of new and more strenuous forms of devotion 
within each faith: charismatic or neo-Pentecostal (born-again) Christianity on the 
one side, and more rigorous versions of Islamic reformism on the other, which 
have each gained millions of converts and stamped their assertive presence alike 
on urban space and the electronic media.
Despite their antagonism, these have several features in common: they are 
strongly aware of themselves as movements for reform and renewal within their 
own faith traditions and are aware of themselves as belonging to transnational 
movements. They are both intensely critical of many of the local adaptations 
made by their respective faiths and have redoubled their efforts to stigmatize and 
eliminate what remains of orisa religion. They promote universalizing rather than 
Africanizing idioms for the expression of their respective faiths: if the drive toward 
a more normative Middle Eastern style has been going on in Yoruba Islam for 
decades, the loss of momentum of the Africanizing impetus in Christianity is strik-
ing. Though the born-agains had important roots in the Aladura movement, it is 
common for them to attack such White-garment churches as the Celestial Church 
of Christ for having incorporated pagan practices. Nollywood movies often incor-
porate born-again perspectives in their hyperrealistic portrayals of witches and 
demons, thus serving to perpetuate a distorted simulacrum of traditional belief 
and practice, while Pentecostal literature attacks wealth-bringing female deities like 
Mami Wata, Yemoja, or Olokun.13 Direct iconoclastic assault has in recent decades 
been more the work of Muslims, with such public displays as egungun masquerades 
their particular targets. Whilst at Oyo it is Islam that encroaches upon the royal 
rituals of Sango, at Ife the Ọọni, the very reincarnation of Oduduwa, gives ground 
to pressure from evangelical Christianity. Ọọni Sijuade has renounced his divine 
status and the title of Alaye (Ruler of the World) that expressed it, while his forceful 
senior wife, a zealot of the Christ Apostolic Church, has built her own chapel in 
the palace and sponsors a nativity play that stages the downfall and replacement of 
orisa religion.14 It is an irony indeed that over a period when Ife has become a pil-
grimage center for orisa devotees from the New World, its indigenous traditional 
priesthood experiences, as Jacob Olupona puts it, “despair and outrage, . . . gasping 
for air in a restricted space, occupied by . . . hostile forces.”15
Yet orisa religion is so closely related to the glories of Yoruba culture, and 
to what makes the Yoruba distinctive as a people, that the demonization of it to 










































which they have been led by their convictions as Christians or Muslims has never 
been their only response to it. Christians particularly have developed another 
strategy to make the orisa safe, which is to secularize them by taking them out of 
the category of religion altogether. This began with the euhemeristic interpreta-
tion of orisa by African pastors of the missions: they were seen as heroes, founder 
kings, ancestors, or great men deified after their deaths, thus enabling them to be 
treated with respect. In recent years, a highly reified concept of culture has been 
used to present the annual festivals of major patronal deities as cultural festivals, 
celebrations of the community and its history rather than as religion (though not 
everyone, including some ọbas themselves, has felt able to accept this redefini-
tion). No part of YTR has been more important in this regard than Ifa; no group of 
indigenous religious specialists has won the same kind of respect from Christian 
pastors and Muslim alfa as did the babalawo. The idea of Ifa as Yoruba philosophy 
or as a great cultural archive remains very influential among Yoruba intellectuals 
down to this day. Here we have a perspective among a minority of well-educated 
Yoruba, even at a time when the dominant movements in Islam and Christianity 
so strongly negate everything to do with traditional religion, that is able to connect 
with the flourishing practice of orisa religion in the Americas.
CIRCLE 3
Clearly orisa religion could not cross the Atlantic under the conditions that it did 
without major changes in its social bearings, its organization, and (most problem-
atically) its content. It is the last of these that has most engaged scholars, concerned 
as they have been to celebrate the African achievement, under the most adverse 
circumstances, in saving such a large portion of their religious heritage and the 
values implicit in it. The extent to which this happened was variable, depending 
both on the culture and capacity of particular groups of slaves and on the institu-
tional conditions into which they were received.
The distinctiveness of the Yoruba case can be pinpointed through two con-
trasts. First, although many different African groups succeeded in establishing 
something of their old religion in New World settings, the success of the Yoruba in 
so doing—above all in the shape of Santería in Cuba and Candomblé in Brazil—is 
outstanding. This seems due partly to the inherent durability yet adaptability of 
the forms, both cultural and institutional, by which orisa religion was carried and 
partly to the historical contingency of the numbers and timing of Yoruba slave 
imports to the Americas. While Yorubaland had supplied slaves to the Atlantic 
trade during the eighteenth century—it had been a major source of revenue for 
the Oyo Empire—the great surge in slaves of Yoruba origin came only from the 
1810s and peaked as late as 1826–50.16 That was due precisely to the collapse of Old 
Oyo, which created a regional power vacuum and decades of internecine warfare 










































across the whole of Yoruba country. The resultant human debris fed the continu-
ing demand for slaves, both local and international. Since both Great Britain and 
France had by the 1830s abolished slavery in their colonies and outlawed the slave 
trade, this late flood of Yoruba slaves passed by illicit channels into the Spanish 
and Portuguese colonies, where slavery was abolished much later (Cuba in 1886; 
Brazil in 1888).
The other condition for the survival of so much of orisa religion came from the 
side of the slaveowners, where the key factor was whether they were Catholic (espe-
cially Iberian) or Protestant. The contrast between the religious outcomes in Cuba, 
Brazil, and Haiti on the one hand, and Jamaica or the Anglo-American colonies (or 
states) on the other, with Trinidad (passing from Spanish through French to British 
control) an interesting hybrid case, is striking. The Catholic powers were prepared 
to recognize and accept the existence of African nations and to allow associations 
based on them a limited sphere of activity, which clearly worked to facilitate the 
survival of ethnic religious traditions, more than the Protestant powers were. This 
was further facilitated by the Catholic institution of the cabildo or religious fra-
ternity. For the Yoruba in particular, the Catholic cult of saints was important in 
providing a framework within which orisa worship, first perhaps disguised and 
then genuinely synthesized with elements of Catholic devotion, could be contin-
ued. Most orisa devotees no doubt regarded themselves as Catholics too and par-
ticipated in Catholic festivals. Nevertheless the Yoruba-derived ritual complexes 
did not simply maintain a sense of themselves as such but also developed orga-
nizationally, ritually, and theologically, as they responded to the challenges of the 
new contexts. This is not to be grasped within the terms of the model put forward 
by Melville J. Herskovits, in which a single continuum runs between poles labeled 
“most African” and “most acculturated to Euro-Catholic norms.”17 Rather, as David 
Brown has put it, “borrowed ‘non-African’ narratives may have helped recrystallize 
heterogeneous resources into a modern, theologically rationalized religion.”18
Orisa religion has evolved as a belief system in the Americas in three principal 
ways:
 1.  The number of deities worshipped has been greatly reduced from the total 
that must have originally been taken across the Atlantic, still less the 401 
(i.e., indefinitely numerous) orisa that are conventionally said to have ex-
isted in Circle 1.
 2.  The main survivors—Sango, Ogun, Yemoja, Esu-Elegba, Obatala (Orisanla 
in Brazil), Ososi, Osun, Oya, Sopona (Babaluaye)—are particularly charac-
teristic of Oyo and the Center and northwest rather than of eastern Yoruba-
land. Among these Sango, the royal deity of Oyo, has risen to a position of 
such overall preeminence that in some regions his name has eclipsed all 
others (e.g., Shango in Trinidad, Xango in parts of Brazil).19 On the other 










































hand there are the contrasting outcomes for Ifa (Orunmila), which virtu-
ally died out in Brazil but flourished greatly in Cuba. At first sight it seems 
surprising that it is this way round, since far more Yoruba people were 
taken as slaves to Bahia than to the Spanish Caribbean,20 and there was 
also a great deal more flux and reflux between Yorubaland and Brazil than 
there was with Cuba. The names of some prominent babalawo are known.21 
By comparison it seems due to contingent (or at least not fully explained) 
circumstances that Ifa became so solidly established in Havana in the late 
nineteenth century through the efforts of five Yoruba-born babalawo who 
are recognized as the founders of the main branches of the entire Regla 
de Ifa in Cuba and the Cuban diaspora down to today, with far-reaching 
 consequences.22
   A further point may perhaps be made about the varying fortunes of 
Yoruba orisa in these new settings. Although I strongly incline to a cre-
olist overall perspective in the interpretation of Cuban or Brazilian phe-
nomena—that is, one that fully accepts their authenticity as such rather 
than evaluating them primarily as more or less effective vehicles for the 
transmission of pregiven African traits—it is important to stress that some 
New World developments seem also to be extensions of cultural dynamics 
already evident in nineteenth-century Yorubaland. Two examples come to 
mind. First, the same features of the Sango cult that fueled its expansion 
from its Oyo heartland into areas to the east and south during the Age of 
Confusion after the collapse of the Oyo Empire continued overseas as oc-
casions presented themselves, whether in Brazil or the Caribbean.23 Second, 
the way in which Lucumi religion in Cuba became bifurcated between what 
Brown calls “Ifa-centric” and “Ocha-centric” ritual fields,24 the former male-
oriented and the latter female-oriented, while it has to be seen as a distinctly 
Cuban development, is still also the further working out of a cultural logic 
that was already evident (and noted by our first contemporary witnesses, 
native CMS agents) in mid-nineteenth-century Yorubaland.25
 3.  Orisa religion has become markedly more “pantheonized,” in David Brown’s 
term, or rationalized as a unified, hierarchical system. Not surprisingly, in 
Cuba this was mainly the work of babalawo, though an analogous process 
occurred more spontaneously in Brazil. Although it is now common for 
scholars of Yoruba religion in Nigeria to speak of a “pantheon” of deities—
by analogy with Greco-Roman religion—this is quite misleading, at least 
for the nineteenth century, for a reason already indicated: What existed in 
concrete reality was less a single Yoruba religion than a range of distinct cult 
complexes that varied from one town and region to another. In Yoruba-
land the different orisa did not share temples or festivals as they did in the 
New World—in fact there was a lot of rivalry between them26—though the 










































festivals of the orisa found in one town would usually be coordinated with 
one another in that town’s unique ritual calendar. But the Sango, Osun, or 
Orisa Oko festivals were not synchronized with one another across different 
towns: there was no pan-Yoruba equivalent of saints’ days.
Again, individuals or compounds might have collections of orisa, which could 
all be brought out together on special occasions, but these were contingent accu-
mulations, not “pantheons.”27 Ifa verses do tell many stories about the relations 
between orisa, and can be used to construct a systematized pantheon, but Ifa does 
not really go very far in that direction itself. Since Ifa contains a vast collection of 
mostly quite short narratives dealing with a particular subject—primordial epi-
sodes of oracular consultation—it is in itself much less “pantheonic” than such 
grand mythological narratives as the Hindu Mahabharata or Hesiod’s Theogony. 
Yet the babalawo, intellectuals as they were, were certainly adept at rationaliza-
tions that pointed in a pantheonic direction. So when babalawo in Ibadan in 1854 
wanted to justify orisa worship to critical missionaries, they argued that the rela-
tionship of the orisa to God was analogous to that between the junior titleholders 
and the Balẹ of the town, both acting as intermediaries between ordinary folk and 
the supreme power.28 Other Cuban developments—the reduced number of orisa, 
the notion of a single Lucumi religion, the bringing together of different orisa in 
one temple, the acquisition by a new initiate of several orisa at the same time29—
must all have encouraged the babalawo to realize more fully the pantheon poten-
tial latent in circle-1 orisa religion. Here it is hard to resist the conclusion that, 
just as it was missionary outsiders in Yorubaland who first discursively fashioned 
Yoruba heathenism (YTR), so it was practitioners in the outside of the Americas 
who first created the reality of a single Yoruba religion.
The Yoruba religion of Circle 3 has been in continuous development. Perhaps 
we may discern three main stages of this: its initial formation from existing mate-
rials and traditions carried directly from West Africa in the nineteenth century; 
a period of consolidation and relative stability in the first half of the twentieth 
century (when it first became the object of positive academic study by scholars 
like Fernando Ortiz, R. Nina Rodrigues, Melville J. Herskovits, Roger Bastide, 
Ruth Landes, and others); and the later twentieth century, which has brought not 
only further internal development but also a dramatic expansion, particularly 
into North America. The background conditions of this last phase are diverse, 
but include a new national consciousness in many Latin American countries, 
such that indigenous and African traditions, long despised by their white criollo 
elites, came to be valorized; the impact of the Cuban revolution, ranging from 
the vicissitudes of its cultural policies toward religion (or religions) at home, to 
the growth in the USA of a large Cuban exile community that carried Santería 
with it; and a new cultural politics of race in the USA that led growing numbers 










































of African-Americans to recover or recreate what they regarded as more authenti-
cally African forms of religion.
The tension between re-Africanization and universalist outreach is perhaps the 
crucial dilemma faced by the Yoruba religion of Circle 3 today. There are impor-
tant differences between its two main forms: Yoruba reversionism, as found among 
African-Americans, and Yorubización among Cubans and Cuban-Americans. For 
the former, the primary impetus to re-Africanization has been a search for racial 
integrity, of which the archetypal product is Oyotunji (Oyo Revived) village in 
South Carolina. In this reinvented Yoruba community, a whole ritual cycle of 
festivals of major orisa has been instituted, and a roots divination introduced to 
provide clients with a Yoruba ancestry. The career of Ọba Adefunmi, Oyotunji’s 
founder, exemplifies the tensions in the relations between black American Yoruba 
reversionists and the Cuban Santeros who introduced orisa religion to the United 
States from the late 1940s. Adefunmi (or Walter S. King, as he then was) had been 
led from a more eclectically African phase (with Akan and Dahomean elements) 
to a more specifically Yoruba one through the influence of a Santero, Cristóbal 
Oliana, from 1959 onward. A decade later, he had moved into black-nationalist 
politics and broke his previous ties with Santería. The idea of receiving a black 
religion from practitioners who included whites was unacceptable, and Adefunmi 
turned toward a more thorough and deliberate reinvention of Yoruba religious 
practice, including getting direct legitimation from the Ọọni of Ife.30 Here the iro-
nies really start to pile up, for as we have seen the Ọọni is a Christian subject to 
strong Pentecostal influence, while the Nigerians saw Adefunmi and his people as 
oyinbo (Europeans).
But re-Africanization and universalist outreach do not have to be so sharply 
opposed. As Stephan Palmié has shown, in contrast to how race has been cultur-
ally constructed in Anglo-America, where blackness and Africanity were mutually 
indexical, in Cuba “ ‘Africanity’ and ‘blackness’ just did not match up against up 
against each other.”31 This made it much more likely for Africanity to offer val-
ues of universal human relevance, so that orisa religion could at least aspire to 
be a world religion. The prime motive of re-Africanization or Yorubización then 
becomes the conviction that the purest, most authentic, most effective forms of 
ritual and doctrine are to be sought at their point of origin.32 Although this notion 
is found in very many religions, its precise emphasis varies: in orisa religion it is 
on geographical origin (specifically on Ile-Ife as the site of the cosmogony); in 
Christianity and Islam it is more on temporal origin, on the age when divine incar-
nation or revelation occurred.
Whatever the primary motive, the impetus to re-Africanize has led to a search 
for authoritative or (what might be called) truly traditional knowledge about 
orisa religion in its homeland, for application in the diaspora. Partly this has 
been sought from the large body of academic and quasi-academic literature on 










































the Yoruba—by scholars of religion, anthropologists, art historians, experts in oral 
(especially Ifa) literature, and so on—and partly it has come from personal contact 
with Yoruba priests, babalawo, herbalists, drummers, and other specialists. Orisa 
devotees have traveled from the New World to be initiated by and to learn from 
religious authorities in Nigeria, while Yoruba specialists have gone the other way, 
to offer their services and to build up followings or spiritual clientages across the 
Atlantic.33 With the deep decline of orisa devotion in Yorubaland, these emerging 
markets for authentic ritual knowledge in the New World are an enticing oppor-
tunity for those with the relevant expertise. The most prestigious of these traveling 
experts or episcopi vagantes is surely Professor Wande Abimbola, who bears the 
title (conferred on him by the Ọọni of Ife) of Awisẹ ni Agbaye (Spokesperson for Ifa 
throughout the World).34 He has been active in the World Orisa Conferences held 
periodically since 1981, which have tended to promote Nigerian Yoruba practice 
as normative—and significantly won more support in Brazil than in Cuba, with its 
own distinctive and strongly instituted Regla de Ifa.
A paradoxical reversal lurks in these moves toward re-Africanization, insofar as 
these can be justified as a kind of desyncretization: the removal of Catholic accre-
tions to bring orisa religion back to its pure, primordial form.35 For in most writ-
ing about modern African religion, the term “syncretism” has been used to express 
this concern when directed the other way: the anxiety of Christians and Muslims 
of the mainline traditions that distinctively African manifestations of those faiths 
(e.g., healing practices in Aladura churches, Sufi devotional rituals) have become 
corrupted by “pagan” elements.36 As I argued above, the dominant movements in 
contemporary Nigeria, both Muslim and Christian, are run strongly against such 
“contamination” of their own traditions. So a war against syncretism appears to be 
the ordre du jour across the whole religious field. But while a notion of syncretism 
as spiritual danger seems to sit easily with doctrinally grounded faiths addressed 
to a single, jealous God “of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob,” it is hard to see how it 
can be applied plausibly or coherently to orisa religion, which was both undog-
matic and accommodative to new cults joining its ensemble. Moreover, it appears 
that a certain spirit of mix-and-match arising from within American culture is 
producing fresh syncretisms, whether with various forms of “Afrikan” Protestant 
Christianity, with New Age spiritualities, or with other Afrocentric traditions. 
Where more likely than New Jersey to find an Egbe Sankofa Kingdom of the Gods 
of Afrika?37
Ifa has always been a critical interface between orisa religion and the scriptural 
monotheisms. Early on, these latter were often seen in terms of Ifa—for example, 
as where their scriptures were seen as analogous to the signs made in the dust on 
the diviner’s tray and treated as a vehicle of predictive prophecy—but later, as Islam 
and Christianity acquired a general hegemony over the Yoruba religious field, 
the assimilation has tended to go the other way. The Church of Orunmila, which 










































appeared in the 1920s, modeled its services upon those of Protestant churches;38 
and although this appealed to only a small minority, it has become common for 
educated Yoruba to read Ifa in a fundamentalist fashion, similarly to how Muslims 
regard the text of the Koran or evangelical Christians conceive of the Bible: as an 
inerrant, unchanging, pristine transcript of God’s Word, set in a primordial Ile-
Ife.39 When this perspective is applied to Ifa in other, non-Yoruba settings, as in 
early twentieth-century Dahomey (as recorded by Bernard Maupoil for the Fon 
diviner Gedegbe)40 or in the Regla de Ifa in Cuba, any variations in its content will 
have to be seen as deviations from or corruptions of its pristine character. That this 
is false to the historical reality of how Ifa has been produced, as an evolving and 
ever self-adapting system of practical oracular wisdom, is cogently shown by Noel 
Amherd in his study of Ifa in Ijebu Remo.41
In recent years the question has been raised of “orisa devotion as world religion,” 
as in the title of an edited volume based on the papers of a large conference on Yoruba 
religion held in Miami in 1999.42 Does the evident globalization of a religion so far 
strongly identified with its ethnolinguistic origins indicate that it has the poten-
tial truly to become “a world religion,” as the volume editors suggest? Certainly 
“Yoruba” religion is a very different case from the sort of “glocalized” religious 
phenomenon represented by, say, Mouridism among Senegalese migrants in Paris 
or New York or the Deobandi-derived Tablighi Jamaat among Pakistani migrants 
and their descendants in London, in that Yoruba are not now its primary vectors 
but people from the Hispanic Caribbean or African-Americans. When Nigerian 
Yoruba go to the U.K. or the USA, they are overwhelmingly more likely to set up 
branches of the Redeemed Christian Church of God or of Nasfat than congrega-
tions of olorisa. Yet some Yoruba cultural entrepreneurs, including a few converts 
to the orisa from Christianity, have made contact with African-Americans and 
produced forms of orisa worship that incorporate a declamatory, testifying style 
like what is found in North American Protestantism.43 Ironically, that same style, 
taken eastward across the Atlantic by Pentecostal evangelists (more white than 
black) over recent decades, has become naturalized in born-again Christianity in 
Nigeria. The outcomes of this cross-play of religious forces—in North America 
between Nigerian Yoruba migrants and visitors, African-Americans, and Latino 
orichá devotees—on both sides of the Atlantic remain wide open.
Despite the positive appeal of re-Africanization for many of those drawn to 
orisa religion today, whether for racial or religious reasons, the strains between 
it and global outreach can only grow. Religions can only become world religions 
if they are able to loosen their links with their racial and linguistic origins and 
adjust their distinctive forms to a wide range of new situational demands. Classic 
Santería and Candomblé were successful in doing this, but syncretism—in Bengt 
Sundkler’s sense of “new wine [i.e., meeting religious demand from non-Yoruba in 
non-African settings] in old wineskins [i.e., Yoruba cultural forms]”—was integral 










































to it. Even the monotheistic world religions, for all their inherent suspicion of 
syncretism, have in their expansion depended on employing a good deal of it in 
practice, though their adherents are prone to disavow it. What is certain is that 
these cultural struggles of orisa religion within Circle 3 can be resolved only there, 
despite the importance of cultural resources from Circle 1 (especially when con-
veyed by ritual experts from Nigeria). For granted the strength of anti-orisa sen-
timent in Circle 2, the cultural resource-base for Nigerian intervention in orisa 
religion outside Africa can be expected only to erode further in years to come. If 
this happens, it may even come about—and not for the first time, as witness the 
Amish or the Shakers—that a religion of Old World origins makes its primary 
home in the New.
• • •
I have treated Circle 1 as the baseline for two divergent lines of historical develop-
ment: The first is a story of orisa religion’s contraction in situ, where many con-
textual features remain in place, whereas the second is a story of expansion in 
radically new contexts of the diaspora, which have resulted in a push-and-pull 
between adaptation to new demands and struggles to maintain or recover the tra-
dition. This contrast poses a general issue so far not addressed. Are we merely 
dealing with two different histories with a common starting point but driven each 
by its own contingencies? The comparison may have usefully pinpointed some of 
these, but can we also derive from it a theoretical understanding of the differences 
that they have produced? To do this, we need to be able to typify the two religious 
outcomes—the Abrahamic faiths as practiced by Nigerian Yoruba in Circle 2 and 
the orisa religion of Circle 3—in such a way as to be able to match them with a 
fitting general characterization of the circumstances in which they exist.
What first comes to mind here is Robin Horton’s contrast between a cultic focus 
on a host of subordinate deities as against a High God or Supreme Being, corre-
lating respectively with the local community (microcosm) and a world of wider 
social relations (macrocosm). But this contrast does not allow us to place Circle 3 
in a coherent or persuasive way, since its cosmology of multiple deities does not 
correspond to a sociology of localized relations. Rather, the deities transited from 
their original microcosm(s), proving themselves equally serviceable to their devo-
tees in the relative macrocosm of the plantations and towns of Cuba and Brazil 
with their populations of heterogeneous origins; and then onward to the greater 
macrocosm of the cities of eastern North America. On the way they took on a fur-
ther macrocosmic dimension not embraced within Horton’s theory: they attracted 
fresh devotees of diverse origins, many of non-Yoruba or even non-African origin. 
So it is hard to see that the worship of orichás in Havana, Miami, or New York, or 
of orixás in Bahia or Rio de Janeiro, is functionally either more or less microcos-
mic or macrocosmic than the Islam or Christianity practiced in Lagos or Ibadan.










































Another dimension of religious difference seems more promising: How far, or 
in what respects, is any religion, or religion as such, to be seen as an instrumental 
or an expressive phenomenon—that is, as providing its adherents with a set of 
adaptive instruments or of intrinsic satisfactions? Most religions have something 
of both, but Christianity in the modern West has relinquished most of its erst-
while instrumental functions to science-based technology and medicine, leaving 
itself largely an expressive phenomenon. The instrumental and expressive aspects 
of religion may each take various forms, some more intrinsic and some more con-
tingent, but for present purposes the two most pertinent are, first, where religion is 
an instrument for the “explanation, prediction and control” (in Horton’s phrase) of 
this-worldly phenomena, and second, where it becomes the vehicle for the expres-
sion of an ethnic or racial identity. A strongly instrumental attitude toward the 
sacred was largely transferred from Circle 1, through the experience of conversion, 
into the Yoruba Christianity (and Islam) of Circle 2. Those who carried the orisa 
with them in their hearts across the Atlantic into the nascent Circle 3 no doubt 
fully shared this orientation too, initially with no sense of their expressing thereby 
a racial or ethnic identity but merely one of devotion to their own orisa or Ifa as 
their personal guardian and helper. For the orisa of Circle 1, where it all began, 
were not at that stage marked as Yoruba, still less as black or as part of a system that 
some others called idolatry. But under the conditions of Circle 3, where slaves (and 
later freedmen) of Yoruba origin mingled with many different ethnic others, as 
well as with a white racial other, some kind of ethnoracial marking became inevi-
table. So in Cuba a Lucumi religion came into being—in Brazil, Nago—which was 
probably the first time that the practitioners (as against the missionary opponents) 
of orisa religion came to see it as a single, overall entity, as a religion.
What did not happen in Cuba was that it became marked as a black religion, 
as happened later in the USA. Is it possible to say why Cubans who were pheno-
typically white not only joined Santería but sometimes became deep experts in 
its African knowledge? At this point, Palmié’s argument seems to shift into a dif-
ferent epistemological register, for he turns to explain this through the agency of 
the orisa themselves: it was not the white initiates who chose their orisa but the 
orisa who chose them. Thus it becomes irrelevant to ask about the motives of the 
white Cubans who joined Santería. That certainly accords with what he describes 
as the “racially unmarked theology of recruitment” of Afro-Cuban religion, which 
surely has roots in the open recruitment patterns of some orisa in the Yoruba 
homeland.44 But whenever was theology a sufficient condition for the religious 
choices of human beings? Granted the racial barriers of Cuban society in the nine-
teenth and the early twentieth century, it seems probable that it was instrumental 
concerns—“to improve their health or to reverse streaks of bad luck”45—rather 
than expressive ones that first drew whites to the orisa, with the expressive satis-
factions of cult membership coming later; but it seems unlikely that we can ever 










































really know. Walter S. King (later Ọba Adefunmi), by contrast, seems to have been 
drawn first to the expressive aspects of orisa religion and later to the instrumen-
tal uses of Ifa divination. So neither does the instrumental/expressive distinction 
serve to explain the difference between the paths taken by Circle 2 and Circle 3. So 
our quest comes to an end in contingency, indeterminacy, and the unpredictability 
accorded to the orisa themselves.
THE C ONCLUSION,  IN WHICH NOTHING 
IS    C ONCLUDED
“It was now the time of the inundation of the Nile. A few days after their visit to the 
catacombs the river began to rise. [Rasselas and his companions] were confined to 
their house. The whole region being under water gave them no invitations to any 
excursions, and, being well supplied with materials for talk, they diverted them-
selves with comparisons of the different forms of life, which they had observed, 
and with various schemes of happiness, which each of them had formed.”46
In his poised and lambent prose, Samuel Johnson—the other one!—takes 
us back to where the comparative method began, in the social thought of the 
Enlightenment. The Grand Cham of English letters was not a systematic theorist, 
still less a writer whom we consider a founding father of social anthropology, yet 
in The History of Rasselas, Prince of Abissinia, he shows how fully he shared its 
cognitive and moral assumptions. More an extended philosophical fable than a 
novel, Rasselas drew its empirical inspiration from the account of Ethiopia writ-
ten by a Portuguese Jesuit, Fr. Jerónimo Lobo, of which Johnson had published 
an abridged translation. His own immersion in the comparativism of the age is 
well evident in how he commends the credibility of Lobo’s account: “Here are no 
Hottentots without religion, polity or articulate language, no Chinese perfectly 
polite and completely skilled in all the sciences”;47 or in how he makes his char-
acters in Rasselas turn to ethnographic comparison as they play with the central 
question of the book—to which Johnson refuses a definite answer—What is the 
path to human happiness?
Rasselas first appeared in 1759, that annus mirabilis for the emergent British 
Empire, when the Atlantic slave trade was close to its height yet the abolition-
ist movement was starting to gain momentum. Johnson was well known for his 
passionate opposition to slavery, as well as for his personal sympathy for black 
people.48 His book gained a large readership on both sides of the Atlantic, but it 
seems to have resonated particularly with the experience and aspiration of some 
of the black victims of the slave trade. It makes sense that Rasselas was a name not 
uncommonly given to (or taken by) by liberated slaves, like the Rasselas Belfield 
(d. 1822) who lies under a handsome gravestone in the churchyard of Bowness-
on-Windermere in the English Lake District. For Rasselas was an African prince, 










































and in identifying with him these former slaves were asserting an ancestral dig-
nity, thus mildly anticipating the African-Americans who adopt Yoruba names 
through the roots divination offered at Oyotunji village. More than that, Johnson’s 
book gave a significant boost toward that image of Abyssinia or Ethiopia as an 
idealized African homeland or the focus of an authentic spiritual life for people 
of African descent, from the Rastafarians to the Ethiopian Church that Adeniran 
Oke proclaimed to his fellow Yoruba in the aftermath of the influenza pandemic of 
1918. Of course, all this goes much further than what Johnson intended—but that 
is the way with potent stories. Rasselas has often been compared with Voltaire’s 
Candide, but the archetype of the Happy Valley from which Rasselas escaped in 
search of knowledge of the world’s diversity is surely the Eden of Milton’s Paradise 
Lost. An essential feature of both stories—in contrast to the various attempts to 
reverse history by a returning to a primordial Ife or Mecca, places where the linea-
ments of the good life are divinely fixed—is that the principal actors are not able 
to return to the paradisal state but have to go forth to make an original history 
through their choices:
The world was all before them, where to choose
Their place of rest, and Providence their guide.
They, hand in hand, with wandering steps and slow,
Through Eden took their solitary way.
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Glossary of Yoruba and Arabic Terms 
 Appearing in the Text and Notes
YORUBA
adua prayer (Muslim) [Tones: low, high, low]
adura prayer (Christian) [Tones: low, high, low]
afin palace [Tones: low, mid]
agbada man’s gown [Tones: mid, high, high]
aiye age, world, time [Tones: mid, high]
alasalatu member of women’s Muslim prayer group [Tones: mid, high, low, high, low]
alfa Muslim cleric [Tones: low, high]
alufa Christian clergyman [Tones: low, low, high]
babalawo diviner, priest of Ifa [Tones: third syllable high, others mid]
balogun war chief, warlord [Tones: mid, high, mid]
Basọrun Oyo’s main subroyal chief [Tones: mid, low, mid]
ẹgbẹ club, society, association [Tones: mid, high]
esin religion (especially world religion) [Tones: low, low]
ìlú town, community [Tones: low, high]
Imale Muslim [Tones: low, unmarked middle, low]
itan story, historical narrative [Tones: low, low]
Lẹmọmu imam [Tones: low, high, low]
mọgaji Ibadan lineage head [Tones: high, low, high]
Nọibi deputy to imam [Tones: high, -, high]










































ọba king, ruler [Tones: mid, mid]
odu sacred division of Ifa verses [Tones: mid, low]
ọlaju enlightened person [Tones: low, high, high]
ologun warrior, war leader [Tones: mid, high, mid]
oogun medicine [Tones: mid, low, low]
oriki praise name [Tones: mid, then high and low on each -i-]
orisa traditional deity [Tones: low, low, low]
oyinbo white man, Westerner [Tones: low, low, high]
ratibi minor local mosque, from “stipend” in Arabic [Tones: low, mid, low]
saraa sacrifice, alms, religious feast [Tones: low, high, high]
waka Islamic song, specially heard in Ramadan [Tones: high, low]
woli Christian prophet [Tones: low, high-low]
AR ABIC
alhaji pilgrim to Mecca
bid‘a heresy
dhimmi protected non-Muslim
hadith recognized traditions of the Prophet’s sayings
hajj annual pilgrimage to Mecca
hijab women’s head scarf
hijra emigration (esp. of the Prophet from Mecca to Medina)
jahiliyya pre-Islamic supposed disorder
jumat Friday prayers
mujaddid centennial revivalist of the Islamic faith
muqaddam facilitator, especially in Sufi rituals
salaf ancestor, Muslim of the early generations
shirk idolatry
sunna the way of the Prophet
tafsir interpretation, exegesis
tahajjud voluntary night prayer
takfir excommunication, expulsion from Islam
tariqa a Sufi order or fellowship
tawhid unity (of God)
ulama Muslim clerics (sing. alim)
umma the Muslim community at large
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Ede, and among the members of strict sects like the Bamidele of Ibadan.










































55. For overall views, see P. Ostien, J. M. Nasir, and F. Kogelmann, eds., Comparative 
Perspectives on Shari’ah in Nigeria (Ibadan: Spectrum Books, 2005); Rotimi Suberu, “Sharia 
and the Travails of Federalism in Nigeria,” Research Report submitted to the French Institute 
for Research in Africa (IFRA) (Ibadan, 2007); and J. Harnischfeger, Democratization and 
Islamic Law: The Sharia Conflict in Nigeria (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 2008).
56. For example Is-Haq Akintola, Shari’ah in Nigeria: An Eschatological Desideratum 
(Ijebu-Ode: Shebiotimo Publications, 2001); A. D. Ajijola, What Is Shariah? (Kaduna: 
Straight Path Publishers, n.d.); Abdulkadir Orire, Shari’a: A Misunderstood Legal System 
(Zaria: Sankore Publishers, 2007). Akintola is a lecturer at LASU and director of a Muslim 
human-rights NGO; Ajijola, a legal practitioner; Orire, the former grand khadi of Kwara 
State.
57. Thus D. O. S. Noibi and S. T. Malik, “Memorandum to Members of the Constituent 
Assembly on the Shari’ah in the Draft Constitution in 1978.” Much of this was recycled in 
the “Memorandum to Osun State House of Assembly on the Review of 1999 Constitution,” 
presented by the League of Imams and Alfas, December 1999. Both documents are repro-
duced as appendixes 1 and 2 in Makinde, “Institution of Shari’ah” (above, n. 54).
58. Quoted in J. S. Adekoya, “The Role of Music in Promoting Islam in Yorubaland” 
(Ph.D. thesis, University of Ibadan, 2005), chapter 1.
59. Makinde, “Institution of Shari’ah” (above, n. 54), 30.
60. As advocated, for example, by A.-F. Olayiwola, Islam in Nigeria: One Crescent, Many 
Focuses (Lagos: Sakirabe Press, 2007), 281, a work that I discuss at greater length below in 
chapter 10. I heard the same idea from MSS members studying Arabic at the University of 
Ibadan.
61. Interview, 17 April 2008.
62. Interview, 27 March 2008. For a full account of Adepoju as poet and intellectual, see 
Oyeniyi Okunoye, “Lanrewaju Adepoju and the Making of Modern Yoruba Poetry,” Africa 
81 (2011), 175–203.
63. It is adjacent to Finsbury Park Station, but has no direct connection with the nearby 
mosque, which became notorious as a hotbed of radical Islamism in the 1990s.
64. H. O. Danmole, “Religious Encounter in Southwestern Nigeria: The Domestication 
of Islam among the Yoruba,” in J. K. Olupona and T. Rey, eds., Òrìsà Devotion as World 
Religion (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2008), 202–21, esp. 215.
65. Margaret J. Drewal, Yoruba Ritual: Performers, Play, Agency (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1992), 151.
66. Olufunke Adeboye, “The ‘Born-Again’ Oba: Pentecostalism and Traditional 
Chieftaincy in Yorubaland,” Lagos Historical Review 7 (2007), 1–20.
67. Adedayo, Abdul-Lateef Adegbite (above, n. 37), 151–52. On the cultural conflicts at 
Oshogbo, see Peter Probst, Osogbo and the Art of Heritage: Monuments, Deities and Money 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2011).
68. Interview, 21 April 2008. Warm thanks to Wale Adebanwi for setting up these inter-
views with the Alafin and Chief Adepoju.
69. J. L. Matory, “Rival Empires: Islam and the Religions of Spirit Possession among the 
Oyo-Yoruba,” American Ethnologist 21 (1994), 495–515, further documents—from fieldwork 
conducted in the northern Oyo town of Igboho in the late 1980s—the local understanding 
of Sango as a Muslim, even at a time when conflict between Muslims and traditionalists was 










































considerable. He even witnessed (n. 34) a denunciation of orisa worship from Adepoju, vis-
iting to attend the opening of a new mosque. This aspect of Sango is altogether omitted from 
the collection of essays edited by Joel E. Tishken, Toyin Falola, and Akintunde Akinyemi, 
Sàngó in Africa and the African Diaspora (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009).
70. See Stephen Sykes, The Identity of Christianity (London: SPCK, 1984), 11–12. 
According to Acts 11:26, Christians were first so called in Antioch.
71. For a telling indictment of the malign long-term consequences of the Sokoto jihad, 
see Murray Last, “Muslims and Christians in Nigeria: An Economy of Moral Panic,” Round 
Table 96 (2007), 605–16. It is a sad irony that, written against Huntington’s thesis of a clash of 
civilizations but shortly before the rise of Boko Haram, Last’s exhortation to optimism has 
(at least for the time being) been brutally invalidated by a group of Muslims who emphati-
cally do believe in the clash of civilizations.
72. For this summary of Suwarian doctrine, see David Robinson, Muslim Societies in 
African History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 56. For a full elaboration 
of the Suwarian tradition and its context, see Ivor Wilks, “The Juula and the Expansion of 
Islam into the Forest,” in N. Levtzion and R. L. Pouwels, eds., The History of Islam in Africa 
(Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2000), 93–116. For an impassioned contemporary 
advocacy of what amounts to Suwarian Islam, see Lansine Kaba, Allahou akbar—Islam, ter-
rorisme et tolerance: Une perspective africaine (Paris: Presence Africaine, 2010).
73. The Rt. Rev. J. I. Fearon, the Anglican Bishop of Kaduna (a Nupe from Lokoja who 
grew up in Kaduna) told me that when, during an M.A. in Islamic Studies, which he took 
at Selly Oak Colleges in Birmingham, he was asked to present a paper on the status of the 
dhimmi in Islam, he broke down in class, and (when the lecturer asked what the matter 
was) he said it was just how it felt like being a Christian in Northern Nigeria. His reaction 
in 1999 was “I’ve lived as a dhimmi all these years, and now they’ve reintroduced hudud [the 
punishments stipulated by Sharia criminal law]” (interview, 13 March 2008).
74. This I was able to see for myself on a conducted tour of Kaduna on 19 March 2008, 
for which many thanks to my knowledgeable guide, Mr. Samuel Aruwan. It was most strik-
ing to compare what is now the vast, homogeneously Muslim quarter of Rigasa, where there 
were once a dozen churches and a Catholic secondary school, with the nearby Kabala West, 
which is Christian/mixed and where you could see small mosques and evidently Yoruba 
Muslims as well as many churches. Samuel asked me about the Ibadan Cross incident 
and admired the way it had been resolved: “They [the Yoruba] love themselves [i.e., one 
another]; they put religion aside. They bear more affinity to themselves [as an ethnic group 
or community] than to religion,”
75. This is variable as between states, since it depends on the policies of state governors, 
but gender segregation on public transport, bans on the sale of alcohol, pressure on Christian 
schools to observe Muslim dress codes, even the levying of special taxes on churches have 
all been reported. For a short case study of Kano State, see Insa Nolte, with N. Danjibo 
and A. Oladeji, “Religion, Politics and Governance in Nigeria” (Religions and Development 
Research Programme, University of Birmingham, Working paper 39, 2009), chapter 3; and 
on the complexities of implementing Sharia, see Alexander Thurston, “Muslim Politics and 
Shari’a in Kano State, Northern Nigeria,” African Affairs 114 (2015), 28–51.
76. See here Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im, African Constitutionalism and the Role of Islam 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006), esp. chapter 4, arguing that while Sharia 










































is not acceptable as the basis of a constitutional order under modern conditions (because of its 
discrimination against women and non-Muslims, and its divinely given character), neverthe-
less a viable constitutional order in any largely Muslim society (such as Nigeria) has to come to 
terms with Islamic values. That precisely is the circle that Nigeria needs to square.
77. As trenchantly argued by Harnischfeger, Democratization and Islamic Law (above, 
n. 55), esp. chapter 5.
9 .  A CENTURY OF INTERPL AY BET WEEN CHRISTIANIT Y AND ISL AM
1. An earlier version of this paper was published as “Un siècle d’interactions entre Islam 
et Christianisme dans l’espace Yoruba,” Politique Africaine 123 (2011), 27–50.
2. G. Simmel, Conflict and the Web of Group Affiliations, trans. K. H. Wolff (New York: 
Free Press of Glencoe, 1955), 14–55 and chapter 2, “Competition.”
3. This was a was regular topos of nineteenth-century social thought, especially among 
advocates of the newly emergent industrial order, such as Andrew Ure, Harriet Martineau, 
and Herbert Spencer: see J. D. Y. Peel, Herbert Spencer: The Evolution of a Sociologist 
(London: Heinemann, 1971), chapter 8, esp. 195–96.
4. On which see Adam Higazi, “Political Histories of Conflict: Power, Authority and 
Collective Violence in Plateau State, Nigeria” (unpublished D.Phil. thesis, University of 
Oxford, 2011).
5. On the balance between competition and coexistence between cults in plural situ-
ations, the excellent study by Meera Venkatachalam on the Ewe of southeastern Ghana 
is very illuminating: Slavery, Memory and Religion in Southeastern Ghana, c. 1850–Present 
(New York: Cambridge University Press for the International African Institute, 2015).
6. See Wael B. Hallaq, Shari’a: Theory, Practice, Transformation (Cambridge: University 
Press, 2009), s.v. ridda (apostasy), esp. 319–20.
7. T. A. O. Oladimeji, “Islamic Architecture in Ijebuland, 1926–1994: A Historical Study 
of Forms” (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Ibadan, 2001).
8. T. G. O. Gbadamosi, The Growth of Islam among the Yoruba, 1841–1908 (London: 
Longman, 1978), 129–30. Their teacher, Idris Animasaun, was teacher at the Government 
Muslim school set up by Blyden.
9. M. S. Cole, Alkorani ni Ede Yoruba (Lagos: CMS Bookshop, 1925), a reprint of 
the original published in 1906: Gbadamosi, Growth of Islam (above, n. 8), 149–50. For 
Ogunbiyi’s pamphlet writing, ibid. 130. His short Itan Anabi Momodu (History of the 
Prophet Mohammed) was reprinted in two successive issues of the CMS monthly magazine 
In Leisure Hours, vol. 2, nos. 9 and 10, contained in CMS Papers G3/A2/0 (1911), 35 and 38. 
Professor Amidu Sanni (personal communication) has drawn my attention to a pamphlet 
Awon Ọrọ Ọlọrun li ede Larubawa ati Yoruba [The Words of God in Arabic and Yoruba: 
i.e., the Ten Commandments] (Lagos: CMS Bookshop, 1911), written by one Alhaji Alimi 
Ogunbiyi, which I think must be a playful self-reference by T. A. J. Ogunbiyi.
10. Ogunbiyi was the son of Chief Jacob Ogunbiyi and when later installed as pastor 
of Holy Trinity, Ebute Ero—the most “downtown” of all the Lagos CMS churches—was 
described as having been “one of those wild Isale Eko boys rescued from his evil ways by the 
Rev. James Johnson” (Lagos Standard, 4 March 1903). He later became archdeacon of Lagos 
and the principal founder of the Reformed Ogboni Fraternity (1918)










































11. Gbadamosi, Growth of Islam (above, n. 8), 230–32.
12. On oriki in general, see Karin Barber, I Could Speak until Tomorrow (Edinburgh 
University Press for the International African Institute, 1991).
13. I came across these pamphlets in the papers of Herbert Macaulay (Kenneth Dike 
Library, University of Ibadan), who must have been sent them as complimentary copies. 
The grandson of Bishop Crowther, Macaulay was an Anglican but also eclectically inter-
ested in all sorts of mysticism.
14. Such as the listing in the Nasfat (see below) Prayer Book (Ikeja, 2006), 32–38.
15. See H. W. Turner, African Independent Church (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967). 
Further on Aladura-Muslim parallels, see H. J. Fisher, “Independency and Islam: The 
Nigerian Aladuras and Some Muslim Comparisons,” Journal of African History 11 (1970), 
269–77.
16. Here we may note that the term woli, used for “prophet” in the Bible and applied 
to the leading Aladura prophets like Babalola (CAC) and Ositelu (Church of the Lord), is 
etymologically a variant of wali.
17. J. D. Y. Peel, Aladura: A Religious Movement among the Yoruba (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1968).
18. See H. J. Fisher, Ahmadiyya: A Study of Contemporary Islam on the West African 
Coast (London: Oxford University Press, 1963).
19. For the information in this paragraph I am entirely indebted to Dr. B. O. Ololajulo 
of the University of Ibadan, himself an Ilaje man who has written on the local impact of 
oil. For a general account of Aiyetoro at its height, see S. R. Barrett, The Rise and Fall of an 
African Utopia: A Wealthy Theocracy in Comparative Perspective (Waterloo, Ont.: Wilfred 
Laurier University Press, 1977), though he says little about these Islamic influences.
20. For an authoritative account, M. A. Ojo, The End-Time Army: Charismatic 
Movements in Modern Nigeria (Trenton: African World Press, 2006).
21. A. Ukah, A New Paradigm of Pentecostal Power: A Study of the Redeemed Christian 
Church of God in Nigeria (Trenton: Africa World Press, 2008), esp. chapters 2 and 3.
22. On the central role of the alfa in the history of Yoruba Islam see Patrick J. Ryan, 
Imale: Yoruba Participation in the Muslim Tradition, a Study of Clerical Piety (Missoula: 
Scholars Press, 1978).
23. This paragraph and the next are much indebted to two Ph.D. theses of the University 
of Ibadan: Y. A. Quadri, “The Tijaniyyah in Nigeria: A Case Study” (1981), and A. F. Ahmad, 
“The Qadiriyyah and Its Impact in Nigeria” (1986). On Tijaniyya’s history more generally, 
see J. M. Abun Nasr, The Tijaniyya: A Sufi Order in the Modern World (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1965).
24. Quadri, “Tijaniyyah” (above, n. 23), 100. He notes that this view was expressed by 
many of his informants.
25. Interview with Mr. Habeeb Usman Lanase, the grandson of Shehu Lanase, 4 May 
2009. Lanase promoted other “un-Yoruba” practices, such as purdah for women and hostil-
ity to lavish funerals, but it was his secession and his support for Reformed Tijaniyya—both 
of which challenged the influence of the established Ibadan ulama—that most upset the 
older generation.
26. According to Imam Salahuddeen Busairi (interview, 13 May 2009), Shehu Ahmed 
had taken to calling himself Aseda, which might be understood literally as “Creator” 










































or more loosely as “One Who Can Do and Undo.” Imam Busairi had joined Reformed 
Tijaniyya as a young man in the 1950s, having been introduced to it by a Hausa friend and 
colleague while working at Sapele, in today’s Delta State.
27. Interview with Alhaji Abdussalam Adebolu, at Madina, 12 May 2009. I am indebted 
to Dr. K. K. Oloso for his introduction and to Imam Salahuddeen Busairi for further back-
ground and elucidation.
28. The clear evidence of close interaction between Yoruba and Hausa adepts of Tijaniyya 
must call into question a widely cited argument in Abner Cohen’s classic study of Sabo, the 
Hausa settlement in Ibadan, Custom and Government in Urban Africa (London: Routledge 
and Kegan Paul, 1969). Cohen maintains that “the Hausa [of Sabo] adopted Tijaniyya in the 
1950s because [it] provided solutions to some of the political problems they faced as a result 
of the coming of party politics” (p. 152). Specifically, he argues, it enabled them to set up a 
cultural barrier between themselves and the Yoruba, since it led to a “localization” of ritual 
in Sabo, separating them from their Yoruba fellow Muslims. There are several problems 
with this view, apart from its brazen reductionism. (1) It is too locally specific, granted that 
the move toward Tijaniyya at this time was so widespread among the Hausa, both at home 
and in their diaspora. (2) It ignores the nearly simultaneous and massive turn of Yoruba 
Muslims to Tijaniyya. This Cohen relegates to a one-line endnote: “Some Yoruba became 
Tijanis but because of the localization of ritual under local mukaddams no interaction with 
Tijani Hausa could take place” (227 n. 1). But (3), as I have shown, such interaction not only 
took place but played a significant role in the rise of Tijaniyya among the Yoruba. Finally 
(4), the “localization of ritual” that Cohen emphasizes was due not to the rise of Tijaniyya 
but to a decision of the Hausa in 1952 to stop attending Friday prayers at the Ibadan central 
mosque and pray separately in their own mosque in Sabo. The Olubadan, the chief imam, 
and the elders of the central mosque reacted as angrily to this secession as they had to the 
secession of Lanase and his followers to a separate jumat mosque, which occurred around 
the same time. Cohen conflates the Hausa turn to Tijaniyya and their decision to have their 
own jumat mosque. But these were distinct: Tijani devotion can take place in any mosque, 
whereas the Hausa withdrawal from weekly association with their Yoruba coreligionists at 
Friday prayers was a political decision of their own.
29. On which see J. D. Y. Peel, Religious Encounter and the Making of the Yoruba 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000), 20–21.
30. On Izala in Northern Nigeria see R. Loimeier, Islamic Reform and Political Change 
in Northern Nigeria (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1997), and Ousmane 
Kane, Muslim Modernity in Postcolonial Nigeria (Leiden: Brill, 2003); and more generally 
D. Westerlund and Eva E. Rosander, eds., African Islam and Islam in Africa: Encounters 
between Sufis and Islamists (London: Hurst, 1997).
31. Notably a prayer called al-Salat al-Fatih, revealed to the founder Ahmad al-Tijani 
(d. 1815), and the use of a white sheet, placed in the center of the group during the rit-
uals of praise. A very forceful attack on Tijanniya for bid‘a is to be found in a book by 
A.-R. Shittu, A Critique of Dr Adekilekun Tijani’s Handbook on the Tijanniyah (Shaki: al-
Furqaan Publishers, 1999). This is a riposte to Dr. D. A. Adekilekun Tijani’s A Handbook on 
the Doctrines and Rites of the Tijanniyah in Question and Answer Form (Ede: Moyanjuola 
Islamic Publications, 1997). Dr. Tijani was a scion of an old ulama family from Ede and the 
imam of the University of Ibadan mosque.










































32. Quadri, “Tijaniyyah” (above, n. 23), 202.
33. Ahmad, “Qadiriyyah” (above, n. 23), 315.
34. On Mr. Shittu’s background, see above, chapter 8 n. 29.
35. One of the most extraordinary, and distinctively Yoruba, is Chrislam, a mélange of 
Islam and Christianity: see Marloes Janson “Unity through Diversity: Chrislam’s Proliferation 
in Lagos” (unpublished paper, 2014). Janson describes two Chrislamic groups, both created 
by people from a Muslim background but assuming the character of small churches, which 
differ in whether their Christian elements are more of Aladura or of born-again inspiration.
36. See A. O. Sanni, “Conversion and Reversion in the Power Accession Narratives of 
Muslim Prayer Groups in Nigeria,” Journal of Oriental and African Studies 21 (2012), 157–66
37. It also has an Islamic precedent, of which it is very unlikely that either Fatayi or his 
Celestial mentor were aware, in the tradition that one of the earliest attestations to the genu-
ineness of Mohammed’s revelation came from a Christian charismatic, the monk Bahira: 
see T. Sizgorich, Violence and Belief in Late Antiquity: Militant Devotion in Christianity and 
Islam  (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009), 156–58.
38. As Sanni observes (“Conversion and Reversion” [above, n. 36], 162): “Membership 
of [Muslim] prayer groups is not denomination specific, and there are even reports of non-
Muslims partaking in the prayer sessions of the Muslim prayer groups from time to time, as 
long as they believe in the efficacy of prayer, whatever the source or agency.”
39. Details in D. O. Ogungbile, “Religious Experience and Women Leadership in Yoruba 
Islam,” Gender and Behaviour 2 (2004), 117–39. The name is a contraction of a phrase mean-
ing “This is a sign from God,” based on Q. 6:124.
40. Cf. the Ẹgbẹ Afadurajagun—rendered as “Praying Battalion”—in the Christ 
Apostolic Church in Ibadan, described in Peel, Aladura (above, n. 17), 168–71.
41. On women’s religious roles see Oyeronke Olajubu, Women in the Yoruba Religious 
Sphere (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003) and Deidre H. Crumbley, Spirit, 
Structure and Flesh: Gendered Experiences in African Instituted Churches among the Yoruba 
of Nigeria (Madison; University of Wisconsin Press, 2008).
42. The term “moderate” was used to me by M. A. Bello, whose valuable M.A. thesis I 
draw upon here: “Shaykh Abdul-Hamid Olohungbemi and His Da’wah Activities in Ado-
Odo (Ogun State) and Its Environs, 1982–2002” (Lagos State University, 2004). Mr. Bello 
was at the time a senior official of Nasfat.
43. See S. A. Olagoke, Shafaudeen at 21: The Story So Far (Ibadan: SAO Multi Ventures, 
c. 2004), esp. chapter 8, “The Rasool Controversy.”
44. These details from a fascinating thesis by J. S. Adekoya, “The Role of Music in 
Promoting Islam in Yorubaland” (Ph.D. thesis, University of Ibadan, 2005), which devotes 
several pages (98–100) to Akinbile. I am grateful to Dr. Adekoya for introducing me to 
Akinbile. I have myself heard an almost identical version of the second of these choruses—
with Bibeli instead of Kurani—sung in Aladura churches.
45. Shaykh R. Akinbile, interview, 1 April 2008.
46. The official rendition of the Arabic is “There Is No Help Except from Allaah.” See 
too see B. Soares, “An Islamic Social Movement in Contemporary West Africa: NASFAT of 
Nigeria,” in S. Ellis and I. van Kessel, eds., Movers and Shakers: Social Movements in Africa 
(Leiden: Brill, 2009).
47. Thus Nasfat members, Samonda, Ibadan, interview, 2 March 2008.










































48. For a full account and many examples of song texts, see Adekoya, “Role of Music” 
(above, n. 44).
49. In the brief accounts of its origins and programs on the Nasfat Web site, there is no 
mention of the born-again opposition except indirectly in a reference to “organizing guzlu 
[ritual bath] for Muslim women reverts.” A revert is a Muslim who has returned to Islam 
after converting to Christianity.
50. He was thinking of the favored location of Aladura and born-again prayer grounds 
on the tops of hills (ori oke) or of streams as venues for rituals of healing and purification. 
There are several on the wooded ridge that is the spine of Ibadan, near Bower Tower. There 
is also a prominent Ibadan-based Pentecostal church called Mountain of Fire and Miracles.
51. All these expressions come from my notes from interviews with three or four figures 
at Nasfat’s Lagos headquarters, 17 April 2008.
52. Headlined “Timeless Wisdom for Modern Managers” (183 pp.; Ibadan: Emgee 
Books, 2006), I bought it from a bookstall outside the Lagos State Secretariat Mosque dur-
ing a Sunday Asalatu service. What is very characteristic of the Nasfat outlook is the wide 
spread of its Muslim references: dedicated to the governor of Zamfara State who introduced 
Sharia law in 1999, it also has messages of support from Prince Bola Ajibola (a distinguished 
lawyer, founder of Crescent University), Professor I. A. B. Balogun (the late doyen of Arabic 
studies in the Yoruba academic world), and at least one academic of Ahl us-Sunna affiliation.
53. Its main product is Nasmalt, which closely resembles Maltina, a nonalcoholic drink 
like a sweet dark beer popular at elite born-again social events.
54. For an attractive photo essay bringing out the resemblances between the campsites 
of Nasfat and Mountain of Fire and Miracles, see The Spiritual Highway: Religious World 
Making in Metropolitan Lagos, pamphlet to accompany an exhibition at the Brunei Gallery, 
SOAS (April–June, 2014): photographer Akintunde Akinleye; curator Marloes Janson.
55. A very useful case study—written with the clear and characteristic intention of “ana-
lysing and correcting the anomalies and bringing to focus the pristine Islamic way of doing 
things”—is M. A. Balogun, “Religious Syncretism in Epeland through the Practice of Magic 
and Divination among Muslim Alfas (Clerics)” (M.A. thesis, Lagos State University, 2002). 
Epe, an Ijebu town on the lagoon that hosted ex-king Kosoko of Lagos and his followers in 
the 1850s and 1860s, became a strong early center of Islam in the Yoruba South. I am grateful 
to Professor Amidu Sanni of LASU for allowing me access to this thesis.
56. M. A. Bello, Meeting Heart Desires: A Concise Discourse on Faith and Spiritual 
Consultancy (Lagos, 2007), p. 39. He explains that the word jalbu originally meant “acquir-
ing” in Arabic. Its practitioners may be called onijalibi in Yoruba.
57. This aesthetic dimension is important: Nasfat’s Web site states it as a primary aim 
“to project the beauty of Islam in words and deeds.”
10 .  PENTEC OSTALISM AND SAL AFISM IN NIGERIA:  MIRROR IMAGES?
1. From a large literature, see Steve Bruce, Fundamentalism (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
2000), Malise Ruthven, Fundamentalism: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004).
2. Thus Tariq Ali, The Clash of Fundamentalisms: Crusades, Jihads and Modernity 
(London: Verso Press, 2002).










































3. Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations,” Foreign Affairs 72/3 (1993), 22–49, 
and The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1996).
4. For example, Richard Bonney, False Prophets: The ‘Clash of Civilizations’ and the 
Global War on Terror (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2008).
5. I use the term “Salafism”—literally “following the [religious practice of] the ances-
tors or forebears [salaf]”—since the notion of Islamism, while often Salafist too, suggests a 
project to establish an Islamic state or politics, which does not apply to all Salafists. Salafism 
may be seen as a contemporary or farther-reaching version of what has often just been 
called reformism, a term applied to movements in West African Islam going back to the 
eighteenth century. For an overview of Salafism, which brings out its many tensions and 
tendencies, see Roel Meijer, ed., Global Salafism: Islam’s New Religious Movement (London: 
Hurst, 2009).
6. B. Larkin and B. Meyer, “Pentecostalism, Islam and Culture: New Religious 
Movements in West Africa,” in E. K. Akyeampong, ed., Themes in West Africa’s History 
(Oxford: James Currey, 2006), 287.
7. Ibid. 286.
8. A questionable inference arising from such assumptions is that the yearning of some 
Ghanaian Pentecostal leaders for a Christian state (whatever exactly that means) is due to 
their links with Nigerian Pentecostals “who seem to mirror Islamic reform movements’ 
appropriation of a number of federal states in Northern Nigeria” (ibid. 298).
9. The literature is growing quickly, but the leading studies for Nigeria are Matthews 
A. Ojo, The End-Time Army: Charismatic Movements in Modern Nigeria (Trenton: Africa 
World Press, 2006), which is strong on the origins and the holiness tendency; Asonzeh 
Ukah, A New Paradigm of Pentecostal Power (Trenton: Africa World Press, 2008), a 
detailed study of the Redeemed Christian Church of God (RCCG); Ruth Marshall, Political 
Spiritualities: The Pentecostal Revolution in Nigeria (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2009); and Ayodeji Abodunde, A Heritage of Faith: A History of Christianity in Nigeria 
(Ibadan: PierceWatershed, 2009), chapters 17–22 and 24–26, which gives the broadest over-
view. On Ghana, Paul Gifford, Ghana’s New Christianity (London: Hurst, 2004).
10. See Paul Gifford, “The Complex Provenance of Some Elements of African 
Pentecostal Theology,” in A. Corten and Ruth Marshall-Fratani, eds., Between Babel and 
Pentecost: Transnational Pentecostalism in Africa and Latin America (London: Hurst, 2001), 
62–79. But an imported theological idiom can express a thoroughly indigenous orientation, 
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Lẹmọmu (chief imam), 139, 140
Lévi-Strauss, Claude, 20, 23
294    INDEX
Olasupo, Abdul-Lateef, Alhaji, 187
Olayiwola, Abdul-Fattah, Islam in Nigeria: One 
Crescent, Many Voices, 208–11, 212
Oliana, Cristóbal, 226
Olohungbemi, Abdul-Hamid, Shaykh, 184
Ọlọhun/Ọlọrun (God), 164, 174, 175–76
Oloso, K.K., Dr., 161, 162
Olubi, Daniel, 44–45, 48–49, 51, 64
Oludmare, 77–78
Oodua People’s Congress (OPC), 205–6
Ọọni of Ife, 221, 226
oriki (praise poetry), 175
Ori (orisa), 54, 60
orisa cult: assaults against, 221; benefits offered, 
63; and conversion to Christianity, 154–55; 
festivals, 76, 134–35, 224–25; fluidity, 7; 
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Cover illustration: Adire cloth in the design Ibadan dun (“Ibadan is sweet”). 
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